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xAbstract
One of the foremost reasons for the success of the Northern Irish Peace Process has been
the ability of the national leadership of the Provisional Republican Movement to bring the
majority of their membership away from the armed campaign and towards the acceptance
of peaceful politics. This dissertation analyses how they were able to achieve this. This
is carried out by considering the processes of the four major splits in modern day Irish
republicanism from 1969 to 1997. Each split was analysed so as to derive why the split
took place and why one side was more successful than the other in the aftermath. The
cases were used to test a stage-based process model of split designed by the author. The
data from thirty-eight semi-structured interviews were analysed using Interpretative
Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). This analysis treated the three Provisional splits as
three micro-processes within the macro-process of Provisional Republican involvement
in the ‘Troubles’, as it did the two Official splits with respect to the Official macro-
process of involvement. The results of the analysis showed that the success of the later
Provisional leadership was significantly tied to their method of changing strategies,
tactics and policies one step at a time rather than by attempting to implement a variety of
substantial changes within a short space of time as the leadership of the 1960s
endeavoured to. This research outlines how the acceptance of peaceful politics for a
terrorist organisation is a gradual stage-based process and that in order to be successful
that the significant changes must be implemented in a patient manner.
xi
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Introduction 
The Northern Irish peace process is internationally recognised as having brought an end 
to the conflict commonly referred to as ‘The Troubles.’1  The involvement of the British 
and Irish governments as well as their American allies is rightly credited as playing a 
major role in achieving a lasting peace.  However, without the positive actions and 
compromises of the Northern Irish actors, both those violent and peaceful actors, the 
achievement of peace would have been impossible.  Central to this was the movement of 
the Irish Republican Movement, in particular the Provisional Irish Republican Army 
(PIRA), from the employment of terrorism2 as a tactic towards the exclusive adoption of 
peaceful politics. 3  Without this action and their continued commitment to peaceful 
politics any progress in the peaceful development of the six counties of Northern Ireland 
would have been extremely difficult.4 
 
The continued success of the peace process is reliant on the commitment of the leaders of 
the various Northern Irish organisations, both violent and non-violent, to the utilisation 
                                                 
1
 While this is the case there have been significant failures of the process and consequently there are those 
who are highly critical of the process.  See Dingley, J. (2002).  Peace in Our Time?  The Stresses and 
Strains on the Northern Ireland Peace Process.  Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 25(6), pp.357-382 
2For the purpose of this work there will not be an extensive discussion outlining the ins and outs of the 
debate.  For the purpose of this dissertation any use of the word ‘terrorism’ refers to the employment of 
violence or the threat of repeated violence by the individual or group intent on bringing about a social or 
political effect.  The aim of this action is to bring about a state of fear in a wider audience than the direct 
physical victims of the initial act or threat of violence.   A terrorist incident should be defined by the use of 
violence or the threat of violence to bring about social or political change, not by the specific motive of the 
perpetrators.  Therefore terrorism is a tactic which can be employed by any individual or group, whether 
they be state or non-state actors.   See for example, Schmid, A. & Jongman (2005).  Political Terrorism: A 
New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature. (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction), pp.1-38; Richardson, L. (2007).  What Terrorists Want.  (London: John Murray), pp.19-39; 
Horgan, J. (2005).  The Psychology of Terrorism.  (London: Routledge),  pp. 1-47; Hoffman, B. (2006).  
Inside Terrorism. (New York: Columbia University Press), pp. 1-41; Weinberg, L., Pedahzur, A. & Hirsch-
Hoefler, S. (2004).  The Challenges of Conceptualising Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence, 16(4), 
pp. 777-794; Silke, A. (1996).  Terrorism and the Blind Man’s Elephant, Terrorism and Political Violence, 
8(3), pp. 12-28; English, R. (2009).  Terrorism How to Respond.  (New York: Oxford University Press).  
Pp.1-26.  
3
 This belief that the Republican change in strategy was a dominant factor in the success of the peace 
process is supportive of the position taken in Hayes, M. (1998).  The Evolution of Republican Strategy and 
the ‘Peace Process’ in Ireland.  In Race & Class, 39(3), pp.21-39 
4
 The same is true for those other Republican groups as well as the Loyalist paramilitaries who renounced 
violence.  
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and promotion of peaceful politics.5  However, what is more important is that the 
majority of their organisational membership similarly ascribe to the power of politics as 
opposed to the employment of the gun and the bomb.  A leadership promoting peaceful 
politics is only constructive if they convince their internal membership and support of its 
benefits.  It has been the ability of the leadership of the modern day Provisional IRA and 
Sinn Fein to successfully convince the majority of its membership of the benefits of 
peaceful politics which has ensured their continued involvement in the continuing peace 
process.   
 
This has been a slow gradual process.  In order to fully understand the entire process one 
must assess Irish Republicanism from as far back as the early 1960s.  The present 
dissertation aims to do this by focusing on the splits in the movement from 1969/1970 to 
1997.  Each of the four splits can, to a degree, be regarded as a result of the leadership of 
the time aiming to bring a stronger political emphasis on the movement.  The level of 
politicisation within each of the splits was different, as was the resulting strength of the 
parent and breakaway organisations.  Therefore one of the most important parts of the 
research is to assess why one leadership was more successful than the other in 
successfully convincing the majority of their membership to support their politicisation 
process.  In total there are four separate splits analysed. These are: 
• 1969/70: The IRA and Sinn Fein splits to form Official Sinn Fein and the Official 
IRA on one side and Provisional Sinn Fein and the Provision IRA on the other 
side of the split. 
• 1974: The Official Republican Movement6 splits which sees the creation of the 
Irish Republican Socialist Movement consisting of the Irish National Liberation 
Army and the Irish Republican Socialist Party. 
• 1986: A split in the Provisional Irish Republican Movement where a group led by 
Ruairi O’Bradaigh, among others, leave to form Republican Sinn Fein and the 
Continuity IRA.7  And; 
                                                 
5
 Dixon, P. (2002).  Political Skills or Lying and Manipulation?  The Choreography of the Northern Ireland 
Peace Process.  In Political Studies, 50, pp.725-741. 
6
 Official IRA and Official Sinn Fein 
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• 1997: The Provisional Irish Republican Movement splits which sees the 
formation of the 32 County Sovereignty Committee8 and the Real IRA.9 
 
The splits should not be regarded as separate entities.  They are intrinsically linked within 
the macro-process of Irish Republican involvement in the ‘Troubles.’  The 1969/70, 1986 
and 1997 splits are contained within the Provisional process of involvement in the 
‘Troubles’ while the 1969/70 and 1974 splits can be considered part of the Official 
process of involvement in the ‘Troubles.’ As the history of Irish Republicanism, and 
splits in the movement, precedes 1969 and has continued beyond 1997 the choice of this 
dateline needs to be explained.  For the majority of observers the Northern Irish 
‘Troubles’ began with the extensive violence of 1969 and was brought to a close in 1998 
with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement.10  While there was paramilitary hostility 
before 1969 and after 1998 this can be regarded as taking place during different phases of 
the history of the Northern Irish conflict.   
 
The start date of the research, 1969, is resonant within Irish Republicanism for a number 
of different reasons, one being the failure of the Goulding leadership of the IRA and Sinn 
Fein to bring the Irish Republican Movement away from violence and towards the 
acceptance of parliamentary politics, resulting in a dramatic split in the movement, a split 
which continues to effect both Irish and British society and security to this day.11  
Alternatively the end date of 1997 can be regarded as being the point in time where the 
Provisional Irish Republican Movement, then the largest grouping of Irish Republican 
paramilitaries, ultimately moved to reject the further dominant use of violence in order to 
achieve their goals, and accepted a peaceful political approach.12  Consequently the 
                                                                                                                                                  
7
 While Republican Sinn Fein to this day deny any formal affiliation with the Continuity IRA it is credible 
to mention the two groups as being affiliated. 
8
 This group is now known as the 32 County Sovereignty Movement. 
9
 32 County Sovereignty Movement deny any official affiliation with the Real IRA. However it is widely 
acknowledged that 32CSM acts as the political wing of the Real IRA.  
10
 This agreement is also often referred to as the Belfast Agreement. 
11
 While this is a brief description of what happened in 1969 it is dealt with more in depth later in the 
dissertation. 
12
 This is not to say that there was no Provisional violence after this date. However the events leading up to 
and during this split can be regarded as vital in the process of the Provisionals ultimately announcing their 
permanent ceasefire and the decommissioning of their weapons.   
 4 
choice of these four specific splits has provided the researcher with an opportunity 
uncommon among much previous research on organisational splits.  The four splits can 
be viewed as a continuum, with each of the four interconnected.   
 
The research analyses the splits from both an organisational and an individual 
perspective.  Unlike much of the terrorism literature the dissertation does not 
automatically class the splits as a form of ‘end of terrorism.’  Not all splits are analogous 
to the end of the terrorist group and some can be more accurately regarded as the 
naissance of a terrorist organisation.  The 1969/70 split which saw the birth of the 
Provisional IRA is a clear example of this. 
 
While fundamentally analysing why and how the splits took place, at both an 
organisational and an individual level, the present research additionally allows one to see 
how and why the Provisional leadership of the late 1990s was able to succeed where the 
Goulding leadership of 1969/70 failed, by convincing the majority of Irish Republicans to 
accept the use of peaceful politics, as opposed to the dominant use of violence, to achieve 
their aims and goals.13  Therefore while the research at first glance is analysing splits in 
Irish Republicanism it is also, at a deeper level, assessing how the leadership of the 
Republican Movement has successfully moved the majority of its membership away from 
a long campaign of terrorist violence and into the arena of peaceful politics.  The research 
similarly provides an opportunity to assess why certain groups and individuals deemed it 
necessary to move away from this politicisation process at certain points in time.  
Therefore the success of the Northern Irish peace process cannot be fully understood 
without first of all understanding these four splits, their results and the reasoning behind 
each of them.  In essence the research is not only looking to the reasoning for the splits 
but also to their functionality in allowing for Republican involvement in the peace 
process.14  
                                                 
13
 While this is only referring to the 1969/70 and 1997 splits the 1974 and 1986 splits also play a vital role 
in the process and need to be analysed in order the gain the most comprehensive understanding possible. 
14
 This is distinct from the peace process literature which focuses on the success from a counter-terrorism 
perspective and looks at the actions taken in policy and legislation.  This research looks to how one of the 
groups of illegal actors internally brought their membership away from the application of terrorism as a 
tactic and towards the acceptance of peaceful politics.  See Guelke, A. (2007).  The Northern Ireland Peace 
 5 
The chosen splits can, and will, be looked at in two separate ways.  They can be analysed 
as individual stand alone case studies of organisational splits.  Similarly they can, as 
detailed above, be analysed together as a series of intertwined splits within the one 
movement.  They are presented in the dissertation as four stage-based micro-processes 
within the macro-process of Republican involvement in the Troubles.  This analysis is 
achieved by comparing and contrasting the two sides within each of the splits, as well as 
comparing the results of each of the individual splits.  Throughout the research there is 
the acknowledgement that the tactics of the Irish Republican Movement are not, and 
rarely have been, solely reliant on the use of terrorism.  It is a movement which has often 
times had armed and political wings working parallel to, and often times with, each other.  
This relationship between the use of armed struggle and politics15 is a theme which is 
acknowledged by many to have played a central role in each of the splits.  In order to 
appreciate the aims and achievements of modern day ‘mainstream’ republicanism it is 
important to first of all understand and contrast the actions and attitudes of the movement 
today with that of the vast majority of republicans in the late 1960s and 1970s.16  The 
present study utilises the cases of the splits to achieve this understanding. 
 
This research has been carried out predominantly through the utilisation of semi-
structured interviews with Irish Republicans who were involved across the splits.  These 
participants represent both leadership and membership levels of Irish republicanism.  The 
interviews were analysed using the analytical approach of Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis (IPA).  While the interview data provided the main body of 
the analysis the results of this analysis were validated through the use of primary and 
secondary sources. 
 
In order to carry out this the analysis has aimed to answer two core organisational 
questions as well as two core individual questions of splits.  The organisational questions 
                                                                                                                                                  
Process and the War Against Terrorism: Conflicting Conceptions?  In Government and Opposition, 42(3), 
pp.272-291.  
15
 See Weinberg, L. and Pedahzur, A. (2003).  Political Parties and Terrorist Groups.  London: Routledge.  
pp.105-118. 
16
 Alonso, R. (2004).  Pathways Out of Terrorism in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country: The 
Misrepresentation of the Irish Model.  Terrorism and Political Violence, 16(4), pp.695-713. (p.698)  
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look at the process of split while the individual questions assess the individual reasoning 
for allegiance.     
 
 QO1. Why did each of the splits take place when they did? 
 
QO2. How did each of the splits take place? 
 
QI1. Why do individual members decide to exit from an organisation to join or set up and 
new organisation? 
 
QI2. Why do individual members decide to stay with a parent organisation at a time of 
split? 
 
What follows is first an analysis of political organisational theory, followed by an 
examination of research on organisational splits.  These chapters take an interdisciplinary 
look at the issues and are not over-reliant on one specific body of research.  The 
dissertation then proceeds to detail the aims of the research as well as the methodology 
employed.  As the four splits are being treated as four micro-processes within the macro-
process of Irish Republican involvement in the Troubles the results of the analysis are 
presented as three separate sub-chapters and one appendix.  The 1974 split is presented as 
an appendix so as to differentiate it from the splits involved in the Provisional process of 
involvement.  In order to gain a greater understanding of the origins and consequences of 
each of the splits these must be read together.  The findings are drawn together in the 
final chapters where the relevance and importance of the research is discussed. 
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Chapter 1 
Function of an Organisation 
“The study of international relations must be made an interdisciplinary enterprise, 
drawing its discourse from all social sciences, and even further.”17 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In recent times there has been an undoubted proliferation of academic interest in the 
tactic of terrorism, and the organisations which utilise it.  However, even with this 
abundance of research there are still too many significant gaps in the literature produced.  
One of the fundamental areas often ignored is that of the internal conflicts within the 
terrorist groups.  These groups, akin to all other organisations, are not homogenous 
groups of people who agree on all matters pertaining to the group, its goals, and 
strategies. 18  Members disagree, factionalise and sometimes split.  By acknowledging 
these facts researchers open themselves up to assessing features of the organisations 
which may move our understanding of terrorism a significant step forward.  While the 
work carried out on internal organisational conflicts in terrorist groups is sparse, this is 
not to say that it is completely non-existent.19  However, terrorism researchers are still 
decades behind their contemporaries analysing economic, religious and social-movement 
organisations.  This should not discourage researchers from approaching the topic, on the 
contrary.  As the quote which opened this chapter indicates the study of international 
relations has to be interdisciplinary in nature, drawing on the methodologies, findings and 
discourses from all areas of the social sciences and beyond.  Consequently this 
dissertation proposes the application of organisational and social-movement 
organisational theory to the analysis of splits in terrorist organisations in general and 
splits in the Irish Republicanism specifically.   
                                                 
17
  An Editorial. (1957)  Journal of Conflict Resolution 1/1. pp.1-2. (p.1) 
18
 Rapoport, D.C. (2001).  Introduction.  In Rapoport, D.C. (Ed.) (2001).  Inside Terrorist Organisations.  
London: Frank Cass.  pp.1-10 (p.1) 
19
 Crelinsten, R.D. (1987).  The Internal Dynamics of the FLQ During the October Crisis of 1970.  In 
Rapoport, D.C. (Ed.) (2001).  Inside Terrorist Organisations. (London: Frank Cass.) pp.59-89; Irvin, C.L. 
(1999).  Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country.  
Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press. 
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These first four chapters outline the theoretical underpinnings of the present research, 
much of which has been developed from economic, political and social-movement 
organisational theory, while not ignoring the theories and findings from previous 
terrorism research.   The present chapter focuses the function of an organisation.  
Included in this analysis are the issues of support, intra-organisational conflict and 
organisational survival.  The purpose of the chapter is to lay a foundation for chapters 2, 
3 and 4 which develop the discussion to detail issues pertinent to our understanding of 
organisational conflicts and splits. 
 
What follows in the present chapter is a detailed, critical account of the theoretical 
approach utilised in the present research.  Throughout this account there is a concerted 
effort to consider the theories and findings from interdisciplinary fields.  The six main 
issues covered within the chapter are. 
• The Organisation 
• The Terrorist Group as a Political Organisation 
• Organisational Survival and Maintenance 
• Support 
• Loyalty, and 
• External Factors. 
 
Throughout the discussions it is emphasised how each of these issues are important in 
understanding splits in terrorist organisations. 
 
1.2 The Organisation 
A split in human organisations is the result of internal debate, disagreement and/or 
conflict which ultimately results in one faction of the organisation deeming it necessary 
to move away from the parent organisation in order to establish a new group more in line 
with the viewpoints and expectations of that section of the membership.  With this 
understanding splits are the result of specific intra-organisational dynamics.  
Consequently in order to fully understand why and how a split takes place, and the 
resultant choices made by members, the researcher must first of all appreciate 
 9 
organisational purpose, aims and function.  This is not to say that the importance of 
external factors is diminished.  As no split is completely unaffected by external forces 
one must be aware of the environment in which splits take place and how certain external 
actors and actions can affect the internal dynamics of organisations.20  However, in order 
to effectively assess the influence which external and environmental factors may have on 
an organisation it is the organisation itself which must first be clearly understood. 
 
It is proposed that terrorist organisations should be analysed and appreciated as a form of 
political interest group.21  Similar to ‘regular’ political organisations the terrorist group 
aims to achieve collective values, which involve bringing about change in specific 
political and social conditions.22  The difference between a terrorist organisation and 
other political organisations is the reliance on violence and the threat of violence as a 
tactic.23  Reference to groups as terrorist organisations and their members as terrorists 
does not imply their exclusive use of terrorism as a tactic, as these organisations have the 
ability to, and do, utilise non-violent tactics in their pursuit of goals.  These terms are 
purely implied for individuals and groups which place a significant emphasis on the 
application of terrorism.  Other political organisations and actors have the ability to 
utilise violence or the threat of violence as a tactic, without being classified as a terrorist 
or a terrorist organisation.  Therefore terrorism is but one tactic available to political 
organisations.24  The application of this claim with the case study of the Provisional 
Republican Movement will display that terrorism is but one activity of many which has 
been utilised by the movement, other tactics employed include non-violent political 
protest, constitutional politics and organised crime.  An organisational perspective has in 
the past been applied to gain a greater understanding of terrorist group behaviour, 
                                                 
20
 Balser, D.B. (1997).  The Impact of Environmental Factors on Factionalism and Schism in Social 
Movement Organisations.  Social Forces, 76(1).  Pp.199-228; Khadka, N. (1995).  Factionalism in the 
Communist Movement in Nepal.  Pacific Affairs, 68(1), pp.55-76. (p.56) 
21
 Oots, K.L. (1989).  Organisational Perspectives on the Formation and Disintegration of Terrorist Groups.  
Terrorism, 12, pp.139-152. (p.139) 
22
 Crenshaw, M. (1987).  Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organisational Approaches.  In 
Rapoport, D.C. (Ed.) (2001).  Inside Terrorist Organisations.  London: Frank Cass. Pp.13-31. (p.13) 
23
 Crenshaw, M. (1985).  An Organisational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism.  Orbis.  
Pp.465-489. (p.465).  
24
 Ibid p.466 
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formation and decline25 as well advancing our knowledge of organisational learning.26  
The knowledge gained from these and other studies has shown the utility of the 
organisational perspective. 
  
1.3 The Terrorist Group as a Political Organisation: Public Goods and Externalities 
Before it is possible to fully assess and appreciate that terrorist groups should be 
categorised as political organisations one must first of all appreciate what constitutes a 
political organisation.  At first sight the organisational activity of a political organisation 
and its members is directed at achieving politically relevant goals, goals which represent 
the beliefs of the membership.27  The aims and goals of the organisation can be 
constituted as the achievement of public or collective goods.  A public or collective good 
is one which cannot be withheld from any member of the eligible community or country.  
Even non-organisational members or non-contributors are eligible to the consumption of 
the goods achieved.28  There are three essential characteristics to public goods.29  There is 
an under provision of public goods as the population are unable to, or lack the incentive 
to, supply the goods for themselves.  The consumption of public goods by one actor does 
not diminish the consumption by another.  And the final characteristic is that non-
contributors cannot be excluded from their consumption.  It is these three factors which 
differentiate a public good from a private good.30  In stating this it is notable to point out 
that it can be argued that there are very few purely public goods, and that the ‘publicness’ 
of the goods is a matter of degree.31  This contention stipulates that there are very few 
                                                 
25
 Oots (1989) 
26
 Jackson, B.A. (2005). Aptitude for Destruction Volume 1: Organisational Learning in Terrorist Groups 
and Its Implications for Combating Terrorism. Pittsburgh, PA: RAND; Jackson, B.A., Baker, J. C., Cragin, 
K., Parachini, J., Trujillo, H. R. and Chalk, P. (2005).  Aptitude for Destruction Volume 2: Case Studies of 
Organisational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups.  Pittsburgh, PA: RAND.  
27
 Wilson, J.Q. (1974).  Political Organisations.  New Jersey: Princeton University Press. (p.10) 
28
 Oots, K.L. (1986).  A Political Organisational Approach to Transnational Terrorism.  Westport, 
Connecticut: Green Wood Press.  (p.45).; Hirschman, A.O. (1970).  Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to 
Decline in Firms, Organisations, and States.  Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. (p.101) 
29
 The defining characteristics have similarly been divided in two by Samuelson, excludability and 
exhaustibility.  This definition excludes the under provision of public goods.  See Gupta, D.K. (2008).  
Understanding Terrorism and Political Violence: The Life Cycle of Birth, Growth, Transformation and 
Demise.  London: Routledge.  (p.36) 
30
 Oots (1989) p.140 
31
 Stokey, E.B. and Zeckhauser, R. (1978).  A Primer for Policy Analysis.  New York: W.W. Norton and 
Company. (pp.306-309).  Cited in Oots, K.L. (1986).  A Political Organisational Approach to 
Transnational Terrorism.  Westport, Connecticut: Green Wood Press.  (p.45) 
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goods which are open to the full consumption by the entire public, whether they be 
tangible, such as transport infrastructure, or intangible goods, such as a new government.   
 
When the concept of public goods is applied to terrorist groups it becomes clear that 
similar to other political organisations the ultimate or purposive aim of terrorist groups is 
the achievement of a public good for a specific population.  Republican paramilitaries, 
aim to achieve an independent unified thirty-two county socialist Ireland.  ETA thrives to 
achieve an independent Basque country.  Among the aims of Al-Qaeda is the overthrow 
of what they believe to be illegitimate regimes in Arab and Islamic Countries and replace 
them with a Caliphate.  Al Qaeda wish to create a single state for all Muslims governed 
by sharia law.32  Each of these aims can be separately defined as a public good.  It is not 
necessary for the good to meet the approval of all of the population.  It is regular that the 
achievement of such goods will be viewed negatively by certain members or groups 
within the population.  With the case of Northern Ireland the Unionist population, as well 
as some others across Ireland and Britain, would look upon the achievement of a united 
Ireland as a negative public good.  There are those who may look positively on one aspect 
of the achievement, but negatively on another.  Staying with the Irish Republican 
example some may be positively disposed to a united Ireland while simultaneously 
viewing a socialist state as negative, or vice versa.  As with all political organisations the 
goals of a terrorist organisation can evolve over time.  This may occur due to a number of 
internal and external factors, many of which will be dealt with over the course of this 
chapter.  One case of goal evolution can be observed in the strengthening of the socialist 
element of the aims and goals of the Irish Republican Movement in the 1960s.  These 
changes and evolutions in goals are generally initiated by the leadership of an 
organisation and it is more likely that they will be successfully brought about, especially 
if the changes are in anyway controversial, when the leadership33 are at a moment of 
strength and have the support of the membership and the relevant external actors.  If this 
is attempted at a time of weakness for the leadership the change is less likely to be 
                                                 
32
 Rapoport, D. C. (2003).  The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11.  In .  In Kegley Jr., C. W 
(ed.) (2003).  The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls.  New Jersey: Prentice Hall.  
Pp. 36-52 
33
 Or the individuals or groups wishing to implement the change 
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successful and may, in extreme circumstances, lead to intra-organisational conflict, 
factionalism and possibly split. 
 
In their pursuit of public goods or otherwise the actions of terrorist organisations, and all 
other political organisations, may lead to externalities; both positive and negative.  An 
externality is when an actor is affected by the actions of others which are beyond the 
affected individual’s control.34  A negative externality with regards the use of terrorism as 
a tactic is the fear experienced by members of the wider public after a violent attack, or 
threat of attack.  It has also been noted that actions by terrorist groups may lead to private 
benefits for the organisation itself.  The example is cited of a bombing campaign against 
political targets by the group increasing the stature of the movement.35  While this is at 
times the case it is also true that the actions of a terrorist organisation can and does have 
negative internal effects.  For Real IRA the Omagh bombing of August 1998 proved to 
have a significantly negative impact on the organisation as a whole with arrests, 
infiltration and it being next to impossible to recruit.  
 
The advancement of the pursuit for specific collective public goods can be regarded as 
one of the foremost similarities between the terrorist group and other political 
organisations but the focus must not purely be on the aims and goals of the organisation.  
Crenshaw outlines further parallels between terrorist organisations and non-violent 
political organisations regarding organisational structure and decision making processes.  
She outlines the similarities in four distinct areas.  The premise suggests that both forms 
of organisation have defined structures and processes by which collective decisions are 
made.  Within the organisation there are functionally differentiated roles for individual 
members.  There are recognised leaders in positions of formal authority.  Finally, and in 
relation to goals, it is proposed that the organisation has a collective set of goals pursued 
as a unit, and that the group takes collective responsibility for their actions in the pursuit 
of these goals.36  This should not be interpreted as suggesting that all terrorist groups are 
                                                 
34
 Oots, (1986) p.46. 
35
 Siqueira, K. (2005).  Political and Militant Wings within Dissident  Movements and Organisations.  
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49(2), pp.218-236.  (p.221)  
36
 Crenshaw, (1985), p.466. 
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homogenous in organisational structure, tactics and goals.  Similar to other political 
organisations there are numerous different options open to each individual terrorist 
organisation.  If one is to consider the question of leadership there are numerous forms 
available to, and applied by, different terrorist organisations and their non-violent 
contemporaries.  Groups which have been classed together as terrorist groups are often 
times extensively different in their leadership structure.  Some may be dictated by a 
dominant figurehead, others led by a collective national leadership and others reliant on 
individual local leaderships to lead the local memberships.  This is parallel to some of the 
options available to non-violent political organisations.    
 
By focusing on the terrorist organisations, rather than the terrorist acts or motives, as a 
determining factor in the process of terrorism significant advancements can and have 
been made in our theoretical understanding of comparisons of terrorist groups.37  By 
analysing the organisational process of the group one can integrate multiple aspects such 
as ideology, social conditions and individual motivations.38  If the terrorist group is to be 
regarded as a political organisation it is clear that the terrorism researcher must also 
recognise the dilemmas and recommendations faced by those researching non-violent 
political organisations.  It has been proposed that if those studying economic or political 
organisations paid closer attention not just to the work analysing other forms of economic 
or political organisations but also social-movement organisations that significant 
advances will be made in both fields.39  In respect to this the following sections will not 
only look in detail at organisational aspects similar to splits in political and terrorist 
organisations, but also look to the findings and theories advanced with respect to other 
forms of organisations and social-movements.  
 
With respect to organisational splits it is necessary to understanding the overall purpose 
of a political organisation, the acquisition of specific public goods, before it is possible to 
fully appreciate the reasoning for the split.  Therefore the function of this chapter is to 
                                                 
37
 Ibid, Pp.465-466. 
38
 Ibid, p.472. 
39
 Campbell, J.C. (2005).  Where Do We Stand? Common Mechanisms in Organisations and Social 
Movement Research.  In Gavis, G.F., McAdam, D., Richard Scott, W. and Zald, M.N. (2005).  Social 
Movements and Organisation Theory.  (pp. 41-68).  New York: Cambridge University Press.  (p.41) 
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achieve an understanding of the function of a political organisation before outlining the 
processes of organisational conflict and split in the subsequent chapters.    
 
1.4 Survival and Maintenance  
 
“Whatever else organisations seek, they seek to survive.”40 
 
As the previous section has detailed the purposive aims of political organisations in 
general, and for the purpose of this research terrorist organisations specifically, is the 
attainment of a specific form of public goods.  While this contention is accurate the 
attainment of the public good is not always the immediate aim of an organisation.  In 
order to be able to achieve an organisation’s ultimate aim of the attainment of their 
preferred public goods their immediate aims must be the survival and maintenance of the 
organisation.41  This is the basic tenet at the heart of all organisational theory.  The 
attainment of the goal is contingent on maintenance of the identity of the organisation.42  
Therefore the minimal and immediate goal of every organisation must be survival.43  It 
has been stipulated that organisations will become more conservative in their strategies 
and tactics if the survival and maintenance is somehow challenged.44  This may prove to 
be a facet of the organisational approach which is the inverse in terrorist organisations.  
The reality for terrorist organisations may be more in line with the assertion by Zald and 
Ash45 in reference to social-movement organisations which states that in times of 
competition for support there may be a shift in goals which may be towards the centre, 
but may also move the group more towards the extremes.   In relation to terrorist 
organisations it is observed that in order to avoid the departure of significant sub-groups 
of an organisation a formerly moderate membership may at times have to radicalise their 
                                                 
40
 Wilson, p.10. 
41
 It is argued later in this section that survival is not always the immediate aim of the organisation. 
42
 Firey, W. (1948).  Informal Organisation and the Theory of Schism.  American Sociological Review. 
13(1).  Pp.15-24. (p.18) 
43
 Crenshaw (1985) p.473 
44
 Zald, M.N. and Ash, R. (1966).  Social Movement Organisations: Growth, Decay and Change.  Social 
Forces, 44(3).  Pp.327-341 (p.327).  This is referred to by Zald and Ash as the Weber-Michels model. 
45
 Zald and Ash (1966) p.332. 
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tactics and strategies.46  Therefore at certain stages the terrorist actions may aid in the 
survival of this organisation.47  This is a complex role for the organisation to play as if 
they over radicalise they risk losing the more moderate membership and external support.  
However, if they are not radical enough the risk lies in losing the more radical elements 
of the membership and support.  The example of the Real IRA’s bombing of Omagh 
displays the over radicalisation of tactics, with detrimental effects for the survival of the 
organisation.  The organisational approach therefore acknowledges the challenges faced 
by the leadership of a terrorist organisation to maintain the survival of the group.48   
 
The cornerstone of any organisation’s survival must be the group’s ability to recruit new 
members.  If a group fails to recruit, retain and regenerate membership the survival of the 
organisation is unfeasible.49  With respect to terrorist organisations in particular the issue 
of membership regeneration is critical.  The nature of terrorism leads to a high turnover 
of membership for a number of different reasons, included among these are arrest, 
burnout50 and death.  Therefore the organisation must be able to constantly recruit new 
members and regenerate a fluctuant membership in order to maintain their survival.  The 
leadership concern for organisational maintenance and survival is dominant especially 
when there is a change in membership sentiment and a growing lack of interest in the 
organisation51 or a lessening in support for the direction in which the organisation is 
taking.  These issues come to the fore especially at a time of organisational change or 
strain, which can lead to organisational split as is detailed in Chapter 4.   
 
It is at times of change where survival is under the most threat.  In order to maintain 
survival the leadership must persuade the membership and supporters that the proposed 
changes are necessary and beneficial for the organisation in the pursuit of the attainment 
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 Crenshaw (1985), p.483 
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 Schelling, T.C. (1991).  What Purpose can “International Terrorism” serve? In Frey, R.G. and Morris, 
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of their purposive goal, the public goods.  If the leadership fails to convince the majority 
of the membership of the importance of these changes they face the possibilities of the 
exit of a significant proportion of the membership and an organisational split.  It is 
necessary to outline how these changes will benefit the future acquisition of the ultimate 
outcome for the group, the desired public good.  Similar to times of tactical and strategic 
change the survival of the organisation is threatened with the presence of rival 
organisations.  These rival organisations may come in the form of rival terrorist groups or 
non-violent political organisations.  This presence leads to competition between the 
groups for membership and support.  At times of competition the leadership must 
convince their membership and supporters to stay with their organisation as opposed to 
joining the alternative.  The issue of competition from rival organisations becomes 
especially pertinent in the aftermath of a split as a split by definition results in the 
development of a new breakaway organisation with similar goals and ambitions to the 
parent organisation.  As has been detailed above at this time of competition with the risk 
of losing members the leadership may radicalise their tactics and strategies in order to 
maintain the survival of the organisation.   
 
Oots52 states that it is unlikely in the naissance of an organisation that the leadership do 
not support the political cause of the group.  However, with the changing times and 
circumstances the leadership may wish to bring about change to the political cause or the 
strategies of the group, or possibly both.  This desire for change may be held by the 
original leadership of the organisation, or alternatively by a new fresh leadership.  These 
changes are deemed necessary in order to bring about the central aim of the organisation 
through methods deemed acceptable by the leadership.  Therefore it is proposed here that 
while at the core survival of the organisation is what the leadership wish to achieve the 
leadership ultimately desires the survival of a group in a form they respect and recognise.  
In the discussions of organisational survival there is often an assumption that the survival 
and maintenance of the group requires the maintenance of the vast majority, if not all, of 
the membership.  Therefore the presence of a split is deemed to be detrimental to this 
survival.  However, with a more detailed inspection schisms and splits can in certain 
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extreme circumstances be regarded as functional for group survival.53  This claim may 
seem counter-intuitive with the simplified notion of the maintenance of group solidarity 
for the sake of the survival of the organisation.  It has been noted that within a terrorist 
group it is important to achieve consensus rather than a majority in order to bring about 
change.54  However, with more considered reflection the maintenance of group solidarity 
can at times prove detrimental for organisational survival and advancement, and the hope 
for consensus can on occasion stifle progress.  At times of extreme intra-organisational 
conflict and debate the leadership will often times feel that they have to compromise their 
position in order to accommodate and retain the membership of some of their detractors, 
and therefore surrender their vision for the organisation.  Therefore this can severely 
interfere with the organisation’s pursuit of the specified public good.  If it comes to the 
stage where they believe that they are over compromising in order to appease their 
internal detractors a split, or a minimal ‘hiving off’ of detractors believed to be holding 
back or disrupting the organisation, may be in the best interests of the leadership and the 
progress of the or group.  If nominal group solidarity is maintained for too long in such 
an environment the leadership is in danger of losing their position of power within the 
organisation or maybe maintaining the existence of a group whose aims, strategies and 
tactics they do not fully ascribe to.  Therefore the immediate aim for the leadership 
should not be purely considered as the survival of the organisation but the survival of the 
organisation in a form they ascribe to, applying the strategies, tactics and purposive aims 
which they stand by.  At a time of extreme intra-organisational conflict and compromise, 
for the sack of survival the organisation can often times threaten to change to an 
unrecognisable state in comparison to the aspirations of the leadership.  Alternatively if 
the leadership is unable to achieve the changes they deem necessary within the 
organisation they may reconcile if the organisation is deemed to be moving in the 
direction of their desired change.  The type of change or debate which has the potential of 
causing internal division within an organisation is evidently a change which is viewed as 
highly significant by the membership.  Therefore it is at times necessary for the 
leadership to be patient in bringing about these changes and acknowledge that it may be a 
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slow process to satisfy a significant proportion of the membership that the proposals are 
to the benefit of the organisation.  If these changes are particularly dramatic or rapid they 
could lead to the defection of those who related to the original model.55  However, if the 
introduction of the change is gradual a number of these potential defectors may be 
convinced of the benefit of the change. 
 
A similar argument can be put across for the internal detractors.  If they believe that they 
are members of an organisation whose direction they no longer agree with or ascribe to 
there are three options available to them loyalty, voice and exit.56  If their loyalty to the 
organisation outweighs their aversion to the direction of the movement they will carry on 
as members and remain silent about their concerns.  However, if they wish to remain in 
the organisation but change the direction, aims or strategies of the group they will voice 
their concerns internally and try and bring about the changes they believe necessary.  If 
the application of the tactic of voice fails to bring about the change(s) they wish the final 
option is that of exit.  Members will only exit when the form and direction which the 
organisation has taken outweighs any loyalty which they have to the organisation and/or 
the leadership.  Their exit can take three distinct forms.  They can exit the organisation 
and cease all organisational participation.  They can exit and join a rival organisation.  
The final option is that they can exit and set up a splinter organisation developed in a way 
supportive of their beliefs.  Therefore the immediate aim for these detractors, and the 
leadership, is not purely the survival of the group but the survival of an organisation 
which they consider worthwhile and whose aims, tactics and strategies they believe in.   
 
For an undesignated period of time after a split there is a higher consensus and 
consistency internally within the organisation, be it the parent organisation or the splinter 
organisation, and therefore maintenance can take a back seat to the development and 
evolution of the organisation and its goals.  This time period of consensus can be quite 
short especially if the split results in the drawn out competition for membership and 
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support.  This is especially the case if there is a near even split in personnel.  In such 
circumstances the competition for membership and support can be heightened as both 
groups and leaderships are evenly matched in strength and appeal.  However, if the parent 
organisation’s leadership can successfully isolate the defectors and keep their numbers 
and support small they will be in a stronger position to move forward with the 
development of the organisation than prior to the split.  Therefore the aim of both 
leaderships, of the splinter and parent organisations, at a time of split must be to retain or 
gain the support of as many of those members and supporters occupying the middle 
ground between the two factions, while also retaining the support in their own specific 
sectors.  This is not to purely maintain the survival of the organisation but to maintain the 
survival of an organisation in a form, or as close to a form as possible, which they believe 
in. 
 
1.5 Support 
In the study of any organisation it is essential to clearly understand the support structure 
in place.  For the purpose of this specific study the analysis of support is crucial as it is 
clear that without sufficient levels of support members may exit to form or join separate 
organisations.57  The researcher must assess the levels of sympathy and connections 
between the organisation and the larger community.58  This larger community should not 
only just be assessed as the community within the organisation’s immediate geographical 
location but should also include the wider national and international communities of 
which the organisation is reliant upon for different forms of support.  The importance of a 
strong support base for a terrorist organisation is widely acknowledged.  The continued 
actions of the organisation can be viewed not only as a means to achieve the political 
aims of the group but also to achieve, maximise and retain support from members and 
followers alike.59  The differing levels of support for an organisation prove crucial for its 
survival and may have a significant influence on the progress of the group in attaining 
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their goals.  This is true for non-violent political and social-movement organisations as 
well as terrorist groups.  This section outlines the importance of organisational support 
for the progress and survival of the group while also outlining various methods utilised in 
order to strengthen or gain the support for a specific organisation, strategy or tactic. 
Correspondingly the damaging affect which a drop or complete loss of support can have 
on an organisation and its goals is similarly analysed.  The levels of support for an 
organisation and its policies fluctuate with time and circumstance,60 and in order for the 
group to survive and develop it must modify itself sufficiently so as to maintain and boost 
its support. 
 
At the most basic level the types of support available to an organisation can be divided 
into two distinct categories, external and internal.  Levels of external support have been 
noted as vital in both the formation and breakdown of the terrorist organisation.61  It is 
acknowledged that this external support generally is sourced from sympathetic 
governments or other terrorist organisations as well as public support groups.62  The 
forms which this support can take have been listed as financial, training, weapons, 
organisational and operational.63  While the concrete physical and operational support 
provided externally may be the most measurable form perhaps the most constructive, and 
with its withdrawal the most destructive, category of external support for a terrorist 
organisation is the public sympathy for the group from the immediate surrounding 
community.64  The power of public support can even be utilised by those authorities 
attempting to bring terrorism to an end as it can be one of the most important factors in 
the application of negotiations.65  The presence of strong public sympathy for a terrorist 
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organisation can have a direct influence on the levels of external financial and operational 
support attained.66  This sympathy can be displayed as either passive or active support.   
With respect to terrorist organisations the active support of the community can include 
acts such as financial support, providing safe houses and entering the organisation.  
Alternatively the community can provide passive support which entails a supportive lack 
of action.  Passive support may involve ignoring signs of group activity, failing to report 
matters to the authorities or expressing support for the organisation’s objectives.67   
 
The weight which public support carries is apparent within social-movement 
organisations.  Similar to terrorist organisations they too must mobilise resources from 
their communities.  This mobilisation of support can prove to neutralise opponents,68 both 
internal and external.  In comparison with the community support supplied for 
constitutional political organisations the support required for terrorist organisations is 
more constant and requires a near total commitment on the part of the community 
supporters.69  If a terrorist organisation can mobilise a strong public support for their 
goals and activities, they will prove more difficult for authorities to counter.  It is noted 
that nationalist separatist terrorist organisations are most affected by a fluctuation in 
public support and sympathy.  These groups claim to be representatives fighting for the 
rights of a very specific population.  Therefore the support for their actions from this 
community provides the organisation and its representative claims with a degree of 
legitimacy.  If and when this support is weakened or withdrawn and there is a public 
backlash against the group and its actions it proves very difficult for the organisation to 
convincingly claim a representative status.  The power which this community support, 
both passive and active, provides is therefore most apparent when it is removed.  
 
If the organisation misjudges a specific action, strategy or goal this may result in a fall in 
popular support, leading at times to a significant modification of methods, tactics or 
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strategies or even to the downfall or split of the organisation.70  There are certain terrorist 
actions which may prove to increase the support of committed ideologues, while 
concurrently resulting in a drop in public support,71 and alternatively there are those 
which result in a drop in support from the ideologues and a rise in support from the 
public.  If the organisation is to survive and succeed it is necessary for the maintenance of 
both forms of support, and therefore a delicate balancing act is required by the leadership. 
 
As has been clearly stated the withdrawal of public support or sympathy can have a 
detrimental affect on the group and its goals, or result in significant changes in the 
strategies, tactics or goals.  Two of the oft cited examples of a dramatic fall in public 
support come with the murders of two separate politicians, Aldo Moro and Pierre 
Laporte, murdered by the Italian Red Brigades and the FLQ respectively.  Both of these 
murders were defining moments for the groups as they were influential in turning public 
opinion against the organisations.  In the aftermath of the Laporte murder, combined with 
the October Crisis, the FLQ saw a significant drop in public sympathy.  While there was 
still a significant proportion of the Quebecois population who supported the attainment of 
an independent Quebec the support for achieving this through violent means significantly 
reduced.  The aftermath of the murder also saw the rise of the Parti Quebecois (PQ) who 
advocated the achievement of an independent Quebec through non-violent means.  While 
the combination of these events did not bring about the complete elimination of the FLQ 
they succeeded in causing considerable damage to the group in that it would no longer be 
able to operate with the degree of support necessary to make group operations viable.72  
Similarly the drop in public support for the Italian Red Brigades, and more importantly a 
significant drop in internal organisational support including defections from the 
membership, in the aftermath of the Moro murder provided the Italian government with 
the opportunity to introduce innovative counter-terrorism initiatives which in turn 
significantly debilitated the group.  With the impetus of public support a previously 
divided government was able to introduce reduced prison sentences for members of the 
Red Brigades in exchange for information.  The timing of this offer of repentance 
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coincided with a strong perception of failure among the membership, and a significant 
public backlash and proved vital in the government’s successful strategy to bring about 
the effective end of the organisation.73   
 
In examining public support and sympathy it is important to note that terrorist 
organisations claiming to act on behalf of a minority community do not automatically 
attain a strong social base of support from these communities.74  This support may 
fluctuate over time, or in some instances may never be present.      
 
While external support garners more attention than internal among organisational 
analysts the role of internal support is just as important for the survival and development 
of the organisation.  Without a significant level of internal support for the actions and 
strategies of the organisation from the membership, the group would never be able to 
attain their goals, bring about the changes deemed necessary for the advancement of the 
organisation and its aims or even achieve survival.  As has been noted in the 
organisational literature an organisation is more likely to succeed in the implementation 
of proposed change and adaptation if they succeed in generating employee or 
membership support for the proposed changes, rather than simply overcoming resistance.  
The resistance to change may in fact be better regarded as reluctance to change.  
Therefore it is within the role of the leadership, or detractors, if they wish to successfully 
implement proposed changes to overcome this reluctance.75  A leadership is dependent on 
the support of various sections of the membership in order to successfully implement its 
vision for the organisation.  Dependent on the structure, history and purpose of the group 
the support of different members will carry diverse strengths.  Within an organisation 
such as the Provisional IRA with a multi-level leadership, where there is an Army 
Council and Executive as well as the GHQ and occasionally the General Army 
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Convention,76 the acquisition of the support from a significant proportion of the different 
leadership elements, and ordinary membership, can prove vital for the implementation of 
any contentious change in policies, strategies or tactics.  Without this internal support the 
implementation of changes and policies will prove a challenge, and in the most extreme 
circumstances may even result in the demotion or expulsion of the proposing 
individual(s).  Even in organisations led by a central figurehead there is still the need for 
internal support with regard to significant changes and policies.  While the lack of such 
support is less likely to result in the demotion of the leader it may provide justification for 
non-compliance or defection among those unreceptive to the policies, strategies or tactics.  
If this is the response by a significant proportion of the membership it will result in the 
weakening of the organisation. 
 
Within the sphere of internal support there are various different actors who can possibly 
lend their support to specific initiatives or policies of the organisation.  Each of these 
actors contributes to the advancement of the organisation in differing ways.  Numerous 
methods and tools are utilised in order to gain the support of the membership and the 
relevant individuals and groups within that membership.  Terrorist organisations are 
heavily reliant on the legitimising power of historical referencing in support of their 
policies or actions.  This entails linking the proposed or utilised tactics and strategies to 
the historical underpinnings of the organisation.  The call for support may reference the 
names of past leaders or fallen comrades, as well as historically important events in order 
to justify the new proposals or the continuation of current strategies.  The advent of the 
PIRA provides a case in point where one of the opening lines of the ‘Where Sinn Fein 
Stands’, a 1970 document which illustrates the justification of the existence of the new 
Provisional Movement, reads “We take our inspiration from the past.”77  This statement is 
situated in order to link the armed and political actions of the new Provisional movement 
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to Republican history. 78  Republicanism to this day looks to its history in order to justify 
their actions and the formation of new splinter groups.79  Groups not only look to the 
history of their own struggle, but to the wider international history of revolutionaries in 
order to gain the validation for their methods and policies.  They may link their actions to 
those of distant armed struggles without obvious connection to their own, in doing so 
placing themselves as a continuation of the wider revolutionary history.80 
 
The legitimacy gained by historical referencing is made stronger if the organisation, or 
detractors, can gain the public support of an influential individual from a significant 
historical period.  The legitimising powers of such an authority figure can influence 
previously undecided sections of the membership to support the proposals of the 
leadership or their detractors, depending on which side the figure is sponsoring.  The 
legitimising power of the individual endorsement need not always come from their 
historical affiliation with the movement but may also derive from their charisma “by 
virtue of which he is set apart from other men and treated as endowed with supernatural, 
superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities.”81  The influential 
power of an individual’s endorsement for organisational change often comes at a time 
when they have not previously aligned themselves with the proposed change,82 therefore 
through example making an adjustment in opinion more acceptable among the rest of the 
membership.  The wider the range of influential individuals supporting a specific 
proposal the more likely it is to be widely accepted by the membership.  Therefore in an 
organisation with both political and armed wings if authoritative figures from both the 
past and present of each wing back a proposal it is more likely to be successfully 
approved.  These individuals need not always be members, past or present, of the 
organisational leadership.  The figures, for example, may have been involved in 
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important operations for the organisation and through this participation had gained the 
respect of the membership.  Horgan cites the importance of role models as a source of 
authoritative legitimacy in the justification of violent action or reaction.83  However, the 
role model is but one possible category of influential individual.  The resultant affect of 
an influential individual’s opinions or actions does not always manifest itself in a role 
following reaction by the influenced individuals.  It is therefore necessary to 
acknowledge the potential for negative as well as positive influential individuals.  While 
the positive impact of a person’s opinion or action has been detailed equally the opinions 
and actions of a figure who is viewed negatively by sections of the membership may have 
the converse affect on these members.  By stating this there is the acknowledgement that 
individual members and sections of the membership, as well as external supportive 
actors, may be influenced to take the opposite view to an individual who they perceive in 
a negative manner.   
 
1.6 Loyalty 
It is proposed here that in order to gain support for a specific change or initiative within 
the organisation it is important to convince the membership and supporters of the value of 
such changes and initiatives with the greater good of the organisation and its goals and 
ambitions in mind.  The ability to convince the membership of the benefits of these 
proposals can in the most extreme circumstances prevent the exit of sections of the 
membership and ultimately an organisational split.   However, this is not the sole means 
of gaining membership support.  Often the most powerful tool available in achieving 
support and solidarity is in appealing to a membership’s organisational loyalty.  The 
development of loyalty can be built over time through ideological indoctrination and the 
emphasising of the external threat.  The benefit of this loyalty is most noticeable, and 
important, at times of strains or changes where there is the possibility of organisational 
exit but members decide to remain with the group.  Therefore it is posited that at a time of 
competition it is vitally important for a leadership to inspire loyalty among members.84  
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For an individual to remain loyal to an organisation at a time of competition, doubt or 
strain they must feel an intense connection with the group’s organisational goals.85  
Jamieson cites the example of those founder members of the Italian Red Brigades who 
even though they were uneasy with the handling of kidnap of Aldo Moro were compelled 
to support the action out of loyalty to the organisation.86  Therefore the presence of 
loyalty can significantly slow down and make less likely the process of membership 
exit.87  The presence of membership loyalty does not guarantee total compliance and 
submission.  Those individuals who remain with the group purely out of loyalty will feel 
a greater need to voice their concerns and try to bring about internal change which they 
feel will benefit the organisation, or indeed they may wish to block proposed changes 
which they regard as detrimental.  If they themselves are not an influential individual 
with the ability of bringing about or blocking these changes they will certainly expect that 
someone else in a more powerful position will act in order to, in their eyes, improve the 
organisation.88  In the presence of intense loyalty to a group the option of exit is no longer 
characterised as just organisational exit but is viewed as treason, defection or desertion.89  
With this exceedingly negative framing of exit for loyal members it becomes extremely 
difficult to justify and commit to exit.  While this makes exit difficult for a loyal member, 
it does not deem it impossible.  In circumstances where the loyal member is significantly 
disillusioned by the direction of the organisation, to the point of exit, they may frame 
their departure from the group not as treason or treachery but as an act of loyalty and 
those who are remaining with the original organisation as being treacherous to the wider 
struggle.  They may deem that their loyalty is not to any specific organisation or 
leadership but to the wider struggle and its historical goals.90  Such a framing of exit is 
present at times of splits where the splinter accuses the parent organisation of betraying 
the aims and ideology of the historical struggle.    
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1.7 External Factors 
While the presence, or absence, of support is strongly reliant on the organisation one 
must not discount the importance which external factors have on the level of support 
from the internal and external communities.  The organisation is not a closed system; the 
environment plays a vital role in the development of an organisation and its aims.91  By 
focusing exclusively on the organisational structure and internal debates one may fail to 
discern the influence of external factors on support levels within and outside of the 
organisation.  Changes in the larger society in which the organisation operates may lead 
to growing support of previously dormant communities, therefore widening the support 
base of the movement.92  Equally the external environment may have a negative affect on 
the support levels both internally and externally.  In their study of schisms in the Czech 
environmental movement Shriver and Messer acknowledged the negative influence 
which economic hardship had on support for the movement.93  External environmental 
factors such as economic stability and public confidence in the constitutional political 
system must be considered when assessing the underlying principle behind a rise or fall 
in organisational support.  In order to have more chance of success in implementing 
proposals or change it is beneficial for the leadership, or detractors, to be in control of as 
many factors as possible and that external factors play as minimal a part as possible.  
Therefore the timing of changes is vitally important in gaining sufficient support from 
internal and external actors.  The role which external environmental factors play must be 
more widely examined in order to gain a clearer understanding of organisational 
processes and actions.94  While the environment affects the levels of support to a degree it 
may also go so far as shaping the changes necessary for the maintenance of the 
organisation.  The leadership may find that due to factors beyond their control in the 
external environment that in order to maintain and strengthen their support they have to 
alter their goals and tactics.95  The leadership may at times even deem it necessary due to 
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environmental factors that organisational structure itself must be radically changed.96   
Considering the specific issue of splits the influential factors much be categorised as 
internal organisational factors or external environmental factors.97  These external 
features include governmental policy, economic or social circumstances or even distant 
international conflicts and movements.  In relation to social-movement organisations 
general societal changes can determine to a large extent the direction taken by the 
organisation.98  With respect to terrorist organisations specifically it has been 
acknowledged that in generating governmental counter-terrorism policies the policy 
makers must not only consider the internal factors affecting an organisation but also the 
external.  Central to this must be an analysis of the ties which the terrorist group has to 
outside groups who support them and the affect of representative claims made by the 
organisation.99 
 
1.8 Chapter Summary 
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide a foundational understanding of the 
function of political organisations.  It has shown how this can be applicable to achieving 
a better understanding of terrorist organisations which are deemed to be political 
organisations.  While the purposive goal of the organisation may be the achievement of a 
specific public good(s) the immediate goal must be defined as organisational survival, or 
at times the survival of the organisation in a form or direction favoured by the leadership 
and/or membership.  In order to maintain this survival it is vital to maintain both support 
and membership loyalty.  While these two factors are vital in the maintenance of survival 
and support it is equally necessary to factor in the constantly changing external factors 
which can have a significant effect on organisational survival.  These factors all have a 
significant influence on the reasoning for and results of organisational splits.   
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Chapter 2 
Intra-Organisational Conflict 
2.1 Introduction  
Across organisations unless a group is able to continuously overcome its limits and apply 
flexible and innovative organisational techniques the group is liable to some degree of 
internal conflict.100  Therefore with this near inevitability of groups facing conflict at 
some stage of their existence it is clearly worthy to have in place a framework to aid in 
explaining and understanding this process.  The present dissertation is ostensibly 
assessing organisational splits.  However, the most comprehensive evaluation of this must 
analyse the intra-organisational conflicts which precede the formal division of the 
organisation.  This is because it is posited that each organisational split is preceded by 
some form of intra-organisational conflict.  Before assessing this in detail it is necessary 
to specify that only in extreme circumstances of conflict do actual splits occur.  The 
majority of cases are resolved through some form of compromise, without any of the 
factions deeming it necessary to break away from the parent organisation.  While clearly 
assessing the existence and development of tensions and factions within the organisation 
the study of intra-organisational conflict can demonstrate the capacity of conflict research 
to detail a wide variety of organisational behaviour due to the dynamic nature of the 
conflict process.101   
 
The present chapter assesses the theoretical underpinnings of intra-organisational conflict 
in general prior to the subsequent evaluation of organisational split in Chapter 4.  This 
develops on the foundation of organisational understanding presented in Chapter 1. 
 
It is evident that conflict is a feature present in all forms of human organisations,102 and 
therefore this chapter once again borrows from the wider organisational literature in order 
to gain a comprehensive understanding.  Across conflicts in various areas a number of the 
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patterns and processes present are repeated from one conflict to the next.103  This 
statement does not just entail all intra-organisational conflicts but all conflicts whether 
they are intra or inter organisational in nature.  Therefore as well as assessing the 
processes involved in internal conflicts there is a brief outline of how a specific model of 
international relations conflict theory104 may be applied to garner a greater understanding 
of the patterns and processes present within intra-organisational conflict.   
 
The chapter is laid out as follows. 
• Reasoning for intra-organisational conflict 
• Alternative Conflict Hypotheses 
• Intra-Organisational Conflict in Terrorist Groups 
 
2.2 Reasoning For Intra-Organisational Conflict 
Large scale organisations can be viewed as an amalgamation of individuals and groups 
seemingly brought together by the incentives to achieve a specific set of goals.  The ends 
and means of these separate individuals and subgroups may at times conflict with the 
policies and viewpoints of the organisational leadership.105  Internal conflict can transpire 
in political organisations for a number of different reasons.  The most fundamental 
grounds for intra-organisational conflict specifically within terrorist organisations can be 
regarded as a disagreement over the ultimate purpose of the group,106 the pursuit of the 
designated public goods.  While at a fundamental level internal conflict can often times 
be portrayed as a disagreement over the organisation’s purposes, and therefore a 
divergence of goals,107 there are clearly alternative causes, often times linked but not 
entirely explained by organisational purpose.  Conflict may arise by the desire to change 
policies and practices of the leadership,108 the presence of theoretical109 and ideological 
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differences or conflicting proposals of dealing with organisational difficulties.110  
Nonetheless there are also those conflicts which occur not out of any strategic, tactical or 
ideological disparity but can be established on purely personal or selfish grounds.  In 
most human organisations there are individuals and groups who feel that they simply 
cannot work with, or for, specific others and therefore clash on personal grounds.  
Alternatively there are those who believe that they should be in a position of leadership as 
opposed to the present occupiers of the position(s).  These personal and self serving 
rationales are at times, but not always, at the heart of intra-organisational conflict.  If the 
terrorist organisation, or internal dissident, is to capitalise on the internal and external 
support described in the previous chapter these internal conflicts must be portrayed as 
disagreements over purpose, strategies or tactics.111  Therefore while the conflicts may be 
framed as taking place on organisational, strategic and tactical grounds the sources and 
membership divisions during conflict will only sometimes reflect this.  The resultant 
division, and at times factionalism, of the organisations often times arise from long 
standing,112 and sometimes dormant, cleavages.  These divisions can occasionally be 
simply portrayed as a social-regional cleavage, one born out of elite career ambition,113 or 
a battle between the old-guard and new-guard of the membership and leadership.  At 
times a number of the previously mentioned factors may be in play throughout, or at 
different stages, of a conflict.  Therefore the researcher must be open to the possibility of 
a multi-level conflict which is capable of adapting and evolving throughout its existence.  
During the course of a conflict new actors may become active as it evolves, and 
additional divisive issues may be brought to the fore which can solidify, strengthen or 
weaken the divide.  Researchers should never apply a blinkered approach to conflict by 
focusing on a sole factor in the hope of finding an explanation, as across conflicts there is 
rarely one solitary reason which can exclusively explain the actors’ rationale.  Similarly 
the assessment of all aspects of a conflict must be considered from the point of view of 
each side of the dispute, failing to do so will clearly result in the production of biased and 
incomplete analysis.  The very nature of conflict designates that what one side may 
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identify as disrespectful and unfounded opposition the other may view as a desire to 
protect the organisation’s best interests.114 
 
2.3 Alternative Conflict Hypotheses 
By introducing the topic of intra-organisational conflict the present chapter has taken a 
brief general look at a series of reasons for the establishment of conflicts across 
organisations.  Developing from this the present section analyses three separate models of 
conflicts and assesses their applicability to the present analysis of organisational splits.  
Two of the models assessed were originally put forward as organisational models of 
conflict and are therefore intuitively applicable to the topic at hand.  These are the 1993 
analysis by March and Simon115 and the model developed by Pondy. 116  The final model 
analysed here is that of Weinberg and Richardson.117  Distinct from the previous two 
models the Weinberg-Richardson model was a process model originally designed to 
assess terrorism as a form of inter-organisational conflict.  However, it is proposed here 
that an adaptation of this process model may also be applicable to the investigation of 
intra-organisational conflict, and ultimately split.  These final two models are deemed 
specifically important in the present research as they propose a stage-based process 
model of conflict, a proposal which is advanced in the analysis of the splits in 
Republicanism.   
 
2.3.1 March and Simon Model of Organisational Conflict. 
In their analysis of organisations March and Simon identified three main classes of 
organisational conflict; individual conflict, organisational conflict and inter-
organisational conflict.  As will be displayed in the general discussion and analysis of 
splits each of these three categories of conflict play a role either before, during or after a 
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split.  In the situation of individual conflict, where an individual is at conflict in their own 
decision making process, it is ascribed that conflict arises from one or more of three 
reasons.  These explanations for the rise of conflict can be individually labelled as 
unacceptability, incomparability and uncertainty.  It is proposed that internal conflicts 
arise when an individual has a decision to make regarding their support or opinions of 
proposed or actual organisational actions or policy.  Within a split the individual may be 
at conflict with themselves due to decisions of allegiance prior to the split with the 
development of rival internal sub-groups and also in the aftermath of split with the 
formation of the breakaway organisation. With the instance of unacceptability an 
individual can assess the probability of outcomes associated with each of the available 
alternatives of action.  Supplementing this they may be able to indicate a preferred 
alternative. However, this alternative is not considered satisfactory.  In the case of 
incomparability the individual can identify the probability distribution of outcomes but 
unlike unacceptability they cannot identify a preferred alternative.  Finally for the 
situation of uncertainty the actor is unaware of the probability distributions connecting 
choice of action and outcome.118   
 
The second form of conflict identified by the authors is that of organisational conflict.  
This can be divided into two forms inter-individual conflict and inter-group conflict.  
This is where individuals or sub-groups conflict within an organisation.  For the purpose 
of the analysis of splits inter-group conflicts is the most pertinent as a split is the result of 
two conflicting sub-groups dividing post-conflict to form two autonomous organisations.  
Inter-group conflict within an organisation occurs in one or more of three situations; 
when there is a perceived requirement for joint decision-making within the organisation, 
a difference of goals or a difference in the perception and interpretation of reality.119  The 
groups most susceptible to inter-group organisational conflict are those with joint 
decision-making structures in place.  Within organisations which are very much goal 
oriented the area of power-relations and authority provides one of the most important 
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areas of conflict.120  Therefore within such organisations, in which terrorist groups can be 
included, the role of the leadership and authority figures must be clearly understood.  In a 
terrorist organisation the role of the leadership is not just focused on entrepreneurial and 
purposive goal orientated actions.  The leadership must provide the membership with the 
confidence to partake in what is a dangerous lifestyle.  Parallel to this the leadership must 
also provide the organisation with its political focus and direction for action.121  
Therefore if a conflict is centred around challenges to the leadership and their decisions 
this can have the most substantial affect on the organisation.  If there is a sustained 
challenge to the leadership by the membership of an organisation, and returning to the 
previous chapter a lack of support, it can become impossible for the leadership to sustain 
the organisation.122  The final form of organisational conflict outlined by March and 
Simon is that of inter-organisational conflict.  While this is relevant to the analysis of 
organisational splits this topic will be dealt with in the discussion of competition in 
Chapter 4.  
 
2.3.2 The Pondy Model  
It has been proposed that conflict can be regarded as a dynamic process which can be 
analysed as a sequence of conflict episodes.123  Pondy outlined a five stage process model 
of conflict.  The five separate stages put forward are as follows; 
1. Latent Conflict (conditions) 
2. Perceived Conflict (cognition) 
3. Felt Conflict (affect) 
4. Manifest Conflict (behaviour), and, 
5. Conflict Aftermath (conditions)124 
 
If Pondy’s stage-based model is to be applicable to organisational splits the instance of 
split would take place in the fourth stage of manifest conflict (behaviour).  This will take 
place after the foundations of the conflict are laid in the initial stage and after the conflict 
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is both perceived and its affects felt within the organisation in the third. If an internal 
conflict cannot be adequately resolved one of the dissenting sub-groups must exit the 
organisation if the organisation is to be able to deal with normal organisational purpose.  
It follows that in the presence of the exit of one of the dissenting factions internal conflict 
will diminish.125  Alternatively if a split is to be avoided this would similarly take place in 
the penultimate stage.  In this instance as opposed to split there would be an internal 
conflict resolution.  The conflict aftermath is very much dependent on the result of the 
fourth stage of manifest conflict.  If there is a split the aftermath may be notable for inter-
group competition between former allies.  If the conflict is resolved the organisation can 
develop their pursuit of the intended public goods.  In situations where a split does not 
take place but the conflict is only nominally resolved this may prove to be the antecedent 
for future more volatile intra-organisational conflicts.  
 
2.3.3 Weinberg/Richardson Model 
A number of the features which characterise conflict in one area can similarly 
characterise it in others.126  This assertion is furthered by Weinberg and Richardson who 
have applied a stage-based process model of conflict theory to the assessment of terrorist 
campaigns in Western Europe.127  While their three stage model was for the purpose of 
explaining and understanding terrorist campaigns it is proposed in the present research to 
advance the assumption of transferability of themes across conflicts by adapting the 
Weinberg-Richardson model to the assessment of intra-organisational conflict and 
ultimately organisational splits.  While the actors in the Weinberg-Richardson model are 
the terrorist organisation and the state, when transferred to assess intra-organisational 
conflicts the actors are two conflicting sub-groups within the organisation.  With analysis 
of the model similarities become apparent between it and the previous detailed intra-
organisational models.   
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The three stages proposed can be explained under three headings; 
 
1. Identification of Distinct Separate Identities 
2. Widening of Conflict 
3. Spiralling of Conflict  
 
Within this model a distinction between the two groups is first identified.  The original 
model outlines that these differences can take the form of economic status, religious 
belief or other such distinctions.  When applied to groups within terrorist organisations 
the division may take the form of old-guard/new-guard, left-wing/right-wing, regionalism 
or other such separations.  This identity of separate groups does not constitute a rationale 
for conflict.  At least one of the groups must have a grievance with the other and set out a 
way which they believe will be able to remove it.  While the presence of grievance(s) and 
a plan to eliminate these does not always lead to conflict it is proposed as a necessary first 
stage.  The probability of violent confrontation only transpires when one of the parties 
makes the strategic choice to contend with the other.128    
 
In the second stage, as conflict intensifies, the single issue dispute becomes a wider more 
general dispute between the groups.  This widening of the conflict draws in a number of 
previously external or uninvolved actors.  It is when the grievances can be generalised 
and put forward as a threat to the identity of a group, or sub-group, with a significant 
membership who strongly identify with the organisation that the possibility of conflict 
arises.129  Within terrorist organisations this threat may, as previously indicated, be 
framed as a threat to the historical legitimacy of the organisation.  In application to intra-
organisational conflict while one sub-group may frame this as a threat they do not frame 
it as a threat to the sub-group but to the organisation or the movement as a whole.  Within 
this stage of the conflict the aim of the groups involved may be diverted from the stated 
goal of the organisation to a concentration of damaging their opponents in conflict.  This 
can be viewed in violent feuds between former comrades which occur in the aftermath of 
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numerous terrorist splits, an issue which will be dealt with in more detail when discussing 
the issue of post split competition.    
 
The third stage of the model details how the conflicting actors are entrapped in conflict.  
The conflict must first undergo a process of de-escalation before a resolution is 
possible.130  As detailed in previous sections in order for a resolution to be feasible the 
timing and conditions must be right, and often times influential individuals may require a 
change of heart.  If an aggressor faces significant resistance from their supporters and/or 
membership they may have to forsake the conflict in order to retain this membership and 
support.  Alternatively a conversion may take place where influential actors on one side 
are persuaded of the merits of their opponents’ position and thus convert to their 
viewpoint.131  In such circumstances it is clear that one must again consider the roles 
played by influential individuals in organisations and groups. 
 
This framework was developed in reference to international conflict, a model applied to 
explain western terrorism.  It is here posited that such a framework, with minor 
alterations, can prove beneficial in gaining a more comprehensive understanding of intra-
organisational conflicts and resultant splits.  The present research proposes that when 
applied to intra-organisational conflict that the split would take place in the crossover 
between stages one and two of the conflict. However, if the split is to be avoided stage 
two must be bypassed and stage one must move straight into the third stage where de-
escalation and resolution of the conflict takes shape.  Such a framework can prove 
indispensable for those wishing to understand and explain splits in terrorist organisations. 
 
2.4 Intra-Organisational Conflict in Terrorist Organisations 
While the above analyses outline and describe the different forms and stages of the 
process of conflict in general what follows specifically looks at intra-organisational 
conflict within terrorist organisations.  There is an assessment of central issues which can 
bring rise to conflict and how the organisations deal with internal struggles.   
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As suggested earlier terrorist groups are organisations which operate in very close, 
secretive and security conscious environments.  While the emphasis on organisational 
security is put in place so as to protect the group and its members from external threats it 
does not always prove beneficial in protecting the membership against the internal threat 
posed by intra-organisational conflict.  This is detailed in the case of the Japanese Red 
Army outlined by Horgan.  In this extreme case fourteen members of the group were 
tortured and killed by their fellow members after an argument about ideological issues 
pertaining to the organisation.132  While not all intra-organisational conflicts end in such 
circumstances it is clear that ideological disagreements about the direction the 
organisation should be taking are some of the most common foundations for intra-
organisational conflicts within terrorist organisations.  These internal conflicts can lead to 
debates and arguments about the optimum strategies for a specific situation or the 
organisation as a whole.133  These ideological differences are not the sole cause of intra-
organisational terrorist conflicts.  In the case of splits the intra-organisational conflict 
leads to the presence of rival organisations competing for the same resources, supporters 
and members.  Irvin, in specific reference to militant nationalist organisations outlines 
five key conditions which can lead to the presence of intra-ethnic competitors.134  The 
first situation is that of a divergence of opinion with regard the relationship between the 
armed and political campaign.  The general argument is about whether the armed 
campaign can be subordinated by the political one, or vice versa.  This relationship 
between the political and armed wings is similarly noted by Crenshaw as a potential 
source of conflict.  Distinct from Irvin, Crenshaw points to the barrier which is often 
placed between the political and armed wings so as to retain the legality of the political 
wing.  The independence generated for the terrorist group from this can potentially lead 
to conflict.135  Subsequent to the armed and political relationships the definition and 
selection of ‘legitimate’ targets for violent attacks can lead to confrontation within the 
organisation.  This is a dilemma faced not just by terrorist groups but by all armed forces, 
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legal or illegal.  The selection of targets can have a significant affect on an armed 
campaign and the reaction taken by the immediate and wider targets as well as the levels 
of support given to the armed campaign or the organisation in general.  Following on 
from this Irvin outlines how the presence of leadership rivalries, specifically with respect 
to the armed wing can invariably lead to internal conflict.  The present author argues that 
the presence of leadership rivalries within the political wing should be equally focused 
upon, especially if and when there is a definite agenda on behalf of one sub-group to 
move the organisation further away from military action and closer to a political 
approach, or vice-versa.  The penultimate issue covered is that of the effect of regime 
repression on organisational proliferation.  This repression can be structural and 
behavioural repression.  While it is not inferred in the original text the repression can be 
either external repression by the legitimate government or security forces, or alternatively 
internal repression by the organisational leadership of the political and/or armed wings of 
the organisation.  The final factor is in regard to organisational coalition or alliance.  Irvin 
maintains that particularly for left-leaning ethno-nationalist groups the presence of 
alliances with radical organisations drawn from other ethnic groups can invariably lead to 
internal conflict.136  This final factor put forward is one which not only has a significant 
impact on militant nationalist groups but on all organisations, both violent and non-
violent.  Zald and Ash outlined that in social-movement organisations if an organisational 
leadership is not fully committed to a coalition of groups that this can result in a conflict 
due to the manoeuvring for power within the overall leadership of the alliance.137   
 
It is proposed in the present research that if one can consider and combine aspects from 
each of these explanations of intra-organisational conflict that this can only benefit the 
researcher in achieving the most complete analysis of intra-organisational terrorist 
conflicts and splits as is possible.  The stage-based models outlined earlier are remodelled 
in Chapter 4 to aid in the development a stage-based model of splits. 
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2.5 Chapter Summary 
The purpose of this short chapter was to expand on the previous chapter and use that 
foundation to outline the reasoning for intra-organisational conflict.  While this 
dissertation is nominally analysing organisational splits each split is preceded by an intra-
organisational conflict.  Therefore it is necessary to understand the conflict prior to being 
able to understand the split.  There were three alternative hypotheses outlined prior to 
detailing the reasoning for conflicts within terrorist organisations.  Throughout it was 
clear that a stage-based process model was suitable to explain conflict, and therefore 
resultantly proposed as appropriate for understanding the process leading up to split. 
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Chapter 3 
Exit, Voice, and Entry 
3.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter outlined the theoretical underpinnings to intra-organisational 
conflict.  As a continuation of this discussion what follows is an examination of the 
options present for those individuals who are dissatisfied with the organisation in which 
they are a member.  Hirschman outlined the presence of two options open to disillusioned 
members, these are exit and voice.138  While Hirschman’s examination of these options, 
as well as the earlier detailed loyalty, is developed to assess such circumstances of 
dissatisfaction within economic organisations the assessment is extended to be similarly 
applied for political organisations.  Crenshaw outlined how this model can be similarly 
applied to provide similar explanations for terrorist groups.139  What follows is a detailed 
analysis of Hirschman’s position which is then applied to enhance the understanding of 
splits.  The Hirschman model not only helps in the explanation of splits but also provides 
a guideline as to why certain actors exit at specific times and why others may prefer to 
utilise voice instead of exit.  Similarly it moves on to propose under what circumstances 
these members will forgo voice and exit the organisation.   
 
Following on from a discussion of both exit and voice the concept of organisational entry 
is examined.  Within the majority of studies of organisational splits and their 
circumstances the analysis will focus on organisational decline and membership exit.  
However, it is proposed here that organisational entry must similarly be considered.  This 
is an innovation made by the present author to make the Hirschman model applicable to 
splits.  While the action of split invariably requires members to leave behind a parent 
organisation it similarly entails the entry into a new group.  Consequently any study of 
splits would be incomplete without the acknowledgement of the antecedents to 
organisational entry.  Normally one would intuitively place any discussion of entry before 
that of exit. Within the confines of splits this order is reversed.  The exit from the parent 
organisation precedes any entry into a new group.   
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Throughout there is a clear respect for the heterogeneity of individuals and their motives.  
This respect of difference acknowledges that there is no hard and fast rule as to why 
someone will exit or enter any organisation.  Therefore the reasoning for any individual’s 
leaving or entering need not mirror that of their fellow members.  Leading on from this an 
individual’s decision to split need not be same as the core reasoning behind the 
organisational split.  With this order considered the present chapter is laid out as follows. 
 
• Voice 
• Exit 
• Entry 
 
The work of Hirschman has been given its own separate chapter as it is central to the 
theoretical understanding of individual and organisational action during the course of 
intra-organisational conflict and split.  It is similarly central to the development of the 
hypotheses for the research displayed in Chapter 5. 
 
3.2 Voice  
When one is dissatisfied with the quality of product produced by an organisation and 
wishes to enhance this quality, rather than exit the organisation, they will voice their 
concerns in order to change and improve the product.  While the language used in this 
statement may be regarded as overly economic this can be modified so as to prove 
relevant in a discussion of political organisations.  A similar statement may read that if a 
member, or group of members, disagree with the policies, strategies, outputs or goals of 
the organisation they may articulate their concerns in order to bring about what they 
deem to be requisite changes within the organisation.  In Hirschman’s terms this 
represents the members utilising the option of ‘voice.’  This can be regarded as any 
attempt to bring about change rather than exiting the organisation, either collectively or 
individually, at a time of decline.140  Before this discussion can proceed it must be noted 
that throughout his 1970 study Hirschman constantly refers to a drop or decline in 
‘quality’ as being the impetus for the utilisation of exit or voice.  The ‘quality’ of product, 
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strategy or policy is particularly subjective in nature.  It would be more accurate to state 
that those who in their opinion perceive a significant deterioration in the quality of 
product, policy or organisation will choose to utilise the options of either exit or voice.141  
This provides the grounding for one explanation as to why some members will not utilise 
either option during a period of what by some may be perceived as deterioration.  Those 
who neither exit nor voice concerns may believe that the output or product provided has 
not deteriorated in quality and may have improved in their eyes.   
 
With specific reference to the target of the public good the perception of this need not 
always be as a result of the good being sought but may equally be the result of a change 
in the wider environment and therefore a change in the expectations of the membership 
and supporters of the organisation.  A change in the environment can lead to a change in 
the priorities of a desired public good.142  The success of voice in bringing about desired 
change will increase, to a certain point, with its volume.  As with exit voice can be 
overdone and if used to excess may in fact prove to have a negative effect on the 
organisation.143  Those who persist with constantly voicing concerns on various issues 
often times only succeed in minimising the influence of their own opinions.  Therefore 
voice must be somewhat selective in order to be most effective.  This selectivity must not 
only be with regard to issue, but also with timing.  If voice is applied at a time of 
weakness for the leadership, and therefore a leadership in greater need of membership 
support, it is more likely to bring about the implementation of the proposals of the agents 
of voice.  If this is to have the proposed effects a degree of patience is also required.  It is 
therefore most productive when voice brings the perceived failings of an organisation to 
the attention of the relevant parties within the leadership and provides them with 
sufficient time and opportunity to respond and/or amend these perceived failings.144   
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In the rare situations where the option of exit is unavailable voice is the only tool offered 
to disenchanted members to display their dissatisfaction.145  For those who also have the 
opportunity to exit if they believe that by voicing their concerns this may be effective in 
bringing about the necessary change exit is postponed, and if the sufficient changes are 
brought about exit will no longer be deemed necessary.146  It is by remaining involved 
with an organisation that one can exercise the most significant influence.  Therefore once 
someone has exited they no longer have the option of voice.  However, by voicing one’s 
concerns there is still the opportunity to exit at a future date.147   
 
With respect to determining what type of member utilises voice and when, Hirschman’s 
study provides an astute insight.  It is proposed that those members who care most about 
the quality of a product, or in the case of political organisations a policy, strategy or goal, 
are the most active agents of voice within an organisation.  Consequently they will be the 
most likely to exit when there is what they perceive to be a significant deterioration in 
quality.148  With this rapid exit at a time of perceived quality deterioration the 
organisation is also deprived of its strongest voice.149  If voice is to have a significant 
impact, while these individuals are still present, the individuals utilising it must be placed 
significantly within the organisation.150  It is much easier for leadership figures to ignore 
or dismiss the grievances of an ordinary member than a fellow member of the leadership, 
or other influential individuals.  Similarly the type of organisation may also prove 
relevant when assessing the influence of voice.151  It has been identified that within 
terrorist organisations specifically voice may be regarded as a more serious threat than 
exit.  Within many of these organisations voice can be regarded as an act of mutiny.152  
Crenshaw proposes that this may be due to the belief that terrorist organisations are 
founded as groups who prefer to utilise action rather than discussion as a tool.  
Consequently the leadership may see any form of voice as a questioning of their 
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legitimacy.153  While this may be true it is proposed that if the leadership is to be most 
successful in implementing, and gaining support for, any form of significant 
organisational or strategic change that they must be prepared to actively engage with 
voice.  If they can successfully convince the majority of the membership, and perhaps 
convert some if not all of the agents of voice, in the necessity of change they will have a 
stronger and more robust organisation.  This is central to ones understanding of the 
determination of the result of a split. 
 
Throughout Hirschman’s discussion voice is predominantly referred to as a tool for the 
rank and file speaking out against the leadership.  However, it should also be considered 
as a tool of the leadership.  In order to successfully implement any significant proposed 
changes the leadership must gain support both internally and externally.  The 
achievement of sufficient support will maintain and progress the organisation in a form 
deemed acceptable to the leadership.  Therefore similarly to those rank and file members 
who wish to show their disagreement with the organisation a leadership seeking reform 
must actively voice why they deem it necessary to implement such change.  Through this 
form of voice the leadership is, similar to rank and file detractors, denouncing the 
structure, strategies or goals of the organisation in its current appearance and in turn are 
calling for reform.  When voice is utilised as a tool of protest against the leadership the 
remonstrated against may wish to defend their position.  When voice is used as a tool of 
the leadership to call for organisational change the defence may come from the rank and 
file membership.  This defence of the organisation in its current form generally comes 
from those traditionalist members who do not approve of proposed changes.  It is 
proposed here that voice should not be considered as a one sided event.  In order to 
produce the best analysis possible voice must be considered a two-sided dynamic process.   
This enables the analysis of the original action of voice as well as the subsequent 
responses.  Dyck and Starke propose the nature of voice is dependent on the reception 
which it receives from the target audience and have suggested that dependent on the 
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reaction voice may exist in one of three forms; tolerated, resisted and militant voice.154  
This ascribes to the notion of voice as a dynamic process.   
 
When discord arises in the rank and file it is most likely to start as a passive conversation 
between detractors with minimal confrontational action taken.  If and when the position 
held by detractors is legitimised to some degree by a figurehead or influential individual 
the group is more likely to develop a stronger group identity and commit themselves in 
attempting to bring about their desired change, leading to active resistance on the part of 
the leadership, or proponents of the status quo.155  This change in determination, identity 
and action can be accounted for by a number of factors.  When the dissension is coming 
from a less influential level of membership the leadership are content to tolerate the 
protestations and not actively interact with them as they are aware that a reaction will aid 
in the criticisms gaining a wider audience.  When the dissenters’ viewpoints are actively 
sponsored by an influential individual within the organisation it may prove to be 
detrimental for the leadership not to respond.  If the leadership wish to maintain and 
promote their position they must now defend against the accusations of their internal 
detractors.   Therefore with the active support of an influential individual voice has 
moved from being tolerated to resisted.  It can further change form if and when voice and 
the reaction to it spreads wider than the original issue of discontent.  In these 
circumstances there may be a direct questioning of the suitability of the leadership as a 
whole, not just a questioning of their judgement on the original issue.  The reaction to this 
challenge may become more militant in nature and can lead to the attempted disparaging, 
segregation or expulsion of the dissenting voices, or the overthrow of the leadership. 
 
There may be a number of different policies, strategies or tactics which members disagree 
with, however, it is only those which they deem to be altering the very essence of the 
organisation and its values which they are most likely to concentrate on and persist 
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with.156  The peripheral issues, while vocally disagreed with, are often times not actively 
pursued or protested against.  It is clear that voice can be overdone and consequently the 
power of dissent can diminish.  As a result those dissenting voices must choose their 
battles wisely.  This is especially true within organisations, such as terrorist groups, 
where voice can be viewed as an act of mutiny.  Detractors weigh up the benefits and 
costs of their dissent before deciding whether to actively pursue an issue.  If as a result of 
this rationalising process the costs outweigh the benefits then they are less likely to over 
actively provide a dissenting voice.  However, in those situations where they believe that 
the very essence of the organisation is potentially being harmed with the proposed action 
the rationalising process for that particular group or individual then deems the benefits of 
dissent outweigh their negative consequences.  This rationalising process does not only 
encapsulate the results which success or failure bring but the degree of support which the 
dissenters gain both internally and externally by challenging the leadership on this issue.  
This is only one specific aspect which is considered.  If the divisive issue is deemed a 
defining component of what that organisation aims and stands for, and therefore what it is 
to be a member irrespective of the levels of support those who hold this issue in such 
importance will actively voice their opposition.   
 
3.3 Exit 
So far in the dissertation the antecedents to exit have been discussed in depth, with only 
limited reference to the formal departure of individuals or sub-groups.  The most 
obviously defining factor of a split is the exit of a number of actors from the organisation 
to form a new group.  This organisational exit is generally preceded by some form of 
voice, hence it’s positioning within the chapter.  What follows is a discussion of 
organisational exit in general and exit from terrorist organisations specifically.  
Hirschman’s model of is assessed and applied in order to explain the conditions pertinent 
to organisational exit and why some individuals exit and when.  Developing on from this 
there is a discussion as to why the exit of some groups and individuals leads to the 
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establishment of a new group while the only quantifiable result from the exit of others 
will be a lessening in numbers of the original organisational membership. 
 
In outlining who exits and when Hirschman makes a distinction between those who exit 
an organisation through deterioration in quality and those who exit upon the raising of 
membership cost.  Hirschman proposes that those who care most about the quality of a 
product are the strongest proponents of voice.  It is these individuals who will be the first 
to exit with a significant perceived drop in the quality of the product or policies proposed.  
In their membership they are likely to be amongst the most active and vocal actors.  
However, when the cost of membership significantly rises this will not negatively affect 
their membership.  This rise in cost will not even bring about a consideration of exit.  The 
escalation in membership cost brings about the exit of marginal actors within the 
organisation, those who care least about the quality of the product produced or policy 
pursued.157  An extension of these hypotheses proposes that those who exit due to a drop 
in quality are more likely to set up new organisations after their exit than those who exit 
due to a rise in cost.  This extension is considering that there are no closely competing 
organisations already there.  If there is an existing organisation with a perceived to be 
superior product quality conscious members may in turn join this organisation as opposed 
to developing their own.  This membership of the competitor organisation, similar to the 
previous membership, will not be dependent on cost.  Consequently the quality conscious 
actor may join an organisation with a higher quality product even if the cost of 
membership is significantly higher in the new organisation.158  These quality conscious 
members are the ones more likely to have the most to lose personally with deterioration 
in quality.  In relation to political and terrorist groups this may include those who 
personally tie their memberships and political beliefs to a specific policy of the 
organisation.  When this is changed, or proposed to be changed, remaining with the 
organisation can prove detrimental to how they define their political viewpoints and 
strategic and policy support.  The change in quality may create a breakdown in the 
cognitive and ideological linkage between the member and their beliefs and the policies 
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and strategies of the organisation.159  Therefore this perceived drop in quality provides 
members with a choice to ‘actively stay’, and activate their option of voice, or to ‘actively 
flee’, and activate their option of exit.160  The weakening of quality must be substantial in 
order for these members to even consider exit.161  With their exit the perceived quality of 
the product and policies produced by the organisation will continue to deteriorate.162  The 
degree of quality differs from actor to actor.  Therefore quality is in the eye of 
beholder.163  In those organisations, such as terrorist groups, where voice is considered 
mutiny and exit treachery, the intention and the result of either one or both of these 
actions by quality conscious members is carried out with the intention and result of 
destruction rather than reformation.164  The concentration of any new organisation created 
by the exiting members frequently places a strong emphasis on damaging the parent 
organisation.  This new organisation will not contain all of the members who disagree 
with the parent organisation on the specific issue which provoked exit.  There will be 
those who fundamentally disagree with the organisation, and who may even actively 
voice this opposition, but who decide to stay.  These individuals have chosen to ‘actively 
stay’ with the parent organisation as they believe that they will be more successful in 
fighting for reform from within rather than exiting and starting afresh by founding a new 
autonomous group.165  Equally their decision to stay with the original group may be 
intrinsically tied to their organisational loyalty. 
 
Crenshaw acknowledged that governments and security forces wishing to counter the 
terrorist threat should be aware of the opportunities for exit within terrorist groups and 
should seek to incorporate these opportunities in their wider strategy of counter-terrorism.  
She cites the example of the Red Brigades in the aftermath of the murder of Aldo Moro.  
The authorities successfully dropped the cost of exit in light of the disillusionment within 
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the organisation by offering new, non-violent incentives and therefore increased 
opportunities for exit.  Leading on from this example Crenshaw suggests that counter-
terrorist initiatives should not be directed at defeating the terrorists militarily but by 
promoting discontent and dissent within the organisation.166  Therefore counter terrorism 
initiatives benefit greatly with a clearer understanding of both how and why members 
leave terrorist groups, the physical exiting of the organisation but perhaps more 
importantly why and how they psychologically disengage from terrorism.167  This final 
stage of the process of terrorist involvement,168 psychological and physical 
disengagement and exit, is the stage which there is the least research about, yet it is this 
phase which may be most beneficial in understanding if one is to counter the threat of 
terrorism.169   
 
Horgan notes that terrorist disengagement can take place at either a physical or 
psychological level and can be influenced by push or pull factors, or a combination of 
both.  It is proposed that an actor need not be psychologically disengaged from terrorism 
to physically disengage from the act or the group, and vice-versa.170  In relation to an 
individual’s motivations to disengage this may be influenced by perceived negative 
aspects or circumstances within the organisation (push factors) or positive external 
factors which entice an individual or group away from terrorism and/or the terrorist group 
(pull factors).171  What has been covered so far with regards to the Hirschman model of 
exit has been physical organisational disengagement motivated by push factors.  As 
always one must be aware of the environmental circumstances in which a specific action 
takes place or opinion is formed.  The application of pull factors as proposed by Horgan 
deals with this issue sufficiently.  One common pull factor with regards to organisational 
exit is the presence of an alternative.  While members may be disillusioned with the route 
being taken by the organisation172 they may not necessarily wish to exit and form a new 
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organisation.  If there is already a convenient existing alternative this facilitates an easier 
exit for the individual or group.  As referenced earlier the rise of the PQ provided 
discontented FLQ members with an alternative constitutional route to their purposive 
goal of an independent Quebec.173  Pull factors need not even be predominantly related to 
the organisation itself.  Some of the most common reasons for exit from a terrorist 
organisation are personal to the exiting individual.  Active terrorism is often times a 
barrier to leading a normal life.  Therefore the opportunity for career progression or the 
desire to start a relationship may ‘pull’ an individual away from their involvement with 
the group.174  
 
One of the most common rationales for exit is that of disconnect, a push factor.  This 
refers to the leadership being disconnected from the expectations which the membership 
and supporters hold for them.  When there is a significant level of disconnect it is more 
likely that the organisational leadership will implement, or attempt to implement, divisive 
policies or strategies.  This is not just true for terrorist organisations but it is the case for 
all forms of human organisation.  Within the context of terrorist organisations, as well as 
other political organisations, it can easily happen that the leadership can become 
increasingly isolated from their membership as well as the individuals and groups which 
they claim to represent.  This is displayed by Adriana Faranda, a former member of the 
Red Brigades, when discussing the lead up to her departure from the organisation. 
 
“By that time the Red Brigades could no longer speak any language except their 
own.”175 
 
This displays that disconnect need not only be conveyed through the policies and 
strategies of the group but can also be exhibited in how the organisational leadership 
present themselves and their viewpoints to their members and supporters.  This sentiment 
is echoed in a quote from an Official IRA member. 
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“[The Leader] brought the trouble on himself by not being in touch with the mood on the 
ground.”176 
 
If they are not actively consulting with their members and supporters leaders will not be 
informed of the expectations on them.  Consequently it is more likely that they lose 
support and members as they become disillusioned with the wide gap between what they 
expect of the organisation and its leadership and the reality of what the actual leadership 
actions and sentiments are. 
 
3.4 Entry 
In order for a split to take place a group of members must invariably leave a parent 
organisation to form a new group.  This specific action of split consequently involves 
organisational exit.  It similarly involves the development of and entry into a new 
organisation.  Therefore if one is to comprehend the phenomenon of organisational split 
they must clearly understand why individuals join organisations as well as exit.  With 
respect to a split the exit from the organisation and the entry into the breakaway group are 
inter-dependent.  Intuitively one should cover entry into an organisation prior to exit.  But 
in the case of splits it is exit which precedes entry and this is why entry is dealt with here 
after exit.  While not identical to the initial entry of individuals into a new organisation 
there are parallels which need to be drawn upon. 
 
Within the study of splits one should not treat those entering the new organisation as a 
homogeneous grouping.  A complete overview of organisational entry with respect to 
splits must respect the heterogeneous nature of those joining the new organisation.  This 
heterogeneity can be on a variety of levels.  At the most basic level the diversity is 
displayed in the levels of experience of those entering the new organisation.  Prior 
involvement in the parent organisation may have been at leadership or rank and file levels 
of membership.  With specific reference to terrorist organisations one must also consider 
whether the individual was involved in the armed or political wing of the organisation, or 
perhaps both.  The variety of roles within any one organisation establishes that this new 
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membership may have come from diverse organisational backgrounds and therefore had 
diverse organisational experiences.  This may lead one to propose that the rationale for 
entering the new organisation, and previously leaving the parent organisation, may differ 
from member to member judging on their previous organisational experience.  While this 
focus is on those who have been previously involved in the parent organisation there are 
also those who are joining an organisation without any previous organisational 
experience of any sort.  The rationale for their entry must similarly be independently 
considered.  This consideration of previous experience is only the tip of the 
heterogeneous iceberg.  Building on from this differentiation must be a similar respect for 
the timing of entry.  Not all dissidents join the new organisation at the point of inception.  
There are those who remain after the split and at a future date exit so as to join the 
dissident group, and there are those organisational novices who will join the group at a 
time other than the point of inception.       
 
The organisational approach to terrorism stipulates that recruits join for various reasons, 
not always centrally tied to ideological commitment.177  Similar to the rationale 
influencing exit entry into a terrorist organisation, or any other organisation, may be 
personal rather than political or ideological.  As a significant proportion of new recruits 
moving into terrorist organisations are young adolescent males their entry into the group 
may be more linked to a sense of rebellion as well as belonging, comradeship and the 
desire for social status.178  This desire to join a terrorist organisation in order to enhance 
an individual’s appearance to others is a common characteristic of nationalist and 
separatist groups.  These groups are more likely to be integrated within the community 
and while a significant proportion of the members of that community may not agree with 
the tactics and strategies of the terrorist group they may respect their goals.179  Taking 
this all into consideration a strong ideology or purposive goals will not be sufficient to 
attract a significant number of new recruits to any organisation.  The leadership must 
therefore be able to put in place sufficient personal and social incentives to attract and 
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retain recruits, and these at times may be supported by material incentives.  If an 
organisation is unable to retain and attract recruits the organisation itself will decline and 
cease to operate.180  Some members may even join an organisation without being fully 
aware of the purposive goals, these are often times later learned through active 
involvement with the organisation. 
 
The geographical location in which a person resides can have a significant impact on 
them joining a specific group.  The influence of this regionalism can derive from the 
influential individuals living in the area, as well as the historical and modern day 
circumstances relating to the locale.  These geographical areas may be as small as an 
apartment block or housing estate, or as large as a country or even continent.  Terrorist 
organisations can invariably find it easier to recruit in specific areas as opposed to 
others.181  Within certain areas the organisation’s ideals are entwined with local 
aspirations.182  These ideals can be in reference to the purposive goals of a movement or a 
more specific goal with respect to the local area.  A terrorist organisation may have a 
specific role to play in a geographical region which supersedes the purposive goal of the 
organisation in the eyes of local members.  Such a role may be in regional defence or 
local policing.  If the organisation is providing a specific public good for the area and its 
residents this may persuade individuals not just to support the actions but they may also 
be encouraged to join.  As was stated earlier the purpose of a political organisation is to 
supply a public good for the membership as well as the greater public they claim to 
represent.  While there may be a larger public good the organisation is aiming to achieve 
for the entire population there are at times regionally specific public goods they wish to 
achieve.  At a time of split regionalism proves one of the most dominant rationales in 
choice of whether to remain a member of the parent organisation or join the newly 
established dissident group.  This can be especially true for the ordinary rank and file 
members whose membership is not as closely tied to ideological and purposive elements.  
Members often times tie their membership to that of local influential individuals.  These 
may be family members, friends or the local leadership.  If a member who they trust and 
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look up to is adamant on joining the dissidents or alternatively staying with the parent 
organisation this may have a significant influence on the choice made.  Tied to this if the 
vast majority of the membership within a designated geographical area are members of 
one specific organisation then the cost of membership of their rivals rises dramatically.  
All of these choices are made in the context of the situation.183  Horgan posits that in 
order to fully understand the rationale behind a person’s initial engagement with a 
terrorist organisation one must be fully aware of the personal factors, setting events and 
the social, political and organisational context.184  The personal factors are in reference to 
the psychological factors experienced by the individual during the process of initial 
involvement.  These may often overlap with the setting events which consider the past 
contextual influences on an individual.  These factors are unchangeable as they have 
taken place in the past.  The final factors are those of the social, political and 
organisational context.  This refers to the terrorist organisation itself, its social standing 
and how it portrays its aims, strategies and ideology.185  These variables provide more 
structured headings for the discussion which preceded.   
 
With all of these variables considered it shows that the decisions made by any one 
individual are meaningful for that person at that point in time.  A person can only make a 
decision based on their knowledge and beliefs at any specific point in time.  This 
viewpoint is in tune with the rational choice perspective applied to terrorism.  This 
approach places emphasis on the consequences of a specific behaviour.186  The individual 
weighs up the costs and benefits of a specific action with the information and knowledge 
they have at that point in time, and as a result comes to a decision as to what action to 
take, if any.  This process is extremely personal in nature and need only be relevant to 
that individual.  For each person different factors carry different weight in their decision-
making process.  This individual perspective works well when applying organisational 
theory as it considers individual actors as rational beings.  Rationality need not always be 
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tied to the purposive goals of the organisation but are tied to the rational processes and 
intentions of each individual member. 
 
3.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has introduced and developed the organisational work of Hirschman187 to 
aid the explanation of split.  It is proposed that in the process of split the exit of the 
breakaway group is preceded by their voicing of concerns over the perceived drop in 
quality of the organisation or a specific aspect.  While the original model outlines the 
reasoning and process of exit, loyalty and voice it is proposed here that when modified to 
fit organisational splits it is necessary to also consider organisational entry, which follows 
exit.  The allegiance of individuals post-split is not always linked to the reasoning of split, 
and may not even be tied to any specific organisational factor.    
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Chapter 4 
Theory of Splits 
4.1 Introduction     
What has been detailed in the dissertation to date has been an analysis of some of the 
important factors which need to be initially considered before one can gain a detailed 
understanding of organisational splits.  However, while a reduction in support, intra-
organisational conflict and membership exit and entry may have their parts to play in 
organisational splits they do not always lead to schism.  Therefore what follows in this 
chapter is a theoretical analysis of why and how organisational splits take place.  In 
keeping with the design of the preceding chapters the analysis begins with an 
examination of the literature on organisational splits before narrowing the discussion to 
focus on splits in terrorist organisations.  While in the main the analysis focuses on the 
lead up to and the act of split it has been deemed important that the section should not 
just finish with the splitting of the organisation.  The actual split should never be regarded 
as an endpoint, but merely as the end of the beginning of a process whose effects are 
invariably visible for some time after the event of the split. Consequently this section 
concludes with an analysis of the situation in the aftermath of the organisational split, 
focusing predominantly on post split inter-organisational competition prior to outlining 
the hypothesised process-model for splits to be tested in the research.  Therefore the 
chapter is laid out as follows 
 
• Organisational Splits 
• Process Model of Splits 
• Splits in the Terrorism Literature 
• Splits: How Terrorist Groups End? 
• Post-Split Competition 
 
Within these sections there is, where relevant, a critical analysis of existing models and 
theories of splits.  
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4.2 Organisational Splits 
Preceding the split of an organisation the group will factionalise through different forms 
of intra-organisational conflict as has been described in Chapter 2.  Some researchers 
regard the intra-organisational conflicts and wider societal changes as being the primary 
causal variables of organisational split.188  The factionalism of the group predominantly 
grows from the call from certain sections of the organisation for a change in policies 
and/or practices.189  However, these factions may have their roots in previously long-
standing cleavages between sub-groups.190  For this reason analysts of splits must have 
clear understanding of the historical precursors, as they may prove informative in the 
search for a viable explanation.  Similarly they must not stop their analysis at the point of 
split as the far-reaching effects may prove more significant than the action itself.  As was 
observed in the analysis of the 1969 split in the Indian National Congress the effects of 
the split can be significantly observed for a decade and beyond in subsequent political 
trends and forces.191  It may be found in this historical analysis that the organisation has 
endured a number of different splits throughout its existence.  One can then assess 
whether or not there is any recurring theme which can provide an insight to the 
organisational split under examination.   
 
Balser describes factionalism as concerning groups belonging to the same organisation 
‘that come into conflicts as they pursue different goals, strategies and tactics, stemming 
from their diverging interests.’192  This description can prove to be significantly 
misleading as in the course of organisational factionalism the divided groups do not 
always differ on all three of the factors detailed by Balser.  For example it is common that 
divided factions will be in agreement on the purposive goals they wish to pursue, 
however, have become factionalised in their views as to how best to achieve these goals.  
A clear example of this is evident in Khadka’s analysis of factionalism in the Nepalese 
Communist movement where the movement was divided into two factions, both of which 
wished to abolish the existing monarchy, however, one wished to do so through 
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democratic means and the other through people’s agitation.193  This example illustrates 
the presence of agreement on goals but a split occurring due to a disagreement on how 
best to achieve these goals.   
 
While the existence of factions and internal organisational disagreement may prove 
difficult for an organisation their presence do not always lead to organisational split.  A 
split only occurs when one of these factions deems it necessary to leave the organisation 
to form a new group, and the two major predictors of the development of factionalism, 
and ultimately split, have been noted as being the ‘heterogeneity of the social base and 
the doctrinal basis of authority.’194  Consequently larger organisations may be deemed 
more susceptible to organisational factionalism and split as the larger the organisation the 
more heterogeneous it is likely to be.  Khadka’s example of the Nepalese Communist 
movement once again illustrates this as it was observed that the larger the movement got 
the more internal feuds and factionalism proliferated.195  However, this should be only 
regarded as a prologue to our understanding of factionalism and splits, and we must 
question whether it is in fact the heterogeneity of a group’s social base that can be the 
cause of a large group’s factionalism.  There may be other factors at play within a split 
which may at first have been explained by heterogeneity.  Each case of factionalism196 or 
split must be taken on its own merits and they must be analysed as to why and how each 
individual case occurred.  For example what may be regarded as the result of 
heterogeneity in one case may be the result of a clash of personalities in another.197  
Therefore while the theoretical proposals of Zald and Ash and others may prove useful as 
guidelines, a guideline on what can be expected is all that they can really be.  They must 
not be treated as true for each split until it has been applied and tested against the 
individual case. 
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With respect to the issue of doctrinal authority Zald and Ash noted that those 
organisations concerned with questions of an ultimate ideological truth and theoretical 
matters are more susceptible to splits than those affected by less theoretical matters.  
Within this proposal it is not the actual ideology but the ideological concerns leading to 
the questioning of organisational authority and the behaviour of the leadership which will 
eventually split the organisation.198  Therefore if one is to ascribe to this claim it would 
follow that if the leadership can adequately deal with this questioning and convince the 
doubting membership of their authority and behaviour they can lessen the magnitude of a 
split, or completely fend it off.  Again this does not posit that those organisations less 
fixated with theoretical and ideological truths will not split, it is merely saying that they 
are less likely to do so. 
  
In organisational splits internal and external factors interact differently from case to case 
and therefore the way in which factionalism and schism occurs varies from organisation 
to organisation, and even in an organisation which experiences multiple splits each 
individual case may take place for differing reasons.  While organisational split may be 
regarded as the dependent variable each individual split may be best explained by a 
distinct set of factors or by the same set of factors with varying degrees of importance.199  
These factors must be considered alongside the effects of the external environment, as if 
one only considers the internal factors their analysis will be incomplete.  Similarly no 
analysis should view one specific factor, be it internal or external, as being fully 
responsible for an organisational split.200  In their 2009 examination of schism in the 
Czech environmental movement Shriver and Messer noted that multiple factors 
contributed to the factionalism and splits within the movement.201  While the movement’s 
ideology proved to be a major contentious issue within the Rainbow Movement202 the 
authors also noted the important roles which the changing political situation and debates 
on organisational tactics and strategy similarly factored in to the explanation of the 
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organisation’s splintering.203   Therefore what is portrayed here can only be regarded as a 
framework of different circumstances in which an organisation may factionalise and 
ultimately split.   
 
All forms of human organisations go through a variety of different disagreements and 
conflicts, yet not all of these conflicts result in split.  The question must be then asked as 
to what forms of conflict result in organisational schism.  Sani and Reicher propose that 
splits will only develop from those conflicts which the sub-groups, or at least one of the 
sub-groups, deem to be potentially threatening to what they consider to be the very 
essence of organisational identity.  This is reflected in the inability of the conflicting 
groups to compromise on tactics, strategies and/or goals as this would result in a 
compromise of identity.  The authors therefore concluded that identity should not just be 
perceived as correlating with schism but as being a causal antecedent.204  Not all 
members will classify the same issues as being a defining element of identity and 
therefore may regard organisational split as unnecessary when others deem it 
unavoidable.  This depends on how important each issue is perceived by the individual 
actors and sub-groups.  Similarly it relies on the opportunities individual members 
believe they will have to change the organisation internally through the application of 
voice as described in the previous chapter.  It is proposed that those who believe they will 
have significant opportunities will forego the chance to split and will stay with the parent 
organisation and attempt to influence internally.  
 
Throughout the literature looking at organisational splits the act of schism is often times 
referred to as being a result of the decline or failure of the organisation.205  However, this 
is too narrow a viewpoint to take and could lead researchers to discontinue their analysis 
of the parent organisation in the aftermath of the split.  While it may be true that the split 
may be illustrative of a declining organisation Balser has shown through her analysis of 
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four separate social movement organisations that the organisation can prosper in spite of 
split.  She cites the examples of Earth First! and the American Federation of Labour as 
being two cases of organisations who succeeded and developed positively in the 
aftermath of a split.206  This finding is in line with the proposal that organisational split 
can provide a positive impact on an organisation and can prove a vital step in the group’s 
survival and prosperity.  Balser cites these findings as being supportive of Simmel’s view 
that schism can be utilised by an organisation in order to deal with internal conflict and 
external threats.207 
 
4.3 Process Model of Split 
It is proposed that organisational splits may be best explained by the design of a suitable 
process model which may be utilised to analyse and describe the various events and 
actions in the lead up to and during a split.  This is an expansion of the position taken in 
Chapter 2 which stated that intra-organisational conflicts are best explained through the 
application of a process model.  Therefore if splits are considered as the result of an intra-
organisational conflict it follows that they should similarly be considered to the result of 
an extended process.  This section critically analyses one such model put forward by 
Dyck and Starke after their analysis of splits in various self governed American 
churches.208   
 
4.3.1 Dyck and Starke Process Model of Breakaway Group Formation 
In their attempts to develop a process model for the development of breakaway 
organisations, and therefore splits, Dyck and Starke indicate that splinter groups form 
 
“when a group of organisational members, frustrated by their inability to 
implement change in their parent organisation, leave it and start up a new 
organisation in which they are free to implement their ideas.”209 
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While it is true that splits can and do occur in such circumstances this does not account 
for the fact that splits can similarly take place with the exit of members diametrically 
opposed to changes which were successfully implemented, or proposed to be 
implemented, during their membership of the parent organisation.  By deciding that splits 
can only take place with the departure of proponents of change this closes analysts off to 
the possibility of different kinds of splits taking place.   
 
Even though there is this fundamental disagreement over the nature of when splits can 
and do take place it is still beneficial for the present study to assess the process model 
proposed in what, in spite of the incomplete definition of splits, is a noteworthy piece of 
work.  The authors propose a six stage process model in order to explain organisational 
splits.  At the end of each stage there is a trigger event which moves the process on a 
stage.  This model is largely based on their research on self governed churches in the 
United States of America.  The model which they have proposed has drawn not only on 
their own fieldwork and research but has similarly benefited from an appreciation of the 
proposals of some others who have been previously described.  The six stages and their 
corresponding five trigger events are: 
 
Stage 1: Relative Harmony     Trigger Event: Conflicting Ideas Event 
Stage 2: Idea Development     Trigger Event: Legitimising Event 
Stage 3: Change                   Trigger Event: Alarm Event 
Stage 4: Resistance                 Trigger Event: Polarising Event 
Stage 5: Intense Conflict         Trigger Event: Justifying Event 
Stage 6: Group Exit 210 
 
As was clearly stated in the introduction to Dyck and Starke’s model this does not give a 
clear picture of all forms of splits.  Due to the sample cases they investigated, and in turn 
based their model upon, the authors only observed those splits which resulted in a 
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breakaway movement formed by the proponents of change.  However, it is proposed here 
that not all splits take place in this way, and that by viewing all splits within the proposed 
model of Dyck and Starke one may be closing themselves off to assessing splits taking 
place with the exit of proponents of the status quo.   
 
It is suggested that one must consider a number of further forms of organisational split.  
The first of these being the exit of rank and file members opposed to the leadership’s 
proposed or actual changes.  It is hypothesized that this exiting group will be largely 
made up of old-guard members wishing to maintain the organisation, its strategies, tactics 
and goals as they were.  The second situation to be considered is when a leadership 
proposing the maintenance of the status quo is overthrown by proponents of change.  In 
the aftermath of this event the former leadership may exit the organisation to set up a 
breakaway group.  In this situation it is proposed that the former leadership will again 
invariably be largely constituted and led by members of the organisational old-guard.  It 
is clear that if these two forms of organisational split are to be considered that a further 
form of organisational split brought on by the exit of proponents of change must similarly 
be considered.  This category of split will take place when the leadership are the 
proponents of change but are overthrown by a section of the membership wishing to 
retain the status quo.  In the aftermath of the coup the old leadership leave to form a new 
organisation based on their beliefs and ideals.  In this final situation the new leadership of 
the parent organisation will more than likely be the members of the old-guard.  In essence 
what is being proposed here is that the breakaway organisation will not necessarily be 
configured of proponents of change from the parent organisation.  The make-up of the 
new breakaway organisation will be more accurately described an organisation consisting 
of individuals who were unsuccessful in their attempts to either bring about change or 
maintain the status quo within the parent organisation.  Therefore it is important which 
sub-group is in control at the time of split.   At this stage these are simply hypothetical 
proposals which need to be further analysed and tested.  It is similarly necessary to take 
into account breakaway groups formed in the aftermath of their expulsion from the parent 
organisation.  It is likely that this form of organisational split will prove to be 
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significantly different from all forms of voluntary split.211  Equally one must also 
consider the possibility of organisational splits in the aftermath of the death or exit of a 
charismatic leader or influential individual.212  With the death, incarceration or simple 
exit of a dominant leadership figure there can be a struggle to succeed them as leader of 
the organisation.  From the ensuing conflict for leadership those unsuccessful in their 
pursuit of power may split to form their own autonomous grouping.  The critical 
difference in these new organisations will not be in organisational ideology, goals, 
strategies or tactics but in the personalities holding leadership positions.  This form of 
conflict and schism is most likely in those organisations without a clearly organised and 
communicated succession plan.   
 
While the stage model proposed by Dyck and Starke is flawed due to its omission of a 
number of separate possibilities of split it may still prove useful for those wishing to 
assess the phenomenon.  One of the most noteworthy contributions which the study made 
is in its inclusion of an assessment of when splits do not happen.  This second section of 
their research again focused on self governing congregations which were involved in 
intra-organisational conflict but were resolved and did not conclude in the exit of any 
members.  The subsequent model proposed from the analysis of the results proved very 
similar to their model describing the formation of breakaway organisations.  The models 
are identical until the fourth stage of resistance.  While in model of group exit this stage 
is followed by a polarising event in the model describing split avoidance the polarising 
event is replaced by a harmonising event where the two groups agree on working together 
in spite of their differences.  This event is illustrated by the two groups listening to each 
other and trying to find a common ground.  During this event the identity of the 
subgroups are weakened by members focusing on the overall organisational identity 
rather than that of the divisive groups.   
 
This event is followed by the final stage of the process, the stage of dissonant harmony.  
This should not be considered as identical to the opening stage of relative harmony as the 
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conflict is not fully resolved, but the members are actively working together for the good 
of the overall organisation.  This is often times noted for a number of compromises on 
both sides which are necessary for organisational survival.213 
 
Throughout their study Dyck and Starke drew strongly on the findings and proposals of 
Lau and Murnighan,214 among others, and in their conclusions found support for Lau and 
Murnighan’s proposals of when organisational division can be strengthened or weakened.  
Their conclusions suggest that these divisions will be accentuated when sub-groups meet 
independently of other organisational members, and when individual sub-group members 
gain the support of fellow sub-group affiliates in their attempts to implement changes.  
The divide is also further strengthened with the heightened competition between sub-
group and status quo members and the increased grouping together of dissident members 
into a sub-group.   
 
The results of the second part of their study propose that these divisions can be 
weakened, and therefore splits can be staved off, when there is an open exchange of 
information between the proponents of changes and those who wish for status quo 
maintenance.  A similar result was observed when minority group views were 
acknowledged and recognised at an early stage.  Finally the divide diminished when 
members met outside of their sub-groups and identified with the larger organisation as a 
group.215  The only proposal of Lau and Murnighan’s which was not supported was that 
of a weakening of division with the organisation grouping together to tackle an external 
threat.  This does not refute the claim it merely illustrates that there was no unifying 
external threat in the case studies identified with the research.       
 
4.4 Splits in the Terrorism Literature  
Splits in the organisational literature have been analysed so far in the chapter.  What 
follows now is an analysis of how the terrorism literature has viewed the same 
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phenomenon.  Terrorist groups are ‘not monolithic entities that remain constant over 
time.’216  Similar to all social organisations they adapt to their changing environment, an 
adaptation which may at times result in the splintering of the group.217  Few terrorist 
organisations have successfully evaded the effect of organisational split in some shape or 
form.  The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-
General Command (PFLP-GC) can all trace their roots to splits within the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation (PLO) nominally over the issue of the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process.218  Similarly between 1965 and 1975 the Basque separatist movement saw the 
development of numerous splinter groups breaking away from ETA, among these were 
ETA-berri, ETA-VI, ETA (politico-militar) and ETA-Zutik, each group claiming to be 
the true representatives of the movement.219  While not always leading to organisational 
split the Islamist movements in Afghanistan, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Iran and 
Sudan were all brought into serious crisis due to factionalism up to the late 1990s.220  
Recent times have even seen the splintering of sections of the Al-Qaeda movement.  
However, what may be considered as a splintering in Al-Qaeda would sometimes more 
accurately be described as the fragmentation of a terrorist coalition, as opposed to splits 
in a terrorist group.  This was illustrated in 2009 by groups such as the Libyan Islamic 
Fighting Group (LIFG) leaving the Al Qaeda movement which it had joined two years 
previously.221  As this organisation was an autonomous group prior to joining Al-Qaeda 
their movement away from the group must be considered in a different light to the 
formation of a completely new breakaway organisation.   
 
In the lead up to splits in the terrorist organisation, as with the splits in all other human 
organisations, the group divides into two distinct factions.  One of the most common 
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divides put forward is between the militant and the political factions, ostensibly those 
who wish to continue the armed struggle and those who suggest that it would be more 
productive to advance their goals through non-violent political means.222  However, the 
partition is not always this uniform in nature. One has to take into account a number of 
different factors such as regionalism, membership overlap between the militant and 
political and the membership’s political aspirations.  While there may be political and 
armed factions in an organisation, and an overlap between the two, this does not suggest 
that either of these wings is united themselves.  Crelinsten in an analysis of the internal 
dynamics of the FLQ outlines that the most divisive factions within the organisation were 
not strategic between politicos and militants but ideological between Trotskyites and 
Maoists.223  Similarly the divide may have its origins in a leadership struggle224 with the 
membership aligning behind either the potential or actual leadership.225  This division 
may be portrayed by the sub-groups as being based on organisational strategy, however, 
the membership’s decision’s of who to support may be similarly based on a number of 
other more diverse factors such as personality, regionalism and loyalty.   
 
While the reasoning for the factionalism may vary across organisations, and across time 
periods, it is clear that factionalism is not at all uncommon among terrorist 
organisations,226 and especially among the larger organisations.227  Factionalism can be 
more common within larger organisations228 as the larger the organisation the greater 
diversity of opinion there is likely to be with regards the organisational objectives.229  
Crenshaw has proposed that the proliferation of factionalism in these organisations may 
be largely due to the terrorist group’s aversion to internal dissent, or to borrow the 
parlance of Hirschman they are averse to ‘voice’, and often regard it as more detrimental 
than exit.  Therefore the organisations may promote separately functioning sub-groups so 
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as to resolve intra-organisational conflict.230  While not always destructive for the 
organisation this can at times, especially when there is a significant proportion of 
membership discontent, be extremely debilitating for the group in the pursuit of their 
goals.  Therefore it is proposed here that the most successful and long lasting terrorist 
organisations have other mechanisms to deal with their most divisive internal conflicts, 
mechanisms which may be best explained by returning to the work of Albert Hirschman. 
 
4.4.1 Application of the Hirschman Model 
In a treatment of the division between two firms or political parties, and their competition 
for membership and support, Hirschman describes how one of the competing parties may 
achieve greater success.  The situation outlined refers to the ideological division being 
positioned along a finite linear scale from left to right.  If the parties initially place 
themselves at the midpoints of their respective right and left halves this can prove the 
ideal situation for the voters as it will be clear for the majority of them where their 
allegiances lie as ideological distance between them and the parties’ policies will be 
minimised.   
 
However, the situation changes if and when one of the parties, for argument’s sake the 
one on the left-hand side of the scale, is able to shift its location without incurring any 
negative cost while the party on the right-hand side feels ideologically or otherwise tied 
to their existing position on the scale.  In such a situation a vote-maximising party will 
invariably move their position towards the right of the scale.  As long as their position 
remains towards the left of the other party they should retain a hold on their far-left voters 
while stealing new voters from the right-wing party by moving in towards their terrain.231  
The advancing party must be careful in such a situation not to move too far towards the 
right as their party’s position may become indistinguishable from their competition’s and 
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this may result in the emergence of a third party maximising on left-wing voter discontent 
and disillusionment.232   
 
It is hypothesised that a similar model may be applied to factionalism within terrorist 
organisations.  Consider the previously referred to factionalism between those in support 
of militant strategies and those advocating political strategies.  If the political advocates 
see themselves as being tied to their proposed strategies and would not advocate any 
move along the linear scale towards the militants but the militants regard their position as 
more flexible this then provides a distinct opportunity on which the militant leadership 
can maximise.  If they move their position along the scale closer towards the political 
advocates’ while still retaining a militant basis they are more likely to gain the support of 
the undecided members and supporters while still retaining their core militant support and 
perhaps stealing some of the voters from the political advocates.  Such a movement can 
significantly marginalise the faction who feel tied down and can negatively impact on the 
influence which they hold within the movement.  Therefore if the factionalism ultimately 
results in a split it will be, in this hypothetical situation, the militants who are more likely 
to emerge with the largest levels of support and membership.  This supports the 
previously stated position from Chapter 1 that the leadership will aim to insure the 
survival of the organisation in a form as close to their ideal as possible.  Therefore while 
the new position taken up by the militants may not be their ideal it at least retains the 
survival of the movement, and a large proportion of the support and membership, closer 
to their ideals than if they had retained their original position which may have resulted in 
a more dramatic split between the two factions.  The tied down position of the political 
advocates in this situation results in minimal levels of support and membership for their 
grouping in the aftermath of the split and therefore leaves them in a weaker position to 
attain their objectives.  Throughout an organisation’s existence there may be a number of 
such linear factionalisms, sometimes more than one may be occurring at a time over 
different issues, and therefore a successful and long lasting organisation will have to be 
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constantly aware of such dilemmas and deal with them adequately without having a 
perceived drop in quality of their policies, strategies and goals. 
 
This interpretation of Hirschman’s model of party and firm competition may prove 
informative in how we tend to look at organisational splits.  Within the terrorism 
literature when there is a focus on splits there is often the assertion that the splitting of 
organisations can be utilised, or manipulated, in counter-terrorism initiatives so as to 
isolate and nullify the radical factions of the organisations.233  While this can be 
considered accurate it may prove more worthwhile to look at the benefits of such a 
situation in a somewhat different way.  Policy makers and counter-terrorism practitioners 
can benefit more by regarding such intra-organisational conflict and factionalism not 
specifically as an opportunity to merely split off ‘pragmatists from radical rejectionists’234 
but as a more positive opportunity to get a larger proportion of the supporters and 
membership to advocate a more political solution to their perceived problem.  Within the 
terrorist movement and their support network at any one time there will generally only be 
a percentage who are tied down to a particular viewpoint or strategic policy.  In the case 
of organisational splits the more successful splits from a counterterrorism perspective 
may not always be those with a clean divide between the militant and political.  The most 
successful will possibly be those splits which result in the political faction making slight 
compromises235 and convincing the undecided membership and supporters, and some of 
the staunch militants, to join and support their grouping.  This will result in a larger 
membership and support structure for those who eventually wish to achieve their 
objectives through political means.  If in the same situation the political faction had 
believed themselves to be significantly tied down to their position they would have 
achieved significantly less support both externally and internally.  While their position in 
this situation may have been more in line with that of governmental policy their position 
is largely inconsequential if they cannot gain sufficient levels of support within their 
given community and membership.  However, in the situation where they have altered 
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their position in order to gain a larger degree of support and membership they will have 
more influence and effect and therefore will be able to bring a larger grouping on a more 
gradual process towards politicisation and democratisation, and consequently isolate the 
more militant faction weakening their position.  In essence what is being proposed here is 
that splits should not be looked at as a single act where governments and counter-terrorist 
officials see the radical factions of organisations isolated.  They should be regarded as an 
opportunity to bring as many members as possible closer to the acceptance of non-violent 
strategies.  Therefore organisational splits and factionalism must be analysed to establish 
how the political wing can best gain the highest levels of membership and support, and 
therefore lessening the influence of the militants.  In such situations they must be 
perceived as a step in the gradual process towards politicisation.  Eventually if the 
political grouping can maintain their high levels of membership and support they may be 
able to move their position, and that of their followers, back to their original one of a 
purely political position.   In an ideal situation the grouping will not have to compromise 
their political strategies at any point and will be able to bring the majority of the 
membership and support along with them in the implementation of a purely non-violent 
political strategy.  However, this is not always the case in reality and the political 
advocates will have to gradually introduce their supporters to non-violent political 
strategies.   
 
Leaders need to ease in to transition and make sure not to alienate their base.  Alienation 
of the base can make it extremely difficult to make any progress.236  Such a transition can 
require a significant amount of patience on behalf of all actors both externally and 
internally, and the timing of changes in policy must be carefully decided so that the 
leadership are in maximum control and external events play as minimal a negative effect 
as possible.  Similarly often times they may wish to manipulate the external and internal 
sentiment at the time of significant incidents which may move people’s strategic leanings 
closer to their ideal political position. 
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4.4.2 Application of the Irvin Model 
This interpretation of Hirschman’s model may be streamlined in conjunction with Irvin’s 
1999 model.  In this she proposes that the opportunities, constraints and resources within 
which the organisation defines its goals and selects its strategies can be affected by three 
separate factors.  These are regime responsiveness, organisational resources and the 
absence or presence of competing political groups prepared to work with the 
governments.  The interaction between these three variables is said to influence the 
respective size and influence of three categories of members; ideologues, radicals and 
politicos.  Similarly the interaction is said to set the strategic context in which the 
members choose among the variety of violent and non-violent strategies available to 
them.237  Taking all of this into consideration the interpretation of Hirschman’s model of 
inter-group competition will say that at an appropriate time an alteration in the strategy 
adopted by the politicos238 closer towards that of the ideologues,239 without significantly 
compromising their original position will possibly attract a significant proportion of the 
radicals240 and even convince a small proportion of the ideologues to join then.  This does 
not specify that merely by moving their strategy slightly ‘to the right of the line’ that they 
will automatically gain more supporters for their position.  They must justify and 
legitimise their position and strategy using a combination of the tools available to them.  
This can be a gradual process of gaining support around the regime from membership and 
supporters at all levels and waiting for the right time to bring about any proposed 
changes.  They may need to utilise the support and legitimisation given to them by 
various influential individuals and position themselves within the historical context of the 
movement.  Essentially they must convince a significant proportion of the membership 
and support that the position they are taking and the strategies and tactics they are 
suggesting are for the good of the organisation and their purposive objectives, the 
specified public goods as detailed in Chapter 1.  They must simultaneously convince a 
significant proportion that their strategy is not just good for the organisation and its 
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objectives but that is also better than those being put forward by their internal 
competitors or any other alternatives which may be on offer at the time. 
       
4.4.3 Application of the Miller Model 
In line with the organisational way of thinking it may be useful to understand ways in 
which organisations can maintain their levels of support and membership, and therefore 
maintaining organisational unity.  Miller in a study of the Students for a Democratic 
Society (SDS) and Weathermen movements of the late 1960s early 1970s provided four 
key criteria which can aid in the progression and maintenance of an organisation.  He 
indicates that the structure must be flexible as the circumstances will change for the 
grouping and a structure which works well for the organisation at one time, and at that 
specific size, may not necessarily be beneficial for the organisation during another time 
period when they have grown or shrunk in size.  The organisation must plan how to 
recruit new members and also how to use and maintain their support once they join.  The 
leadership must address any gaps between membership expectations and strategic and 
tactical realities.  This does not necessarily require a full compromise on the strategies 
and tactics but leaders must actively consult with their members and if possible convince 
them of the benefits of their proposed position.  The final point addressed by Miller is 
that the organisation must focus on their primary enemies rather than focusing their 
resources on intra-organisational conflicts, or inter-organisational conflicts with former 
comrades in the aftermath of splits.241  If an organisation can successfully consider these 
four points they will be more successful in bringing along the membership to their way of 
thinking and therefore minimise the opportunities available to any internal factions 
wishing to take over the organisation or developing a successful and appealing alternative 
organisation. 
 
4.5. Splits: How Terrorist Groups End? 
In their 2008 study Jones and Libicki noted that of the six-hundred and forty-eight 
terrorist organisations they analysed that one hundred and thirty splintered, this includes 
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twenty-six of the forty-five religious terrorist groups in their sample.242  While their 
statistical analysis may prove enlightening their viewpoint on the nature of splits must be 
considered significantly flawed.  Throughout their analysis of the splintering of terrorist 
organisations they continuously refer to it as a way in which a terrorist group ends.243  
This fails to acknowledge in full the complete process of a terrorist split.  An 
organisational schism need not constitute the end of the parent organisation, as by 
definition it is only a section of the membership which are leaving, and therefore the 
parent organisation can still remain in existence.  It can prove more accurate to describe 
an organisational split as a way for a new terrorist organisation to form, or the end of an 
organisation as a unified political movement.244  While the parent organisation may 
change in membership levels, and possibly strategy, tactics and goals, the organisational 
split does not necessarily constitute the end of this group as can be viewed from the 
examples cited previously, as well as in the case studies of splits in the Irish Republican 
Movement.  The problems which needed to be acknowledged with the Dyck and Starke 
model of organisational split are therefore similarly faced here.  The viewpoint taken is 
much too narrow to constitute an accurate description of all forms of splits.  
 
While it is clear that organisational splits do not purely constitute the end of terrorist 
groups there are comparable elements which play a significant role in both actions.  
Therefore it would be narrow-minded to completely discount what this literature has to 
offer to the enhancement of understanding.  For years the terrorism literature has widely 
ignored the need to engage in a detailed and wide reaching analysis of the factors 
contributing to the end of terrorist organisations.  What research there was mainly 
concentrated on the analyses of individual case studies, from the demise of the European 
left wing terrorists245 to the deterioration of radical Islam.246  In recent years this has 
begun to change with a number of books, and reports being published exclusively looking 
at the end of terrorist groups, the end of terrorism or disengagement from terrorism, or at 
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least dedicating a significant section to these subjects.247  However, while up until 
recently there has been a dearth of literature theoretically assessing the disintegration of 
terrorist organisations the three most informative studies on the subject can be dated back 
to the 1980s and to this day they provide the foundations for a number of the modern day 
approaches to the topic.  The studies referred to are those of Ross and Gurr,248 Oots249 
and Crenshaw.250  Both the works of Crenshaw and Ross and Gurr developed their own 
individual theoretical interpretations of the decline of terrorist organisations.  In their 
separate works they each developed a list of conditions which may produce the demise of 
the terrorist group.   
 
Through their research on the decline of terrorism in Canada and the United States251 
Ross and Gurr outline four principal conditions which may precipitate the decline of the 
terrorist organisation and/or their utilisation of the tactic of terrorism.  These can be 
divided into two separate groups, external and internal conditions as illustrated below. 
 
External Factors: 
• Pre-Emption 
• Deterrence 
Internal Factors: 
• Burnout  
• Backlash 
 
The external factors described are pre-emption and deterrence and the internal factors 
burnout and backlash.  In this framework the external factors refer specifically to 
counterterrorist policies and actions, while the internal factors are general conditions 
which reduce the organisation’s capabilities to continue utilising the tactic of terrorism.   
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In her analysis of the end of terrorist organisations Crenshaw initially stipulated that a 
decline in terrorism can take place due to three factors.  Those conditions detailed by 
Crenshaw are 
  
• Physical Defeat 
• Abandonment of the tactic of Terrorism 
• Organisational Disintegration 
 
Rarely is it that any of these conditions take place independently of one of the others.  
Crenshaw went on to develop her theory further by looking at the end of terrorism rather 
than merely the end of the terrorist organisation with a later paper.  Similar to Ross and 
Gurr she noted that it is important in bringing about an end to terrorism to consider both 
internal organisational and external factors.  Considering how governmental policy can 
actively respond to terrorism she outlined four separate strategies which can possibly be 
implemented in order to tackle the terrorist threat.  These were 
 
• Deterrence 
• Criminal Justice 
• Enhanced Defence 
• Negotiations252 
 
Acknowledging the role these variables may have in ending a group or at least their 
utilisation of the tactic of terrorism she acknowledges that the end of terrorism will come 
about due to one or more of five separate situations.   
 
• Success 
• Preliminary Success 
• Organisational Breakdown 
• Decline in Support 
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• New Alternatives253  
 
Within the context of organisational splits it is likely that of these five separate factors 
organisational breakdown and dwindling support may prove to have the most significant 
effect. 
 
Other more recent authors have developed their own lists of conditions which can bring 
about the end of terrorism or the end of the terrorist group.254  There proves to be a 
significant overlap between their contributions and those of Crenshaw and Ross and Gurr.  
There is one point raised by Gupta255 that terrorists may transition from political terrorism 
to other forms of criminal activity.  Within Crenshaw’s factors this may come under the 
heading of new alternatives.  It may also take place in the aftermath of organisational 
success, or preliminary success, as the organisation no longer has the need for the 
application of terrorist violence they may now revert to other forms of criminal activity to 
fill the void left by the lack of terrorism.  This is a significant factor which is and must 
continue to be appreciated by governments and policy makers alike 
     
4.6 Post-Split Competition 
Any analysis of an organisational split should not end with the split itself but must 
continue by looking to the aftermath of the event and what takes place in the months and 
years subsequent and the consequences, both organisational and otherwise.  While the 
intra-organisational competition for membership and support is a distinguishing feature 
of the lead up to a split this competition, in its new inter-organisational form, intensifies 
in the aftermath when there are two distinct organisations vying within the same 
populations for membership and support.256  The decision as to which faction to side with 
may have been made by many in the lead up to the split but a number of individual 
members and supporters may remain undecided, or may even have been unaware of the 
developing factionalism within their organisation.  It is only when the division is no 
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longer internal, and there exist two autonomous organisations, that many members and 
supporters will make the decision as to which group to side with. 
 
The competition between organisations so close in origins and objectives requires the 
leadership of each group to be responsive so as to distinguish their organisation from 
their competitor’s and therefore make membership and support more attractive.  This can 
often lead to a shift in goals or strategies employed by the organisations, which can move 
closer towards the centre or alternatively towards the extremes.257  The direction of the 
movement is often times dependent on the positioning of their competitor and how best to 
distinguish their group.  The movement in position is not always one sided in nature and 
Della Porta and Diani have noted that the ‘institutionalisation of one organisation can go 
along with the radicalisation of another.’258 
 
Due to the identical origins of both organisations this distinction and competition will not 
be for the purposive objectives but for the immediate goals, strategies and tactics.  This 
competition can often times distract the organisations from the pursuit of their purposive 
objectives with an over-proportionate amount of time and energy being spent on 
competition between two groups who to many external observers may be regarded as 
indistinguishable in nature.  As the conflict intensifies purposive goals are often times 
displaced by the aspiration to harm and inflict injury on the rival organisation.  This can 
lead to growing animosity between the two groups,259 and may lead to a redefinition of 
enemy in the eyes of some members.  No longer are these former allies merely rivals, 
they can become enemies, irrespective of their closeness in goals.  Invariably both groups 
share a common enemy, be it organisational, governmental or societal.  However, they 
are distracted by the perceived necessity to undermine former comrades, and therefore 
may concentrate more on the developing competition. 
 
The level and degree of inter-organisational competition is often times reliant on the span 
of the divide.  In a situation where there is one organisation in the aftermath of the split 
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which is significantly larger than the other they will not see as much of a need to compare 
and justify their positions against those of their competitors.  Due to their dominance they 
will tend not to perceive their former allies as a threat to their position, and can 
consequently pay more attention to moving the organisation forward in the pursuit of 
their goals.  Conversely their rivals will be in too weak a position to effectively challenge 
the stronger party’s position.   However, if there is a relatively even split the competitive 
situation is accentuated.  Both sides will perceive the other as a threat to their position, or 
their potential dominance within the relevant communities.  This can result in a near 
disregard for their ultimate objectives and an over-zealous concentration on demeaning 
their movement competitors.  Ryan witnessed this while researching American feminist 
organisations of the 1960s and 70s.  Within the feminist movement there was a 
considerable level of ‘painful personal attacks’ against inter-organisational 
competitors.260  This climate of competition had a significant debilitating effect on the 
movement as a whole.   
 
Competition can result in the mutual enticement of members or supporters over from one 
group to the other,261 or alternatively can demoralise people to the consequence of them 
moving away from the movement completely.  For those organisations reliant on a very 
specific population for membership and support the level of competition can become 
intensified due to the finite potential communities which they can draw from.  Therefore 
for ethno-nationalist organisations the existence of a competing ethnic group can be 
particularly threatening.262  Within such a situation if a group can assemble a package of 
both purposive and selective incentives which is perceived to be better than those of the 
competing organisation, it will be able to entice new and rival members to join their 
group faster than their competitor can.  With respect to those individuals willing to move 
from one organisation to another in such a competitive situation they will be most likely 
to be those who choose organisational affiliation mainly due to the selective incentives on 
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offer.  Therefore competitive organisations will often find the need to increase the supply 
of these selective incentives263   
 
The resulting competition for support, membership and resources can result in a 
significant variation in organisational behaviour.264  With respect to terrorist 
organisations this change of behaviour can result in a significant rise in the intensity of 
violence.265  Due to the fact that terrorist organisations by definition are committed to the 
application of violence as a tactic to achieve their political targets one of the principal 
competitive arenas becomes the armed struggle.266  This can be witnessed in an escalation 
of violence in the pursuit of organisational membership and support or alternatively 
competition can result in the naissance of inter-organisational violent feuds between the 
former allies.  Violent acts are often times utilised to display the potential, capabilities 
and dominance of the perpetrator in comparison to their rivals.  Therefore the main 
purpose of the act may in actual fact be an attempt to undermine competitors and prove 
the strength of the organisation to their members and supporters, as well as potential 
future recruits on each of these fronts.  Schiller outlines that the purpose of the 
simultaneous attacks by Abu-Nidal on El-Al ticket counters in Rome and Vienna airports 
in December 1987 was not linked to their pursuit of an independent Palestine but instead 
was an act designed to humiliate Yasser Arafat in the eyes of the sympathetic Italians and 
Austrians.267  It has also been indicated in reference to those groups utilising the tactic of 
suicide bombing that in the presence of multiple insurgent organisations, each competing 
for public support, there can be an increase in the scope and quantity of suicide bombings 
as a show of strength from each of the particular organisations.268  Such violent actions in 
a competitive environment can similarly be conceived in order to attract the necessary 
financial resources from external supporters in order to maintain the organisation’s 
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struggle, as well as providing the ability for the organisation to develop the supply of the 
selective incentives necessary to attract and maintain membership.269   
 
External sponsors will not financially support an organisation unless it believes that it has 
the ability to act and achieve its stated aims.  Often times the only way to display this 
ability for action in a competitive environment is by mounting extensive violent actions 
or campaigns of violence.  In this competitive situation, with the heightened threat of exit 
due to the existence of a new close alternative, the leadership of the organisation must 
continually attempt to distinguish their organisation from that of their competitors in 
order to prevent the defection of the membership, support and sponsorship to their rivals.  
If the membership perceive the alternative grouping to be more actively pursuing their 
objectives they will be more likely to defect.270  Therefore the increase in violent activity 
in a competitive arena can be a display of strength and the greater potential to achieve the 
targeted objectives.271 
 
4.7 Hypothesised Process Model 
Through the analysis and consideration of the various models of intra-organisational 
conflict and split, as well as the extended research from the organisational and terrorism 
literature, the theoretical section of this dissertation concludes with the design of two 
stage-based process models, one of split and one of split avoidance.  The first model 
presented is the stage-based process model of split. 
 
Stage 1: The Origins of Split 
Stage 2: Factional Development 
Stage 3: Inevitability of and Preparation for Split 
Stage 4: Organisational Exit and Breakaway Group Formation 
Stage 5: Aftermath of Split: Competition and Re-Organisation. 
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The second is the proposed model of split-avoidance 
 
Stage 1: The Origins of Conflict 
Stage 2: Factional Development 
Stage 3: Successful Application of Voice 
Stage 4: Organisational Change or Maintenance of Status Quo 
Stage 5: Aftermath of Conflict: Re-Organisation 
 
As is displayed above both processes are identical for the opening stages with the origins 
of split or conflict which may date back a significant length of time.  However, with the 
factional and conflict development brought about through a combination of long-standing 
cleavages and invariably a proposed organisational change the critical stage which 
decides the outcome of the conflict is Stage 3.  It is proposed that the actions which take 
place within this stage determine whether the conflict is resolved or results in split.  If one 
of the developing sub-groups accentuates their position by actively preparing for split, 
due to what they deem an irreconcilable conflict perceived to be threatening to 
organisational identity, then the third stage brings about the inevitability of split.  
However, if one or both of the sub-groups successfully apply compromise and voice then 
a split is avoided through either the maintenance of the status quo or the successfully 
supported implementation of organisational change.272  In the aftermath of split there is 
competition for both membership and support with each organisation trying to justify and 
legitimise their position.  Both the parent organisation and the breakaway group need to 
organise and re-organise in some way.  During split avoidance the organisation has to 
similarly re-organise as if there is not an adequate re-organisation in the aftermath of 
conflict the residue may lead to further conflict and possibly split.     
 
These are presented as falsifiable models, and it is recommended that they are tested 
across organisations.  They will be tested in the present research.   
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4.8 Chapter Summary 
The aim of the present chapter has been to complete the theoretical analysis which began 
in Chapter 1.  This has been carried out by specifically looking at the theory of splits. The 
analysis of the existing theoretical literature has been carried out in a critical manner with 
a number of suggestions made so as to adapt and strengthen the existing theories.  The 
research must not stop with the event of the actual split as the consequences of the split 
both internally and externally can prove vital to our overall comprehension of the 
phenomenon itself.  The transition from intra-organisational conflict to inter-
organisational conflict in the aftermath of the split has been focused on in this regard.  
The past four chapters have been designed to illustrate the theoretical background to the 
research before moving into the core of the present study which is the analysis of splits in 
the Irish Republican Movement from 1969 to 1997.  The final section of the chapter 
outlines the proposed stage-based process model for testing.  Two separate models have 
been developed one for the occurrence of split and the other for split avoidance.              
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Chapter 5 
Aims of Present Study and Hypotheses 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of the previous four chapters was to outline the theoretical underpinnings to 
the present research.  From this a set of theoretical hypotheses has been developed for 
testing to compliment the four core research questions, two assessing the splits from an 
organisational perspective and two from an individual perspective. 
 
QO1. Why did each of the splits take place when they did? 
 
QO2. How did each of the splits take place? 
 
QI1. Why do individual members decide to exit from an organisation to join or set up and 
new organisation? 
 
QI2. Why do individual members decide to stay with a parent organisation at a time of 
split? 
 
As with the four core questions the hypotheses have been similarly divided into those 
assessing the splits from an organisational and an individual perspective.  The present 
chapter proposes these hypothesises and signals, in reference to the findings from the 
theoretical chapters, where they have been derived from.   
 
Throughout the previous chapters the analysis of the theories of split has been extensive 
and has critically developed the organisational and individual theories of organisations, 
intra-organisational conflict and split.  From this a theoretical basis for understanding has 
developed.  The purpose for the remainder of the dissertation is to see whether these are 
relevant and applicable to the case study of splits in the Irish Republican Movement from 
1969 to 1997.  While it would desirable to test all of the proposals put forward in 
previous research this is not achievable.  Similarly other assertions while previously 
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presented as theories of split would be better described as tautologies of split, and 
therefore would be meaningless to test, but still necessary to emphasise.  Central among 
these tautologies are that splits are the result of what is perceived, by at least one of the 
sub-groups, to be an irreconcilable intra-organisational conflict.  If the conflict at the 
centre of the split was not deemed to be irreconcilable there would be no purpose of split.  
Therefore the analysis should not test whether the conflict is perceived to be 
irreconcilable but at what stage this perception is formed, and why.  With respect to the 
assertion that heterogeneous organisations are more susceptible to split,273 the very fact 
that the group is splitting indicates that the original organisation was heterogeneous to 
some definable degree.  This tautology deems it unnecessary to test the organisations for 
heterogeneity.  However, what is beneficial is the analysis of what forms of heterogeneity 
makes the organisation susceptible to split.  This is testable in the analysis of the 
interview data through the discernment of what heterogeneities are emphasised by the 
participants.   
 
While the hypotheses proposed are testable within the current case study of splits in the 
Irish Republican Movement the results of this analysis should not be deemed 
representative of all forms of split and therefore require future testing within other 
contexts.  
 
5.2 Organisational Aims and Hypotheses 
At the most basic level the present study aims to assess why and how each of the four 
designated splits in the Irish Republican Movement took place when they did.   Through 
the theoretical analysis from the previous chapters a number of hypotheses have been 
developed to be tested alongside the answering of these research questions.  Displayed 
below are the hypotheses with reference to their theoretical origins. 
 
While the purposive goals of all political organisations are the acquisition of a specified 
public good this is preceded by the immediate goal of organisational survival.  It is 
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posited that organisational survival is at the centre of the actions of all organisations.274  
With respect to organisational split the concept of survival must be further developed.  
With the presence of two competing internal sub-groups it may seem counter-intuitive 
that the immediate goal of both factions would be the same, but yet are competing against 
each other and hence a basic understanding of organisational survival would determine 
that the nature of a conflict puts this goal at risk.  However, in the case of a conflict over 
an issue which is deemed threatening to organisational identity275 the notion of survival 
does not purely constitute the maintenance of the same membership and organisational 
set-up.  For both sides in the conflict, those proposing change as well as those opposing 
it, the immediate goal is proposed to be the survival of the organisation in a form they 
respect and recognise.  Therefore the first hypotheses states        
 
HO1. The immediate goal for each sub-group at the time of split is organisational 
survival in a form which they respect and recognise. 
 
Every human organisation is beset by intra-organisational conflicts.  However, not all of 
these conflicts result in split.  Therefore in order to understand organisational split it is 
necessary to understand if there is a specific form of conflict which precedes split.  Sani 
and Reicher276 propose that splits will only take place when the issue at the centre of the 
conflict is deemed to be threatening to the organisational identity by at least one of the 
sub-groups involved.  The heterogeneity of organisations results in the organisational 
identity being perceived differently by the diverse members and sub-groups.  Therefore 
the issue of perception is central to the second organisational hypothesis which states 
 
HO2. The conflict at the centre of a split is, for at least one of the sub-groups, threatening 
to the organisational identity.  
 
Splits are often times perceived as a stand-alone event determined by an individual 
conflict.  However, it is proposed that they may actually be the result of long-standing 
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cleavages between the sub-groups.277  This is in support of the assertion that splits are 
best explained as a stage-based process rather than a one-off event.  Process models can 
aid in illustrating the development of the division to the point of split.  Therefore the third 
hypothesis reads as follows. 
 
HO3. The roots of the splits will be in previously long standing cleavages. 
 
As will be detailed in the next chapter these and all of the research questions and 
hypotheses will be approached through the application of interview based methodology, 
and analysed using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA).  The data was 
generated through a series of interviews from both sides of each split at both a leadership 
and rank and file level.  In the process of answering each of these two core organisational 
questions and assessing the relevance of the hypotheses the research is drawing 
assessment as to whether or not the processes involved in the lead up to the splits fit in 
the relevant theoretical process models and theories of conflict and split which were 
outlined in the previous chapters. 
 
With the assessment of why and how the organisations split there will be a similar 
assessment as to why and how certain groups were more successful in attracting members 
and supporters than others were.  This provides the research with the next questions in 
regard to organisational splits. 
 
QO3 i). What are the factors necessary to successfully attract members and supporters 
during the course of and after an organisational split? 
 
The obvious question which leads on from this is: 
 
QO3 ii). What are the factors which deter members and supporters from joining a group 
during the course of and after an organisational split? 
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In the process of answering these questions it is necessary for the researcher to apply a 
judgement for each of the four splits as to which sides were most successful, or 
unsuccessful, in the lead up to, during and after each case.278  Success in the aftermath of 
split is not a single factor issue.  The most obvious measure of success is with regard to 
the physical number of members within the movement.  However, one must also consider 
the comparative levels of support for each group in the aftermath of split.  This must 
consider both active and passive support, the levels of finances and weapons acquired 
from external sources as well as the support of the immediate public through for example 
the usage of safe-houses.  This far removed in time from the events, and with the 
clandestine nature of the organisations being analysed, it is difficult to scientifically 
assess accurately the exact levels of membership and support for each group.  Therefore 
the most accurate way to assess the levels of strength for each group in the immediate 
aftermath of split is through talking to those who were organisational members at the 
time of split, as well as in the aftermath.  It is important to assess the perceptions of both 
sides of the divide, as well as well informed external observers, in order to attain the most 
accurate reflection.  This has been carried out through the interview process which will be 
described in the next chapter.  It was complemented with an extensive review of the 
literature written about the Irish Republican Movement.  This has included literature 
written about the extensive Irish Republican Movement as well as ones about specific 
groups and individuals, and the Northern Irish ‘Troubles’ and peace process as a whole. 
This similarly included reviewing the literature produced by the groups and external 
observers from the times of split in their newspapers and pamphlets.  Each source 
assessed, while differing slightly in some aspects, gave the same general assessment of 
the results of each split. 
 
It is accepted that at the time of split in 1969/70 that the division between the groups was 
relatively even in nature.  However, in the subsequent years the Provisional Movement 
gained control of the majority of membership and support.  Regarding the 1974 split 
those who left to form the Irish Republican Socialist Movement are deemed to have been 
in the minority, but a sizeable minority.  Both the 1986 and 1997 splits are regarded as 
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being weighted significantly in favour of the Provisional leadership.  While the research 
question can assess the reasoning behind these groups’ successes and failures a number of 
hypotheses relevant to successful recruitment of membership and support at time of split 
have also been developed from the theoretical base which require testing 
 
Hirschman279 outlined in relation to political organisations that at a time of intra-
organisational factionalism the sub-group who are less ‘tied’ to their position are more 
likely to gain more support than the sub-group who is unwilling to modify their position.  
During a significantly divisive conflict where there are two groups taking diametrically 
opposite positions with a number of members undecided on their position if one of the 
sub-groups is willing to move their position closer to the ‘centre’ they are more likely to 
gain the support of the undecided members than a sub-group who are firm in their 
position.  Therefore in the aftermath of a split the sub-group more willing to compromise 
is expected to gain the larger support.  However, if both groups are willing to 
compromise it is expected that a split will be avoided.      
 
HO4. The sub-group most willing to make compromises is the one most likely to be 
successful in the aftermath of a split. 
 
The final area to be assessed from an organisational perspective in this research is the 
situation of split aftermath.  As has been noted any research on organisational splits must 
not finish at the point of split as the effects of the split are just as important, and often 
times more important, than the process of split.  For the purpose of this section of 
analysis the research question reads as follows. 
 
QO4. What are the significant consequences of the split? 
 
It is proposed here that the consequences will predominantly centre on inter-
organisational conflict and the change of focus of the relevant organisations.  In the 
aftermath of a significant organisational split the goals of the two resulting groupings are 
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transformed.  They are now competing with each other for membership and support.  
Therefore their roles have changed from allies to competitors as a result of the split.  In 
this competitive environment it is proposed that there will be an increased animosity 
between the organisations and that purposive goal aspirations are often replaced with the 
‘need’ to harm the structure and credibility of the rival organisation.280  Leading on from 
this supposition is the development of the final organisational hypothesis to be tested. 
 
HO5. In the presence of significant inter-organisational conflict the purposive goals of 
the organisation will be substituted with the aspiration of harming the rival organisation. 
 
5.3 Individual Hypotheses and Aims 
At the heart of the research when looking at splits from an individual perspective are 
questions of allegiance and the rationale behind this.  It is proposed that the rationale 
behind the choice for national leadership members will be significantly linked to the 
reasoning for the organisational split.  Those members with a significantly low level of 
experience in the organisation will make their decisions of allegiance at a time of split 
based on local issues and influences such as influential individuals and regionalism.    
The Hirschman model goes further than link a person’s decision to their organisational 
level or experience.  He outlines the importance of an individual’s expectations of what 
they wish to achieve through their organisational membership as a deciding factor.  In 
this he distinguishes between those quality conscious member and those whose 
membership is based on selective incentives.  The hypotheses assessed from this 
delineation of levels of experience are as follows. 
 
HI1: The explanation of allegiance for a member of experienced membership and 
leadership will be intrinsically tied to the reasoning for the organisational split. 
 
HI2. The explanation of allegiance for a member with a low level of experience will be 
predominantly tied to local influences and situations. 
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HI3. A quality conscious member will exit the organisation to join or set up a new 
organisation when there is a perceived drop in the quality of the product produced by the 
parent organisation. 
 
The testing of each of these hypotheses will be carried out through the analysis of the 
collected interview data as well as the relevant primary sources.  While the majority of 
the interviewees were sought due to their experiences of organisational splits there were 
also those who exited the movement at a time other than a split.  Therefore this adds an 
extra aspect to the data whereby there can be a comparison between the four sets of 
individual members’ data; these being the data of those who left at a time of split, those 
members who stayed with the parent organisation at the time of split, those who left the 
organisation at a time other than split and those who stayed with the organisation at a 
conflicting stage other than a split.  This multi-layered analysis can supply a richness and 
depth to the results which would have otherwise have been unavailable if the researcher 
solely assessed the data from the time of the splits.  The methodology to carry out this 
research is detailed in the next chapter after which the results of the analysis are 
presented, prior to a discussion of the relevance and applicability of the results. 
 
5.4 The Functionality of Splits as a Process  
The theoretical analysis of both intra-organisational conflicts and splits has indicated that 
splits should not be looked at as an event but rather as a result of a process.  A number of 
stage-based process models have been developed to explain the phenomena.281  Therefore 
the present research, in consultation with previously proposed stage-based process 
models, aims to test the proposed model of organisational split as proposed in Chapter 4 
on splits in the Irish Republicanism. 
 
Throughout this stage of the analysis there is an appreciation of the necessity to identify 
the specific form of split and not to consider splits as homogeneous processes.  This will 
therefore test if the model fits each form of split.  Fundamental to this stage of the 
                                                 
281
 See for example Dyck and Starke (1999); Pondy (1967), p.299; Weinberg and Richardson (2004).  
pp.138-160. 
 94 
research is the understanding that the four splits analysed are not stand-alone entities but 
are interconnected micro-processes within the macro-process of Irish Republican 
involvement in the Troubles. However, it similarly aims to establish the organisational 
functionality of the splits.  Therefore the establishment of the process model aims not 
only to understand the reasoning for the splits but also to determine the functionality of 
the splits as individual entities and as a macro-process      
 
5.5 Chapter Summary 
The present chapter provides a bridge between the theoretical analysis of the previous 
four chapters and the case specific methodology and analysis which follows in the rest of 
the dissertation.  The purpose of the chapter was to outline the research questions, aims 
and hypotheses derive from the theoretical analysis which is to be applied to the case 
studies of splits in the Irish Republican Movement.  The questions and hypotheses have 
focused on the organisational reasoning for the splits as well as the individual member 
rationale for allegiance during and after the splits.  Parallel to these aims is the 
establishment of appropriate stage-based process models in order to explain both the 
reasoning and functionality of the splits as individual micro-processes within the macro-
process of Irish Republican involvement in the Troubles.    
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Chapter 6 
Methodology 
“A central tenet of the approach below is that our primary objective should be to 
understand those who engage in the behaviour.  It is not our job to condemn, to 
condone or to find some objective ‘truth’.”282 
 
6.1 Introduction to Methodology 
The primary objective for any social scientist must be to gain as comprehensive an 
understanding of their subject as possible.  It is this aspiration that was at the core of the 
development of this methodology.  For too long there has been an almost irresponsible 
reliance on secondary and tertiary sources within terrorism research, to the neglect of the 
development of new data.283  This is not to say that the use of secondary and tertiary 
sources should be completely disposed of.  However, if one wishes to gain a clearer 
understanding of those individuals, and the groups, involved in political violence there is 
the necessity to listen to them.  While access to participants may be difficult to achieve it 
is far from impossible.284  The present chapter outlines how the author developed and 
implemented an interdisciplinary285 methodology aimed at garnering a comprehensive 
understanding of splits in the Irish Republicanism from 1969 to 1997.  This methodology 
was multi-layered including the use of both primary and secondary sources in 
conjunction with the analysis of the data derived from an extensive interviewing process.  
Through the application of interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA), an approach 
to qualitative research predominantly used in health psychology, there was an analysis of 
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the data generated from the interviews.  As with all noteworthy interview methodologies 
there was respect and awareness for the numerous ethical issues which arise in such 
research.   
 
6.2 Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis 
A variation of interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) was employed as the 
methodological tool to analyse the primary data generated from the series of interviews.  
IPA is a qualitative research technique which has predominantly been used in health 
psychology.286  However, recently academics from outside of health psychology have 
utilised it in their research.  IPA studies have ranged from an analysis of the sexual 
decision making of gay men287 to terrorism research.  In their 2007 paper Mark Burgess 
and colleagues interviewed both former members of the IRA and peaceful civil rights 
activists to assess how they interpreted the social conditions in a post Good Friday 
Agreement Northern Ireland.  The researchers deemed IPA to be the appropriate 
methodological tool for their project as it provided the researchers with an appropriate 
tool to analyse complex issues that directly impact on the lives of individual participants 
and their decision making process.288  This methodology allowed the researchers to gain 
an insight into how individuals make sense of their social circumstances.     
 
IPA is phenomenological in nature in so far as it entails a broad examination of a 
participant’s lived experiences and an individual’s personal perception or account of an 
object and/or event.  Unlike other techniques it does not aim to produce an objective 
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record of the object or event itself.289  In essence IPA is broadly concerned with how 
people think and what they believe to be important and relevant about the issue290 under 
discussion.291  Fundamental to the success of IPA as a methodology is the 
acknowledgement of the dynamic process of analysis, a process in which the researcher 
plays an active role.292  Throughout the interview process, in which the participant is 
being asked about their own perceptions and understandings of specific lived 
experiences, the participant is trying to make sense of their world and the experiences and 
decisions they are being asked about.  Therefore when it comes to the interpretation 
stages of the process the researcher is fundamentally trying to make sense of the 
participants trying to make sense of their world.293  Consequently this form of analysis is 
declaring that the participants who are interviewed are the experts on the topic at hand, as 
it is an interpretation of their beliefs which will take prominence throughout the research.  
It is not pertinent whether or not these beliefs contain an absolute truth of the situation, 
what is important is that the factors or themes which the participants deem important 
come to the fore in the research.  In IPA the assumption is that the data collected will 
indicate how the participants perceive and make sense of the issue under scrutiny. 
 
Across the social scientific disciplines, and beyond, it is vital that the research questions 
are not altered to suit any one particular methodology; if anything it should be the 
methodologies which are adapted to suit the questions.  This is a view which has widely 
been embraced by IPA practitioners.294  Individual researchers must resolve how best IPA 
may suit their specific research questions, if at all.  It is believed that the present research 
has successfully adapted the IPA technique to the benefit of the study. 
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The nature of many previous IPA studies has led to the researchers regarding ‘traditional 
criteria’ for evaluating research quality, such as reliability, as inappropriate in assessing 
their work.295  While this may have been the case in previous research the political and 
historical relevance of the issue at hand and the nature of the participant group assembled 
have enabled the research results to be assessed under the ‘traditional’ headings of both 
reliability and validity.  While still maintaining the focus of the research on the individual 
participants’ views and perceptions the availability and prevalence of secondary and 
tertiary sources such as speeches and policy papers from the time of the splits has 
provided the author with further valuable resources to strengthen the analysis.   
 
IPA projects are principally concerned with issues which affect the individual actor, the 
decisions which they make and how this affects their life.  One of the central research 
questions of the current project is ‘why and how did the splits take place in the Irish 
Republican Movement?’  At first glance IPA may be deemed an inappropriate technique 
for answering this question.  However, while this question is dealing with a group 
action296 the application of IPA has gone on to ascertain what the important factors in 
splits are in the opinion of individual actors on either side of the split and at different 
levels within the groups.  Therefore in dealing with the group level questions of the 
research IPA has enabled the researcher to establish why and how the splits took place in 
the opinion of different groups of individuals.  This is keeping with the philosophical 
origins of the technique as the researcher is concentrating on individual perceptions and 
opinions. 
 
6.3 Interviewing  
There are a number of ways of applying the IPA technique. However, the most common, 
and most widely recommended method,297 is through the utilisation of semi-structured 
interviews.  The following sections detail how an extensive set of semi-structured 
interviews were planned, administered and analysed.  While the interview technique has 
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been developed in accordance with IPA recommendations the opinions and findings of 
terrorism and political violence researchers have also been widely consulted in order to 
create the most robust interview methodology possible. 
 
“The fact remains that one must find out how participants understand the struggle, 
how their organization operates, and so there can be no substitute for talking with 
them.” 298 
 
The core purpose of this thesis has been to gain a significant understanding of both 
individual and group actions and decisions which eventually culminated in the splits.  
Through this process of understanding it similarly wished to assess how the Provisional 
leadership were able to bring the majority of their membership towards the acceptance of 
peaceful politics.  The research has relied extensively, but not exclusively, on data 
collected through interviews with individuals involved at various levels of the Republican 
Movement.  Each interviewee was involved in at least one split in the Irish Republican 
Movement between the years 1969 and 1997.   
 
6.3.1 Sampling Procedure 
A lot of the success of a research project depends on a well thought out sampling 
procedure.299  Within the present research purposive sampling was utilised.300  In order to 
gain as complete an understanding as possible of each split it was necessary to meet and 
speak with individuals involved on both sides of each split.301   Where possible the 
researcher aimed to meet with members of both the national leadership and the rank and 
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file membership.302  As each of the splits involved the break-up of both the political and 
armed groups it was deemed appropriate to meet with members from both respective 
groups.  The main determining factor in the sampling was that the participant had been 
involved in at least one of the splits being analysed.   
 
There is no consensus among researchers as to how best to procure interviews with 
individuals involved, or previously involved, in terrorism and/or its related political 
activity.303  This observation is epitomised in the present research, as numerous methods 
were applied in securing interviews with relevant individuals.304  Contacts were made 
through formal correspondence with the political wings of the organisations.  Requests 
were made with these contacts to speak to specific individuals or to general members 
who had been involved in the split.   
 
The use of trusted intermediaries proved one of the most valuable resources throughout 
the research process.  These intermediaries were both internal and external to the 
Republican Movement.  Without one specific contact from the Irish national media it is 
very likely that the researcher would never have been granted interviews with various 
members of the Sinn Fein leadership.   
 
The use of snowballing as a sampling technique is widely appreciated by both terrorism 
and IPA researchers alike.305  At the end of many of the interviews participants were 
asked if they knew of anyone else who might be willing to partake in the research.  From 
the contacts gained through this process further interviews were organised.  
 
With specific reference to the Real IRA and the 32 County Sovereignty Movement there 
proved to be significant problems in arranging interviews.  While the author gained 
access to two leading members of the 32CSM and one leading member of the Real IRA 
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attempts to meet with other members proved challenging.  In late 2008 contact was being 
made with a number of members of the Real IRA on behalf of the researcher.  Initial 
indications were that three specific individuals would be willing to meet at a later date in 
2009.  However, after the Massereene Barracks attack306 it became apparent that these 
interviews would no longer be possible.  Indication was given that members of the 
organisation were at the time only speaking to approved journalists.  At this stage of the 
research all available avenues had been exhausted and it was resolved that no further 
attempts would be made to arrange any more interviews. 
 
6.3.2 Participants 
In total thirty-eight individuals were interviewed between October 2007 and March 
2009.307  Of the thirty-eight interviewed thirty-five of the interviews were recorded while 
two of the participants308 requested for the meeting not to be recorded.  During these 
interviews the researcher took detailed notes which were written up immediately after.309  
The interviews with Roy Johnston were administered through email contact.310  The 
organisational allegiances of the participants are contained in the tables below.  Each 
table represents those who were involved in each particular split. 
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Group Leadership Ordinary 
Member 
Involved Prior 
to the End of 
the Border 
Campaign 
Entered 
Republican 
Movement in 
or around 
1969/70 
Joined the 
group after 
initially 
joining the 
other group 
Total 
Official 
Republican 
Movement 
3 2 4 1 10 
Provisional 
Republican 
Movement 
3 2 13 3 21 
Other 1 0 0 0 1 
Total 7 4 17 4 32 
Table 6.1: Participants involved at the time of the 1969/70 split 
 
 
Group Leadership Ordinary Member Total 
Official Republican Movement 2 4 6 
Irish Republican Socialist Movement 1 4 5 
Undisclosed 0 1 1 
Total 3 9 12 
  Table 6.2: Participants involved at the time of the 1974 split 
 
Group Leadership Ordinary 
Membership 
Supporter Total 
Provisional Republican 
Movement 
7 7 0 14 
Republican Sinn 
Fein/Continuity IRA 
5 1 2 8 
Table 6.3: Participants involved at the time of the 1986 split 
 
Group Leadership Ordinary 
Membership 
Total 
Provisional Republican Movement 8 1 9 
32 County Sovereignty Committee/ 
Real IRA 
2 1 3 
Table 6.4: Participants involved at the time of the 1997 split. 
 
The previous information portrays the make-up of the participants involved at the time of 
the individual splits being analysed.  However, there were also a number of participants 
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who exited their Movement at a time other than a split.  The majority of these individuals 
exited organised Irish Republicanism completely.  However, the two participants who left 
the IRSP and/or the INLA did so to join Republican Sinn Fein and/or the Continuity IRA. 
The make-up of these individuals is displayed in Table 6.5: 
 
Group Leadership Ordinary 
Membership 
Total 
Official Republican Movement 1 3 4 
Provisional Republican Movement 1 3 4 
Irish Republican Socialist Movement 0 2 2 
Irish Republican Movement (prior to 
1969/70 split) 
1 0 1 
 Table 6.5: Participants who exited the Movement at a time other than a split. 
 
6.3.3 Interview Methodology 
Each interview was conducted in a semi-structured manner.311 This provides the best data 
for the application of IPA.312  The semi structured nature of the interview provides many 
advantages to both interviewer and participant alike.  The method allows the interviewer 
to be freer in questioning and probe areas of interest which arise and it provides more 
opportunity than a structured interview to place the participant at ease as the interviewer 
can follow the participants’ interests and concerns.  In the semi-structured interview the 
specific ordering of the questions is not essential.  This style of interviewing is more akin 
to a conversation and therefore allows the researcher to modify the initial questions with 
respect to the responses of the participants.313   
 
Prior to the meetings an interview schedule was developed, outlining the major questions 
and issues which were necessary to raise in the process of the interview.  It was the 
intention of the researcher for these questions to be very open ended, general, questions 
so that the answers provided by participants were reflective purely of their own beliefs 
and opinions and were not influenced or led by the wording of the question.  Where these 
questions did not bring a detailed response from the participant there were also probing 
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and event specific questions prepared to instigate a more in-depth response.  None of the 
questions prepared for the interview schedule contained any of the author’s own value 
judgements, as it was vital that the participants were not influenced in any way by the 
researcher’s opinion.314  The questions were neither loaded nor double-barrelled in nature 
as the use of such questioning techniques can lead to problems regarding the validity and 
reliability of the responses given by participants.315  Researchers applying any form of 
interview methodology must be constantly aware of the wording of their questions; as the 
wording of a particular question is phrased can have a significant influence on the type of 
answer given by the participant.316   
 
The questions dealt with both individual and group hypotheses as well as the individual 
and group research questions.  With regards to probing questions asking about the 
relevance of specific events these were initially developed from the extensive reading of 
relevant sources about the splits.  The interview schedule was constantly being developed 
throughout the interview process with unexpected issues coming to the fore in previous 
interviews.   
 
As Appendix B displays there was a comprehensive interview schedule prepared for each 
separate split at both an individual and group level as was well as splits in general and 
situations where there was no split.  There was no single interview were all of these 
questions were asked of the participant.  Generally speaking the majority of the 
interviews were taken up by the open general questions.317  This dominance of the open 
general questions provides a stronger level of data and the answers to these questions can 
be more reliably referred to as the genuine viewpoints of the participants than the more 
specific questions which follow them in the interview schedule.   
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As has been clearly indicated in the preceding paragraphs there was detailed preparation 
completed prior to the interviews in general and individual interviews specifically.  
However, as is to be expected no amount of preparation can change the willingness of 
participants to talk about issues which they do not wish to, and it was never the intention 
of the author to do so.  Across the course of the interviews there were certain individuals 
who indicated that they wished not to talk about specific issues.  These issues were 
generally, but not always, to do with illegal activities and/or membership of the armed 
wing of the movement.  With specific reference to membership of the IRSP and INLA 
there was an extensive desire not to talk about what happened in the years following the 
split of 1974. While they would discuss the feuds between them and the Official 
Republican Movement they were silent about the subsequent feuds with groups such as 
the Irish Peoples Liberation Organisation (IPLO).  It was clear from the responses of 
these participants as a group that there was still considerable tension both locally and 
nationally regarding certain events.  As it was indicated that the discussion of such issues 
could possibly compromise the safety of the participants ethics and common sense 
designated that the issue should not be probed any further. The foundation of all ethical 
research is that the safety of the participant and the researcher should not be 
compromised in any way.  With this taken into consideration it is clear that any 
significant indication of risk by the participant had to be treated with the utmost respect 
and appropriately dealt with.318  
 
6.4 Interpretative Data Analysis 
When the interviews had been completed the author conducted a detailed interpretative 
analysis of the data.319  This was carried out through a multi-stage analysis of the data. 
Throughout each stage the author constantly referred to the original interview transcripts 
so as to be confident that the themes and mechanisms arising from the interpretation were 
an accurate reflection of what the participant had originally detailed, and had not been 
influenced in any way by the previous knowledge or expectations of the researcher. 
During each stage of the analysis process the relevant analysis of each individual 
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transcript was completed before progressing to the subsequent interview.  As this process 
progressed from stage to stage themes that initially started as being broad evolved, where 
necessary, to become more refined and focused.320  These stages were informed by 
previous IPA methodologies which have been incorporated and adapted in order to form 
the most productive analysis technique for the present research.321  
 
6.5 Validity 
The issue of validity is not strongly associated with the application of IPA, or terrorism 
research for that matter.322  However, there was a concerted effort in the present research 
to produce results which could be considered as valid as possible.  There were a number 
of measures taken in order to obtain the validity of results.   
 
The rigorous analysis process, coupled with an unbiased questioning technique is the 
predominant validating method applied.  It has been noted that some of the main criteria 
in the validation of research are commitment and rigour.323  At each stage of the research 
process the author has endeavoured to be as rigorous as possible.  This rigour and 
commitment is exemplified in the multi-stage analytic process.  Throughout this process 
there was a conscious effort that the interpretation of the data stayed true to the initial 
intentions of each of the participants.   
 
During the sampling process there was a concerted effort to access the opinions of 
participants from both sides of the splits at both an ordinary member and leadership level.  
These individuals were also questioned as external observers to the splits which they had 
not participated in.  This purposive sampling was strengthened by the presence of those 
who had left a Republican group at a time other than a split.  They could speak as people 
with no present affiliation with any group. This sampling process can be regarded as a 
form of triangulation whereby the opinions of people and groups of differing perspectives 
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were taken into consideration before final conclusions were made.324  As well as the 
opinions of different groups being analysed so too were the opinions of members at 
different levels of these groups.  Therefore the viewpoints of both leadership and ordinary 
or rank and file members were able to be compared and contrasted.   
 
Throughout the interview process there was reference by various participants to specific 
documents and/or speeches which had a significant influence on the splits for them at an 
individual level and/or for the split at a group level.  The regularity of this occurrence 
indicated the important role which these sources had to play in the research.  Therefore 
throughout the write up of the results section of the analysis some of these are referred to 
in order to support or at times question the validity of the results.  The sources analysed 
included policy documents, speeches, influential journalistic articles, as well as 
statements of support or opposition.  While a number of these sources were brought to the 
attention of the researcher by interview participants there were also a variety of 
documents which were sourced independently during the process of the research.  These 
documents provided a more complete awareness of the context in which the split took 
place.  While the interview data gathered provides an unrivalled insight the use of these 
documented sources offers information and opinions untainted by years of thought and 
debate.  One can argue that an interview based research project separated by as 
significant a timescale between event and interview as this one is can be adversely 
affected by the deterioration or distortion of memories.  While this may be the case it is 
not believed to have had a significant impact on the present research.  With specific 
reference to those documents which detailed why and how the splits took place they have 
not been considered as portraying absolute truths.  Alternatively they should be regarded 
as reflections of the opinions of the authors and/or the leadership of the groups at the time 
of production.  These documents were often times produced so as to have influence the 
membership and/or support of the group as well as the potential membership and/or 
support.   
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A final process of dealing with the issue validity was the application of verification 
techniques.  These techniques were specifically applied when a participant was 
introducing a new event which had previously not arisen in previous interviews or 
research.  In such cases it was important for the research to specifically verify the timing 
and authenticity of these events described.  This was carried out so as to validate whether 
or not these specific events could possibly have had an affect on the split at a group level 
and/or the decision making process of the individual being interviewed.  This verification 
process involved the research consulting various reference books and newspaper articles 
from the time of the events being referred to.  This is a variation of the process outlined 
through the use of Republican published documents and speeches.  However during this 
verification process external sources were also utilised.  This process was extremely 
necessary when the participant referred to specific murders and/or attacks as well as 
specific speeches and meetings.  The implied importance of these events had to be 
verified in accordance with the series of events being described.  With regards to certain 
cases it transpired that events which participants had attributed significance to in the lead-
up to the split had actually taken place after the split.  During this verification process the 
inaccuracies on behalf of the participants generally affected the description of the split 
from a group point of view.  The participants rarely made factual errors when detailing 
their own individual decision making process.  
 
6.6 Chapter Summary 
The purpose of this chapter has been to outline how the research was completed.  The 
utilisation of a purposive sampling techniques based on the triangulation of opinions was 
integral to the development of significant sample group to interview about the splits.  The 
sample included individuals from all groups at all levels.  The interview data was 
analysed using IPA.  This included a multi-stage analysis in which the interview 
transcripts were analysed at both an individual and a group level.  The interviews were 
carried out in a semi-structured manner. The importance of research ethics was dominant 
at all stages of the research, and was especially important with regards the safety of 
individual participants as well as the researcher.  The present research has approached the 
importance of validity in the utilisation of a rigorous interview and analytical 
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methodology as well as the triangulation of opinions through the purposive sampling of 
participants and the analysis of significant secondary and tertiary documents produced in 
or around the time of the splits.   
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Chapter 7 
Introduction to Interview Analysis: 
The Macro-Process of Irish Republican Involvement in the 
‘Troubles’ 
7.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapters have outlined the theoretical and methodological background to 
the research.  What follows in the subsequent sub-chapters is a detailed illustration of the 
results gathered through the analysis of data.325  The subsequent chapters focus on 
answering the four core organisational and individual research questions: 
 
QO1. Why did each of the splits take place when they did? 
 
QO2. How did each of the splits take place? 
 
QI1. Why do individual members decide to exit from an organisation to join or set up and 
new organisation? 
 
QI2. Why do individual members decide to stay with a parent organisation at a time of 
split? 
 
This has been carried out through the application of Interpretative Phenomenological 
Analysis (IPA).  These results are introduced in a process based thematic manner.  The 
description of each of the stages of the process is supported through the utilisation of 
quotes from members of both sides of each of the splits, at all levels of membership.  This 
has not aimed to attain an absolute ‘truth’ about what happened during each split.  What 
is more important here is the understanding of how each side appreciated what happened 
during the process of each split.  It is this perception which is important to the research as 
it is through this that the organisational decisions of the time were made.  The utilisation 
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of each point of view provides a more comprehensive understanding of each split and the 
relevance of particular themes to each side is gained.326 
 
It was the initial aspiration of the research to analyse why and how splits do not take 
place in certain situations so as to strengthen the findings of why and how they do take 
place.  While this issue was raised in each individual interview it has been deemed that 
the data gathered is insufficient to be utilised in a valid and reliable manner in most parts.  
However, it is believed that the analysis of outcomes of splits goes some way to 
answering this question as it assesses how one side can minimise the impact of an 
impending split.   This is embedded in the final research questions. 
 
QO3 i). What are the factors necessary to successfully attract members and supporters 
during the course of and after an organisational split? 
 
QO3 ii). What are the factors which deter members and supporters from joining a group 
during the course of and after an organisational split? 
 
These questions move the research beyond an historical analysis of ‘why’ and ‘how’ the 
splits took place and introduce what is believed to be the most worthwhile contribution of 
the study.  It provides a more analytical assessment of the successes and failures by each 
side during the splits.  By asking the above questions our understanding of how the 
Provisional leadership in time brought the majority of their membership away from 
armed conflict and towards peaceful politics is greatly enhanced.  This comparative 
analysis provides a foundation to our understanding of how the Northern Irish peace 
process was able to be the success it is. 
 
As has been stated in previous chapters this analysis of the splits does not finish with the 
action of organisational split.  The analysis looks beyond the official division of the group 
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and looks at the effects which the splits had in the immediate and long-term aftermath.  It 
is within this analysis that the final organisational research question is assessed. 
 
QO4. What are the significant consequences of the split? 
 
This assessment focuses on both the immediate and long-term consequences of the splits.  
As the splits are being treated as micro-processes within the macro-process of Irish 
Republican involvement in the ‘Troubles’ there is an observable overlap between the 
consequences of one split with the subsequent organisational schism.  Therefore the 
aftermath of one split is similarly being assessed as the origin of the next. 
 
On a broad level this analysis is endeavouring to answer these core research questions 
through the analysis of the interview data gathered.  However, throughout the process of 
analysis the set of organisational hypotheses introduced in Chapter 5 are similarly tested.  
Therefore while the analysis is exploratory in its attempts to answer the general research 
questions it is simultaneously testing the more specific hypotheses which have been 
developed through the analysis of the relevant theoretical literature.     
 
7.2 Splits in the Irish Republican Movement 
The history of the Irish Republican Movement is beset by splits, from the aftermath of the 
Treaty of 1921 to the modern day.  For many observers this prevalence of splits may be 
regarded as the defining feature of the Republican Movement.  The oft quoted line by 
Brendan Behan is regularly cited in reference to this historical frequency of split. 
 
“Brendan Behan famously said ‘the first thing on the Republican agenda is the 
split.’”327  
 
This reference to Behan is often used as a reflection not only of the predominance of 
splits within the Irish Republican Movement but as an illustration of how this regularity 
of split sets the movement aside from other organisations.  However, while the regular 
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occurrence of splits can, and should, be regarded as a defining characteristic of the 
history of Irish Republicanism this does not mark it out as unique.  A more accurate 
reflection of the situation would suggest that the incidence of splits is reflective of the 
situations experienced in all human organisations rather than as a unique trait of Irish 
Republicanism.  This assertion is supported by Richard McAuley, a senior advisor to 
Gerry Adams within Sinn Fein, and a former prisoner and member of the Provisional 
IRA. 
 
“The reality is that in almost any political party, any political organisation, any 
political movement you care to think of in the history of humanity somebody has 
disagreed with the leadership at some point and gone off and done their own thing, 
and sometimes more than once.  So Republicans are no different than anybody else, 
God help us it is almost part of the human condition.  We like to disagree.”328   
 
This dispelling of the uniqueness of the Irish Republican propensity to split allows one to 
analyse their occurrence in a more constructive and pragmatic manner.  It allows the 
research to move away from looking for any unique feature of the movement which may 
leave it susceptible to split and instead analyses the normality of this organisational 
occurrence. 
 
The present research classes each of the four case studies as occurrences of splits.  This is 
not in line with the assessment by the current leadership of Sinn Fein.  While 
acknowledging the presence of organisational division they are averse to refer to 1986 
and 1997 as instances of ‘splits’. 
 
“You see you need to be careful about using the word ‘split.’  When you consider 
what happened in 1986, what happened at the beginning of all of this was a fairly 
major split between the Official Republican Movement and the Provisional 
Republican Movement.  But in the aftermath of all of that we had all sorts of 
situations with for example the formation of the INLA and the IPLO, which really 
                                                 
328
 Richard McAuley 
 114 
were offshoots from the Official Republican Movement.  But in terms of what was 
known as the Provisional IRA right through there were two big situations that had 
to be dealt with, which were the 1986 situation and I think that clearly there was a 
split but it wasn’t a 50/50 split it wasn’t even a 60/40 split it wasn’t even a 70/30 
split.  So be careful with the use of the word split.  In terms of the situation in the 
aftermath of the Good Friday Agreement, even lesser so again, with probably only 
less that five percent of people deciding that this was not the way to go.  So I 
wouldn’t have regarded that as a split, so if you like those people tried to cause a 
split and it was fended off, it was defeated by the strategy put in place by the 
leadership of Republicanism of Sinn Fein, and indeed the leadership of the IRA 
were hugely supportive of the process of drawing the Unionists in, and the British 
government into peace negotiations.”329   
 
The aversion to the use of the word, which for many is regarded as analogous to failure, 
is a method utilised so as to protect and enhance this leadership’s legacy.  It is with great 
pride that they define their leadership as one which has successfully avoided splits, where 
others have failed to do so. 
 
“…it was the ability of this leadership not to have splits is I think probably the real 
part of it which is unprecedented in Republican history.” 330  
 
In the present research each of the four case studies are individually, and collectively, 
analysed as instances of organisational split.  However, it is recognised that the outcome 
of each is considerably different. The case of 1969/70 is regarded as a close to even 
divide.  With respect to 1986 and 1997 in particular the results of these are significantly 
weighted in the favour of the Provisionals.  Rather than ignoring these situations the 
present research has analysed them as cases of split so as to observe why and how there 
was such a distinct difference in the results of each case.  While the current Provisional 
leadership may wish to be acknowledged as the only leadership to have avoided split they 
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would be more accurately described as a leadership who successfully lessened the impact 
of two splits in 1986 and 1997.  This provides the researcher with the opportunity to 
interpret how they managed to be as successful in attracting such significant levels of 
membership and support for their position, and why and how the Goulding leadership 
was unsuccessful in this regard in 1969/70. 
 
7.3 Splits as a Process 
Numerous researchers have deemed it both constructive and accurate to assess splits as 
the culmination of an organisational process.  While the analysis of the present data 
shows that a split must not be regarded as the endpoint it does, however, show that a 
process model is the best way of detailing how and why a split takes place. Within the 
process based assessment one can observe the reasoning for the successes and failures of 
sub-groups in the lead up to, during and after the splits.  In the analysis of each stage 
there is a focus on the themes which have been deemed relevant.  A number of the most 
prominent themes are repeatedly relevant across stages. 
 
The stages during each of the splits are not necessarily uniform and during each 
individual process the length of time to move from one stage to another varies.  Even 
though there may appear to be a uniformity of themes an in-depth reading of the analysis 
will show that these factors can carry different degrees of importance and consequence 
across cases.  It is this variation in influence of different factors which can prove most 
significant in the outcome of the split.  
 
While the presentation of the analysis may suggest that these are ultimately four 
independent case studies the three ‘Provisional’ splits should be looked upon as three 
separate stages of Provisional involvement in the ‘Troubles.’  While the 1974 split is part 
of the overall Republican involvement in the ‘Troubles’ the split of 1969/70 meant that 
this organisation had moved on to a separate process of left-wing Republican 
involvement in the ‘Troubles.’ One can gain a greater understanding of the causes, results 
and consequences of the cases by simultaneously analysing each individual split as a 
micro-process within the macro-process of Irish Republican involvement in the 
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‘Troubles’ rather than looking at each as an independent case study.  This is why the 
three Provisional splits have been presented as sub-chapters rather than individual 
standalone chapters.331 
 
In other studies the comparison of unrelated splits may present the analysis of each 
equivalent stage side by side.  However, due to the interconnected nature of these splits it 
has been deemed beneficial and informative to present them splits chronologically so as 
to examine the macro-process of Irish Republican involvement in the ‘Troubles.’  
Therefore rather than viewing the splits as individual entities they are assessed and 
presented as processes which had a significant effect on each other.  This is signified in 
the fact that the micro-process of 1969/70 split in general, and the split aftermath in 
particular, must also be regarded as the opening stage for both the 1974 split in the 
Official Republican Movement and the 1986 split in the Provisionals. 
 
Throughout the analysis there is reference to the number and make-up of participants who 
indicated the importance of specific themes.  This is not to be perceived as a detailed 
quantitative analysis.  Instead it is used to illustrate where relevant the divide in 
importance across groups and across levels of membership within each of the groups. 
 
The results sub-chapters are based upon the analysis of the interview data.  However, 
where necessary and viable the researcher has validated the themes raised through the 
analysis of both primary documents produced at the time.  This is referred to within 
various footnotes.  Similarly previous secondary analysis is referred to for verification 
purposes.  The use of such materials strengthens the validity of the results displayed, and 
does not detract from the importance of the viewpoints of the participants.  Often times 
the documents referred to were donated to the author by interview participants to support 
their opinions and analysis of the situation. 
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7.4 Chapter Summary 
The purpose of this chapter has been to introduce to the reader to the layout of the 
analytical results sub-chapters.  The results chapters have been divided into three separate 
sub-chapters, one for each of the Provisional splits being analysed, with the analysis of 
the 1974 Official split contained within Appendix F.  These have been presented as sub-
chapters rather than individual chapters as the splits are viewed as inter-connected micro-
processes within the macro-process of Provisional Republican involvement in the 
‘Troubles’.  They should therefore be read in unison so as to have a more complete 
understanding of the splits from both an organisational and individual perspective.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 118 
Chapter 8(a) 
1969/70: The Origin of the Macro-Process 
‘The tinder piled up and it went on fire in ‘69.’ 332 
 
8a.1 Introduction  
The origins of each of the splits lies in the years and decades previous.  A thorough 
analysis must look a number of years back in order to gain the most comprehensive 
understanding of not only the cause but the significance of each individual micro-process 
to fully understand the entire macro-process.  Many would suggest that this analysis 
should not just focus on the actions of the years previous but that there should initially be 
a clear foundation of understanding of the Republican history from generations past, an 
opinion put forward by Sean O’Bradaigh in his assessment of the origins of the 1969/70 
split. 
 
“I suppose you can find the proximate roots of it, the immediate, within a couple of 
years and then you can find the approximate roots going back even further.  I 
suppose the approximate roots are going back to the Treaty almost, because each 
time this comes up we are coming up against the same question, ‘do we recognise 
the Free State?’ … Will we maintain the Republican position or will we go and 
take part in [Dail Eireann].’”333 
 
A clear understanding of Republican history enhances ones understanding of each of the 
splits.  However, the majority of interviewees focused the ‘proximate roots’ of the 
divides.  The origins of the splits were detailed to lie in the years previous to the ultimate 
organisational divisions.  While those of extended organisational experience, especially at 
a leadership level, at the time of each of the splits were able to go into the most detail 
about the significant events of the years previous those with less operational experience at 
the very least acknowledged the significance of specific incidents, policies and strategies 
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from previous years.  The process leading up and including the split of 1969/70 has been 
identified as the derivation of Irish Republican involvement in Troubles. 
 
Of all the splits 1969/70 is the one which has most defined modern day Irish 
Republicanism.  It resulted in the birth of the Provisional IRA and Sinn Fein as well as 
the formal introduction to Republicanism of many of its most influential modern day 
actors.  The significance is observable throughout all elements of Irish Republicanism 
from 1969 to today.  Therefore without a clear understanding of this divide one cannot 
completely understand modern day Irish Republicanism. 
 
In total thirty-five participants discussed the 1969/70 split.  Table 8a.1 displays the make-
up of these participants.   
Group Leadership Member 
Involved Prior 
to the End of 
the Border 
Campaign 
Entered 
Republican 
Movement in 
or around 
1969/70 
Joined group 
significantly 
after 1969/70 
Total 
Official 3 2 5 1 11 
Provisional  3 2 16 1 22 
External334 0 0 0 1 (IRSM) 1 
Other 1 0 0 0 1 
Total 7 4 21 3 35 
Table 8a.1: Participants who discussed 1969/70 split 
 
The present chapter presents the process in the lead-up to the 1969/70 split.  The process 
has been divided into 5 stages.  The dominant themes are illustrated within the sub-
sections of each stage.  These are the themes which the analysis showed to be the most 
important in each of the separate stages.  They should not be interpreted as separate sub-
stages but as, at times, overlapping themes relevant during the specific stage of the 
process.  The title of each stage illustrates the stage’s dominant characteristic and 
function.  The title of each sub-section illustrates the dominant themes described.  
Analysis presented in this and each of the sub-chapters was guided by the analysis of the 
interview data.  However, this was expanded to also include relevant primary and 
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secondary sources.  This strengthens the validity of the analysis presented in each of the 
sub-chapters. 
 
The five stages identified in the process of the 1969/70 split are supportive of the model 
proposed in Chapter 4: 
 
Stage 1: The Origins of 1969/70 
Stage 2: Factional Development 
Stage 3: Inevitability of and Preparation for Split 
Stage 4: Organisational Exit and Breakaway Group Formation 
Stage 5 and Stage 1: Aftermath of Split: Competition and Re-Organisation. 
 
The fifth and final stage of the micro-process must also be regarded, in combination with 
the rest of the split process, as the opening stage of the micro-processes of the 1974 and 
1986 splits.  
     
8a.2 Stage 1:  The Origins of 1969/70 
While the ‘approximate’ origins of the split lie within the history of Irish Republicanism 
each of the participants interviewed who had extended experience prior to 1969 identified 
the culmination of the Border Campaign of the late 1950s and early 1960s as the requisite 
starting point for any understanding of the ‘proximate’ origins of the split.335  Similarly 
six of the participants without extensive Republican experience discussed the effect of the 
aftermath of the Campaign.  However, for the majority of new recruits to the movement 
in the lead up to and after 1969/70 the origins of the split through their own experiences 
took place in the immediate lead up to the formal division of the movement.   
 
Of those participants who outlined the importance of the aftermath of the Border 
Campaign all agreed to its transitional nature.  This is reflected in the analysis of those 
from both sides of the split.  
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Within this first stage of the 1969/70 split the dominant themes to be covered are 
• Public Support: Weakened 
• Membership: Exit, Weakening and Disillusionment 
• The Origins of Factionalism 
 
8a.2.1 Public Support: Weakened  
One of the major consequences of the Border Campaign was that there was deterioration 
in the public support for the Movement and what it could offer the general public of 
Ireland. This was a campaign which initially gained the support of the people.336  
However, this support was short lived and in1962 the Army Council of the IRA officially 
declared its end.  Whatever support the Republican Movement had gained at the 
beginning of the campaign had dissipated, and was probably even lower than it had been 
prior to the beginning of the operation.  This decline was evident in the weakening of 
both passive and active support. 
 
“After beginning the campaign it was obvious that we didn’t have enough weapons 
or support, safe houses etc.”337 
 
This lack of support was a result of a public feeling that the Republican Movement was 
not representative of the beliefs of the wider Irish population in general, and the 
nationalist population particularly.  There was disconnect between the actions and beliefs 
of the Republican leadership and the populations they claimed to represent.  With this 
decline in support it proved extremely difficult for the IRA to operate to any significant 
degree of success.  The Irish public were not supportive of any form of armed action to 
achieve a united Ireland.  This proved a critical issue in the failure of the campaign.  It is 
recognised by those within the Movement that in order to sustain any form of military 
campaign they needed support within the community.  Without this support the armed 
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campaign invariably fails.  This would later prove to be a lesson which future generations 
of Republican leaders would bestow on new recruits. 
 
“It is vital you cannot sustain a military campaign without the support of a 
substantial section of the population… Why the 56 campaign failed is because the 
Republican Movement had become isolated from the people, had become divorced 
from the people, had become elitist, had become obsessed with ending partition 
and had turned a blind eye to issues like unemployment and poverty and 
emigration and bad housing.”338 
 
This reaffirms that if a movement is to gain the public support it requires it is first of all 
necessary to make their groups objectives relevant among their existing and potential 
support base.339  During the Border Campaign the focus of the leadership was not on 
those issues of importance to the general Irish population.  Instead there was perceived to 
be an almost blinkered focus on the achievement of a united Ireland and the ending of 
partition.  This issue of disconnect with the wider public was one which was sought to be 
addressed in the aftermath of this failed armed campaign. 
 
With the end of the Border Campaign in 1962 the deterioration of support for the Irish 
Republican Movement continued.  Even for those who remained supportive of the 
movement there was a heightened disillusionment with its trajectory.  This lack of 
support led to a drop in the finances of the movement and resultantly a drop in their 
accessibility to new weapons and artillery.340  Without a significant degree of public 
support it proves impossible to succeed in achieving objectives, unless they can alter the 
issues which have distanced them from the population they claim to represent.  Each of 
the interviewees across the splits emphasised the importance of public support in 
determining the results of an intra-organisational conflict. 
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8a.2.2 Membership: Exit, Weakening and Disillusionment 
This disillusionment with the IRA and Sinn Fein within the public sphere was reflected in 
the membership with a number of members exiting at both armed and political levels.341   
The Border Campaign was seen by members as a failure. This is a view put across by 
both sides of the split.  This is illustrated in the quotes below, the first from Tomas 
MacGiolla the 1960s president of Sinn Fein and after the split president of Official Sinn 
Fein and the second from ‘Alex’ an influential Belfast IRA member who was among 
those Belfast Republicans who overthrew the Belfast IRA leadership and refused to 
support the national leadership of Cathal Goulding in 1969.  ‘Alex’ was an influential 
northern member in the formation of the Provisional IRA and in the aftermath of the 1986 
split chose to support the Continuity IRA and Republican Sinn Fein. 
 
“When the campaign eventually ended, that’s the 1950s campaign, which was 
Operation Harvest…It was a disaster from the very beginning and after a couple of 
years there were many people who already were disillusioned and didn’t want the 
campaign and wanted it to stop.  It went on for another four years.”342 
 
“The Border Campaign was a fiasco, looking back on it now it was a total fiasco.  
I don’t think they had a clue to be honest with you about what they were up 
against.”343 
 
As with the public this operational failure resulted in the disillusionment of large 
proportions of the organisational membership which in turn brought about the exit of 
members who neither saw the possibility of success nor agreed with the strategies and 
tactics of the organisation at that point in time.   
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As well as a large number of members exiting the movement there were also a significant 
number either interned or on the run.  With large proportions of the IRA leadership on the 
run for the concluding years of the campaign the standing and relevance of IRA was 
further weakened.  There were also those who were forced to exit for reasons not directly 
related to the Republican Movement, largely due to economic issues.  As with all sectors 
of the population this significantly affected the IRA and Sinn Fein during the 1950s and 
60s as numerous existing and potential members were forced to emigrate, and in turn the 
majority of them ceased active involvement with the movement.  Therefore the public 
good which the Republican Movement were aiming to achieve, a united Ireland, was 
significantly detached from the public goods desired by the majority of the population, 
economic stability.344   
 
The aftermath of the Border Campaign resulted in such a detrimental weakening of the 
IRA that it can be considered from both a morale and physical capability point of view 
that it was at one of its weakest points.  Resultantly in the aftermath of the campaign even 
within those areas which historically, would be considered as strong Republican regions 
the membership levels were extremely sparse.  This was evident in the Republican 
heartlands of Belfast where the IRA membership was close to non-existent. 
 
“When I got out I reported back to the Republican Movement…I think there was 
only about eight people in the Movement in Belfast, most of them just didn’t come 
back in… So basically it was starting from scratch all over again.”345 
 
This deterioration in the membership cannot purely be blamed on the failure of the 
Border Campaign and outward migration.  The weakening of the movement was taking 
place prior to the Border Campaign.  As with the deterioration in support many people no 
longer saw the relevance of joining the IRA or Sinn Fein.  As a result there were very few 
members in the 1950s and early 1960s.  The Republican Movement for the most part was 
a deteriorating group irrelevant to the vast majority of the population of Ireland, and 
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therefore ineffective in operations and in attaining objectives.  It is invariably the levels 
of membership, and their choices of who to side with in an intra-organisational conflict 
and the resultant split, which decides the successes and failures of either side.346   
 
8a.2.3 The Origins of Factionalism 
The fragility of Republicanism in the aftermath of this campaign emphasised the need for 
a re-evaluation in order to maintain organisational survival.347  This necessity resulted in 
an overhaul of the national leadership, a move widely supported.  The new leadership 
with Cathal Goulding as the IRA Chief of Staff distanced their policies from the armed 
struggle and placed a greater emphasis on a left-wing political approach.348  They realised 
that in order to achieve the basic aim of organisational survival that they needed to first of 
all reconnect with both their membership and support base.  The emphasis was placed on 
making the aims and strategies of the organisation relevant to the wider Irish population.  
At this stage of the process the new leadership were largely setting about re-organising 
both the IRA and Sinn Fein.  This resulted in moving away from the armed struggle and 
the introduction of new strategies and policies largely centred on politically left-wing 
ideals.  
 
The left-wing political policies espoused by the Goulding leadership at this time were 
significantly removed from the policies traditionally promoted by the organisation.  For 
many of the traditional old-guard within both the IRA and Sinn Fein these policies would 
have been considered negatively as ‘extreme socialism.’  This led to discontent among a 
number of old-guard traditionalists at this initial stage of the process of split, a discontent 
which resulted in a number of them exiting.  This theme is resonant throughout each of 
the micro-processes and is supportive of  
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HO1. The immediate goal for each sub-group at the time of split is organisational 
survival in a form which they respect and recognise. 
 
HO1.  The immediate objective for all organisations is the survival of the organisation.  
While this requires the recruitment of new members it also requires the maintenance of 
the existing support.  Times of significant change within an organisation are the most 
likely times of membership exit.  Therefore it must be the aim of the organisational 
leadership to convince a significant majority of the membership of the necessity for these 
changes.  At this stage of the process the exit of these members was not as damaging to 
organisational survival as it is in later stages.  The necessity for change in the movement 
provided the Goulding leadership to adjust the policies and strategies to fit better with 
their aspirations for the left-wing politicisation of the movement  
 
The new left-wing ideology advocated by Cathal Goulding and his affiliates was largely 
influenced and formulated by some of the new members and advisors introduced to 
organised Republicanism at the dawn of the new leadership.  The most influential of 
these was Dr Roy Johnston.349   
 
One of the methods he utilised to open debate within the movement, as well as externally, 
was the development of the Wolfe Tone Society in 1963.  This group was made up of 
individuals who were predominantly external to the movement.  In their meetings they 
discussed the future development of Republicanism in Ireland.  The ideas generated from 
the Society in turn influenced much of the positioning of Republican policy of the time.  
These groupings were predominantly made up of left wing political activists and 
academics.  Some of the most prominent voices were those promoting and supporting the 
politicisation of the IRA and Sinn Fein.  The politicisation process took place 
independent of the Wolfe Tone Society.  However, it was within these meetings that 
many of the influential policies were developed in depth and resultantly adopted either in 
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part or completely by the leadership.350  Prominent to this influence was their distancing 
from armed Republicanism. 
 
While the promotion of peaceful political strategies was the cornerstone of the 
leadership’s re-organisation this was not fully supported by all members.  Many of the 
old-guard traditionalists were wary of the growing left-wing influence within the 
movement.  This rise of left-wing ideals coupled with the demotion of the armed 
campaign resulted in the origins of internal factionalism.   
 
“It was only after I came out [of prison], because from the inside you are cut off, it 
was only after I came out.  When you seen the way these people were going.  Their 
attitude was that physical force was unwanted…they were following the 
Communist Party line and objectives…It was not long till you realised that that is 
what was happening and people who were objecting to it were dismissed.”351   
 
While a number of members exited the movement as a result of their discontent, and 
others were dismissed from the organisation, there were also those traditionalist members 
who stayed and internally displayed their dissatisfaction.  There were a number of 
disgruntled members at this stage of the process but they could not yet be considered an 
organised dissident faction.  There were dispersed showings of rebellion, none of which 
characterised as an organised campaign against the strategic policies of the leadership.  
For many the origins of their discontent lay in the downgrading in importance of the IRA 
and the resultant decline in military training and operations.  There were small regional 
pockets of Republican activists who resisted this move and continued with small scale 
armed training and operations. 
 
For the new leadership and their advisors the IRA was seen as an out of date entity, one 
which in its historical form could stand in the way of the politicisation and rise of Sinn 
Fein.  They wished for IRA members to become political and less militarily minded, and 
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hence required all IRA volunteers to join Sinn Fein.352  This promotion of political 
strategies in the place of the armed campaign was resisted by some volunteers who 
carried on with the utilisation of physical force Republicanism in spite of the national 
leadership’s wishes.   
 
“The IRA was considered moribund, virtually moribund, at that time.  I mean there 
was obviously some grouping there in the background…He [Goulding] was trying 
to get Republicans to go political... Famously of course there were incidents, there 
was some trading dispute down in the west, there was some action some boats were 
blown up.”353 
 
This discontent was not extensively on display in the initial periods of this stage of the 
process.  However, towards the end as the left-wing political direction was becoming 
firmly established the voices of discontent became louder and more constant.  This could 
not yet be considered as a highly organised dissident sub-group at this stage.   
 
Not all of the discontent can be seen to originate as a result of strategy or policy specific 
issues.  There were also some personality based issues at the heart of this initial 
factionalism.  While this was evident in some instances at a national leadership level it 
was similarly illustrated locally in the Republican regions of Ireland.  As with all human 
organisations internal grievances need not always be with strategic, tactical or policy 
based disputes.  Some of the factionalism and ultimately the decisions made by 
individuals during the process of split can be seen to have their basis in personal as well 
as, or at times in spite of, strategic and policy issues.  This is illustrated by Dolours Price 
in her description of the Republican community in Belfast in the 1960s.     
 
“I knew the Sullivans and Billy McMillen and all the people that became 
Stickies.354  I would have known them all before there was any idea of splits, 
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it can be seen in the different ways that the members of the Officials and Provisionals attached their 
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discussions or talk.  I would have heard my father talk about…he didn’t like that 
crowd, he didn’t like Billy McMillen.  A lot of personality things went on.  He 
didn’t like Billy McMillen on a personal basis and didn’t like Malachy McGurran, 
didn’t like Billy Sullivan and Jimmy Sullivan.”355   
 
This displays that while much of the factionalism may have been policy and strategy 
driven throughout the process of split that people’s affiliations may have originated from 
their personal attitude to the people on either side of the divide.  This is a theme which 
will is dealt with in Appendix G. 
 
This present stage viewed as the origin of the 1969/70 split provides significant support 
for four of the organisational hypotheses. 
 
HO2. The conflict at the centre of a split is, for at least one of the sub-groups, threatening 
to the organisational identity.  
 
HO2.  The emerging change of focus by the movement at this stage was for a number of 
the old-guard traditionalists seen as detrimental to the organisational identity.  For many 
of them they would have been significantly sceptical of an extreme left-wing influence on 
the movement especially when it was detracting from the armed campaign and the pursuit 
of a united Ireland.  This change of focus was due in part to the growing heterogeneity of 
the membership with the introduction of a number of left-wing politicisers with no desire 
to continue the armed campaign.  Not only was there a divergence of policy related 
viewpoints at this stage but there was also a clash of personalities.     
 
At this early stage of the intra-organisational conflict the dissidents were still of the belief 
that the division could be resolved by internal measures rather than by exiting to form an 
autonomous organisation.  They were attempting the utilisation of voice in an attempt to 
                                                                                                                                                  
commemorative Easter lilies.  After 1969/70 the Officials attached their lilies to their clothes using an 
adhesive gum, hence the name ‘Sticky’, and the Provisionals used a pin.  The Provisional for a time were 
referred to as the ‘Pinheads’ or ‘Pinnies’ but this did not last as long as term ‘Sticky.’ 
355
  Dolours Price 
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bring about change while also defying orders.  A number of small units were still actively 
preparing for an armed campaign, thus defying the intentions of the leadership and 
illustrating their belief that there was still the possibility of resolving their grievance and 
partaking in future armed campaigns.  However, the most resonant reason for the 
avoidance of split at this stage was that the dissidents were not adequately organised to 
exit in a collective manner to form a new grouping or to overthrow the exiting leadership. 
 
8a.3 Stage 2: Factional Development 
The Republican Movement of the late twentieth century is defined by its policies and 
actions in Northern Ireland.  However, the policies and strategies employed in the 
immediate aftermath of the Border Campaign focused predominantly on actions in the 
Republic of Ireland.  The purposive goal of the movement was still the unification of 
Ireland.  However, this was not the immediate priority of the new leadership.  Their 
central aim was organisational survival and is therefore supportive of  
 
HO1. The immediate goal for each sub-group at the time of split is organisational 
survival in a form which they respect and recognise. 
 
HO1.  In order to begin thinking about unification they first had to re-establish some 
degree of membership and public support.  This led to the re-organisation of the 
movement and the establishment of more left-wing political tactics.  Therefore the 
leadership were revising and expanding the public goods which they were aiming to 
achieve, and in doing so they were attempting to become more relevant to the Irish 
public.  While this was successful to some degree in gaining support and recruiting, to a 
small degree, a new breed of left-wing political supporters it also led to discontent within 
the organisation.  This discontent was mainly from the traditionalist old-guard.  The 
central theme can be defined as development of the organisation into a form close to the 
leadership’s ideal.  Parallel to this, however, must be regarded the emerging dissident 
specific theme of survival of the traditional values, policies and tactics.  This is dissident 
aim is supportive of 
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HO2. The conflict at the centre of a split is, for at least one of the sub-groups, threatening 
to the organisational identity.  
 
HO2.  While this conflict does not cause organisational split at this stage of the process it 
is during this stage that it is identified as threatening to organisational identity, and 
therefore the dissidents begin to attempt to maintain the survival of their intended 
organisational identity. 
 
Throughout the process it is the competition between the aims of the dissidents and the 
leadership which decides the outcome of the split.  In this stage concrete strategic and 
policy changes were attempted by the leadership through internal constitutional reform.  
While this succeeded in firmly placing their agenda on the table one of the most 
significant developments from this was the growth and organisation of a dissident sub-
group. 
 
Within this politicisation was the introduction of multiple actual and proposed changes.  
The most significant result of this was multi-platform intra-organisational conflict. 
Twenty-five interviewees, ten Official and fifteen Provisional, outlined the nature of the 
factionalisms within the movement in the lead up to the 1969/70 split.  A number of these 
participants described a variety of separate conflicts which were developing concurrently.  
The tables below illustrate some of the intra-organisational conflicts taking place within 
the movement at this stage.  This demonstrates the diversity of conflicts which were 
taking place at the time. 
 
Group Leadership Member 
Involved Prior 
to the End of 
the Border 
Campaign 
Entered 
Republican 
Movement in 
or around 
1969/70 
Joined group 
significantly 
after 1969/70 
Total 
Official 2 2 0 0 4 
Provisional  1 0 2 0 3 
External  0 0 0 0 0 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 3 2 2 0 7 
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Table 8a.2: Factionalism due to Armed Strategy 
 
 
 
 
Group Leadership Member 
Involved Prior 
to the End of 
the Border 
Campaign 
Entered 
Republican 
Movement in 
or around 
1969/70 
Joined group 
significantly 
after 1969/70 
Total 
Official 3 2 0 0 5 
Provisional  1 1 1 0 3 
External 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 4 3 1 0 8 
Table 8a.3: Factionalism due to Political Strategy 
 
Group Leadership Member 
Involved Prior 
to the End of 
the Border 
Campaign 
Entered 
Republican 
Movement in 
or around 
1969/70 
Joined group 
significantly 
after 1969/70 
Total 
Official 3 2 0 0 5 
Provisional  1 1 1 0 3 
External 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 4 3 1 0 8 
Table 8a.4: Factionalism due to Political Strategy 
 
With respect to factionalism due to political strategy of the movement at this stage the 
analysis shows that there were a number of different political elements which were 
causing factionalism at the time.  This is illustrated in the tables below. 
 
Group Leadership Member 
Involved Prior 
to the End of 
the Border 
Campaign 
Entered 
Republican 
Movement in 
or around 
1969/70 
Joined group 
significantly 
after 1969/70 
Total 
Official 1 2 0 0 3 
Provisional  1 2 0 0 3 
External 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 1 0 0 0 1 
Total 3 4 0 0 7 
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Table 8a.5: Factionalism due to Left-Wing Political Strategy 
 
 
 
 
Group Leadership Member 
Involved Prior 
to the End of 
the Border 
Campaign 
Entered 
Republican 
Movement in 
or around 
1969/70 
Joined group 
significantly 
after 1969/70 
Total 
Official 3 2 0 0 5 
Provisional  1 2 0 0 3 
External 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 4 4 0 0 8 
Table 8a.6: Factionalism due to Abstentionism  
 
Much of the factionalism within the movement can be defined by the strategy or issue 
over which the conflict is based.  However, the location within the movement where the 
conflict was dominant is similarly important.  Two key areas within the movement were 
identified by participants, these are within the national leadership and in the membership 
between the religious old-guard and the left-wing politicisers.  The most dominant of 
these two was the developing factionalism within the national leadership which 
eventually contributed most to the split.  The make-up of participants outlining the 
importance of these factionalisms is presented below.  Most notable in the factionalism in 
the national leadership is the fact that five members of this leadership emphasised its 
importance.  
Group Leadership Member 
Involved Prior 
to the End of 
the Border 
Campaign 
Entered 
Republican 
Movement in 
or around 
1969/70 
Joined group 
significantly 
after 1969/70 
Total 
Official 2 0 2 0 4 
Provisional  2 1 2 0 5 
External 0 0 0 1 1 
Other 1 0 0 0 1 
Total 5 1 4 1 11 
Table 8a.7: Factionalism in National Leadership 
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Group Leadership Member 
Involved Prior 
to the End of 
the Border 
Campaign 
Entered 
Republican 
Movement in 
or around 
1969/70 
Joined group 
significantly 
after 1969/70 
Total 
Official 1 2 0 0 5 
Provisional  1 0 2 0 3 
External 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 2 2 2 0 6 
Table 8a.8: Intra-organisational conflicts between Left-Wing Politicisers and Religious 
Old-Guard 
 
What follows now is analysis of why and how these factionalisms developed and their 
importance in the micro-process of the split.  As has been stated above the central theme 
to this stage is policy changes: too much too soon.356  Within the analysis of this them 
there is a focus on some of the changes and proposed changes made under the following 
headings. 
 
• Armed To Political 
• Politically Left-Wing 
• Abstentionism 
 
Similarly there is the analysis of the specific factionalism within the national leadership 
 
8a.3.1 Policy Changes: Too Much Too Soon? 
The foundations of factionalism were laid in the initial stage with the emphasis being 
placed on the development of a left-wing political movement and the downgrading in 
                                                 
356
 For the dissidents these policy changes can be considered as push factors each contributing to their exit 
from the organisation.  The net result of each of them combined makes them a more prominent cumulative 
push factor than if there was only one change.  Horgan, J. (2006); The significant proposed changes in 
tactics and strategies of the leadership brought about intra-organisational conflict, Burke Rochford Jnr.  
(1989) p.163 
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importance of the IRA.  However, it was not until the full extent of the proposed changes 
was nationally apparent that the dissident factions became more vocal and organised.  
Five interviewees, four Provisionals two at a leadership level and one siding with the 
Goulding leadership in a leadership advisory capacity, outlined the prominent role played 
by the outlining of and voting on a set of proposals for change at both General Army 
Conventions of the IRA and Ard Fheiseanna of Sinn Fein in 1965 and 1966.  While there 
were multiple proposed changes put forward by the leadership the one which caused the 
most discontent among the dissenters was the issue of abstentionism.357  The changes 
proposed that the abstentionist policies to all three parliaments, Dail Eireann, 
Westminster and Stormont, would be dropped.358  For many traditionalist members these 
policies were the cornerstone of what it was to be an Irish Republican.  In essence this 
coupled with the other proposed changes were read by the dissidents as the politicisation 
of the Irish Republican Movement and the downgrading of the armed struggle and 
therefore threatening in their eyes to the organisational identity. 
 
“When you added it up the aim was quite clear, it was to convert a revolutionary 
republican movement into a constitutional party.  Although that wasn’t said as 
such that was the affect of it and in keeping with that, as was logical, the IRA was 
to be run down.”359   
 
For O’Bradaigh and many other leadership and experienced members the most important, 
and damaging, of the proposed amendments was the dropping of the abstentionist 
policies.  However, there were multiple other proposed and real changes which were 
taking place in the movement at both a political and armed level simultaneously.  The 
politicisation of the movement, combined with a heightened emphasis on the civil rights 
movement, provided multiple platforms for internal dissent.  The analysis of the 
interview data suggests that the leadership were trying to change too much too soon and 
therefore this provided a stronger support for the development of dissenting sub-
                                                 
357
 For a discussion of Sinn Fein as an abstentionist party see Maillot, A. (2005).  New Sinn Fein: Irish 
Republicanism in the Twenty First Century.  London: Routledge.  Pp.8-20.  
358
 MacStiofain, S. (1975).  Memoirs of a Revolutionary.  London: Gordon Cremonisi. Pp. 92-93. 
359
  Ruairi O’Bradaigh 
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groups.360  The opinion that the leadership were trying to do too much too soon was 
delineated by seven participants, three Officials and four Provisionals.  Of these seven 
participants six were experienced members prior to the split in 1969/70 and one 
Provisional was a new recruit in 1968.  The thematic analysis of the present stage of the 
process outlines the key areas of proposed strategic change as well as the actions taken by 
the movement at this time and how they contributed to the strengthening and 
development of intra-organisational conflict on a number of different fronts.  What 
follows is the analysis of some of the changes being implemented and proposed at this 
time at the effect they had in causing both factionalism and intra-organisational conflict.  
The themes are 
 
• Armed to Political 
• Politically Left-Wing 
• Abstentionism361 
 
There is similarly analysis of factionalism specifically within the national leadership.  
The excess of the changes and factionalisms illustrates the notion that the leadership were 
trying to change too much too soon. 
  
8a.3.1.1 Armed to Political362 
Central to their politicisation of the movement the leadership wished to downgrade the 
importance of the IRA.  The roles of the two wings of the movement, Sinn Fein and the 
IRA, were reversed and the objective was for the IRA to promote the political policies of 
Sinn Fein. 
 
                                                 
360
 This is supportive of the belief that if organisational changes are dramatic and rapid that they could lead 
to the significant exit of those tied to the original model. Della Porta, (2009), p.76;  See also Piderit (2000) 
p.783 
361
 It is also acknowledged that there was minor factionalism due to Republican involvement in the civil 
rights movement and also between the traditional Catholic membership and the left-wing. 
362
 The dominance of the debate about and relationship between the armed and political strategies in each of 
the four splits supports the assertion by both Irvin (1999), p.41 and Crenshaw (1985) p.468 of the centrality 
of these strategies and their relationship in intra-organisational conflicts within terrorist organisations 
 137 
“In the IRA the Army had democratised.  The Army was used to promote Sinn Fein.  
We didn’t say this is how you have to vote but the policies should determine who 
should vote in what way.”363 
 
While there were many would be Provisionals who saw the need for a strong political 
party their opinion was that this should work in unison with the IRA.  Therefore they 
believed in the need for a movement which was both political and armed, not one or the 
other.  
 
“I thought that the two could go in tandem…This was all being phased out.  
Goulding said at an army meeting in Connaught that ‘the time is long past going 
around barns with a Thompson.’”364   
 
This downgrading of the IRA specifically and the armed struggle in general was too 
severe for some members.  The weakening of the IRA and the armed campaign was seen 
to be weakening the entire movement and its opportunities to achieve its objectives.  
There were even those who would ultimately remain loyal to the Goulding leadership, 
and some who would be considered part of that leadership, who believed in the need for a 
strong IRA.    
 
“In 1965 I resigned as Quartermaster.  I felt that the Movement had to get 
weapons, had to re-arm.  Even a small amount would have been helpful.”365  
 
Some of the major forces behind this politicisation have, with hindsight, come to believe 
that the only significant achievement of the process should be viewed as negative.  In no 
way did they turn the Republican Movement into a strong political force.  The primary 
consequence of this pursuit of politicisation must ultimately be regarded as the split of 
1969/70.  While it must not be viewed as the sole cause of the split it must certainly be 
regarded among the primary factors. 
                                                 
363
  Mick Ryan 
364
  Des Long 
365
  Mick Ryan 
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“The politicisation of the Republican Movement in the 60s, what did it lead to?  It 
led to the famous split which was a disaster.  In retrospect if I was back in my 
twenties again I am not so sure I would have followed the same political force.”366 
 
At this stage of the process a number of opponents to this expressed their discontent to 
this downgrading of what many regarded as an essential element of the strategy of the 
Irish Republican Movement.  This dissatisfaction was expressed at both leadership and 
rank and file levels and predominantly but, not exclusively, among members of the IRA. 
 
“Most of the IRA felt that the only way to achieve a 32-county independent Ireland 
was by military force alone.  They saw Sinn Fein as separate.  This was never 
thought out fully.  It was my view that the IRA was there to complete the job which 
was ‘suspended’ in 1921.  My view was that the struggle was just in hiatus.”367 
 
The discontent within the membership and among certain elements of the leadership with 
respect to the downgrading of the armed struggle is viewed by many as the most decisive 
element at play in both the reasoning for and the result of the split. 
 
“That [the split] was always going to come because it was kind of based on very 
basic, you are either for armed struggle or you are not, or you are for politics.”368  
 
While for many this may have been the dominant element it was not the sole intra-
organisational conflict in the lead up to 1969/70.  
 
8a.3.1.2 Politically Left-Wing  
The political development was very much moving towards the left.  To a large extent 
they were moving the organisation away from the traditional republican ethos and it was 
becoming dominated by left-wing political ideals and values.  With the low levels of 
membership and support they were shaping what could have been perceived as an 
                                                 
366
  Anthony Coughlan 
367
  Mick Ryan 
368
  Dolours Price 
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entirely new organisation.  The emphasis of debates both locally and nationally were no 
longer military based but were focused on the alleviation of perceived social injustices.  
In its new form the organisation was almost unrecognisable from the traditional 
Republican Movement. 
 
This change to a socialist approach in turn brought with it a modification on the 
purposive goals of the organisation.  The movement would have historically considered 
itself to be a left-leaning political and armed movement.  However, this stronger 
emphasis on socialism brought the aspiration for the organisation to achieve a thirty-two 
county socialist republic to prominence.  This required members and supporters not only 
to aspire to a united Ireland but to a socialist united Ireland.  For many of the future 
Provisionals the prominence of socialism in the place, to a large extent, of the pursuit of a 
united Ireland was significantly and negatively moving the goals of the movement in the 
wrong direction. 
 
“You had the introduction into the Republican Movement of a degree of socialism, 
which was extreme, which was a diversion really.  If that becomes the main thrust 
then the question of national liberation becomes a bit of a side show from there 
on.”
369
   
 
This shift towards a left-wing set of goals isolated a significant proportion of the 
traditionalist membership and support.  When this is coupled with the downgrading of the 
IRA a larger and more significant section of the population were effectively isolated.  By 
changing the goals and strategy of a movement from the pursuit of a thirty-two county 
Irish Republic through the use of armed struggle to the pursuit of a thirty-two county Irish 
socialist Republic by political means the leadership were, in a short space of time, 
severely altering the emphasis of the organisation.  Resultantly their new aspirations 
could now realistically only be supported and aspired to by a different and somewhat 
narrower base.   
 
                                                 
369
  Sean O’Bradaigh 
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One specific element within the left-wing proposal put forward towards the end of this 
stage of the process was a proposed coalition with likeminded left-wing parties and 
movements for the purpose of promoting the left-wing aims of the combined 
movement.370  This proposed union acquired the moniker of National Liberation Front 
[NLF].371  When proposed this succeeded in heightening the traditionalist’s apprehension 
of the new left-wing strategy.  The issue was seized by the growing dissenting sub-group 
as a negative example of the direction the movement was taking.  They began to spread 
their message of distrust of the left-wing trajectory which the movement was taking.372 
 
“As the movement was moving more towards the left he [Sean MacStiofain] started 
to talk to people on his side locally about how this wasn’t right for the Movement.  
MacStiofain was very much anti-Communist.  However, there were very few people 
within the IRA who would have been Communist…He was against the dropping of 
abstentionism and the leftward trend of the Movement.”373   
 
These voices of dissent were negatively portraying the Goulding leadership as being 
Communists and emphasising what they perceived to be the negative aspects of the left-
wing political ideology being put forward.  Some of the strongest voices of discontent 
came from a number of influence old-guard traditionalist Republicans who had left the 
movement in the aftermath of the Border Campaign but had since returned due to their 
disillusionment with the direction of the movement under this new leadership.  The 
influence of this returning old guard in conjunction with the influential dissidents who 
had remained provided a legitimisation for the position of the dissidents.374  
 
                                                 
370
 This proposed coalition was central to the intra-organisational conflict as proposed by Irvin (1999), p.41 
371
 In Cathal Goulding’s oration in Bodenstown in June 1967 he stated ‘to all radical and progressive 
groups, to all individual revolutionaries, the Republican Movement should be a rallying ground, the point 
of unity.’  This can be seen as a call for what became known as the NLF.  Goulding, C. (July 1967).  
Bodenstown ’67: Oration by Cathal Goulding.  In United Irishman, pp.10-11  
372
 This is a classic example of the initial utilisation of voice prior to exit to see if they could change the 
internal workings of the movement and opinions of the leadership and membership.  Hirschman (1970) 
373
  Mick Ryan 
374
 This is supportive of the Dyck and Starke model which posits the presence of legitimising voices in 
favour of the dissidents as a trigger event for the progress of the process of split. See Dyck and Starke 
(1999), pp.804-811 
 141 
8a.3.1.3 Abstentionism 
To the fore of many people’s analysis of the 1969/70 split is the issue of abstentionism, 
an issue which is later revisited in the lead up to the 1986 split.375  Historically the 
Republican Movement viewed the three parliaments as institutions which by their very 
nature promoted the partition of Ireland.376  Therefore any Sinn Fein member who was 
elected to any of the three houses would abstain from taking their seats on strategic and 
policy grounds.  This became an issue debated within the leadership of both Sinn Fein 
and the IRA as well as in the Wolfe Tone Society.  For the new leadership this policy was 
seen as a burden debilitating the progress of their politicisation of the movement. 
 
When in the mid 1960s this was brought to an initial vote, along with a variety of other 
proposals, the vote was to drop the abstentionist policy completely for all three 
parliaments.  This was read in turn by some members as the recognition of the legitimacy 
of the three parliaments and the acceptance of partition.  For many at that time 
abstentionism was a central tenet of Irish Republicanism, and for some this continues to 
be the case.  It was considered to be beyond a strategy or tactic but was regarded as a 
principle and even part of their ideology.  Therefore the proposed change of these policies 
was viewed by many of the old-guard as significantly threatening to organisational 
identity.   Since the partition of the state there was the acceptance that the organisational 
position was the denouncement of the legitimacy of each of the parliaments and now the 
leadership were proposing an alteration to this strategy by recommending the policy’s 
abolition.  Interviews with members of both sides of the split indicate the deep rooted and 
historical sentiment that went with the abstentionist policy. 
 
                                                 
375
 For an analysis of debates on republican abstentionist policies see Lynn, B. (2002).  Tactic or Principle? 
The Evolution of Republican Thinking on Abstentionism in Ireland, 1970-1998.  In Irish Political Studies, 
17(2), pp.74-94 
376
 Abstentionism was also a dominant theme in Sinn Fein at the beginning of the twentieth century.  See 
Pyne, P. (1974).  The politics of parliamentary abstentionism: Ireland’s Four Sinn Fein Parties 1905-1926.  
In Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 12(2), pp.206-227 
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“Abstentionism was always a Republican policy.  For instance today’s situation, 
how can you say you are a Republican and have to run this state with the British? 
”
377
   
 
“The suspicion of taking seats was deep rooted.  [Future] Provisional leaders like 
the O’Bradaighs [Sean and Ruairi], [Eamon] MacThomais, [John Joe] McGirl 
and others had spoken publicly at meetings recruiting into Sinn Fein and the IRA 
under the guise of not taking seats.  They said that the Dail would corrupt you.  
Then these people were asked by the leadership to consider that what was once a 
mortal sin was suddenly no longer so.”378 
    
While this may be phrased as a singular policy change in practice this proposal elicited 
three major changes in policy.  These were hugely significant changes individually, but 
by proposing to drop the policy to all three parliaments the leadership were calling for a 
monumental turnaround in strategy.  For many participants retrospective analysis says 
that the Goulding leadership may have been better advised to alter the position with 
respect to one parliament at a time.  The leadership believed in taking their seats in each 
of the three.  However, if they could not bring a significant portion of the membership 
and support with them this change was to be inconsequential. 
 
The overriding theme of this stage with respect to strategic changes, ‘too much, too 
soon’, is not only applicable to the full range of strategic and policy changes but is 
specifically applicable to the issue of the proposed changes in the abstentionist policies.  
When these are combined with the various other concrete and proposed changes the 
leadership was always likely to isolate a large number of their supporters, as well as 
fellow members of the leadership.      
 
This retrospective analysis may suggest the obvious problems to be faced by trying to 
impose these changes to the abstentionist policies.  However, at the time it was believed 
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that in order to sustain the existence of the movement that drastic changes were needed.  
The leadership inferred that they would be more likely to attract new members and 
supporters if they were to take their seats and be seen to be actively involved in the 
political set-up, rather than being the eternal external agitators.379  In order to maintain 
organisational survival one must not only attract new membership and support but they 
need also to preserve a significant proportion of their old-guard and bring them along 
with them.  For many of the traditionalist old-guard these sweeping changes to a deep-
rooted policy was to prove ‘too much, too soon.’  The stance taken by both sides of the 
conflict provided the basis for continuous and developing factionalism from the mid 
1960s up until the official division in Sinn Fein in 1970.   
 
With this battery of fluctuation, change and proposed change tensions mounted within the 
membership and across the leadership resulting in intense intra-organisational conflict 
and factionalism. 
 
8a.3.1.4 National Leadership 
One of the clearest examples of factionalism was within the national leadership.380  This 
was particularly evident in the IRA Army Council.  During the mid to late 1960s this 
seven person council was divided evenly with three sitting members supportive of 
politicisation and three in favour of the advancement of the armed campaign and one, 
Tomas MacGiolla, generally described as taking a ‘neutral’ position until his final 
decision to side with the Officials.381  This division was also evident within the leadership 
of Sinn Fein as well as within other factions of the Republican leadership.  It is alleged by 
Provisionals under their title of ‘internal methods’ that the Goulding leadership 
manipulated who would take vital roles within the organisation so as to push forward 
their socialist agenda. 
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 Hanley and Millar P. 40. 
380
 This is supports the claim that areas of power-relations is one of the prominent venues for intra-
organisational conflict. March and Simon (1993), p.142 
381
 White, R.W. (2006).   
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“People had largely been identified as to what side they took in this brewing 
situation and because the people in favour of all these things were in charge of the 
Army, and they had a very good say in Sinn Fein as well, and they controlled the 
newspaper The United Irishman, then they were in the position to use great 
influence.”382 
 
As the mouthpiece of the movement the Republican newspaper, the United Irishman, was 
a powerful tool to put across the preferred message of the movement to the membership.  
Therefore at a time of intra-organisational conflict whichever side was in editorial control 
were better positioned to transmit and justify their viewpoints to the wider membership.  
In the lead up to the split the left-leaning leadership was in control of the paper.  
Therefore, they decided what was to be published and, at times more importantly, what 
was to be omitted from the publication  
 
This factionalism within the national leadership while evident during this stage of the 
process grew in strength and significance in the final stages. 
 
HO1. The immediate goal for each sub-group at the time of split is organisational 
survival in a form which they respect and recognise. 
 
HO2. The conflict at the centre of a split is, for at least one of the sub-groups, threatening 
to the organisational identity.  
 
 
HO1. & HO2.  The presence of these multiple proposed changes and the resultant intra-
organisational conflicts was seen as threatening to the organisational identity of the 
movement by a larger proportion of the movement than it was deemed to be during the 
last stage.  The multiple changes inevitably isolated a growing number of members and 
resultantly created a stronger dissident sub-group.  These intra-organisational conflicts 
were not only threatening to the organisational identity on an individual level.  The 
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immediate aim of organisational survival was not given the attention it required by the 
leadership at this time of multiple change as it was significantly isolating a larger 
proportion of the membership with each proposed change and therefore strengthening the 
dissidents.  While it was deemed threatening to the identity it was still viewed to be 
reconcilable.  Due to the fact that the votes for change were being defeated throughout 
this stage the internal dissenters believed that the issues could be solved internally.  In 
marked contrast to the opening stages the dissidents were becoming more organised at 
this stage.   
 
8a.4 Stage 3: Inevitability of and Preparation for Split 
The opening two stages of this process may be regarded as laying the groundwork for the 
split.  However, this third stage should be regarded as the most critical in deciding the 
outcome of the division.  Each of the thirty participants who discussed the 1969/70 split 
emphasised the importance of the actions taken, or not taken, by the IRA in the summer 
of 1969.  This is therefore regarded as the most dominant reasoning not only for the split 
taking place but also as the dominant factor in deciding its outcome.  While the opening 
two stages created situations where sections of the membership and supporters were 
disillusioned with the direction the movement was taking, these dissidents while 
expressing their concerns had yet to garner a sufficient degree of internal or external 
support for their position.  Without this support any move away from the parent 
organisation would have proved counterproductive and the resulting splinter group would 
have been close to irrelevant within the wider society.  However, in late 1968 and early 
1969 the situation in Northern Ireland began to gain widespread national and 
international attention.  Civil rights marches were attacked by loyalist groups as members 
of the RUC and B-Specials stood by.  At other times officers themselves baton-charged 
and injured marchers.  With growing violence and the resultant riots on both sides of the 
sectarian divide there were community calls for the IRA to defend the communities and 
provide weapons.  However, the leadership resisted as it was not their intention to get 
involved in armed conflict.  They wished to maintain their plans to politicise the 
Republican Movement.  The Northern Irish situation came to a fore in August 1969 with 
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incidents such as the Battle of the Bogside383 and the ensuing sectarian rioting across 
Northern Ireland.384  In Belfast hundreds of houses were burned to the ground, leaving 
thousands of people, mainly Catholics, homeless.  By August 14th the British government 
sent army troops into Northern Ireland.  The events of 1969 proved vital in the process 
leading up to the split, and the escalation of terrorist violence in Northern Ireland.385   The 
violence and the calls for weapons provided a new impetus to the dissident sub-group.  
The dissidence was now purely focused on the need for defence and an armed strategy.  
This was especially the case with the returning old-guard members.386 
 
“I think the split in the early seventies was down to a lot of republicans on our side 
were old-style republicans.  And the whole thing that was happening in Belfast and 
Derry, where people were burnt out of there homes, I think the reactionary element 
took over.”387   
 
The growing tensions within the organisation cemented the inevitability of split.  
Throughout this period the mounting tension in Northern Ireland and the perceived 
inaction of the IRA succeeded in bringing back additional old-guard members to those 
who had already returned.  Many attempted to defend the Republican communities.  
Parallel to this a growing number of young Northern nationalists became involved in the 
defence of their communities.  While this was not always under the auspices of the IRA a 
number of the young recruits went on to join and played a crucial role within the 
Provisional movement in the aftermath of the split.  For twenty-one of the thirty-two 
participants this stage of the process represented their first involvement with organised 
republicanism and signalled the beginning of the split in their eyes. 
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Within this ten month time period the voices of dissent grew louder and reached a wider 
audience.  The dissidents became more organised and began to prepare for the eventuality 
of split.  The Goulding leadership continued their push for constitutional change, to drop 
the abstentionist policies and put forward their left wing objectives and policies.388  Their 
desire for organisational change was parallel to a weakening of their position and support, 
and the strengthening of the alternative being provided by the ‘Provisionals.’   While no 
official split was to take place until late 1969 it is noted that it is when referring to this 
third stage of the process that participants start to prominently refer to two distinct 
Republican groupings, the ‘Officials’ and the ‘Provisionals’.  This is particularly 
prominent in reference to defence provided in Republican areas by the returning old-
guard who became founding members of the Provisional IRA and the failure to provide 
defence and weapons by future Officials.  This deliberate labelling of groups shows how 
it was within this period that the two distinct groups began to take shape, a move which 
rendered the split inevitable. 
 
Within the analysis of this stage the dominant themes focused on are: 
 
• Preparation for Split 
• Republican Expectations and Leadership Disconnect 
• External Influence: Fianna Fail 
 
8a.4.1 Preparation for Split 
As the situation in Northern Ireland grew more hostile at the end of 1968 and the 
beginning of 1969, especially with incidents such as the attacks on marchers at Burntollet 
Bridge, the growing dissident grouping became more organised and vocal in their dissent.  
They called on the leadership to refocus their strategies on armed struggle and to move 
away from left-wing political proposals being put forward.  In these months there were 
preparations made by leading ‘Provisionals’ for the upcoming split.  They sounded out 
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individuals for recruitment and support by criticising the ‘Communist’ trajectory that the 
movement was taking.  They strengthened their position in opposition to the politicising 
leadership.  This was carried out across Ireland at a local level. 
 
“In early 1969 I called in to Ned Dempsey in Carlow. Ned told me that he had had 
a visitor from Belfast, Liam Burke and Miles Shevlin, the Dublin solicitor.  They 
were criticising the ‘Communist takeover’ of the Movement…[Sean] MacStiofain 
would have been in touch with each unit and was  finding out from them what was 
going on locally.  As the Movement was moving more towards the left he started to 
talk to people on his side locally about how this wasn’t right for the Movement.”389   
 
As this took place on the side of the dissidents the national leadership were also putting 
forward their case for politicisation.  They promoted their preference for left-wing 
Republicanism and dropping the abstentionist policies.  It was their aim to prevent a split 
and continue the promotion of their political strategies, even in light of the events in 
Northern Ireland.  However, they were aware from 1968 that a split was inevitable due to 
the growing organisation by the dissident sub-group.  It was their task then to lessen the 
impact of the split.   
 
“I personally from the beginning of my contact had hoped that an actual split 
could be avoided; people who were unable to adapt to a socially critical political 
approach would, we expected, drop out individually. It became evident however 
that a split was being organised prior to the 1968 Ard Fheis which launched the 
'Garland Commission' process; this latter was a conscious attempt to counter it… 
We did our best to avoid it happening, on the whole; we tried to bring everyone 
along the political road, but the proto-Provisionals were organising against us all 
the time.”390 
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“And there was an escalating situation, and just as a final push was being made by 
Cathal Goulding and company in ‘68 at the Ard Fheis…They employed full time 
organisers, and the full time organisers were sorting us out as to probables and 
possibles and all the rest of it.”391   
 
For the dissidents their most national show of dissent came at the re-interment of Peter 
Barnes and James McCormack392 in Mullingar in July 1969.  At the graveside Jimmy 
Steele, one of the leading Belfast old-guard, gave a speech which was to send out a signal 
to all both within and outside of Republicanism that there was a growing dissenting 
faction who significantly disagreed with the course of action being taken by the 
leadership. This speech is acknowledged by both sides as a significant moment in the 
process of the split and ultimately the development of the Provisional IRA.  In his speech 
Steele sidestepped the issues of civil rights and instead promoted and defended the use of 
force by the IRA.  He also showed his contempt for left-wing politics and the notion that 
members were to be “more conversant with the teaching of Chairman Mao than those of 
our dead comrades.”  He was dismissed from the IRA due to the criticisms of the IRA in 
the speech.  However, the sentiments he portrayed had effect throughout the movement.  
It put forward an alternative voice to that of the politicising leadership. 
 
“With the Jimmy Steele speech in Mullingar in July 1969 they were laying the 
groundwork for what was to come”393 
 
While this was the public face of the internal dissidence the preparation for the split on 
behalf of both sides was continuing.  On the side of the dissidents members of the 
national leadership such as Sean MacStiofain and Ruairi O’Bradaigh were being very 
vocal in their criticisms and their intentions if this left-wing politicisation continued.    
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“MacStiofain was letting me know since July 1969 ‘we are never going to accept a 
vote on the Dail, Stormont, Westminster and the NLF.  We are hoping you will be 
on our side.’”394 
   
This continued with the dissidents actively approaching members of both the rank and 
file membership and leadership to side with them on the issues causing intra-
organisational conflict.  In the aftermath of the ‘pogroms’ of August 1969 their 
organising moved beyond the pursuit of support for their position and now included the 
acquisition of IRA arms and artillery for future use. 
 
“After the pogroms the organisation of dissidents started taking place.  At one 
point in August 1969 weapons from a HQ dump were given to MacStiofain by the 
person in charge of that particular dump.  I find it amazing that MacStiofain was 
left in as Director of Intelligence.”395   
 
As this took place and the situation in Northern Ireland became more violent the 
Goulding leadership pushed ahead with their politicisation process.  They realised that in 
order to be successful that this required additional effort and promotion on their behalf 
and they similarly attempted to recruit new members to advance their position. 
 
“Around August 69… Goulding and Garland came to me and I was invited to join 
the IRA…I think they were inviting me because they thought I might be helpful to 
them and they wanted me to maintain the political line on top, tried to maintain the 
hegemony of the political line, better able to do it than Roy they put it.”396 
 
With the majority of people now calling for the IRA to defend the areas under attack and 
to provide weapons the appeal for the promotion of the political process was out of touch 
and disconnected with the expectations which the public had for the IRA and Sinn Fein.   
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8a.4.2 Republican Expectations and Leadership Disconnect  
The escalating violence in Northern Ireland raised the expectations of many in the 
nationalist areas, and across the rest of the island, for the IRA to defend the communities 
and to provide weapons for the newly forming defence committees.  In the years previous 
many of these people regarded the IRA as an obsolete grouping.  But in light of the 
violence this viewpoint changed.  Many now desired an IRA presence to supply defence 
and weapons.  However, the intentions of the leadership were disconnected from these 
expectations as they wished to continue their politicisation process and not for the IRA to 
act as a defender of the communities.397  This was deemed to be one of the most critical 
factors in deciding the result of the split.  For many members the split did not take place 
because of abstentionism or left-wing politics, but it was the result of the failure of the 
national leadership to defend the people they claimed to represent during these months. 
 
“So the ’69 split, yes you were aware of, in simplistic terms I would have said.  If 
you had said to me in January ’70 “what is the split over?” I would have turned 
around and I would have said to you “The IRA leadership sold us out, they left us 
defenceless, they sold the guns, they decommissioned”398 
 
The expectation of both the Republican membership and the public at this time was for 
weapons and defence of the regions.  However, participants acknowledged that the 
national leadership’s actions and sentiments were significantly disconnected from these 
expectations. As Table 8a.13 displays this belief that there was a significant disconnect 
between membership expectations and leadership strategy was most dominant among the 
Provisionals, and especially from those who joined the movement in or around the time 
of split.  Even if the leadership wished to meet the expectations of their public and 
membership it was acknowledged that they were unprepared for the circumstances of the 
summer of 1969.  All of these observations are analysed below and the make-up 
participants detailing this is displayed in the following tables. 
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Group Leadership Member 
Involved Prior 
to the End of 
the Border 
Campaign 
Entered 
Republican 
Movement in 
or around 
1969/70 
Joined group 
significantly 
after 1969/70 
Total 
Official 2 0 1 0 3 
Provisional  0 1 6 0 7 
External 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 1 0 0 0 1 
Total 3 1 7 0 11 
Table 8a.9: Membership Expectations: Weapons 
 
Group Leadership Member 
Involved Prior 
to the End of 
the Border 
Campaign 
Entered 
Republican 
Movement in 
or around 
1969/70 
Joined group 
significantly 
after 1969/70 
Total 
Official 2 1 0 0 3 
Provisional  2 1 8 0 11 
External 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 1 0 0 0 1 
Total 5 2 8 0 15 
Table 8a.10: Membership Expectations: Defence 
 
Group Leadership Member 
Involved Prior 
to the End of 
the Border 
Campaign 
Entered 
Republican 
Movement in 
or around 
1969/70 
Joined group 
significantly 
after 1969/70 
Total 
Official 1 1 1 0 3 
Provisional  2 0 5 0 7 
External 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 1 0 0 0 1 
Total 4 1 6 0 11 
Table 8a.11: Public Expectations: Defence 
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Group Leadership Member 
Involved Prior 
to the End of 
the Border 
Campaign 
Entered 
Republican 
Movement in 
or around 
1969/70 
Joined group 
significantly 
after 1969/70 
Total 
Official 3 2 2 0 7 
Provisional  2 2 9 0 13 
External 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 1 0 0 0 1 
Total 6 4 11 0 21 
Table 8a.12: Disconnect between membership expectations and Leadership strategy 
 
Group Leadership Member 
Involved Prior 
to the End of 
the Border 
Campaign 
Entered 
Republican 
Movement in 
or around 
1969/70 
Joined group 
significantly 
after 1969/70 
Total 
Official 1 0 1 0 2 
Provisional  1 0 2 0 3 
External 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 1 0 0 0 1 
Total 3 0 3 0 6 
Table 8a.13: Leadership Unprepared 
 
It is recognised by members of both sides that this failure by the leadership to provide 
defence and weapons for the nationalist communities of Northern Ireland strengthened 
the position of their internal detractors.  No longer was the internal conflict dominated 
with the pros and cons of abstentionism and left-wing politics, issues which did not affect 
everyday lives.  The issues of defence and the supply of weapons did have this significant 
impact.  In light of this there were now people who years previously had dismissed the 
relevance of the IRA calling for them to defend them and disapproving when this defence 
did not arrive.   
 
It is at this stage that the process moves from intra-organisational conflict to a process of 
split.  This can be explained through the utilisation of four hypotheses. 
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HO2. The conflict at the centre of a split is, for at least one of the sub-groups, threatening 
to the organisational identity.  
 
HO4. The sub-group most willing to make compromises is the one most likely to be 
successful in the aftermath of a split. 
 
HO2. & HO4.  For the old-guard traditionalist members one of the most dominant 
historical purposes and identities of the IRA was that of Catholic and Nationalist 
defenders.  However, in this time of violence perpetrated against and by these 
communities the IRA leadership was hesitant to subscribe to this identity.  This is due to 
the heterogeneous nature of the membership at this stage.  Within the movement there 
were two diverse standpoints being put forward.  There were the old-guard traditionalists, 
many just recently returned, calling for decisive armed action and defence by the IRA.  In 
stark contrast to this was the viewpoint of the politicisers who did not wish for the IRA to 
partake in an armed campaign any longer.  In the lead-up to and during the summer of 
1969 it was clear that neither side were willing to compromise on their position and 
therefore creating the inevitability of split.  The discontent about the IRA’s reluctance to 
partake was not just present within the movement but also among the general public.     
 
“And then you had the explosion of all of 1969.  You had a very, very strong sense 
of anger at the IRA’s lack of preparation for the defence. ”399 
 
There was a large number of new recruits entering the movement at this time who were 
not joining due to their views on left-wing politics or the much debated abstentionist 
policies, or even the target of attaining a united Ireland.400  They were joining so as to get 
arms to protect there families and communities.  
 
“The discontent came in afterwards when there was a panic ‘where do we get 
guns?’  All people wanted was guns.  Even people of a left wing persuasion would 
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have sold their political beliefs to get their hands on guns to defend the areas, not 
for philosophical reasons, but in order to have protection for the families in those 
areas.”401   
 
While there were a small number of weapons supplied to defend the communities these 
were mainly provided by the old-guard traditionalists.  This significantly strengthened the 
dissidents’ standing among young recruits and the public whose expectation was for the 
IRA to defend the communities.  It was not just would be ‘Provisionals’ who regard the 
failure to provide weapons and defence at this stage as a mistake by the Goulding 
leadership.  There are those who sided with the leadership, and those who advised them, 
who believed that if they had met the expectations of the population that the result of the 
split could have been significantly different, or could even have been avoided. 
 
“It is regrettable perhaps that Goulding and company didn’t have a few more guns 
on the Falls Rd in August 69 to defend the locals.  That might have enabled them to 
keep on top of the situation politically.”402 
 
While these sentiments are put forward with the benefit of hindsight at the time of the 
events the policies put forward by and actions taken by the Dublin leadership was 
severely disconnected from those of their membership and public.  In the months after the 
failure of the leadership to provide defence for the communities in August 1969 was used 
and manipulated by the ‘Provisional’ leadership to further strengthen support for their 
position and their movement away from the leadership. 
 
“The pogroms were the catalyst which aided the Provos, and they are 
manipulating the facts of what happened then and in events after.”403 
 
The view of a large proportion of the people within the effected areas was that it was the 
role of the IRA to defend them.  However, this opinion was not shared by the national 
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leadership.  They no longer saw their role as that of Catholic defenders.  They saw this as 
an opportunity for the British army and the RUC to defend the areas against the loyalists 
and the B-Specials, a viewpoint which only succeeded in cementing the idea of 
leadership disconnect in the minds of many.       
 
“Goulding would have seen things politically; it was an opportunity where a clash 
could occur.  With the British troops coming in and Loyalists, or some Orange 
elements or B-Specials going around parishes.  It was an ideal situation for a clash 
between ultra-loyalism and the British authorities, who were supposed to be in 
charge of law and order.  That is the view that I would have ascribed to at the 
time.”404   
 
The sense of leadership abandonment was uppermost in the minds of those in the worst 
effected areas.  This further accentuated a growing notion of north/south divide within the 
movement as the belief was that the national leadership, based in Dublin, had the time 
and space to develop and debate political policy and were therefore disconnected from 
the daily hardship for Republicans in Northern Ireland.  They were unaware of what was 
needed in the communities on a day to day basis. 
 
“I would say that either there would be a lot more ideology taught in Dublin than 
there ever would have been in Belfast and that is understandable because we were 
dealing with the constant threat of Loyalist attack and pogroms.  We had to live 
with that notion.  So that was uppermost in most people’s minds, not the ideology 
of each according to their needs and from each according to their means, or 
whatever.”405 
 
Even if the Goulding leadership had seen their role as that of Catholic defenders it is 
unlikely that they would have been able to provide any adequate form of defence for the 
population.  This lack of preparedness was criticised both during and after the events. 
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“And of course some of the people who had been active in other campaigns, but 
not so active in the sixties, some of the older people who had come back were very 
critical of this lack of preparedness.  Because it was clear to everybody, including 
me as a young person that things were getting into a very serious situation.”406   
 
8a.4.2 External Influence: Fianna Fail 
Officials claim that a significant amount of responsibility for the Provisionals’ 
development rests with key members of Fianna Fail, the governmental party of the 
Republic of Ireland at that time.407  This is illustrated in Table 8a.14. 
 
Group Leadership Member 
Involved Prior 
to the End of 
the Border 
Campaign 
Entered 
Republican 
Movement in 
or around 
1969/70 
Joined group 
significantly 
after 1969/70 
Total 
Official 2 2 1 0 4 
Provisional  0 0 1 0 1 
External 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 1 0 0 0 1 
Total 3 2 2 0 7 
Table 8a.14: Influence of Fianna Fail in developing the Provisionals 
 
This viewpoint was promoted by the Officials in the aftermath of the split, and was used 
as a justification for their failure to become the dominant Republican force.408  The 
argument put forward was that certain members of Fianna Fail were wary of the electoral 
challenge which they could meet from a successfully politicised left-wing Sinn Fein.  
Therefore they sought to split the organisation by funding the development of the 
Provisionals if they would move away from the Dublin leadership and concentrate 
exclusively on Northern Ireland. 
 
                                                 
406
  Gerry Adams 
407
 Oots (1989) p.145 
408
 See Official Republican Movement (1971) Fianna Fail and the IRA. 
 158 
“In the 1960s it went from inactivity to the revival of republicanism, from non-
involvement to very active involvement in issues like fish ins, land, ground rents, 
rivers, lakes, mortgages societies, housing etc.409  We were really beginning to 
make headway.  People weren’t saying that this is wrong.  Participation in the Dail 
and more action in councils would have benefited from this growing support.  
Fianna Fail feared this.  The IRA were now involved in the civil rights movement 
and fighting the Brits.  It wasn’t just disorganised loyalist mobs in pogroms but 
they were supported by the state to force the IRA into action and divert the focus to 
the armed campaign.  This brought an effective end to the IRA/Sinn Fein impetus in 
the south, the concentration had been in the south.”410    
 
Information was reaching the Republican leadership from early 1969 that individuals 
were being approached by representatives of Fianna Fail members and they were 
discussing the possibility of a breakaway group, and how they could help in its 
development.  The people approached were predominantly old-guard Republicans who 
would have been believed to have been against the left-wing politicisation of the 
Republican movement.  For any politically violent organisation, especially a newly 
developing one, they must have sources of finance as well as the availability of weapons 
and artillery.  The accusation from the Officials is that the Provisionals acquired a 
significant proportion of this from members of the Fianna Fail party, most notably 
cabinet ministers Charles Haughey and Neil Blaney with the assistance of Irish army 
intelligence officer Captain James Kelly.411 
 
8a.5 Stage 4: Organisational Exit and Breakaway Group Formation 
During stage 3 it transpired that a split in Irish Republicanism was to be inevitable.  
However, it is in stage 4 that the split took place.  Continuing on from the previous stage 
the ‘Provisionals’ attempted to maximise their position due to the circumstances of the 
time, especially with the perceived failure of the leadership to provide weapons and 
defence.  A number of divisive issues came to the fore in the years leading up to 1969.  
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But it was the divided opinion on IRA responsibilities at this time which accelerated the 
process. 
 
“I get a sense that in the autumn of 1969/1970 things start to move very, very 
quickly.   I think what is happening is the lid is off and there is an entirely new 
situation for everyone and the situation has a momentum after August 69 which is 
in a way very different from what went before.”412 
 
The split officially took place in both sections of the movement over the issue of 
abstentionism.  However, there were numerous issues at the heart of the conflict but most 
notably it was the continued failure of the IRA to defend communities which ultimately 
decided the outcome.  While the specific regional sections moved away from the 
leadership prior to the Army Convention and Ard Fheis, most notably the Belfast IRA, 
the official split took place in the aftermath of these two national conventions.  The split 
took place in the IRA prior to the one in Sinn Fein.  The purpose of the description of this 
stage is to illustrate how the Goulding leadership attempted to minimise the effect of the 
split while continuing with their politicisation of the Republican Movement.  Concurrent 
to this is an analysis of how the ‘Provisionals’ attempted to maximise their position and 
gain as much support as possible.   
 
Within the present stage the themes focused on are: 
• The Split 
• Competition for Support 
• Personality Clashes and Trust 
This is followed by an overview of the split process. 
 
8a.5.1 The Split 
At the will of the national leadership during the Army Convention of 1969 a vote was 
taken on two of the main divisive issues of the time, the development of a National 
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Liberation Front and the abolition of the constitutional abstentionist policies.413  Both 
votes were passed by their required majorities.414 In the days and weeks after the 
Convention the dissidents formed the Provisional Army Council and the Provisional 
IRA.415  Among the leadership figures within this breakaway grouping were Sean 
MacStiofain as Chief of Staff alongside fellow leadership figures such Ruairi O’Bradaigh 
and Daithi O’Conail and a number of the Belfast Republicans who had exited prior to the 
Convention, people such as Leo Martin. 
 
When the split within the IRA took place in December 1969416 Sinn Fein remained 
theoretically intact.  However, this all changed when at the Ard Fheis of January 11th 
1970 a number of political dissenters staged a walk-out.417  Akin to the IRA Army 
Convention there was a vote taken on the dropping of the abstentionist policies.  When 
the vote was taken this received a simple majority but not by the necessary two-thirds.418  
Following what was effectively a defeat for the motion a new motion was called from the 
floor by Seamus Costello for the Ard Fheis to recognise the vote that was passed at the 
Army Convention the month previous.  With the calling of this motion there was the 
walk-out of dissidents.  This was due to the fact as a non-constitutional vote it only 
required a simple majority to be passed, a vote the dissenters knew they would be 
defeated on.  The dissidents, a number of whom had been present at the Army 
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Convention as well, after their walk-out elected a new ‘caretaker Sinn Fein Ard 
Chomhairle’ [Executive].  They were ready for the eventuality of defeat and had prior to 
the Ard Fheis put plans in place for the development of a new political party to align 
itself with the newly developing Provisional IRA.  The events of late 1969/70 support a 
number of the hypotheses, but one in particular. 
HO4. The sub-group most willing to make compromises is the one most likely to be 
successful in the aftermath of a split. 
 
HO4.  The continued push by the national leadership for the politicisation of the 
movement should a distinct reluctance to compromise.  In the lead-up to both the 
Convention and Ard Fheis they were aware of the preparations for split on behalf of the 
dissidents.  However, they were reluctant to adapt to the changing circumstances and the 
changing expectations of the membership and public.  They were therefore unwilling to 
compromise.  By fixing themselves to their politicising position and not moving their 
strategies and policies in anyway closer to the dissidents’ position they as a result 
experienced a more damaging split than may have otherwise taken place.  
 
What follows now is the analysis of two dominant themes which were identified by 
participants in this fourth stage of the Provisional/Official split.  These themes are 
competition for support and personality clashes and trust.  The focus here is not on why 
the split took place.  Rather this assessment outlines these two issues in relation to how 
both sides acquired, or attempted to acquire, sufficient support for their position during 
the split. 
  
8a.5.2 Competition for Support 
With the inevitability of the split the main task for both sides during this stage of the 
process was to attempt to secure and retain as much support as possible.  The Officials 
wished to minimise the effect of the divide while their Provisional adversaries hoped to 
accentuate the split.  They were competing for the support of both IRA and Sinn Fein 
members.  This task principally took place in the aftermath of the split as the two 
groupings vied for membership and support.  It essentially started in the mid to late 1960s 
 162 
as members of both sides were canvassing across the country.  However, at this stage of 
the process the main competition was to gain the adequate numbers of support among 
those attending both the Army Convention and the Ard Fheis.   
 
For the Goulding leadership the years leading up to the split had seen them attempting to 
fend off or postpone a split.  It was their belief that by doing so their politicisation 
process would be in a stronger position to succeed.  If it were not for the events of 1969 
they may have been right. 
 
“While we had been pushing for this for a while we wanted to slow it down at that 
stage [1969], we were just trying to avoid a split.  I always felt, and Cathal did too 
that the longer you avoid splits, the better you will be, the stronger you will be.  
You would be developing where you weren’t developed before.”419 
 
While survival is at the cornerstone of all organisational behaviour the leadership put this 
in jeopardy by retaining the membership of the internal dissident grouping for too long.  
The dissidents were preparing for a division for a number of years previous to the actual 
split.  However, if the leadership had pre-empted this move away in the years prior and 
forced their exit the emerging breakaway organisation would have been significantly 
weaker in membership and support due to the inability to adequately prepare.  It was 
purely a result of the Northern Irish situation of 1969 and the early 1970s that the 
emerging Provisionals emerged in such a dominant position within Republicanism close 
to their formation.    
 
The accusation from the Provisionals is that the national leadership’s attempts to acquire 
more support for their position, and postpone a split, was carried out through what they 
define as ‘internal methods’.  They contend that the Officials manipulated the makeup of 
the delegates at both the Army Convention and the Ard Fheis so as that the votes would 
be falsely weighted in their favour.  This was accomplished by failing to collect a number 
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of known dissidents for the Convention while also bringing an excess of delegates from 
areas where the support for their position was strong.  
 
 “The split came first in the army before Sinn Fein and the Limerick and Clare 
delegates to the Army Convention were left behind, they were not picked up.  On 
the night of the 22nd and 23rd of December those who didn’t agree with the result of 
this convention met in Athlone and set up the Provisional Army Council.”420 
 
In addition to this the Belfast IRA and others who had exited the movement pre-split 
were not eligible to attend.   
 
This tactic succeeded in helping the Goulding leadership achieve their two-thirds 
majority.  This though only solved the short-term issue of passing the vote.  They had not 
succeeded in fending off or postponing a split.  The real competition for support was to 
take place in the months and years after the split. 
 
For the Ard Fheis a similar tactic of delegate manipulation was deemed to have been 
used.  The Provisionals contend that new supportive cumanns were developed, as some 
dissident ones were closed down. 
 
“There are a whole lot of rules, all organisations have rules, but inevitably like in 
all organisations it slips a bit.  You are supposed to have a meeting of the Cumann 
every month, but you might only have ten a year, you mightn’t have one in August 
because someone is always away on holidays.  There is always little bits and pieces 
like this.”421           
  
This accusation of corruption provided further rationale for their movement away from 
the politicising leadership.  They embraced the issue and utilised it as they sought to 
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achieve dominance in the resultant recruitment contest.  It provided yet another 
justification in their eyes for their movement away from the parent group.  
 
By placing an overemphasis on organisational survival the leadership had actually 
weakened the movement.  A united movement is only beneficial when the viewpoints are 
also united rather than having irreconcilable intra-organisational conflicts internally 
damaging the group.  Therefore the notion of organisational survival should not be 
confused with full membership retention and unity.  In extreme situations of intra-
organisational conflict it is at times more beneficial for the survival of the movement to 
allow the dissidents exit prior to them organising, strengthening and significantly 
damaging the organisation.   
 
8a.5.3 Personality Clashes and Trust 
  
“You just can’t extricate personalities as a factor in any situation.”422 
 
To date the analysis of this split has mainly focused on the issues which were dividing 
Republicanism in the 1960s.  However, while much of the reasoning for the divide was 
organisationally based one must also appreciate that personality also played a significant 
role.  The role played here was two fold.  This theme had a significant influence on why 
the split took place, but it also played a role in deciding the outcome of the split.  While 
much of a person’s decision making process was based on the organisationally divisive 
issues, be they to do with the armed or the political strategy, the influence of the 
allegiances of others also impacted on this choice.  At times the decision was made 
dependent on what side trusted individuals were joining.    
 
“Many people made up their mind on the basis of who was on particular sides, 
people they trusted and liked more…It was not clear cut hard political people 
deciding.  It was human factors that were deciding why some people went with one 
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side over another, and this is not in hindsight. The political orientation would have 
counted but to what degree with certain individuals is unclear.”423 
 
Conversely the allegiance of others who were less trusted, or simply disliked, may have 
had a negative impact on the choice made.  Some of these personality clashes also played 
a significant role in the split actually taking place in the first place.  This is especially 
relevant with respect to personality clashes at a leadership level.  Nine participants, three 
outlined the role which personality clashes played in creating the split.  
Group Leadership Member 
Involved Prior 
to the End of 
the Border 
Campaign 
Entered 
Republican 
Movement in 
or around 
1969/70 
Joined group 
significantly 
after 1969/70 
Total 
Official 1 0 1 0 2 
Provisional  2 0 4 0 6 
External 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 1 0 0 0 1 
Total 4 0 5 0 9 
Table 8a.15: Significance of Personality Clashes 
 
While these personality clashes were not the main cause of the schism they were certainly 
a dominant factor throughout.  Related to the theme of significance of personality twenty-
one participants outlined the importance of influential individuals in the outcome of and 
the reasoning for the split.  Twelve of these participants were Provisionals and nine 
Officials.  Each of them alluded to the influence of individual members of the national 
leadership with the most dominant individuals mentioned being Cathal Goulding and Roy 
Johnston.  Seventeen participants outlined the influence of the old guard while a further 
thirteen discussed the influence of specific members of their local leadership.  This is 
illustrated in the tables below and is developed in Appendix E which looks at the role of 
influential individuals in allegiance choice. 
Group Leadership Member 
Involved Prior 
to the End of 
the Border 
Campaign 
Entered 
Republican 
Movement in 
or around 
1969/70 
Joined group 
significantly 
after 1969/70 
Total 
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Official 2 1 3 0 6 
Provisional  1 2 7 0 10 
External 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 1 0 0 0 1 
Total 4 3 10 0 17 
Table 8a.16: Influential Individuals: Old-Guard 
Group Leadership Member 
Involved Prior 
to the End of 
the Border 
Campaign 
Entered 
Republican 
Movement in 
or around 
1969/70 
Joined group 
significantly 
after 1969/70 
Total 
Official 2 1 3 1 7 
Provisional  0 3 3 0 6 
External 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 1 0 0 0 1 
Total 3 4 6 1 14 
Table 8a.17: Influential Individuals: Local Leadership 
 
8a.5.4 Overview of the Split 
In the stages previous the reasons for intra-organisational conflict were detailed.  These 
included abstentionism, politicisation, the influence of left-wing political thinking, the 
decline of the armed strategy and the failure of the IRA to meet Republican expectations 
in 1969.  No one single issue can, or should, be perceived as being the sole reason for the 
split of 1969/70.  Each contributed to the justification for a split on behalf of the 
Provisionals. A statement issued by the Caretaker Executive of the Provisional IRA on 
January 17th 1970 outlined what they believed to be the main reasons for the split.  These 
were; the recognition of the parliaments by the Goulding leadership, the creation of a 
formal alliance with radical left wing groups, the influence of ‘extreme socialism’, 
internal methods,424 how the northern Catholics had been ‘let down’ by the IRA425 and 
campaigning for the retention of Stormont.426  The Official Republican Movement issued 
a number of statements through their newspaper the United Irishman, and other forums 
noting their perception of the split.  In these statements they comprehensively outlined 
the rationale for their economic, social, political and military decisions in the 1960s.427  
Significantly they placed an amount of the responsibility for the development of the 
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Provisionals with Fianna Fail who they believed had funded and armed the Provisionals 
as they feared the competition which they would have faced from a political left wing 
Republican Movement.428  
 
What must be acknowledged though is that the combination of the issues and the changes 
which the IRA and Sinn Fein were going through did accentuate and significantly 
affected the outcome of the split.  If the split had been purely about abstentionism, for 
example, the exiting Provisionals would have been a significantly weaker organisation 
with a lower level of support.  This is due to the fact that only those with an intrinsic 
reluctance to the dropping of the abstentionist policy would have sided with them.  
 
There is variance in the emphasis on issues and events across participants.  However, 
each interviewee was in agreement that the violence in Northern Ireland of 1969 and the 
IRA’s inability to provide defence and weapons was the most significant factor in 
deciding the outcome of the split.  The schism was predicted to take place anyway due to 
the disillusionment with the politicisation process.  However, it was the decisions made 
by the Dublin leadership especially in August 1969 and the inadequacy of the IRA at this 
time which succeeded in making the Provisional IRA a more dominant force in the 
aftermath of the split.  This is a belief echoed across allegiances and across generations.   
 
A split does not end with the official division of the organisation and the formation of a 
breakaway group.  It is important to analyse the aftermath and the effect of the split.  Due 
to the fact that this research is treating the four splits as micro-processes within the 
macro-process of Republican involvement in the ‘Troubles’ this final stage of the 
1969/70 split should also be considered as the opening stage of the 1974429 and 1986 
splits.  In order to fully understand both of these micro-processes one must consider the 
consequences of and continuations of the process which led up to the division of 1969/70.   
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8a.6 Stage 5 and Stage 1: Aftermath of Split: Competition and Re-organisation  
Following the formal split in the movement the main undertaking for the Officials was re-
organisation after the significant depletion of their membership and leadership.430  For 
their part the Provisionals had to develop a whole new organisational structure from 
scratch.  One of their first tasks was the development of their own newspaper, An 
Phoblacht.  This was viewed as a priority as they needed to set out their purpose and their 
account of the splits to the Republican public.431  For both groups the organisational 
newspaper was seen as a vital tool.  The Provisionals realised that it was of immediate 
import in the initial organisation of the splinter group.  The decision to publish An 
Phoblacht was made at the same time as the development of the leadership structure and 
the first issue was published in February 1970. 
 
“There were four members of the Ard Comhairle, and then the elected a number of 
people as a Caretaker Executive.  The expression that was used in the army was a 
Provisional Executive and a Provisional Army Council, until such time as the 
position could be regularised.  So similarly in Sinn Fein Caretaker Executive and a 
decision to launch a new newspaper and so on.”  
 
The re-organisation was an extensive process in itself.  It required a significant amount of 
national and regional organisation.  As well as the structuring process it also required the 
training of new recruits and the acquisition of weapons. 
 
“It [re-organisation] was an ongoing thing.  Even after the Provisional campaign 
started, it is an ongoing thing weapons and training.  The main thing in Belfast was 
to make sure that areas were properly sufficient at defending themselves.  It was a 
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long struggle, it seemed an age but when you look back on it now it boils down to 
months.”432 
 
While the split took place December and January of 1969/70 the dynamic nature of the 
process meant that in certain sections of the membership the true effects of the split were 
not felt until some time after.  There was a number of members and supporters who were 
oblivious to the fact that a split had even taken place, or if they were conscious to the fact 
there were some unaware of the defining differences between the two groups.  For this 
reason there were a number of new members who initially joined one group before 
leaving to join the other some time after the split.433 
   
Many of the Republican regions were bitterly divided between Officials and Provisionals 
in the aftermath.  However, there were other areas which still cooperated together.  The 
bitterness that was displayed immediately in areas such as West Belfast was not 
necessarily the case in every Republican community. 
 
“Even in 1970 we had a joint commemoration, Easter commemoration in Drumbo, 
at that time because we said we would not let anybody interfere with us and we 
would go ahead with the Donegal Tir Conaill commemoration committee and not 
have any Dublin interference in it or anything like that so we had a joint 
commemoration at that time in 1970 in Drumbo.”434 
 
The organisation and re-organisation of the groups were the priorities in the immediate 
aftermath of the split.  However, the dominant theme throughout this stage was that of 
competition.  Therefore the themes focused on in this final stage of the micro-process are: 
• Competition 
• Competition for Membership and Support 
• New Enemy: Violent Feuds 
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8a.6.1 Competition 
The immediate consequence of any split is that of inter-organisational competition.  The 
two groups competed on a number of fronts, but most notably for membership and 
support.  In the aftermath of split the Officials and Provisionals were not just competing 
for the membership of people from the original Republican Movement but also for 
numerous new recruits.  They therefore had to actively recruit and justify the position of 
the group in contrast to that of their opposition.435  In the direct aftermath of the split the 
two organisations were relatively numerically even in membership and support terms.  
Both sides were trying to prove that they were stronger than their opposition and that they 
were the legitimate voice of Republicanism. As a result of this, acting in conjunction with 
the acrimonious nature of the split, this competition resulted in the outbreak of violent 
feuds between former comrades.  Twelve participants, six Officials and six Provisionals, 
emphasised the violent feuds which engulfed Republicanism in the years after the split.  
This is following section is supportive of 
 
HO5. In the presence of significant inter-organisational conflict the purposive goals of 
the organisation will be substituted with the aspiration of harming the rival organisation. 
 
8a.6.1.1 Competition for Membership and Support 
For any organisation to sustain survival they must be able to constantly recruit new 
members as well as maintain the membership which they already have.  When there is 
another organisation vying to attract membership and support from the same population 
this task becomes more challenging, especially when the population is too small to 
successfully accommodate the survival of two similar groups.  Therefore the aftermath of 
a split leads to intense competition for membership and support between the two 
organisations in what is a finite population.  In the aftermath of the 1969/70 split it would 
be remiss to assume that what was necessary to attract support and membership across 
Republicanism was the same in each region. The split of 1969/’70, and the subsequent 
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splits, saw divisions form in the support structures in place in the US as well as Ireland.436    
As is detailed in Appendix G in the account of regionalism the location of a specific 
population had significant impact on what their expectations were in the organisation.  In 
the aftermath of 1969/70 in Belfast the issues of community defence and the acquisition 
of weapons were at the forefront for people when considering which of the two groups to 
support or join.  This caused significant problems for the local Official IRA as the 
national leadership was reluctant to supply weapons for an armed strategy against the 
security services and/or the loyalist paramilitaries, yet the Provisional campaign in the 
area was building and a significant number of Republicans were joining the new 
breakaway group.  This again revisits the theme of leadership disconnect.  The national 
leadership wanted to avoid an armed campaign.  However, the Belfast membership was 
demanding it. 
 
“The Provisional campaign intensified and the pressure was on the Official 
leadership in Belfast to implement a more robust policy of defence and retaliation 
against the British.  It was obvious that [Billy] McMillen [Belfast leader of the 
OIRA] was walking a tightrope with what needed to be done in Belfast and what 
the Dublin leadership were requiring…it was obvious that the Dublin leadership 
were embarking on a course of strategies and tactics which were far removed from 
the situation in Belfast.  They didn’t seem to realise that the Provisionals were 
creating a situation which would make a lot of their strategies and policies 
impossible to implement.”437 
 
Initially the split was characterised by the evenness of the divide.  However, in the long 
run the competition for membership and support was numerically won by the 
Provisionals.438  This is mainly due to the aggressive nature of their tactics in contrast to 
                                                 
436
 See O’Dochartaigh, N. (1995).  ‘Sure, it’s Hard to Keep up with the Splits here’: Irish-American 
Responses to the Outbreak of Conflict in Northern Ireland 1968-1974.  Irish Political Studies, 100, pp.138-
160. 
437
  ‘Paul’ 
438
 This was acknowledged by Official Sinn Fein in a statement in July 1972 in which MacGiolla stated that 
‘the Provisional Alliance appears to be in the antecedent’ they ‘have won publicity because their demands 
are simple, easily presented and easily understood.’  MacGiolla, T. (July 1972).  Where we Stand: The 
Republican Position.  Pp.5-6    
 172 
the more controlled response of the Officials to the violence on the streets of Northern 
Ireland.  Their violent reactions to loyalist and British attacks significantly raised their 
profile and support.  While the Officials did not completely adhere to a purely political 
strategy their armed response was more considered and restrained than that of the 
Provisionals.  However, when it came to their armed reaction to the Provisionals there 
was a significant difference.      
 
8a.6.1.2 New Enemy: Violent Feuds 
At times of intense competition for membership and support between violent political 
groupings this often results in violent feuds.439  This is especially true in intensely bitter 
feuds such as 1969/70, and similarly when the divide is relatively even.  From the outset 
of the competition between the Officials and Provisionals was expressed in the form of 
violent feuding.  It proved to be the prominent theme in the aftermath of the split, as is 
displayed in the table below. 
 
Group Leadership Member 
Involved Prior 
to the End of 
the Border 
Campaign 
Entered 
Republican 
Movement in 
or around 
1969/70 
Joined group 
significantly 
after 1969/70 
Total 
Official 2 1 2 1 6 
Provisional  1 2 4 0 7 
External 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 3 3 6 1 13 
Table 8a.18: Violent Feuds 
 
This feuding was especially visible in areas such as west Belfast where the two groupings 
were living in close proximity and the split had been particularly personal.  There was 
significantly more expected of the armed Republicans here with respect to defence and 
weapons.  The community was visibly divided. 
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“It was very, very difficult and realising then that the situation had been brought 
about whereby the community of the Falls Rd would never be the same again, the 
community on the Falls Rd. would be torn apart, it would never be the community 
which we had known, a sense of disillusionment if you can’t unite the people of the 
Falls Rd. how are you going to establish a thirty two county Republic, a thirty  
county socialist Republic, there was a sense of disillusionment there.”440 
 
However, while Belfast was the most visible location of violent feuds between the groups 
it would be wrong to state that feuds were isolated to Belfast or to Northern Ireland as a 
whole.   
 
The split of 1969/70 created tensions within the wider Republican community that were 
not largely repeated in the aftermath of the other splits.  While there was feuding after 
each of the other three, especially after 1974, it was never again as all consuming for the 
entire Republican population as it was in 1970.  The two groups shared a common 
enemy, the British, and a common goal, the unification of Ireland.  In spite of this much 
of their concentration at this time was given to dismantling each other’s organisational 
structures.  The national Official leadership intended not to get involved in the any form 
of armed campaign but the attacks on them by Provisionals provoked a response. 
 
“We made the decision that we wouldn’t get involved in the situation in the north, 
but we began to get involved then in the north.  Also the Provos later in 71 or 72 
got involved in shooting us, our members, and our members were responding.”441   
 
In essence they each had a new enemy.  This was a very different form of enemy though.  
It was one who knew the tactics and strategies which would be employed in certain 
circumstances as they had until very recently been comrades. 
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“Similar feelings must have been felt in the Civil War.  These people knew our 
methodology, and now they were our worst enemy.”442 
 
This was demoralising for much of the membership and support, especially those who 
were not actively involved in the actual split.  For many Officials it seemed like there 
were weapons made readily available when they wished to fight against the Provisionals, 
but yet not when they wished to attack the British or loyalist forces.   
 
“We began to ascertain that there was a trend here whereby you could get access 
to weapons if it was trouble with the Provisionals, you never get access to them if 
you were wanting to defend an area against the British Army or otherwise 
incursion.  There was a question mark over that and why this was happening.”443 
 
As with the split itself the reasoning for the feuds could be ascribed to the policy and 
strategic differences between the two groups.  However, more often these feuds were 
personality driven, with some former comrades using this as a method of settling old 
scores.  The bitterness of this split is still evident in certain communities to this day, forty 
years after the split took place. 
 
“Certainly there are people to this day who have a whole bitterness towards the 
Stickies, and Stickies who hold bitterness towards the Provos.  That is still there, its 
myopic, but it is still there.”444   
 
In response to the escalating violence by both republican and loyalist paramilitary groups 
in the early 1970s in August 1971 the British parliament passed legislation which 
introduced internment without trial for suspected paramilitaries in Northern Ireland.  This 
resulted in a large number of suspected members of both the Provisional and Official IRA 
being interned in prison for an indefinite period of time. This led not only to members of 
both groups being incarcerated but to a number of innocent civilians unjustly accused of 
                                                 
442
  Mick Ryan 
443
  ‘Paul’ 
444
  Richard O’Rawe, April 9th 2008 
 175 
paramilitary membership and activity being interned for extended periods of time.  This 
caused additional anger among the nationalist and republican communities of Northern 
Ireland, anger which resulted in a larger number of new members entering the groups 
than may have without this aggressive measure. 
 
The Republican feuds on the streets and in the prisons continued.  However, so did the 
Republican offensive against the British and loyalists.  There were similarly loyalist 
attacks against Republicans and at times highly questionable tactics employed by the 
British forces.  The end of the 1960s and the turn of the 1970s saw Northern Ireland 
engulfed in a protracted conflict, ‘The Troubles’, which would last for close to thirty 
years.  This conflict at times spread to Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland.  
Throughout the ‘Troubles’ the actions of each of the conflicting groups resulted in the 
injuries, death and distress of innocent civilians.  The conflict was to see three more 
significant splits in Irish Republicanism.  While none of these three were as dramatic and 
defining as their predecessor of 1969/70 each was significant in their own right.        
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Chapter 8(b) 
1986: The Beginning of the End 
 
8b.1 Introduction  
The mid 1970s and early 1980s in Northern Ireland are rightly remembered as being 
among the most violent years of the Troubles.  Perhaps paradoxically the analysis shows 
that this period should also be considered as the beginning of the Republican Movement’s 
gradual advance towards the acceptance of peaceful politics.  The culmination of this was 
the split of 1986 and ‘mainstream’ Republicanism’s dropping of the abstentionist policy 
to Dail Eireann.  The present split is analysed as a successful politicisation process on 
behalf of the Provisional leadership of the 1980s.  While there was a split in both the IRA 
and Sinn Fein this was a relatively minor split when compared especially to 1969/70.  
Therefore the focus of the analysis of the present micro-process is on how the 
Adams/McGuinness leadership successfully maintained their core membership while 
politicising the organisation.  It is acknowledged that the 1986 split is a different form of 
split from 1969/70 and 1974.  1969/70 was a split resulting from the dissident faction 
exiting to form an autonomous organisation and 1974 resulted from the expulsion of the 
dissident faction.  As will be displayed 1986 was the result of the original dissenting 
faction gaining power from the old leadership.  Subsequently the former leadership left 
with a group of supporters to form their own organisation as they did not agree with the 
changes brought in by the former internal detractors. 
 
The opening stage of this process has already been outlined in the detailing of the 
aftermath of the 1969/70 split.  In the years after that split the Provisional Movement 
embarked on an extended terrorist campaign across Ireland and Great Britain resulting in 
the deaths of service men and women, innocent civilians and fellow paramilitaries.  Their 
campaign was mainly focused on aggressively countering British presence in Northern 
Ireland.  However, they also entered into violent feuds with the Official IRA and loyalist 
paramilitaries.     
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In total twenty-two participants were actively involved in the 1986 split, Table 8b.1 
illustrates the organisational makeup of the participants which also includes those 
external observers who referred to the split in their interviews. 
 
Group Leadership Membership Supporter Total 
Provisional 7 7 0 14 
RSF/CIRA 5 1 2 8 
External 
Observer  
3 (2 Officials and 1 
IRSM) 
4 (1 Official and 3 
IRSM) 
0 7 
Total 15 (3 external) 12 (4 external) 2 29 (7 
external) 
Table 8b.1: Participants who discussed 1986 split 
 
As with the previous two sub-chapters the present chapter presents the analysis of the 
1986 split as a stage-based micro process.  Similar to the 1969/70 split the analysis of the 
1986 split has illustrated that it was a five-stage micro-process.  The significant 
difference between the two splits lies in the third stage of the process.  While the function 
of the third stage of the 1969/70 split was the inevitability of and the preparation for the 
split in the process in the lead-up to 1986 there was a transition of power from the old-
guard leadership to the new-guard leadership of Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness.  
A distinct difference also lies in the final stage detailing the aftermath of the split.  While 
the aftermath of both 1969/70 and 1974 are notable for the violent feuds which took place 
this was not the same in the aftermath of 1986.  This is explained by the dominance of the 
Provisional Movement in the aftermath of this split and the weakness of the Continuity 
IRA and Republican Sinn Fein.  Identical to the previous sub-chapters the sub-sections of 
each stage describe the dominant themes within this stage of the process and should not 
be considered as separate stages or sub-stages. 
 
The stages of the process of the 1986 split does not fit the model of split.  For the first 
three stages it fitted with the model for split avoidance.  However, even with the 
successful application of voice resulting in a change of leadership and strategy this still 
resulted in an organisational split.  However, it is argued that this was a minor split in 
comparison to 1969/70 and the split of the small grouping which formed the Continuity 
IRA and Republican Sinn Fein were a minority grouping who deemed the political 
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changes as significantly threatening to the organisational identity, even with the 
compromises. 
  
Stage 1: Aftermath of Split: Competition and Re-organisation445 
Stage 2: Factional Development 
Stage 3: Successful Application of Voice: Transition of Power 
Stage 4: Organisational Exit and Breakaway Group Formation  
Stage 5: Aftermath of Split. 
 
8b.2 Stage 2: Factional Development 
The initial stage of this process was analysed as the aftermath of the split in 1969/70.  It 
was significant for the feuds which took place between Provisionals and Officials.  
However, with respect to the process of split the most notable consequences were the 
introduction of internment and the influx of a young, mainly northern, membership into 
the Provisionals.  Many of this young membership, as well as those who joined in the late 
1960s, played a significant role in shaping the course of Irish Republicanism.  It was 
under their leadership that the Provisional IRA took part in a sustained terrorist campaign 
during the Troubles.  However, it is also under this leadership that the majority of the 
Irish Republican Movement accepted the necessity for peaceful politics in the place of 
armed force.  This majority move to peaceful politics began here in the process of the 
1986 split, a move that partly originated in the debates between many of the interned and 
imprisoned Republicans.  The present stage analyses the developing intra-organisational 
conflicts within the movement in the mid to late 1970s and assesses how these were 
significantly different to those present in the process of 1969/70.  There is also a 
continuous examination of the growing influence of the new, mainly northern, leadership 
and the direction they wished to take the movement. 
 
All of the active participants acknowledged that the process of change in the 1986 split 
began in the mid 1970s.  While the RSF/CIRA participants generally did not agree on one 
specific event to signify the instigation of this change the majority of Provisional 
                                                 
445
 This stage is analysed in stage 5 of the 1969/70 split in sub-chapter 8a. 
 179 
participants were in agreement.  Twelve Provisionals specified that the Provisional 
ceasefire of 1974/75 was the beginning of the change.  One member of the RSF/CIRA 
leadership also identified this as the starting point for the split.  This is illustrated in Table 
8b.2. 
Group Leadership Membership Supporter Total 
Provisional 5 7 0 12 
RSF/CIRA 1 0 0 1 
External Observer  0 0 0 0 
Total 6 7 0 13 
Table 8b.2: 1974/5 ceasefire beginning of 1986 process 
 
The cessation referred to was initiated in December 1974 after a meeting between leading 
Republicans and Protestant clergymen446 in Feakle, Co. Clare.  In the aftermath of the 
Feakle talks discussions continued between the Provisionals and intermediaries about the 
possibility of a December ceasefire.  The Provisionals announced a ten day cessation on 
December 20th 1974.  This was extended to last until January 17th, while the Provisionals 
negotiated with NIO officials.  However, the Republicans brought it to an end as their 
demands had not been met.  The end of the ceasefire was marked by continued bombings 
and attacks in both England and Northern Ireland.  The following month on February 9th 
the Provisionals announced an indefinite ceasefire and again entered into negotiations 
with the British.  Key to their demands was the construction of a plan for British 
withdrawal from Northern Ireland.  These talks and ceasefire eventually came to a close 
with no development on the Provisionals demands.447  The ceasefire officially ended in 
November 1975.  However, during the period of the ceasefire there was growing unrest 
within the Provisional movement about the handling of the talks by the leadership.  A 
number of members broke the ceasefire, often times claiming their actions under names 
other than the Provisional IRA.  This discontent was evident not only within the 
communities but also among the Republican prisoners and internees.   
 
The talks were led on the Republican side by Ruairi O’Bradaigh and Daithi O’Conail 
who are characterised by many as principal members of the old southern leadership of the 
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time.  These negotiations have been much maligned by the Provisionals as having a 
detrimental effect on the movement.  However, O’Bradaigh defends his and the 
leadership’s position of entering into and continuing with the negotiations. 
 
“The invitation was from the British government to ‘discuss structures of British 
disengagement from Ireland.’  Now how could one refuse that?  Except that they 
were being deceitful, but how could one refuse that?”448   
 
His position is that the Republican negotiators were led to believe that there was a 
possibility of achieving British withdrawal from Northern Ireland.  However, there was a 
failure to agree on the proposed timeline, and that the British would not publicly 
announce their intention for withdrawal. 
 
The ceasefire and the protracted negotiations have been criticised both during and in the 
years after their existence.  In both instances criticisms have principally, but not 
exclusively, come from the newly emerging northern leadership of the time.  The 
accusation is that the lengthy nature of the combined cessation and talks, which resulted 
in no real benefits for Republicanism, led to a sense of disillusionment among the 
membership and supporters.  There was a growing belief that the Provisional leadership 
of the time had effectively run its course.  They no longer knew how to move the 
Republican movement forward and it was therefore time for a new leadership to take 
over. 
 
“I think it [1975 ceasefire] had a big effect.  If you like the then, and I stress then, 
young leadership would have seen that period as a time where the old days, it was 
totally out-manoeuvred by the British in terms of how they were dealing with them, 
what was on offer and the reality of it.  After that had run its phase it was time to 
move on.”449 
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The viewpoint expressed is that the leadership of the time were politically naïve and 
consequently unable to pragmatically deal with the British.  They had brought the 
movement as far as they possibly could, and therefore it was time for a change, both in 
personnel and policy.  
 
“In terms of the ceasefire, this is without being overly critical, I think the 
leadership was military as opposed to political.  That doesn’t mean you can’t be 
military and political or that you can’t have military thoughts when you are 
political, but really I think it was politically naïve.  I mean the Brits were saying 
things like they were going to leave, but they weren’t.  They were saying that there 
was an economic argument that it was inevitable to leave.  But all of that was 
frankly a bit of bullshit to try and prolong the ceasefire and make it harder for 
them to go back to armed struggle, to all of those things.”450   
 
Throughout the negotiations there were critical voices coming out especially from the 
prisons about the way the national leadership was handling the situation and questioning 
the benefits which they talks and ceasefire had for the Republican cause.  The criticisms 
were chiefly coming from leading northern republicans, people such as Gerry Adams and 
Ivor Bell.  These people had a significant influence on the prison population, as well as 
on republicans external to the prison. 
 
“People who were in jail, like Adams and Ivor Bell and other people who were 
querying what was going on and their influence would have been felt amongst the 
prison population, some of whom were coming out of jail and also in late August 
1975 Adams started to write for Republican News…So there was a big lot 
disillusioned about what was going on in ’75.  And also it had been felt that the 
IRA had lost its way.”451 
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The longer the negotiations went on without any significant benefits for the republican 
cause the more demoralising it became for the membership.  The newly emerging 
leadership used this demoralisation as an opportunity to begin their gradual takeover of 
the movement both politically and militarily. 
 
“To be quite critical I think that there wasn’t a particularly strong view of British 
objectives at the time, and the ceasefire then created tensions.  I suppose then at 
that point you have a new…the other side of the ceasefire in late 1975/76 you begin 
to see a new leadership emerge, a leadership that has brought the movement right 
along to where we are today.”452 
 
The members of this new leadership, which gradually came into position in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, look upon this an essential transition which was carried out for the good 
of republicanism.  While not arguing with the point that it was these negotiations which 
laid the foundations necessary for the new leadership to take over four of the rank and file 
members, three of who became independent dissidents in the 1980s or 90s and one who 
joined the 32 County Sovereignty Movement in 1998, were critical of the move to 
acquire power which was taken.  They specify that individuals within this newly 
emerging leadership were using the situation for their own personal and selfish benefits.  
It was not necessarily the case that they were opposed to the actions of the O’Bradaigh 
leadership at the time.  However, they saw this as an opportunity to utilise the 
disillusionment within republicanism not only to acquire positions of power but to also 
isolate certain leadership members.   
 
“I think it was probably called for the best reasons, but I think it was used by 
certain individuals within the Provisional Movement to enhance their status.”453   
 
This is a similar argument to the one put forward in the last sub-chapter with respect to 
Seamus Costello’s moves to take power within the Officials in the lead up to 1974.  
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However, in the present situation it was more a collective leadership rather than an 
individual seeking to takeover. 
 
Those republicans who exited in 1986 believe that the criticism of the 1975 leadership 
was mainly utilised in the years subsequent to the events as opposed to at the time.  Some 
of these emerging leaders were already in positions of power at the time of the ceasefire 
and negotiations, yet failed to speak out against them at the time.  However, in the years 
later they utilised the situation to critically assess the old leadership. They wished to 
frame this as a failed leadership, one which had significantly damaged the republican 
cause.  There was not necessarily the purely negative sentiment among the rank and file 
at the time.  Many saw the benefits of the extended ceasefire as it allowed for those on the 
run to return home and for the IRA to re-organise where necessary. 
 
“There seemed to be developments only in terms of entering into truces, we didn’t 
see these truces in the way Adams and McGuinness would later, you also have to 
bear in mind McGuinness was seen by us as a key leader and he wasn’t making his 
opposition to the truce known then in the way that he would later.”454 
 
The poor handling of the 1975 ceasefire and negotiations became a prominent aspect in 
the subsequent years of the negative portrayal of the ‘old southern’ leadership by their 
new northern counterparts.  It was utilised to illustrate how they were out of touch and 
were unable to move republicanism forward.  However, it most notably provided the 
catalyst for a more focused discussion to take place about the utility of a more dominant 
political strategy to work alongside the armed campaign. 
 
8b.2.1 Voice: Questioning of Strategy 
The 1986 split is exemplified by the successful start to the politicisation process within 
the Provisionals with the dropping of the abstentionist policy to the Dail.  This 
politicisation was only made possible by the extended process of internal debate at both 
leadership and rank and file levels.  One of the most prominent forums for this strategic 
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debate was within the Republican prison populations.  This is an observation recognised 
by eleven participants as is illustrated in Table 8b.3. 
Group Leadership Membership Supporter Total 
Provisional 3 5 0 8 
RSF/CIRA 2 1 0 3 
External Observer  0 0 0 0 
Total 5 6 0 11 
Table 8b.3: The importance of debates within the Prisons 
 
Throughout the 1970s a large proportion of Provisional republicans were either 
imprisoned or interned.  The prison populations ranged from national and local leadership 
figures down to ordinary rank and file members.  Within the prisons the inmates 
organised as they would on the outside in an organisational command structure.   At this 
time, especially from the mid 1970s on leadership figures within the prisons such as 
Gerry Adams were openly questioning the direction the movement was taking, and the 
long term strategies of the national leadership.  The external context of a weakening 
Republican Movement meant that the Republican community was more receptive to 
critical questioning of the long term strategy.  Within this context prisoners were being 
asked to think not just militarily but also politically.  They were advised to educate 
themselves on other revolutionary struggles, as well as the Irish one, and see how this 
could be applied to the situation in Northern Ireland.  There was encouragement to look 
beyond a purely armed campaign and to develop their political thinking.  Critical to this, 
and in stark contrast to the Goulding leadership of the 1960s, was that the prison 
leadership was not calling for a complete move away from the armed struggle but that a 
continued armed campaign would be complemented by a strengthened political strategy.  
This important differentiation allowed this discussion to be more inclusive and did not 
isolate as many as the political discussions of the 1960s. 
 
I remember Gerry Adams in the jail.  We were all sitting there and he says ‘you 
know the armed struggle is only a means to the end, not the end.  Youse are 
politicians.’  And people said ‘we’re not really, we’re army’.  ‘No you have to 
develop your consciousness in here…Politics is important and the armed struggle 
is only a means to an end, and not the end.’  So everything I think we see now with 
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Sinn Fein today, I think Adams and them people actually foreseen that.  They 
probably knew that the armed struggle was outmoded, but you couldn’t do it 
because you would have been overthrown, the army would have turned against 
them.”455   
 
These discussions led to the gradual acceptance of the utility of the introduction of a 
political element to the republican struggle.  The prisons provided the time and the space 
for the republicans to actively discuss, argue and think about how this could add to or 
detract from the armed struggle.  It provided the perfect platform for those in favour of a 
more political struggle to introduce to and convince others of the necessity of this 
political element while simultaneously questioning the present tactics of the movement.  
 
“So I think out of the perhaps initial very violent background, and then people 
through internment and imprisonment, actually having the time.  Because when you 
were in prison you were removed from that day to day almost kind of survival, or 
conflict.  They began to reflect these arguments, began to examine whether the 
current kind of structures of republicanism was fit for purpose.”456    
 
An inevitable consequence of these discussions about the importance of a political 
element was the debate surrounding electoral politics.  As in the lead up to 1969/70 there 
was an innate scepticism about republican participation in electoral politics.  However, 
within the confines of the prison environment the pros and cons of republican 
involvement were discussed.  There were those within the prisons who were strong 
advocates of electoral involvement and they utilised their time inside to discuss and open 
others up to the possibility.  The debate was one which continued both within the prisons 
and externally within the republican community through the 1970s, 80s and 90s.  The 
gradual and continuous process of the discussions went on to shape the strategic path 
taken by the movement. 
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These discussions over the long term strategy of the movement taking place within the 
prisons had an obvious influence on those who were present and taking part in the 
process.  However, they also had an external influence on the wider republican 
community.  Within republican circles throughout the 1970s and 1980s the republican 
prison population were held in high regard.  Their opinions and actions were listened to 
and appreciated.  While many externally would not have been privy to the breadth of the 
internal discussions taking place there was the strategic utilisation by the prisoners of the 
republican publications to outline their critical analysis of the republican struggle.  The 
most prominent example of this is the series of articles believed to be penned by Gerry 
Adams but published under the pen name ‘Brownie’ which appeared in the northern 
Republican newspaper Republican News between August 1975 and February 1977.  
While detailing his experiences of prison life the articles also provided a vehicle for 
‘Brownie’ to be critical of national leadership while also putting forward the 
recommendation of placing a stronger emphasis on the political element of the struggle.  
These articles proved significantly influential within the republican population as they 
introduced the wider community to the debates and discussions which were taking place 
within the prisons at the time.  ‘Brownie’ was one of the methods utilised to gradually 
introduce this debate into the wider republican population.457 
 
Those who stayed with the Provisionals after the split look to these political debates 
within the prisons as a positive and necessary step in the process of modern day Irish 
Republicanism.  However, those who exited to form the Continuity IRA and Republican 
Sinn Fein regard this in a negative manner.  They deem it as the start of the downfall of 
the ‘true’ Irish republicanism.  The influence of these debates, both within and outside of 
the prisons, are seen by them as moving the focus away from the armed campaign and 
towards a corrupt and illegitimate political process.  An obvious divide was forming 
between the northern and the southern leadership and within the prison the northern 
influence is blamed for the ultimate acceptance of Dail Eireann.  The blame is laid at their 
door for not fully understanding the significance of dropping the abstentionist policy to 
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the Dail.  This was an ‘illegitimate’ prospect one that could not be supported in the eyes 
of those who eventually moved away from the Provisionals in 1986.  
 
“I have a suspicion that that [the discussion to drop abstentionism to the Dail] 
originated probably in Long Kesh camp in the 1970s and again it is people looking 
for a shortcut to an all Ireland Republic and I have a suspicion that it was…Well 
inevitably it was in Long Kesh, it was mostly Northern people.  I do feel that 
unfortunately within the north there is this kind of foolish attitude towards the 
twenty-six county state.”458      
 
The obvious influence of these prison debates came with the impact the prisoners had 
upon release.  Many of the leaders of the discussions within the prisons acquired 
prominent positions within the national and local leadership of the IRA and Sinn Fein.  
There were great expectations that leaders such as Gerry Adams while introducing the 
political element to the campaign would also lead the Provisionals in a sustained and 
successful armed resistance against the British presence in Northern Ireland. 
 
“I think in Adams people had a great expectation of him.  I think in many ways 
Adams was trying to influence the debate out there with the Brownie columns and 
influence Seamus Twomey, who was Chief of Staff of the IRA.  It started with the 
1975 ceasefire.”459 
 
Within their leadership roles they extended the discussions which had taken place and 
introduced the issues to the wider population.  They did this through internal local 
discussions but also through public speeches and addresses.   
 
“I remember at Bodenstown, maybe about 1978 or thereabouts, or in some keynote 
interview or speech, it might not have been Bodenstown, saying that there could be 
no military victory for any side that the problem in the north was a political 
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problem and it needed a political solution.  That caused all sorts of controversy in 
a certain generation of republican leaders, and for me it was just so obvious.”460 
 
While many of the proposals put forward by them were deemed contentious by some of 
the older traditional membership they also ensured that they gained significant levels of 
support from this section of the membership as well.  This is a factor which proved 
crucial in eventually passing the proposals both in this micro-process as well as within 
1997.  In order to be successful it was necessary for this newly emerging leadership to 
gain an air of legitimacy by achieving the support of influential members from all 
sections of organised republicanism. 
 
The presence of this gradual introduction of critical voice at this stage of the process 
provides support for:. 
 
HO4.  The sub-group most willing to make compromises is the one most likely to be 
successful in the aftermath of the split. 
 
HO4.  Even though this process did eventually result in a split within the movement it 
was a minimal division of the organisation.  The actions and preparation taken by the 
Adams/McGuinness leadership throughout the process significantly contributed to 
minimising the effect of the split.  The gradual introduction of critical voice was one of 
the most significant factors at play.  The similarities between the intentions the Goulding 
leadership and the achievements of the Adams/McGuinness leadership are unmistakable.  
Goulding wished to fully politicise the movement and bring it away from the armed 
campaign, but failed.  However, it was the Adams/McGuinness leadership who gradually 
achieved this with the Provisionals.  This ongoing politicisation started here with the 
application of voice and compromise.  The critical difference between the two situations 
is that, as stated in sub-chapter 8a, the Goulding leadership attempted to change too much 
too soon.  In contrast the Provisional leadership of the late 70s and early 80s gradually 
introduced the idea of a strengthened political arm to the movement while stating that 
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they wished to maintain the armed struggle.  This showed a connection between the 
dissenting voices and the membership and wider republican population.  It was a respect 
for context.  As the years and decades after show the leadership only introduced 
significant changes when they believed that they had the support of the majority of 
members.  It is through this continued application appreciation for context and 
membership sentiment that this was achieved.  
 
8b.2.2 IRA Restructuring and Northern Prominence 
While the debates about the introduction of a stronger political element were beginning in 
the mid 1970s the main focus of the northern leadership at this stage was the restructuring 
of the entire organisation, specifically the IRA.  They advocated the IRA becoming a 
cellular organisation461 more capable of adopting the ‘long war’ strategy which was 
proposed.  This strategy of a long war was articulated by Jimmy Drumm in Bodenstown 
in June 1977.462  This is one of many examples of the utilisation of the legitimising voice 
of the internally respected old guard to put forward the newly emerging strategic 
argument.  This is a tactic reminiscent of the original Provisionals using Jimmy Steele in 
the late 1970s to put forward their criticisms of the Goulding leadership.   The proposal 
was that this armed strategy was to go hand in hand with a new form of political 
pressure.463  However, at this stage the assertion was that the armed strategy was still to 
take prominence.  While the young northerners were gaining prominence within the 
movement they were still aware that they needed the support from some of the older 
members in order to bring about the changes they wished and to retain this air of 
Republican legitimacy.   
 
Part of the restructuring of the IRA in the late 1970s saw the division of the army into the 
northern and southern commands.  With the vast majority of the armed campaign taking 
place within Northern Ireland the Northern Command, in conjunction with the Army 
Council and GHQ, took charge of the active service operations and the Southern 
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Command acted primarily in a quartermaster role in the supply of safe-houses and 
training.  This accentuated a growing divide within the movement between the northern 
and southern republicans.  For some northerners there was resentment in taking orders 
from those who were geographically separate from the daily struggle.   
 
“In human terms quite naturally, people would resent what they considered to be 
people who were a hundred miles from the warfront giving orders, and you also 
had this conception of what was cynically called ‘long rifles’, people who were 
very far away from it.  There was that element of it.”464 
 
This establishment of the divided Northern and Southern Commands was seen by some 
of the southern IRA members as a means by which the emerging northern leadership 
could take further control of the day to day running of the armed campaign.  While this 
was not the viewpoint of all southern republicans there was a small minority who viewed 
it as such, and in turn believed that their role was being diminished and their viewpoint 
isolated.   
 
“They got the Northern Command up and running and by 79 they had complete 
command of the whole lot and more or less pushed out the southern section of the 
movement.”465 
 
The ultimate factionalism of the movement was established over the issue of 
abstentionism to the Dail.  However, for many volunteers the divide was more accurately 
defined as one which was north/south in nature.  In the comparative analysis of this and 
the 1969 split some of the most prominent differences are within the area of intra-
organisational conflict.  The prelude to 1969 was defined by the multiple intra-
organisational conflicts which were taking place at the one time.  This succeeded in 
strengthening the campaign of those opposed to the proposed changes of the Goulding 
leadership.  In contrast the years prior to 1986 are defined by the narrow focus of the 
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conflict.  This is as a result of the gradual introduction of changes and proposed changes.  
The strategy in turn proved successful in isolating a small minority of dissenters and 
earning the support of the vast majority of members and supporters.  The conflicts in 
1986 were predominantly located within the national leadership as opposed to 1969/70 
which were more evident across the entire organisation.  The 1986 conflicts did not 
spread across the movement until the split was inevitable, and even then it did not have a 
significant effect on the membership.  In essence 1969/70 was the consequence of a 
collection of intra-organisational conflicts which engulfed the entire membership.  In 
contrast 1986 can be seen as a power struggle within the leadership which was 
accompanied by tensions surrounding the gradual politicisation.   
 
Throughout the interview process fifteen participants, five RSF/CIRA and seven 
Provisionals, described the developing intra-organisational conflict at this stage as being 
a north/south divide, as is illustrated in Table 8b.4. 
 
Group Leadership Membership Supporter Total 
Provisional 4 3 0 7 
RSF/CIRA 2 1 2 5 
External 
Observer  
1 (1 IRSM) 2 (1 Official and 1 
IRSM) 
0 3 
Total 7 (1 
external) 
6 (2 external) 2 15 (3 
external) 
Table 8b.4: North/South Factionalism  
 
A further five, described it as a division between the old guard traditionalists and the new 
guard. 
Group Leadership Membership Supporter Total 
Provisional 2 2 0 4 
RSF/CIRA 1 0 0 1 
External Observer  0 0 0 0 
Total 3 2 0 5 
Table 8b.5: Old Guard/New Guard Factionalism 
 
The prevailing description any factionalism which was in place at this stage was 
described as intra-organisational conflict which was centred on conflicts taking place 
within the national leadership.  Thirteen participants outlined that the main conflict was 
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taking place within the national leadership of the organisation, the majority of whom 
were members of the leadership themselves. 
Group Leadership Membership Supporter Total 
Provisional 4 5 0 14 
RSF/CIRA 4 0 0 8 
External Observer  0 0 0 0 
Total 8 5 0 13 
Table 8b.6: National Leadership Factionalism 
 
While the analysis initially pointed to the presence of intra-organisational conflict 
between the old guard and the new guard, as well as between the northern and southern 
membership of the movement, upon closer analysis of the data this does not give a fair 
reflection of what was actually taking place.  The emerging divide was not between the 
northern and southern membership, or between the old members and new members.  The 
minor divide was concentrated within the leadership structures and was between the 
mainly the old-guard southern leadership and the northern leadership.  The new northern 
leadership actually had the support of much of the northern old guard, as well as the 
southern new membership.  Therefore the grouping forming in resistance to change was 
principally concentrated within the southern national leadership.  However, at this stage 
of the process the strategic change was merely being discussed and it was not until the 
subsequent stage that concrete changes were actively proposed and initiated. 
 
8b.3 Stage 3: Successful Application of Voice: Transition of Power: One Step at a 
Time 
From the early 1970s paramilitary prisoners in Northern Ireland were granted ‘Special 
Category’ status.  This meant that they did not have to wear prison uniforms or take part 
in prison work with non-political prisoners. 466  However, in March 1976 this status was 
withdrawn.  This resulted in protest by the Republican prisoners in the years which 
followed.  Initially a number went on what has become know as the blanket protest. This 
form of protest involved prisoners refusing to wear prison uniforms and therefore only 
wearing their blanket wrapped around them.  As this protest was not bringing about the 
changes wished for by the prisoners they adopted a new strategy in 1978 where they 
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combined the blanket protest with a dirty protest.  This new strategy involved prisoners 
smearing the walls of their cells with their own excrement.467  While this was attracting 
more public and media attention it still was not bringing about the changes in prisoners’ 
status.  In light of this October 1980 saw the adoption of a protest strategy used the world 
over, and historically frequently used by Irish Republicans; the hunger strike.  The 1980 
hunger strike saw seven Republican prisoners in Long Kesh simultaneously start their 
strike.  This strike was led by Brendan ‘Darky’ Hughes, the OC of the Provisionals in 
Long Kesh.468  The seven prisoners continued their strike until December 18th when it 
was believed that one of the strikers was within hours of death.  Hughes was informed 
that negotiations had been fruitful and that their demands had been met.  The strike was 
therefore stopped without any fatalities.  However, it soon transpired that the demands 
were not met to the full satisfaction of the prisoners.  Therefore in March 1981 a new 
hunger strike was started, this time led by Bobby Sands.  One of the major differences 
between the two hunger strikes was that the 1981 strikers started at staggered intervals for 
maximum impact.  Again the strike was not having the intended impact of the prisoners’ 
demands being met by the British government.  Therefore when a by-election was called 
for the Fermanagh-South Tyrone Westminster seat the Republican Movement decided 
that Bobby Sands would stand as the Sinn Fein abstentionist candidate, an election which 
he subsequently won.  This shift in strategy saw a swell in public support and sympathy 
for the prisoners and in turn the Republican Movement.  The Republican thinking was 
that Margaret Thatcher, the British prime minister, would not let an MP die on hunger 
strike.469  However in May 1981 Bobby Sands became the first of ten hunger strikers to 
die while on strike. His election was followed by the election of two of his fellow hunger 
strikers as abstentionist TDs in the Dail Eireann general election of June 1981.  It was not 
until October 3rd 1981 that the strike was called off. 
 
The results of the analysis for this stage show how in this period the new politicising 
leadership were able to significantly move forward their agenda and gradually implement 
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some of their desired changes while simultaneously achieving more control and power 
within the movement at both an armed and political level.  
 
8b.3.1 Strengthening in Alternative Support: Benefits of Circumstance 
The late 1970s is noted as a period of significant disillusionment for the Provisional 
membership.  The campaign was not seen to be making any advance in their objectives of 
British withdrawal and the unification of Ireland.  The IRA membership was coming to 
this realisation and as a result a significant proportion were leaving the movement.   
 
“I think people got to the point that they were getting out, they just weren’t going 
back.  I got out of prison I met loads of people saying ‘Joe, pressure from the 
parents, pressure from the wife, I got married, I’ve got a job, I have to think of my 
kids and family, I don’t think it’s worth it anymore, I don’t think the revolution is 
going anywhere.’”470 
     
Coupled with this was a lack of public support for the extended Provisional armed 
campaign.  The nationalist communities of Ireland were supportive of political rather than 
armed campaigns.  This weakening of public support had played a significant role in the 
disillusionment of the membership.  With the hunger strike campaign and particularly the 
election of Bobby Sands there was a perceived growing support for Republicanism 
through the elections of Sinn Fein abstentionist candidates in both the Republic and 
Northern Ireland.471   However, the subsequent gradual weakening of support, 
particularly in the Republic, in the years after the hunger strikes signified that this support 
was context specific rather than an actual strengthening in support for Provisional 
Republicanism.   
 
“So whilst in the June ’81 general election in the south of Ireland the H-Blocks and 
the hunger strikes had an impact to the extent that Kieran Doherty, who was later 
to die in August ’81 was elected TD for Cavan/Monaghan and Paddy Agnew who 
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was ‘on the blanket’, and who was from Louth, was elected to Leinster House as 
TD for Louth.  In February ’82, when another election was called, that vote had 
completely disappeared, just completely disappeared.  So it had come out 
emotionally in an emergency as a one off.472  I believed, several of us believed, that 
there was a major lesson to be learned from this.”473 
 
This show of electoral success during the hunger strikes displayed to them, and more 
importantly it displayed to the rest of the movement, the benefits that a strong political 
element to the Republican campaign could bring.474  It provided tangible evidence of the 
benefits of political involvement.475 
 
“It was a huge event, and it made it easier for us to convince the movement, or the 
bulk of the movement that we could be involved here in politics and it wouldn’t 
interfere with the progress of the armed struggle.  In fact arguably propaganda 
wise it enhanced it, dove-tailed with it.”476   
 
However, as with the Goulding leadership of the 1960s they intimated that the 
abstentionist policy was impeding any further political success during non-emotionally 
arousing times.  The emotionally exaggerated Republican electoral success of 1981 
therefore provided the necessary impetus for the young leadership to gain more power 
within Republicanism and significantly strengthened their position in wishing to 
politicise the movement.  The theme of strengthened public support at this stage of the 
process proved to be one of the most dominant factors in the success of the Adams 
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leadership in gradually implementing their politicising strategy.  Twenty participants 
emphasised the importance of this theme in the overall process of the politicisation of the 
Provisional Republican Movement not only within this micro-process but within the 
entire macro-process.   
 
Group Leadership Membership Supporter Total 
Provisional 5 7 0 12 
RSF/CIRA 3 1 1 5 
External Observer  1 (1 Official) 2 (2 IRSM) 0 3 
Total 9 (1 external) 10 (2 external) 21 20 
Table 8b.7: Strengthened Public Support 
 
However, even with this growing support for the politicisation of the movement did not 
just grow from the electoral successes achieved by Sinn Fein.  There was a concerted 
effort through a variety of methods which resulted in the ultimate acceptance of the 
strengthening of the political element.  
    
8b.3.2 Control of Voice 
As has been already intimated in this process the Republican newspapers provided a vital 
vehicle for the leadership to get their desired message across.  Therefore as with the 
1969/70 process when there are developing factions within the movement the editorial 
control of the paper, and with it the control of potential national voice, proved a 
significant tool which was actively utilised.  Until January 1979 there were two 
Provisional newspapers Republican News which was southern based and under the 
editorial control of the traditionalist elements of the southern leadership and An 
Phoblacht northern based and under the control of the emerging young northern 
leadership.  In January 1979 when Deasun Breatnach stepped down as editor of 
Republican News Danny Morrison, editor of An Phoblacht and close ally of Adams, came 
down to Dublin with his staff from Belfast and merged the two papers to form An 
Phoblacht/Republican News.  This move proved significant as the young northerners now 
had control of the propaganda of the movement and could push their views without fear 
of alternative points of view within the movement being easily put forward.  Five 
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Provisionals outlined the importance of the control over what opinions and articles are 
disseminated to the membership.  
 
Group Leadership Membership Supporter Total 
Provisional 3 2 0 5 
RSF/CIRA 3 1 0 4 
External Observer  0 0 0 0 
Total 6 3 0 9  
Table 8b.8: Merger of papers 
 
This theme also signifies an important step in the gradual process of the northern 
leadership acquiring control of the movement. 
 
“I became aware that this was part of the politics of change within the movement, 
the old guard being pushed out, and Danny and Adams and co. moving into Dublin 
coming from Belfast, becoming national figures.  That was all part of the changing 
of the guard, for want of a better word.”477 
 
This merger proved to be a significant stepping stone in the strengthening of the 
politicisers’ position.  It provided them an open platform for expressing their views, 
policies and strategies and simultaneously weakened the voice of those old-guard 
traditionalists. The membership and supporters of the movement were reliant on the 
newspaper to provide them with much of their organisational information and policy 
arguments.  Therefore the merger of the papers was a move which gradually diminished 
the traditionalists’ support base. 
 
In the years leading up to the 1986 debates and abstentionist vote the newspaper was 
utilised as a tool at the forefront of the debate.  However, with it in the editorial control of 
those advocating the dropping of the abstentionist policy the debate, and other policy 
changes, within the paper was very one-sided with the arguments for politicisation at the 
forefront of opinion pieces published.  So therefore in the years leading up to the 1986 
vote there was active and patient campaigning for this change in political strategy within 
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not only the IRA and Sinn Fein but also through the medium of An Phoblacht/Republican 
News.   
 
“My point being is that therefore prior to 1986 debates were also carried out in An 
Phoblacht, in preparation for the ground, we were chipping away and the 
argument for continued abstentionism in the Twenty-Six Counties.  So you had a 
debate going on inside the IRA, you had an An Phoblacht debate, you had a Sinn 
Fein debate over a period of years prior to 86.” 478   
 
While there was a growing appreciation for the need for a stronger political strategy 
among the membership there were significant elements within the organisation who were 
yet to be convinced that the dropping of the abstentionist policy was the way for this to be 
best achieved.  Therefore it was important that the leadership did not force this change 
upon them but gradually and continuously put forward their arguments for this change 
while simultaneously stifling the potential for stronger counter-arguments to be put 
forward by their internal rivals.   
 
8b.3.3 Strategy Change: One Step at a Time: Armed to Armed and Political 
The key to the success of the politicising Provisionals in the 1980s was the gradual 
process of the changes introduced.  The ‘young northerners’ only officially brought 
forward their proposed changes when they were certain that they had sufficient levels of 
support across the movement.479  At times when they did not have this support they 
postponed the changes until a time they did, a tactic they utilised across the peace 
process.  This is in stark contrast to the Goulding leadership of the 1960s who tried to 
change too much too soon.  They pushed forward with votes of abstentionism, NLF and 
other votes when there were significant levels of opposition across the movement.  This 
respect for timing and support proved the most significant asset in the ongoing support 
for the leadership across the entire peace process, a process in which they successfully 
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brought the Provisional movement gradually away from terrorism and towards the 
acceptance of peaceful politics. 
 
One of the tactics utilised throughout this process, in the lead up to 1986 and in the years 
after, was the distancing of the leadership from contentious proposals and debates until it 
was clear that majority support was in place.  This is a tactic which was discussed by 
eleven participants.  
 
Group Leadership Membership Supporter Total 
Provisional 1 4 0 5 
RSF/CIRA 4 1 1 6 
External Observer  0 0 0 0 
Total 5 5 1 11 
Table 8b.9: Leadership Distancing 
 
 
In the local and national debates about potential changes to both the armed and political 
strategies it was rarely the key leadership figures who introduced the potential for change 
to the debates.  They often utilised republican actors external to the leadership structure to 
‘test the waters’ prior to their official backing of the proposal.  It was only when the 
feelings towards the proposals were significantly positive that the leadership officially 
endorsed it.     
 
“Adams doesn’t declare himself until he is absolutely certain that the ground is 
correct.  He wasn’t talking about dropping abstentionism, certainly not at a local 
level, he may have been talking about it at an Ard Comhairle level that we need to 
revise our strategies.  I am aware that at Ard Comhairle level there was friction as 
early as in the early eighties.  In fact there was friction earlier, even before the 
hunger strikes.”480 
 
This tactic enabled the key figures to distance themselves from any unsuccessful attempt 
to implement a controversial change in strategy, and therefore it was more difficult for 
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their internal detractors to accuse or blame them.  It also allowed them to take the credit 
when such changes were successful.  However, it was largely down to the groundwork in 
the months and often years beforehand that allowed for this success.  The continuous 
implementation of this distancing tactic is one of the key reasons for the success of the 
drastic changes implemented by the leadership.  It is similarly part of the reason for the 
prolonged dominance of Republicanism by this leadership. 
 
This patience in the implementation of change allowed the leadership to portray an image 
of being significantly connected with the expectations of their membership and the 
communities they claimed to represent.  This sets them apart from the disconnect present 
at the end of the Goulding leadership.  It was their relevancy to their base at specific 
times which maintained their organisational dominance and strength ahead of any internal 
detractors.   
 
“It’s incontrovertible that that kind of seminal formative revolutionary debate, the 
fact that we had to engage with republicans right throughout, just to prevent the 
split from being more catastrophic than it was required that you headed off and 
you started debating this and discussing this.  To win the debate required an 
engagement and negotiation and it was an important lesson that was taken into the 
peace negotiations, you negotiate with your base every step of the way.”481   
 
This is a process which was take place both within the IRA and Sinn Fein.  While this 
took a considerable amount of time the end result is that the leadership were in a stronger 
position due to the mandate given to them by their base.   
 
While this process is looked upon positively by the Provisionals those who formed or 
supported Republican Sinn Fein and/or the Continuity IRA see it otherwise.  They regard 
the tactic less as a form of consultation with the base and more a process of demanding 
the acceptance of the leadership stance until there is an overall consensus.  They contend 
that the Adams/McGuinness leadership forced a consensus on topics by suppressing 
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active debate within the organisation and placing known supporters of their position 
within leadership positions across the country.  This is a similar accusation to that which 
was directed at the Goulding leadership.   
 
“Every OC in every county was a Belfast man.  So they were controlling the Army 
and then they went for Sinn Fein.  The only group that they didn’t control was the 
Executive of the Irish Republican Army.”482 
 
This claim of suppressed debate was put forward by each of the RSF/CIRA participants 
as well as two former Provisional members, who are both independent/freelance 
dissidents.  Even if this was the case the analysis of the data indicates that the leadership 
successfully portrayed the guise of active and constructive engagement with the base. 
 
The key failure of the Goulding leadership was the downgrading in importance of the 
armed campaign from their long-term strategy.   This coupled with the further wholesale 
changes to the organisation provided a strong platform for the detractors to base their 
dissent on and therefore attract stronger support, and in the aftermath of the split greater 
levels of membership.  Conversely the success of the 1986 leadership was their 
maintenance of the armed strategy to continue alongside the stronger political element.  
This maintenance of the traditional armed campaign placated a significant proportion of 
would be detractors.   
 
“With the dual strategy you could maybe see that the fact that the armed struggle 
was going on was giving people a sense that there wasn’t a sell out happening.”483  
  
The fact that there was a slow gradual implementation and proposal of change, rather 
than immediate wholesale change, allowed the membership and support to acclimatise to 
the benefits of the implemented change before any further change is proposed.  In the 
situation where the previous change had a perceived positive impact on the movement 
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and had aided in the progress of the organisation in the pursuit of their purposive goals 
membership are more likely to be receptive to the idea of further changes.  This 
movement from a purely armed strategy to a combined armed and political strategy484 
was deemed to be one of the most important factors in the post split strength of the 
Provisionals by seventeen participants as illustrated in Table 8b.10. 
 
Group Leadership Membership Supporter Total 
Provisional 4 7 0 11 
RSF/CIRA 2 1 2 5 
External Observer  0 1 (1 Official) 0 1 
Total 6 9 (1 external) 2 17 
Table 8b.10: Change from Armed to Armed and Political Strategy 
 
The retention of the armed campaign is deemed to be the major factor which kept the 
PIRA largely intact, an assertion which is supported by those five leadership figures of 
the armed wing of the movement. 
   
HO4. The sub-group most willing to make compromises is the one most likely to be 
successful in the aftermath of a split. 
 
HO4.  While a split was not avoided in 1986 the application of compromise and voice 
successfully lessened the effects of the divide.  It was this appreciation and respect for the 
sentiments of their base which allowed the newly forming leadership to prosper.  They 
were aware that the radical changes they wished to implement w ere only possible at a 
time when there was sufficient levels of support throughout the movement.  Therefore 
they were keeping themselves constantly aware of the sentiment and levels of support.  
By implementing changes in this gradual manner of one step at a time they displayed 
their willingness to compromise.  While they may have wished to implement more 
sweeping changes there was awareness that this would strengthen the position of their 
internal detractors.  As was displayed in 1969/70 the implementation of too many 
isolating policy and strategy related changes at the one time can prove detrimental to the 
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aspirations of the leadership.  Therefore a strategy of one step at a time weakens the 
detractors’ position and therefore weakens any potential competition in the aftermath of a 
split and provides the organisation with the opportunity to focus on purposive goes rather 
than having to change focus to competition for membership and support.  The strategy of 
maintaining the armed campaign as well strengthening the political wing of the 
movement resulted in the isolation of a small number of dissenters.  The pledge to 
continue the armed struggle ensured the support of a wider grouping.  Any move to call 
and end to the armed strategy would have resulted in a stronger RSF and particularly and 
stronger CIRA.              
 
For many Republicans during the Troubles one of the most defining features of the 
Provisional Movement was its ability to mount a significant armed campaign against the 
British ‘occupation’ of Northern Ireland.  Especially for many of those northern 
Provisionals partaking in almost daily violence across the six counties of Northern 
Ireland any threat to this element of the movement’s make-up would have been defined 
as threatening to the identity and purpose of the movement.  Therefore it was essential for 
the maintenance of strong support for the gradual changes being made at this stage that 
the armed campaign be retained as a fundamental element of the strategy.  If it was not 
retained the exiting group would have been more likely to have had a much stronger 
armed grouping than the Continuity IRA which developed in the aftermath of the split of 
1986.  As will be portrayed        
 
8b.3.4 Leadership Change 
As with the strategy changes implemented and proposed the transition of power was 
similarly a gradual step by step process.  Throughout the 1970s the young northerners and 
their supporters gained and retained leadership positions within both the IRA and Sinn 
Fein, and in doing so took the place of many of those less supportive of the direction they 
wished to take the movement.  The result was a leadership, local and national, more 
supportive of the gradual transformation of the organisation.  Those internal detractors 
who exited to join or support the Continuity IRA and/or Republican Sinn Fein in 1986, as 
well as a number of freelance dissidents and Provisionals, maintain that this was carried 
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very purposively and at times aggressively.  The Adams/McGuinness leadership deemed 
that they required to get rid of certain individuals within the movement so as to achieve 
the necessary control of both the IRA and Sinn Fein so as to progress the movement in 
the manner they wished. 
 
“He got out and the first thing he done when he got out was to remove Billy McKee 
as Brigade OC, and then get himself elected onto the Army Council.  I think he was 
also Adjutant General of the IRA around then.  But that’s what he did, and he 
started by getting the majority of people who were on the Council, who were in his 
pocket, and once he had that he had control of the Movement.” 485  
 
The accusation by four participants, two RSF/CIRA, one freelance dissident and one 
member of the 32 County Sovereignty Movement, was that the removal of a number of 
those in disagreement with the newly forming leadership was done by violent means.  
This was either carried out directly through executions or indirectly by sending IRA 
members on missions which the leadership knew they would not return from.  This 
forceful removal was not a tactic used against all dissenters.  It was principally used to 
eliminate those individuals who were deemed to pose a threat to the progress of the new 
leadership. 
 
“They would have conspired to get rid of people who posed a threat to Adams, 
people who were charismatic, people who had leadership qualities, who would 
have posed a threat to Adams’ position.”486 
 
Within the Republican Movement the greatest threat posed to the progress of the northern 
leadership came from the old-guard traditionalist leadership, especially well respected 
leaders like Ruairi O’Bradaigh and Daithi O’Conail.  Within Sinn Fein they held the 
positions of President and Vice President respectively and were also heavily influential 
within the IRA leadership.  These individuals were the main figures within the leadership 
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maintain the traditionalist Republican position.  Their respected and lengthy history 
within the movement in the view of many members legitimised their position.  Due to the 
respect within which they were held by all members an obvious removal would have 
been significantly damaging to their internal opposition.  Therefore they attempted to 
force their resignations.  They did so by calling for the removal of the Eire Nua policy.487   
This was a policy seen by O’Bradaigh, O’Conail and other members of the old guard 
traditionalists as a fundamental part of the purposive goals of the movement.  It was their 
view that the desired public good that the Republican Movement should aim for was the 
federalist united Ireland outlined in the document.  O’Bradaigh in particular was one of 
the most vocal advocates of the policy. 
 
“The major disagreement with the Eire Nua programme was that the Adams crowd 
knew that if you could outmanoeuvre O’Bradaigh on it you could outmanoeuvre 
him both strategically and organisationally, and you could undermine him within 
Sinn Fein.”488 
   
The first attempt to remove the policy from the constitution took place in the 1981 Ard 
Fheis where they received a majority.  However, this did not meet the requisite two-thirds 
majority.  They did receive this majority in 1982.  This constitutional withdrawal of the 
policy highlighted the growing tensions within the leadership of the movement and in 
1983 O’Bradaigh, O’Conail and Cathleen Knowles all stepped down from the Ard 
Comhairle489 of Sinn Fein.  In O’Bradaigh’s resignation speech as president of Sinn Fein 
he highlighted his belief about the dangers of constitutional politics and the need for the 
Republican Movement to stick to its ‘basic principles.’490  They saw this as a drop in the 
quality of Republican policy.   These resignations saw the further rise of the new 
leadership with Adams taking over as president of Sinn Fein.  For the likes of O’Bradaigh 
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and O’Conail the removal of Eire Nua was seen to be threatening to the identity of the 
movement, and they consequently stepped down from their positions of power within the 
movement.  However, it was not threatening enough to yet justify their exit from the 
entire organisation. 
 
This vote against the Eire Nua policy was not designed due to a significant disagreement 
with the policy.  It was part of a process of removing those who threatened the newly 
forming leadership.  
 
“The people who thought as I did just felt they weren’t wanted.”491 
 
This period of time from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s showed can be defined as a 
steady rise to power of this young northern leadership.  A clear part of this progress to 
gain significant control they changed a number of significant policies while removing 
from power the advocates of these policies which they considered to be holding them 
back.    
 
“I just felt that Ruairi was just not up to the job of what the struggle needed… no 
one could stand in the way of progress.”492 
 
The aftermath of this significant change in leadership is defined by the process to remove 
the abstentionist policy to the Dail.  However, as was detailed the leadership did not link 
themselves to this sensitive issue until they believed that they had enough support to 
successfully change they policy. 
 
“When Gerry Adams took over in 1983 he said that he was quite happy with the 
policy of abstentionism.  I think it was 1985 before the leadership decided that they 
would go public on it and the following year they were very very public on it.  They 
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did it in a devious way.  They don’t try to persuade, they tried to instruct and 
demand.”493 
 
This stage in the lead up to the 1986 split is analysed as a contrast to the equivalent stage 
of the 1969/70 process.  While the Goulding leadership attempted to change too much too 
soon and therefore significantly strengthened the dissidents membership and support the 
Adams/McGuinness leadership changed policy one step at a time and as a result 
weakened support for the traditionalists.  Most notable within this differentiation is the 
maintenance of the armed campaign in the 1980s as opposed to its significant 
destabilisation in the 1960s. 
 
However, the success of the 1986 leadership and the failure of the 1969/70 must not be 
purely attributed to their own internal organisational actions.  For the Goulding leadership 
the violence in Northern Ireland played a more significant role in the post-split strength 
of the Provisionals than any abstentionist or left wing policy.  And in the early 1980s it 
was the hunger strike campaign and specifically the election of Bobby Sands and others 
which provided the impetus for a strengthened political strategy.  Without this 
demonstration of the potential for political involvement it is unlikely that the Republican 
membership would have been as easily convinced of the worth of strengthened political 
strategy. 
 
8b.4 Stage 4: Organisational Exit and Breakaway Group Formation 
With the apparent decline in support for electoral Republicanism in the mid 1980s, and 
the rise of constitutional alternatives such as the New Ireland Forum494 and the Anglo 
Irish Agreement,495 it was felt that major political change was needed by the movement.  
In response to this the internal debate was re-opened within the IRA and Sinn Fein about 
the possibility of dropping the abstentionist policy.  However, while the Goulding 
leadership had tried to change this policy for all three parliaments in one go the Adams 
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leadership were only proposing the dropping of abstentionism to Dail Eireann, the least 
objectionable of the three.  For many Republicans the abstentionist policy was more than 
a tactic it was a defining feature of what it was to be an Irish Republican.  However, the 
proposal to drop the policy only to the Dail, while still continuing with the armed 
struggle, proved less divisive than the more comprehensive changes proposed by the 
Goulding leadership in the late 1960s.  As with all constitutional amendments this change 
required a two thirds majority. 
 
After the General Army Convention of 1986, which saw the vote to drop the abstentionist 
policy to the Dail passed, those opposed to the change, mainly from the outgoing Army 
Executive, met to develop a new armed movement.  This is supportive of  
 
HI3. A quality conscious member will exit the organisation to join or set up a new 
organisation when there is a perceived drop in the quality of the product produced by the 
parent organisation. 
 
HI3.  Those leaving the IRA and Sinn Fein in 1986 were leaving due to the perceived 
drop in quality of the product produced by the organisation and therefore continued their 
involvement in organised Republicanism by setting up a new political and armed 
organisation.496  They placed a stronger emphasis on the abstentionist policies than those 
who remained with the movement. 
 
The exiting Executive contacted Tom Maguire, the last surviving member of the last all 
Ireland Dail and a member of the Old IRA, and in 1987 he issued a statement497 declaring 
the legitimacy of the Continuity Executive as the true IRA, while discounting the claims 
to legitimacy of the ongoing Provisional IRA.498  While the existence of an armed wing 
was heavily suspected it was not until 1994 at a graveside salute to Tom Maguire that the 
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Continuity IRA were brought to the public’s awareness.499  The argument is posited that 
the declaration of the existence of the Continuity IRA at this stage of the peace process, 
when the Provisionals had declared a ceasefire, is due to Republican Sinn Fein and the 
Continuity representing a certain group of Irish Republicans who will support and 
organise military activity for as long as there is any sort of British presence in Ireland.  
The announcement of the Provisional ceasefire made the need for this ‘true’ form of 
Republicanism all the more pressing.500  However, it must also be noted as is supported 
by the interview evidence that in the direct aftermath of the split in the PIRA that it took a 
significant amount of time for an efficient dissident armed structure to form.   
 
As with 1969/70 in the aftermath of the IRA divide there was a similar cleavage within 
Sinn Fein at the 1986 Ard Fheis.  The vote for the dropping the abstentionist policy to the 
Dail required a two thirds majority due to its constitutional nature.  One of the methods 
utilised by the leadership to succeed in their aims was to obtain the support of prominent 
Republicans from the IRA and Sinn Fein, but most importantly from a number of old 
guard Republicans, in order to legitimise their proposals.  This support is apparent in the 
range of speakers who spoke in favour of the change in the 1986 Sinn Fein Ard Fheis.  
Supporters of the change varied from the new leadership of Adams, McGuinness501 and 
Morrison to old guard Republicans such as John Joe McGirl and Joe Cahill502 as well as 
prominent IRA prisoners such as Gerry Kelly who sent a letter of support from prison in 
Amsterdam where he was being held after escaping from Long Kesh and going on the 
run.
503
  The support of these and other prominent individuals as well as a number of years 
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of ground work in securing the vote proved successful as in the 1986 Ard Fheis504 the 
motion was passed and Sinn Fein members elected to Dail Eireann were constitutionally 
allowed to take their seats in the parliament.  With the passing of this bill a small number 
of delegates walked out of the venue and ‘continued’ the Ard Fheis in a different location 
where they declared the establishment of Republican Sinn Fein. While their decision to 
split took place in 1986 it is argued that the decisions of individual members of 
Republican Sinn Fein can be traced to a combination of their ‘upbringing and an 
identification with the movement’s ideology.’505  For many of their membership active 
politics in Dail Eireann was not only considered anti-Republican but there was also the 
view that involvement in the parliament would lead to corruption and a focus on 
politics.506  At the inauguration of the ‘new’ party in 1986 the members present did not 
admit to the presence of an armed-wing affiliated to the party.  From an individual 
perspective it has been noted that there are two distinct reasons for choosing which side 
to support and/or join in the aftermath of a split one is a sense of ‘we-ness’ or solidarity 
with members on one side of the split and the second are ideological reasons in the form 
of support or opposition to constitutional politics.507  This argument may be applied to 
any of the splits with the notion of ‘we-ness’ staying the same but the ideological reasons 
changing to ‘support for reasoning of the split.’   Neither Republican Sinn Fein nor the 
Continuity IRA has ever gained the levels of support or membership of the Provisionals.  
However, to this day they are considered as one of the most dangerous paramilitary 
groups in Northern Ireland.508 
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This exit of Republican Sinn Fein and the Continuity IRA is seen as functional for the 
advancement of the politicisation of the Provisional Movement and it liberated the 
organisation of some of the leading dissenting voices.509 
 
8b.4.1 Change in Political Strategy: Abstentionism  
As has been detailed throughout this chapter the politicisation process up to 1986 was a 
gradual process marked by individual strategy changes designed to cause minimal 
dissension at the time of actual change.  The changes had all been preceded by internal 
discussions and were only voted upon or implemented when the leadership believed that 
they had the support of the majority of the movement.  This was the same with the case of 
dropping the abstentionist policy to Dail Eireann in 1986.  The Adams/McGuinness 
leadership, and their internal supporters, entered into discussions across the movement in 
order to gauge levels of support for the change to what was a sensitive issue.510  These 
discussions continued up to the day of the Convention as well as at the Ard Fheis.  As 
with all potentially divisive strategy changes it was extremely important for the 
leadership to prepare the ground in the years prior to ensure their desired result.  This was 
especially true with the change of the abstentionist policy as it had been the centre of 
splits in the past.  It was a divisive issue, especially for those members in the Republic of 
Ireland as they were to be the ones most affected by the change, and at the time they were 
more representative of old-guard traditional republicanism than their northern colleagues, 
many of whom had initially engaged with Sinn Fein and the IRA in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. 
 
 “I think in broad terms and this is very broad it wasn’t seen as such a fundamental 
issue in the north, it would have been certainly in some places in the south.  It 
would have certainly been to some older members a real fundamental and defining 
issue of what the party was about.”511 
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The change of the abstentionist policy to Dail Eireann proved to be one of the most 
dominant themes with respect to the 1986 split.  This is illustrated in Table 8b.11 which 
illustrates the make-up of the twenty participants who discussed the issue. 
 
Group Leadership Membership Supporter Total 
Provisional 6 5 0 11 
RSF/CIRA 5 1 1 7 
External Observer  0 2 (2 Officials) 0 2 
Total 11 8 (2 external) 1 20 (2 external) 
Table 8b.11: Change of Abstentionist Policy to Dail Eireann 
 
As with the Goulding leadership before them the northern politicisers led by Adams and 
Morrison regarded the abstentionist policy as a burden suppressing their political 
progress.  The electoral support for Sinn Fein significantly dropped in the Republic 
during elections detached from emotionally arousing moments.  While the hunger strikes 
had seen a dramatic rise in the electoral success of the party the vote returned to its pre-
hunger strike base-level in the years after.  This decline had not been echoed in Northern 
Ireland. The key difference was in public acceptance of the political institutions.  As the 
northern nationalist and republican populations failed to recognise Stormont and 
especially Westminster as legitimate governing bodies they were more willing to accept 
the continuation of the abstentionist policies to these institutions than the southern 
electorate who for the most part regarded Dail Eireann as their rightful legislator.  
Therefore for many southern nationalists a vote for abstentionist Sinn Fein was seen as a 
wasted ballot.  This was a viewpoint recognised by the young leadership and therefore 
they saw it necessary to remove the inhibiting policy.  Therefore the continued 
advocating of southern abstentionism was deemed as a significant obstacle in their 
attempts make republicanism relevant to southern base.    
 
“So in 1983, after that election in ‘83/’84, it was quite obvious that unless we were 
prepared to go in to Leinster House that vote was going to remain at rock bottom 
and could rise occasionally.”512    
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It was here where the core difference between the two extremes on either side of the 
debate lay.  The politicisers viewed twenty-six county abstentionism as a tactic which had 
failed, and was debilitating Republican progress.  One the other side of the divide lay the 
old-guard traditionalists who viewed abstentionism as a cornerstone of Irish 
Republicanism, closer to part of Republican ideology than a tactic.   
 
“Abstentionism was a policy that had been elevated to a principle”  513 
 
Even though it was northern republicans who were pushing for the dropping of the 
abstentionist policy to Dail Eireann, and old guard southern Republicans leading the calls 
for policy maintenance, both sides required to widen their support base.  As with all intra-
organisational conflicts there were firm advocates on either side of the divide.  However, 
there were similarly those undecided members who required convincing by either side 
before deciding their position.  The arguments applied by both sides to justify their 
position to the Republican base were polar opposites.  The justification put forward by 
those advocating a policy change suggested that abstentionism in the south was 
hampering Republican progress.  It was argued that without a change in policy that 
Republicanism would remain irrelevant to majority of residents within the Republic of 
Ireland.  However, this argument was constantly supported with a reaffirmation of the 
commitment to armed struggle.  This therefore narrowed the prospective support base for 
the dissenting voices.  The main task for the new leadership was to convince those 
undecided members that political involvement did not equate to a weakening of 
Republican standards and tradition.  This was made simpler by the electoral successes of 
the years previous. 
 
“I suppose the fact that Bobby Sands was able to be elected and of course the other 
elections, Kieran Doherty and Paddy Agnew and all of those gave the sense that 
there was people out there who would respond to Sinn Fein if they were more 
                                                 
513
  Sean McManus 
 214 
proactive in engaging in politics and that electoral politics was something that they 
had to engage in.”514 
 
On the other side of the divide, in stark contrast, the old-guard traditionalists relied upon 
historical referencing and moral principle based arguments to justify their aversion to the 
arguments for policy change.  Their arguments were principally based on the belief that 
abstentionism was not a tactic which could be utilised or dispatched when the leadership 
saw fit.  Abstentionism, to them, was a historical principle at the centre of what it was to 
be ‘true’ Republicans.  This was a principle which could not be removed by any 
leadership at any point during the struggle.  The only parliament they would recognise 
was a thirty-two county parliament elected by the entire population of Ireland.  Electoral 
acceptance of any of the three parliaments would, in their opinion, leave the movement 
morally bankrupt and would equate to a move away from ‘true’ Republicanism.   
 
“Then in 1986 whenever the Provos decided to recognise Leinster House at the 
Ard Fheis of 1986, we left, walked out of the Ard Fheis, because it was never in the 
constitution of the Republican Movement that you recognised partitionist 
assemblies…So those who walked out of the Mansion House in 1986, walked out 
with the Republican Movement intact, its principles its beliefs and its constitution.  
Those who remained in the Mansion House dissented from the principles and 
beliefs of the Republican movement by recognising a partitionist 
assembly515…Those who remained dissented from the Republican Movement and 
had no right to call themselves Republican after that, because each step they’ve 
taken has been further and further and further away from the movement and its 
goals.”516 
 
As they held abstentionism as a fundamental part of Republican identity those who left to 
form both the Continuity IRA and Republican Sinn Fein did so as they believed that an 
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acceptance of seats in Dail Eireann was threatening to organisational identity.  This is 
therefore supportive of  
 
HO2. The conflict at the centre of a split is, for at least one of the sub-groups, threatening 
to the organisational identity.  
 
As has been stated above the advocates for a change in policy were successful in 
receiving the necessary two-thirds majority at both the Army Convention and the Ard 
Fheis. The Provisional leadership under the guidance of Adams and McGuinness when 
compared to the politicising Goulding leadership had positioned their policy more 
strategically to enable the undecided membership to side with them as opposed to the 
O’Bradaigh leadership who were firmly tied to their positioning on the issue of 
abstentionism.  The key in this regard was the ability of the new leadership to 
continuously vocalise their intentions to continue the armed struggle in unison with a now 
stronger political strategy.  The positioning of the two internal sub-groups emphasised the 
perception that of a progressive Adams leadership as opposed to the O’Bradaigh and 
O’Conail leadership who displayed no ability to move the movement forward, a 
leadership unable to adapt with changing circumstances.  Related to this was the issue 
that the changes implemented by the new leadership were not seen to be significantly 
threatening to organisational identity by the majority of the movement.  This is due to the 
minimal nature of change coupled with the continued the continued reaffirmation of the 
continuation of the armed struggle.517 
 
8b.4.2 Preparation for Split 
It is essential to detail the policy related differences between the two sub-groups in the 
analysis of the result of all splits.  However, it is equally necessary to understand the non-
policy related issues which significantly impacted upon the result.  The previous splits 
emphasise the necessity for pre-split preparation whether it be in organising a breakaway 
group at both armed and political levels or alternatively preparation on behalf of the 
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leadership to weaken the potential for a strong breakaway group.  In 1969/70 the pre-split 
preparation on behalf of the would be Provisionals enabled the new movement to start 
their armed and political campaigns immediately at the point of inception, while the pre-
split preparation on behalf of the Official leadership in advance of 1974 considerably 
weakened both the INLA and IRSP.  While the IRSM had also prepared for the division 
the pre-emptive actions of the Officials curtailed this preparation and in turn the IRSM 
was never the dominant Republican movement it could potentially have been.  With 
respect to the 1986 divide the pre-split preparation was truly one-sided.  The preparations 
for change were dominated by the Adams leadership at both armed and political levels.  
In contrast those wishing to avoid organisational change were noticeably unprepared for a 
split.  This is portrayed in the analysis of the interview data from those on both sides of 
the divide.  As displayed in Table 8b.12 seventeen participants referred to the preparation 
for change which ultimately resulted in their successful passing of the vote to remove the 
abstentionist policy to Dail Eireann.   
Group Leadership Membership Supporter Total 
Provisional 5 7 0 12 
RSF/CIRA 3 1 1 5 
External Observer  0 0 0 0 
Total 8 8 1 17 
Table 8b.12: Adams/McGuinness Leadership Preparation for Change 
 
Central to this pre-change preparation, and therefore central to the post-split Provisional 
dominance, was the emphasis placed on gaining internal support for all policy related 
changes prior to putting them to a vote.  This sets the Adams/McGuinness leadership 
aside from their predecessors in the Goulding leadership of the 1960s.  For Goulding’s 
changes the organisation wide support was not there to the same extent as with Adams 
and McGuinness.  The importance of this pre-change securing of support is displayed in 
Table 8b.13. 
Group Leadership Membership Supporter Total 
Provisional 5 6 0 11 
RSF/CIRA 4 0 1 5 
External Observer  0 0 0 0 
Total 8 6 1 16 
Table 8b.13: Pre-Change Securing of Support 
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As displayed above this appreciation of the benefits of this preparation was from both 
sides of the divide. 
 
“Adams and them were better organised.  Adams is a very smart politician and 
tactician.  Nobody can deny that…On the other side, on the army side with regard 
the Continuity, they hadn’t even a water pistol because they had secured all the 
dumps in between times before this thing took place.  They had secured all the 
dumps and all the guns were in their control.”518 
 
This pre-split preparation was all carried out in order to minimise the possible effects of a 
divide on the movement.  A stronger post-split organisation maximises the potential for 
the movement to achieve organisational goals, and to maintain organisational survival. 
 
“The most important thing in the course of the struggle and one of the priorities I 
think for us at all times was to keep as many people with us as we could to prevent 
as far as possible any fragmentation or  slippage from the edges.  We were never 
going to keep everybody.  In the course of the struggle you’re always going to lose 
some folks.”519 
  
An essential part of this pre-split preparation with respect to 1986 was securing the 
support of influential individuals within the movement for each sub-group’s policy 
positioning.  For many members individual allegiance was decided not by arguments for 
or against abstentionism, but by the positioning of individual members whom they trusted 
and respected.  It was a priority of the Adams leadership to secure the support for change 
from a broad range of legitimising figures within the movement.  The 
O’Bradaigh/O’Conail sub-group had the ability, through their lengthy and influential 
membership and leadership of the movement, to provide a claim to the historical 
continuity of the struggle.  They provided a link to the pre-1960s IRA in opposition to the 
relatively inexperienced involvement of Adams and his supporters.  Therefore one of the 
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essential, and most beneficial, steps taken by the leadership was taken in securing the 
support of other influential old-guard republicans which lessened the continuity claims of 
O’Bradaigh, O’Conail and others.  The importance of the influential old-guard was 
referred to by sixteen participants in total, with each of the RSF/CIRA referring to the 
importance of this for them.  This supports the position taken in this research that there 
was an over-reliance from this sub-group on the historical past of the movement and in 
turn a dearth of progressive planning for how the movement was to move forward. 
 
Group Leadership Membership Supporter Total 
Provisional 4 4 0 8 
RSF/CIRA 5 1 2 8 
External Observer  0 0 0 0 
Total 9 5 2 16 
Table 8b.14: Old-Guard Influential Individuals 
 
In this respect John-Joe McGirl, Joe Cahill and others spoke out in support of the change 
in the abstentionist policy to Dail Eireann.  The support of these influential individuals 
from both the Republic and Northern Ireland significantly strengthened the case for 
change.  This was complimented by the wide variety of support for the change from all 
sections of Republicanism at both armed and political levels as well as from Republican 
prisoners.  This does not suggest that RSF/CIRA did not gain the support of influential 
Republicans.  In 1969 Comdt. General Tom Maguire, the sole survivor of the Second 
Dail,520 in the eyes of many members legitimised the existence of the burgeoning 
Provisional IRA by declaring his support for the breakaway grouping.521  In 1986 he 
transferred his support to the Continuity IRA and Republican Sinn Fein.522  The support 
of Maguire and other influential traditionalist Republicans523 was utilised by those calling 
for the maintenance of the status quo as a historical legitimisation for their position.  
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However, this support was negated to a large extent by the cumulative support from 
across the movement and across the generations acquired by the Adams leadership.   
 
“I think people like John Joe McGirl and Seamus Twomey and Joe Cahill and 
having their support was actually crucial.  In a historical sense it would have been 
nice to have Tom Maguire on our side.  I know they went to see him and spoke to 
him, not really to seek his endorsement but just really to appraise him of what was 
happening.  He didn’t agree with it. I suppose every generation has to decide for 
itself how it is going to advance the struggle, and not be hampered by decisions of 
previous generations, but be mindful of their experiences as well.” 524  
 
The importance of influential individuals in decisions of allegiance is further developed 
in Appendix G. 
 
8b.5 Stage 5 and Stage 1:525 Aftermath of Split 
The aftermath of the previous two splits are notable for the intense competition for 
membership and support between the two resultant groupings, leading to violent feuds 
between the two sets of former comrades.  However, this competition was not evident in 
the same intensity after the 1986 split.  Due to the dominance of the Provisional IRA and 
Sinn Fein, and the resultantly weak Continuity IRA and Republican Sinn Fein, there were 
not the extensive feuds which were the embodiment of the previous splits.  For the 
Provisionals the Continuity were not seen as a significant threat to their position within 
Republicanism and consequently the Continuity were in no way strong enough to mount 
any significant offensive against a grouping which had, in the years since their split from 
the Officials, acquired the title of ‘mainstream’ republicanism.  For the Provisionals the 
results of the votes at both the Army Convention and the Ard Fheis allowed them to 
continue with the politicisation of the movement while maintaining a significant terrorist 
campaign.  However, for the breakaway group the years after were dominated by their 
immediate objective for organisational survival.  This included the necessity of acquiring 
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weapons, the recruitment of membership and support and the maintenance of the numbers 
who originally exited with them.   
 
While both the Provisionals of 1969 and the INLA of 1974 accumulated a reasonable 
stockpile of weapons and artillery in the lead-up to and in the aftermath of their splits this 
was not the case for the Continuity IRA of 1986.  As has been stated above members of 
both Republican Sinn Fein and the Continuity IRA admit that they had failed to prepare 
for the eventuality of split.  Resources were close to non-existent for the new 
organisation.  Therefore in order to organise any form of armed organisation this 
necessitated the founding members attempting to acquire arms and finances from internal 
as well as external supporters and members.  The Continuity IRA accuse leading 
Provisionals of threatening them against setting up a new armed grouping and similarly 
Republican Sinn Fein indict that in the naissance of the new political party that members 
and potential members were warned by Provisionals not to join or support the new 
movement.  As has been already stated these threats never reached the scale of violent 
feuds. 
 
“Next thing we set up [Republican Sinn Fein] and we got ourselves an office and 
we hadn’t a penny.  On the other side, on the army side with regard the Continuity, 
they hadn’t even a water pistol because they [the Provisionals] had secured all the 
dumps in between times before this thing took place.  They had secured all the 
dumps and all the guns were in their control…The next thing anyway myself and 
O’Bradaigh was called to a meeting in Sligo and we were threatened by [Martin] 
McGuinness and Pat Doherty and they had two henchmen outside the door, and 
told that we would be shot if another army was set up”526 
 
While the 1986 splits did not result in violent feuds similar to 1974 and 1969/70 one of 
the comparative outcomes was the refocusing of the Continuity IRA and Republican Sinn 
Fein with respect to who their main enemy was.  It is the belief of the Provisionals that 
the Continuity’s and Republican Sinn Fein’s exploits was not concentrated on bringing an 
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end to British presence in Northern Ireland.  Alternatively their focus was on condemning 
the actions and intentions of the Provisionals.    
 
“We became the focus [of RSF] over and beyond the role of the British and the 
Irish governments, we became the focus of the energy of Republican Sinn Fein.  
They spent their time examining what we were doing and criticising it, rather than 
providing an alternative that would address the question of independence and self-
determination.”527   
  
This is an accusation made against the Continuity and especially RSF by Provisionals as 
well as the other Republican groupings and freelance dissidents.  However, it is not one 
confessed to by the membership of the organisation in question.  Such an admittance 
would constitute for many the failure of the organisation’s actions and goals.  While not 
admitted to by members and supporters it is borne out through the interviews.  During the 
interviews each of the participants across all the organisations were questioned about the 
modern days activities of their respective groups.  During this section of the interviews 
each RSF and Continuity IRA member placed more emphasis on criticising the 
Provisional Republican Movement and its leadership rather than emphasising the actions 
of their own organisation.  It was also noted that four members and supporters were 
actively critical of the actions of both the armed and political wings of their own 
grouping.  This signifies the failure of both Republican Sinn Fein and the Continuity IRA 
to make any significant impact on Irish Republicanism. 
 
“It [the ineffectiveness of the Continuity IRA] is embarrassing, it is not good 
enough, nothing anywhere near good enough.”528 
 
Through their critical analysis of the Provisional Republican Movement, and the constant 
historical referencing, they were constantly framing themselves as the ‘true’ Republicans.  
This belief is further emphasised within the chosen title of the armed wing, Continuity 
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IRA.  It is their belief that as they have not altered the Republican stance or political 
strategy that they are the only organisation who should be considered as ‘true’ Irish 
Republicans maintaining the stance of historical figures throughout Republican history.  
These criticisms while mainly focused on the Provisional Movement spreads across all of 
the Republican organisations both dissident and mainstream.  This is especially true 
among the old-guard leadership figures such as Ruairi and Sean O’Bradaigh.  However, 
even if they wish to portray themselves as ‘true’ Irish Republicans this is not a message 
which has resonated among the wider Republican community.  Since their inception in 
1986 both the Continuity IRA and Republican Sinn Fein have failed in attracting any 
significant level of support, a point which is acknowledged and accepted as a failure of 
the movement by those members of the movement as well as those external.  No matter 
what the intentions or strategies of an organisation nothing can be achieved without an 
adequate level of support, both passive and active. 
 
8b.6 Split Summary 
The 1986 split was the micro-process which effectively began the politicisation of the 
Provisional Republican Movement.  However, it is necessary to emphasise that the 
origins of this divide lie within the process of the 1969/70 split.  This longevity of the 
process supports 
 
HO3. The roots of the splits will be in previously long standing cleavages. 
 
HO3.  While the actors from the politicising side of 1969/70 divide had left to form the 
Officials many of those old-guard traditionalists opposing them stayed and played the 
same role in the 1986 split.  The Republican cleavage of the abstentionists and non-
abstentionists continues throughout the movement from its inception up to the present 
day.  Therefore for a cleavage to be long-standing the actors do not necessarily have to be 
the same, but the reasoning for cleavage needs to remain constant.   
 
Without the rejection of the abstentionist policy to Dail Eireann the gradual movement 
towards the full acceptance of peaceful politics would not have been possible.  The 
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contrasts between the attempted politicisation by the Goulding leadership and the 1986 
success of the Adams/McGuinness leadership have been portrayed throughout the 
analysis.  The Adams/McGuinness leadership changed policy one step at a time as 
opposed to the Goulding leadership who tried to change too much too soon.529  The 
contrasting affects of the two tactics are borne out in the resultant strengths of the parent 
and breakaway groups in both instances.  The method employed by the 1986 Provisionals 
successfully maintained the vast majority of the membership and were therefore able to 
continue with their politicisation process in the years after.  This is in stark contrast to the 
dramatic split of 1969/70 which resulted in violent feuds and a significantly depleted 
Official IRA.  It is posited that the Adams/McGuinness leadership of the years preceding 
1986 had learned from the mistakes and experiences of the Goulding leadership of the 
1960s.530  The modern leadership did not attempt multiple political and armed strategy 
changes in unison.  Their strategy was to maintain a strong armed campaign throughout 
their gradual politicisation of the movement.  This therefore assuaged a number of 
potential dissidents who saw the armed campaign as central to the purpose of the 
movement.  This incremental change was only viewed as threatening to organisational 
identity by a small portion of the membership.  This therefore weakened the dissident 
grouping numerically, and the pre-split preparation weakened their potential resources.  
The concept that the 1986 leadership had learned from the mistakes is acknowledged by 
twelve participants in total, seven of which are members or supporters of RSF/CIRA.  
This is portrayed in table 8b.15 
 
Group Leadership Membership Supporter Total 
Provisional 3 1 0 4 
RSF/CIRA 4 1 2 7 
External Observer  1 (Official) 0 0 1 
Table 8b.15:  Lessons learned 
 
As Table 8b.15 illustrates this is a theme deemed significant by seven of the eight 
participants who were either members or supporters of Republican Sinn Fein and/or the 
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Continuity IRA.  For those members this perception of the Adams/McGuinness 
leadership learning from the mistakes of Goulding’s tenure is portrayed in a negative 
manner.  The regarded it as a cynical and calculated political move to deceive members 
and supporters of their true intentions for the organisation. The belief of these participants 
is that it was always the intention of the Adams/McGuinness leadership to fully politicise 
to movement and therefore the maintenance of the armed strategy at this stage was purely 
to maintain a strong internal support base in their gradual politicising process.  A similar 
assessment is given to their alteration of the abstentionist policy solely to Dail Eireann.        
 
“Number one the Provos had learned from the mistakes the Stickies had made and 
they didn’t put forward the three parliaments they put forward the one, number two 
they insisted that they were keeping the war going, and that was regarded by many 
people… as the engine of the whole thing.”531 
 
For those four Provisionals who accepted that lessons had been learned from the process 
of the 1969/70 split while they did acknowledge the importance of gradualism their 
emphasis was on the value of engaging with the Republican base.  One of the most 
significant themes within the micro-process of 1969/70 was the disconnect between the 
intentions of the leadership and the expectations of the base.  This is deemed to be one of 
the most significant factors contributing to the result of the 1969/70 split.  Similarly it 
was the 1986 leadership’s ability to connect with and engage the expectations of their 
membership which significantly contributed to their success.  This engagement with the 
base at times required significant convincing and negotiating on the part of the 
leadership.  It was necessary for them to first convince their membership of the necessity 
for, and the benefits of, proposed change.  It is only when they had convinced the 
majority that they actively attempted to implement the proposals. 
 
Without the gradualism of change and the engagement with the base it is likely that the 
result of the split would have been a much more even divide numerically.  However, it is 
essential to similarly acknowledge the context in which both splits took place.  In 
                                                 
531
  Ruairi O’Bradaigh 
 225 
1969/70 the Goulding leadership was at a significantly weak point with respect to internal 
and external support.  It was perceived that they had failed the northern republican and 
nationalist communities by not supplying adequate defence for them.  During this time 
the expectations of both the membership and the public was that the Republican 
Movement was there to take significant armed action in the defence and protection of the 
Republican communities.  Therefore the leadership’s push to change the political policies 
of the organisation was met with contempt by a large proportion of the membership and 
community.  This is in contrast with the situation in the lead up to 1986.  In the aftermath 
of the electoral success of Bobby Sands and others there was a belief within the 
movement that Sinn Fein could potentially make significant electoral advances.  
Therefore the context of the early to mid-1980s provided opportunity to successfully 
implement political reform with the movement.  This reform, and the emphasis on 
gradualism, continued right through to present day Republicanism.  
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Chapter 8 (c) 
1997: The Steps Into Peace 
 
8c.1 Introduction 
The 1997 split in the Provisional Republican Movement is the final micro-process in the 
macro-process of republican involvement in the ‘Troubles.’  This process resulted in a 
split in the Provisional IRA bringing about the formation of the Real IRA and a split in 
Sinn Fein which culminated in the formation of the breakaway group the 32 County 
Sovereignty Committee.532  These two groups publicly deny an official connection to 
each other.  However, it is widely recognised that the 32CSM is the political affiliate of 
the Real IRA.  This was supported in the interview with ‘Conor’ who was a leading 
founding member of the Real IRA.533 
 
“Representatives from the Army who wanted to split met with the political people 
(32County Sovereignty Committee) to decide how best to frame the split.”534 
 
As has been previously detailed 1997 was not a major split in Republicanism.  Only a 
small minority of individuals left either the IRA or Sinn Fein.  The majority of these left 
from the PIRA Army Executive,535 with very few political members exiting.  The ability 
of the Provisional leadership to maintain the support of the majority of the membership 
and fend off a major split allowed for the continued success of the peace process.  They 
successfully maintained the support of those within the middle-ground of Republicanism.  
These were neither politicisers nor pure advocates of a continued armed campaign.  
Therefore by convincing the majority of them the leadership maintained their power 
within Republicanism. 
 
                                                 
532
 Now 32-County Sovereignty Movement. 
533
 See also Clarke, L., Sheehan, M., McManus, J. and Ryder, C. (August 23rd, 1998).  Out of Darkness.  In 
The Sunday Times. 
534
  ‘Conor’ 
535
 This is resonant of the split in the PIRA in 1986 where the founding members of the CIRA were 
predominantly from the Army Executive. 
 227 
This is a net result of the gradualism of change applied by the Adams/McGuinness 
leadership throughout the process.  They eased the membership into the transition.536  As 
in the previous splits this was accomplished by gaining the support of influential 
individuals across the movement. The process in the lead-up to 1997 should be regarded 
as the continued politicisation of the Irish Republican Movement culminating in the 
signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998.537  The split had the positive aspect, from 
the viewpoint of the politicisers, of removing the internal detractors from the 
movement.538   This allowed the process to continue to the present day with the 
acceptance of Sinn Fein to take seats in Stormont, the signing of the St. Andrews 
Agreement, the republican acceptance of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) 
and the successful power-sharing of Sinn Fein and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 
in the devolved Northern Irish Assembly.  While Northern Irish politics and maintenance 
of peace continues to be a difficult and highly sensitive process with stumbling blocks 
along the way the progress made on all sides since 1997 has made Northern Ireland a 
much safer and developing country. 
 
It is the belief of the author that the lead-up to the 1997 split in the Provisionals should, 
like the other three splits, be regarded as a micro-process within the macro-process of 
Republican involvement in the Troubles.  However, due to a number of interview based 
difficulties it cannot be presented as such in the present sub-chapter.  As was detailed in 
the Chapter 4 there were significant difficulties in gaining interviews with members of 
either the Real IRA or the 32 County Sovereignty Movement.  In total three members 
were interviewed, one member of the Real IRA and two from the 32CSM.  The two 32 
CSM members were unwilling to discuss the split in the PIRA and therefore there was in 
total one participant able to give the Real IRA side of the process.  Equally only one of 
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the 32CSM members, Francie Mackey, was actually involved in the split in the political 
movement.  ‘Una’ did not join the 32CSC until 1998, a year after the actual split, 
therefore she stated that she was unable to speak with any significant authority about why 
and how the split took place.  However, the micro-process of the 1997 split is not only 
notable for the exit of the Real IRA and 32CSC.  Throughout the process a number of 
individuals left the movement on their own rather than with a group due to their 
disagreement with a specific action, policy or strategy by the Provisionals. As Table 8c.1 
displays four of the participants interviewed became freelance republican dissidents 
during this process.539  They therefore give an alternative perspective to the process than 
either the Provisionals or 32CSC/RIRA. 
 
Group Leadership Ordinary 
Membership 
Supporter Total 
Provisional Republican 
Movement 
8 1 0 9 
32 County Sovereignty 
Committee/ Real IRA 
2 1 0 3 
Freelance Republicans 1 3 0 4 
External 2 (2 
RSF/CIRA) 
3 (2 RSF/CIRA, 1 
IRSM) 
1 
(RSF/CIRA) 
6 
Total 13 (3 
external) 
8 (6 external) 1 (1 external) 22 
Table 8c.1: Participants who discussed the 1997 split. 
 
While there were nine participants who were either ordinary members or leadership 
figures within the Provisionals during this process a number of them were dismissive of 
the 1997 split and were unwilling to talk about the actual split in any great detail.  
However, they were more willing to talk about the general politicisation process within 
the Provisional Movement.  Therefore the present sub-chapter will not be presented as a 
stage-based micro-process.  It is instead presented by first of all detailing a historical 
analysis of the split 1997 split as well as the modern day situation in Northern Ireland.  
This is then followed by the analysis of a number of the dominant themes which 
influenced the outcome of the 1997 split and the continued politicisation of the 
Provisionals between 1986 and 1997.  Four specific themes are focused on in the 
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analysis, two of which are considered major factors in why and how the split took place.  
These two themes have been identified as Change in Strategy and Factionalism.  The 
final two themes have been deemed significant in the result of the split, why the 
Provisionals were significantly stronger in the aftermath of the split.  These themes are 
Preparation for Change and Gradualism.  As with the previous sub-chapters the themes 
are supported with the utilisation of quotes gathered during the interview process. 
 
8c.2 Historical Analysis of 1997 Split 
The aftermath of the 1986 split saw the continued politicisation of the Provisionals.  In 
1987 Sinn Fein published ‘Scenario for Peace’ a document which called for an all-Ireland 
constitutional conference while also replacing the central Republican demand of ‘Brits 
out’ with one of national self determination.540  The following year one of the major 
advances on the road to a peace process took place with the initiation of talks between 
Gerry Adams and John Hume the leader of the constitutional nationalist SDLP.541  While 
there was denial on behalf of the IRA of the possibility of a ceasefire coming from the 
talks, the meetings clearly showed the intent to the Republican leadership to look beyond 
the exclusive use of force.  These talks were to prove important as it revealed to 
republicans and nationalists the possibility of a pan-nationalist front,542 a concept the 
Adams leadership wished to expand on.  Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s there 
were significant advances made within the Provisional IRA and Sinn Fein on the move 
away from an armed campaign.  These advances allowed the leadership to enter into, 
often times secret, negotiations with the British and Irish governments.  While the 
Republican Movement put forward their proposals for the advancement of the peace 
process to the governments in the form of a document developed throughout the process 
of the Hume-Adams talks543 Albert Reynolds and John Major544 in 1993 negotiated a 
separate document called the Downing Street Declaration.545  This declaration was seen 
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as a setback in the Republican Movement as it deviated from Hume-Adams but more 
importantly it saw the Irish government being more willing to negotiate with the British 
government as opposed to the nationalist and Republican communities,546 while also 
being seen to be more favourable to the Unionist communities.  The Army Council 
rejected the Downing St. Declaration.  However, Adams convinced the Council not to 
reveal their rejection immediately and to ‘play for time.’  They therefore called for 
clarification on points within the document, while also touring the island to take 
soundings from their constituencies on their thoughts and aspirations for the 
movement.547  This is a tactic which proved highly beneficial for the Republican 
Movement as the grassroots membership did not feel aggrieved for not being consulted 
on major decisions.  While it has been noted that these years saw the advancement of the 
politicisation of the Republican Movement it must also be observed that parallel to this 
were some of the most vicious attacks ever committed in the name of Irish 
Republicanism.  Included among these was the unprecedented use of what has been 
referred to as the ‘proxy bomb’ in 1990.  This is where Catholic civilians were at 
gunpoint forced to drive explosive laden vehicles to British army checkpoints where they 
would be remotely exploded by members of the Provisional IRA.  So negative was the 
backlash from all communities to the use of such a tactic that the Provisionals ceased its 
use, but maintained other violent tactics.548 
 
In 1994 major inroads were made in the burgeoning peace process.  In February of that 
year Gerry Adams was granted a forty-eight hour visa to the United States by President 
Bill Clinton, a gesture which showed America’s expectation that Adams would be able to 
deliver a move for the Republican Movement away from the armed struggle.  Similarly 
the Irish government removed the broadcasting ban on Sinn Fein members.  These 
actions can be regarded as a show of faith in the possibility of the Sinn Fein leadership 
bringing about a cessation of violence.  From early to mid 1994 the possibility of such a 
ceasefire was being discussed at leadership levels within the Provisional Movement.  The 
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topic was first broached in discussions about the possibility for a short exploratory 
cessation.  While talks had collapsed between Republicans and the British they continued 
between Republicans and the SDLP and the Irish government, and therefore shifted from 
targeting British withdrawal to the establishment of a pan-nationalist front.549  These talks 
developed a blueprint for future Republican strategies and actions.  However, what the 
Republican leadership was telling their membership was different to what they were 
telling the other negotiators.550  While negotiations were often times fraught eventually 
on August 31st 1994 the Army Council of the Provisional IRA announced a four month 
ceasefire, which was later extended.  This announcement was in the acceptance of a 
fourteen point proposal issued by Irish Taoiseach Albert Reynolds.551  This cessation was 
greeted with celebrations across the whole island of Ireland as well as in Great Britain.552   
 
However, while there were celebrations outside of the Republican Movement, throughout 
this period there was growing unease among a number of members of the IRA and Sinn 
Fein that the leadership were moving away from the ultimate aim of the movement, Irish 
unity.  This discontent was at rank and file level but more worryingly for the Army 
Council it was most prominent within the Army Executive, which had largely been 
excluded from the negotiation process to that date.  They felt that little or no progress was 
being made on behalf of Republicans and this was being held back by the British 
government’s refusal to sit down with Sinn Fein officials while also standing firm on the 
need for a significant move by the Republicans on the issue of decommissioning.  Within 
the Executive the discontent was led by the Quartermaster General Michael McKevitt and 
the IRA Director of Engineering Frank McGuinness.  However, these were not the only 
strong voices of discontent as high ranking members, such as Brian Keenan, also voiced 
their disapproval.  In January 1996 the Executive called an extraordinary General Army 
Convention.  It was clear to the Army Council that the intention of the Executive was to 
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bring an end to the ceasefire and end the Adams leadership of the Movement.  In a move 
to prevent this the Army Council met in the same month and called an end to the fifteen 
month ceasefire.  This was dramatically illustrated with a bomb in Canary Wharf in 
London on February 9th 1996.553  
 
When the Convention eventually took place in October 1996 the Adams leadership had 
regained some of the faith of the membership due to a number of ‘successful’ IRA attacks 
on British security targets.  However, they still faced considerable dissent among certain 
members of the Executive and other delegates.  The majority of the motions tabled at the 
convention were critical of the peace process and sought to weaken the power of the 
Army Council to call extended ceasefires and decommission weapons.554  One of the 
most important votes came with the election of the new Army Council by the new 
Executive.  While it initially seemed that the newly elected Executive would be able to 
fill the seven man Council with dissident voices alongside Gerry Adams the last minute 
vote of confidence for the peace process from newly elected Executive member Brian 
Keenan555 and the inability of Frank McGuinness to attend the Convention556 the new 
Council was elected and consisted of a majority of members loyal to the Adams-
McGuinness leadership and therefore the peace process.557  In the aftermath of the 1996 
convention the tense atmosphere continued within the leadership and membership of Sinn 
Fein and the IRA.  In the months following the Convention both Adams and Martin 
McGuinness issued statements about the possibility of another unequivocal ceasefire and 
Sinn Fein entering into talks parallel to beginning the process of decommissioning.558   
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One of the major breakthroughs for the entire peace process came with a change of 
government in Britain.  The Conservative government of John Major was replaced with 
the electorate voting Tony Blair’s Labour Party into power.  One of Blair’s most 
significant cabinet appointments was that of Mo Mowlam to the position of Secretary of 
State for Northern Ireland.  Within weeks of her appointment Mowlam gave the 
Republican Movement the assurance that if they declared a ceasefire that they would be 
admitted to all-party talks.  This removed the obstacle of decommissioning for the 
leadership.  However one of her most impressive achievements at this time was 
simultaneously convincing the Ulster Unionists to participate in these talks.559  In 
response to this in July 1997 the Army Council voted to call another ceasefire.  This 
ceasefire was justified to the Executive on tactical grounds and with the rising electoral 
popularity of the Sinn Fein party and the combined pressure of the British and Irish 
governments the British had set a form date of September 15th for the start of talks which 
would be concluded in May 1998.  However, there was still distrust of the Adams 
leadership from the Executive especially from McKevitt, Frank McGuinness and Brian 
Gillen.  They believed that another ceasefire would only succeed in weakening the IRA.  
The ceasefire was therefore called without the full support of the Executive.560   
 
While the issue of the ceasefire was strengthening the divisions between the Army 
Council and the Executive it was the Mitchell Principles561 which heightened the tension 
to the point of split.  The Executive detailed that signing up to the principles would be 
denouncing the purpose of the IRA and therefore would be unconstitutional.  With 
members of the Sinn Fein negotiating team such as Adams, Martin McGuinness and Pat 
Doherty not only members of the political party but also the Army Council they were 
faced with a dilemma.  With the Council and the Executive in deadlock over whether this 
was unconstitutional or not another General Army Convention was convened to decide 
on the matter.  It was clear that the Army Council had prepared well for the 
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Convention562 and had assured that they were surrounded by supporters of their 
standpoint on the matter of the Mitchell Principles, their leadership and the relationship 
between the Executive and the Council.  However, one of the key factors which swung in 
their favour was the Belfast Commander Brian Gillen changing his affiliation to support 
Adams’ position at the last minute, similar to what Brian Keenan had done the year 
previously.  The entire Convention went in favour of the Adams faction, with support 
being given to them to enter Stormont talks.  The new Executive, while still dissident to 
the Adams leadership was only so by a margin of two votes.  At their first meeting 
however five key members resigned from the Executive led by the Quartermaster General 
Michael McKevitt and the head of the Engineering Department Frank McGuinness.  
Along with them came the majority of the engineering department and all the Southern 
Command’s quartermasters.  They went on to set up a group they titled Oglaigh na 
hEireann, but who are constantly referred to as the Real IRA.  The official reasoning for 
the split was given as the acceptance of the Mitchell Principles.563  The armed group was 
aligned with the political dissidents the 32-County Sovereignty Committee who were led 
by figures such as Francie Mackey and Bernadette Sands-McKevitt, the wife of Michael 
McKevitt and sister of Bobby Sands.  This group formed from dissident members of Sinn 
Fein in December 1997 in opposition to the signing of the Mitchell Principles and in 
support of the right for Irish Republicans to use armed struggle in the pursuit of national 
sovereignty.564  The Sovereignty Committee set itself up as a political pressure group, and 
under the leadership of Mackey and Sands-McKevitt went about drafting a paper to 
present to the United Nations accusing the British of denying Ireland of its right to 
national sovereignty.565 
 
In the aftermath of the split the Real IRA became the most dangerous of all the dissident 
groups.  They wished to set themselves apart from the PIRA. 
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“We urged members that they must kill a British soldier face to face, no sniper, with a 
gun as the Provos hadn’t done that in years and this would prove that they were 
different.”566 
 
On August 15th 1998 they were responsible for one of the worst atrocities throughout the 
whole history of the Northern Irish Troubles.  They detonated a bomb in the Co. Tyrone 
town of Omagh.  This bomb killed twenty nine people in total, as well as two unborn 
babies and injured three hundred and ten others.567  In the years after Omagh although 
they continued their campaign they were decimated with arrests and departures, and it 
proved close to impossible to recruit new members. 
 
“The Omagh bombing stopped the influx of new recruits and support, and made 
people leave who were loyal before.”568 
 
Among the most high profile arrests were those of McKevitt and Liam Campbell the 
Director of Operations and Colm Murphy569 who was arrested for conspiring to cause the 
Omagh bombing.  In October 2002 McKevitt and other imprisoned members of the Real 
IRA issued a statement calling on the organisation to discontinue activity. 
 
In recent years the Real IRA has reorganised and they are now embarking on a new 
campaign of violence.570  However, they have also faced a split of their own with the 
development of a small splinter group in 2006 called Oglaigh na hEireann.571  This split 
is believed to have taken place largely on grounds of competition for leadership.  The 
name Oglaigh na hEireann has proven to be confusing for analysts and policy makers 
alike.  This is a name, meaning Volunteers of Ireland, which has been adopted by every 
group declaring themselves to be the Irish Republican Army but has taken specific 
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prominence in recent times.  This is the name used by the Real IRA in 1997 at the time of 
the split.  However, it has also been used by splinter groups from the Real IRA and 
intermittingly by the Continuity IRA in claiming responsibility for attacks.  Similarly to 
the Real IRA the Continuity IRA are now facing growing factionalism within their own 
ranks.  It is believed that some of the recent attacks credited to the group have been 
undertaken without the consent of their Army Council.  There is growing unrest within 
the movement as some of the younger members believe that the Republican Sinn Fein 
members who dominate the Army Council are holding the movement back and are 
reducing the chances for the organisation to develop their strategies and tactics.572  While 
the presence of these three dangerous splinter groups is worrying what is more worrying 
is the evidence that they are willing to work together on both a political and military 
level.  This dates back as far as the Omagh bombing.573 
 
“It was a relatively new organisation; there may well have been liaisons with other 
Republican groupings in the organising and the carrying out of.”574 
 
On a political level members of these groups, and others, are now working together in 
groups such as the Republican Network for Unity and the New Republican Forum.  One 
of the most prominent modern day political dissident republican groups is Eirigi.575  This 
group was initially established in April 2006 in reaction to the Sinn Fein recognition of 
the Police Service of Northern Ireland.  While Eirigi does not have a military wing a 
number of their members have been implicated with paramilitary groups such as the Real 
IRA, most notably Colin Duffy who has been accused of involvement in the murder of 
two British soldiers at the Massereene barracks in March 2009.  Similarly the Republican 
Network for Unity is a political grouping without a military wing.  However a number of 
their members have been strongly linked by the security services and Sinn Fein to the 
ongoing activities of the Real IRA.  Prominent among these accusations is the allegation 
that Tony Catney, a former Sinn Fein Director of Elections and life sentence prisoner for 
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a sectarian murder, is the leader of the Real IRA in Belfast.  This is a claim which Catney 
regularly denies, however he often prefixes his denial by saying that if he was the Real 
IRA boss for Belfast he would not admit to it.576   
 
While the peace process is internationally acknowledged to have been successful it is 
unmistakable that the Republican threat is still prominent across Ireland and Great 
Britain.577  However, in contrast to the ‘war’ waged by the Provisional IRA these new 
dissident groups are much smaller groupings, with little or no support, utilising different 
tactics and strategies from their Provisional predecessors.  There is a stated specific 
targeting of Catholic members of the PSNI and members of the British Army.  However 
alongside the threat to the security forces the dissidents are now also targeting their 
former comrades in Sinn Fein and across ‘mainstream’ Republicanism.  While these and 
other differences are clear to see it is vital in order to gain an understanding of the groups, 
their origins and membership that one assesses the splits and groups that have come 
before them and the changes they went through.   
 
8c.3 Change in Strategy: Armed and Political to Political 
As the historical analysis of the split illustrates the major change in the Provisional 
Republican Movement in the process of the 1997 split was a change from an armed and 
political strategy to a predominantly political strategy.  As will be described in the 
sections outlining the importance of gradualism and pre-split preparation this 
continuation of the politicisation process was successful for the Provisional leadership 
due to their continuation of only making significant changes one step at a time and 
ensuring that they had significant levels of internal support prior to attempting these 
changes.  However, as with the previous splits the leadership were unable to convince all 
the membership of the importance of the change and a minority deemed this move away 
from the armed strategy as significantly damaging to the organisational identity.  For as 
long as there was a British presence in Ireland the armed strategy was seen by the 
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dissidents as central to the Irish Republican strategy, and therefore any removal of the 
strategy would be deemed as threatening to what they perceived to be the organisational 
identity.  Hence this is supportive of  
 
HO2. The conflict at the centre of a split is, for at least one of the sub-groups, threatening 
to the organisational identity.  
 
This change in strategy was identified by six of the participants as a significant factor in 
the 1997 split as displayed in Table 8c.2 
Group Leadership Ordinary 
Membership 
Supporter Total 
Provisional Republican 
Movement 
4 1 0 5 
32 County Sovereignty 
Committee/ Real IRA 
2 1 0 3 
Freelance Republicans 0 1 0 1 
External 1 (1 
RSF/CIRA) 
0 0 1 
Total 7(1 external) 3 0 10 
Table 8c.2: Change in Strategy from Armed and Political to Armed 
 
For those who moved away from the Provisionals to form the Real IRA in particular the 
rejection of the armed strategy which came with the acceptance of the Mitchell Principles 
proved too significant a change for them to countenance.  While there had been 
cessations throughout Republican history the agreement amounted to a permanent move 
away from any form of armed strategy by the Provisional Republican Movement, and the 
acceptance of a devolved Stormont Assembly.  For a minority of the movement this 
proved to be too significant a change, one which significantly threatened the 
organisational identity.   
 
“It’s when people signed up to the Mitchell principles and went on to sign up to the 
Good Friday Agreement that there had to be a split because they signed up to 
things which were completely the opposite to what Republicanism stands for.”578 
 
                                                 
578
  ‘Una’ 
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There was a view within sections of the Provisional Movement that the PIRA was at its 
strongest point in history, both in manpower and in its arsenal.  For some of those aware 
of the significance of the armed faction’s strength there was a belief that the armed 
campaign should therefore be continued, and possibly intensified.   
 
“The Army were stronger than ever in the lead up to 1997.  If weapons were there, 
prior to split, why couldn’t we use them?”579 
 
However, this was not a view shared by the majority of the movement.  While the PIRA 
was significantly strong in both regards it was not believed that an accentuated armed 
campaign would benefit the pursuit of a united Ireland.  The belief among the leadership 
and their supporters was that the context of the situation had changed and that there were 
no longer any benefits in, or support for, an armed campaign.  Their retrospective 
analysis of the situation outlines that, as with the abstentionists who moved away in 1986, 
the 1997 dissidents had confused a tactic with a principle.580  To the dissidents the armed 
campaign was, for as long as there was a British presence in Ireland, a principle of the 
Movement.  However, for the politicisers this was a tactic that was utilised within a 
specific context to serve the purpose of that time.  In their eyes its employment no longer 
had a purpose.     
 
“I think it is mixing up principles with tactics or strategy.  Whatever you think of 
the armed struggle people went into it because they thought that that was the only 
choice.  An armed struggle, in my opinion, always has to be the last choice, the 
choice that you had no choice but to make.”581   
 
For the dissidents it was not just the ending of the armed campaign, it was everything that 
came with this which provoked their exit.  In their minds this was analogous to the failure 
of the armed strategy and therefore the pointlessness of over thirty-years of what they 
constituted as ‘war.’  They could not be convinced of the acceptance of political 
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participation in a Northern Irish state which they failed to recognise.  In essence they saw 
the politicisation of the movement as a betrayal to what they held as their republican 
principles.  This was the net threat of the proposed changes.  However, for those internal 
advocates of politicisation they regarded the context to have made the need for political 
participation as pertinent and as a strategy from which they could achieve much more 
than through armed action. 
 
“I think politics was relevant, and again we were in a new phase in the developing 
peace process.  The view that politics equalled betrayal was still strong among 
some of those people, and we couldn’t bring them around to the various challenges 
that the peace process threw up.  They saw that as moving away from the 
fundamentals of Republicanism.  They never really proved the case they just…  I 
suppose the Mitchell Principles gave them a bit of a challenge and that is where 
they made their stand.  But again they weren’t a major… The vast, vast majority of 
the movement stayed together.”582 
 
With this change in strategy came internal factionalism and conflict.  This mainly took 
place within the PIRA. 
 
8c.4 Factionalism 
As the previous section suggests the main factionalism within the movement during this 
split was between those who were committed to the politicisation of Republicanism and 
those who wished to retain the armed campaign.  This is illustrated in Table 8c.3 
Group Leadership Ordinary 
Membership 
Supporter Total 
Provisional Republican 
Movement 
1 0 0 1 
32 County Sovereignty 
Committee/ Real IRA 
2 1 0 3 
Freelance Republicans 0 3 0 3 
External 0 0 0 0 
Total 3 4 0 7 
Table 8c.3: Factionalism: Armed/Political 
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As has been stated earlier the focus of the intra-organisational conflict was within the 
PIRA leadership.  Similar to both the 1986 and 1969/70 splits some have looked to define 
it as a divide between northern and southern republicans,583 an opinion put forward by six 
of the participants, as displayed in Table 8c.4. 
 
Group Leadership Ordinary 
Membership 
Supporter Total 
Provisional Republican 
Movement 
2 0 0 2 
32 County Sovereignty 
Committee/ Real IRA 
2 0 0 2 
Freelance Republicans 0 2 0 6 
External 0 0 0 0 
Total 4 2 0 6 
Table 8c.4: Factionalism: North/South Divide 
 
This north/south divide is portrayed very differently by those who left to form the 
dissident groupings and their former allies who stayed within ‘mainstream’ 
Republicanism.  This points to the power of local influences and regionalism even among 
those at leadership levels and therefore would seem to counter. 
 
HI1: The explanation of allegiance for a member of experienced membership and 
leadership will be intrinsically tied to the reasoning for the organisational split. 
 
And suggests an extension to  
 
HI2. The explanation of allegiance for a member with a low level of experience will be 
predominantly tied to local influences and situations. 
 
so as to include leadership members. 
 
                                                 
583
 While the majority of those who moved away to form 32CSC and the RIRA were from the Republic of 
Ireland the majority of southern republicans stayed with the Provisionals after the split.  Similarly not all 
northern republicans stayed with the Provisionals and some left to join 32CSC or the RIRA. 
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For the dissidents the regional divide both during and after the process of split was as a 
result of the northern leadership’s failure to focus any significant attention on either the 
role of the southern membership or the potential for progress within the twenty-six 
counties.  This led to a sense of alienation among the southern leadership and 
membership. 
 
“I think that it [the north/south divide] is very true in the Provisional Movement 
following 86.  The northern leadership alienated the south, there is no doubt.  It is 
only in later years that they moved with their southern project.  But prior to the 
more recent electoral successes in the south following 98, prior to that there was 
no great push in the South for electoral politics.”584 
 
However, within the Provisional leadership the view of and explanation for the 
north/south divide comes from a different standpoint.  For them the reasoning is not due 
to an abandonment of southern republicanism, in their eyes it is best explained by their 
distance from the epicentre of the struggle.  For those living in Northern Ireland they had 
to experience the daily effects of a maintained armed campaign and were critically aware 
of the lack of support within the Republican communities or across the wider nationalist 
population for a sustained campaign.  There was an awareness of the need, and potential, 
for an alternative strategy.  In their eyes the southern members still advocating an armed 
campaign were able to distance their lives from the daily consequences of an extended 
armed campaign. 
 
“It was interesting that the shaving off in almost all these incidences was southern 
based, not entirely, but mostly…People who are affected you will find have a more 
practical application of their beliefs than people who are sometimes just a couple 
of hundred yards away, sometimes people who are further away from the 
epicentre.”585   
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Looking beyond the northern/southern divide within the split the core reasoning for the 
schism, as illustrated earlier, was the debate over the purpose and necessity of a 
continued armed campaign.  For those departing the Provisionals to continue to 
administer and support the continuation of an armed strategy they framed their 
justification as lying in the fact that a united Ireland had not yet been achieved.  Therefore 
they portrayed themselves as ‘morally’ committed to the continuation of the struggle until 
a stage when this ultimate objective had been achieved.  It was only then that they would 
justify calling for a discontinuation of the violent campaign.  
 
“We didn’t pick up guns for this agreement.  Morally we couldn’t stop as we 
hadn’t gotten what we start out to get.”586 
 
This is supportive of  
 
HO2. The conflict at the centre of a split is, for at least one of the sub-groups, threatening 
to the organisational identity.  
 
HO2.  As was detailed in the previous section they deemed this to be significantly 
threatening to the organisational identity of the movement.  However, in contrast those 
advocating the change regarded the need for an armed campaign to be over and the 
context of the situation of the time was providing the need for a different approach to 
Irish Republicanism. 
 
“It’s just he [McKevitt] wouldn’t wake up and smell the coffee that the reality is 
the war was over.”587 
 
This divergence of positions ultimately caused the split within the movement.  However, 
it did not solely explain the result of the division. 
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8c.5 Gradualism: One Step at a Time  
Throughout the process of the 1986 split one of the most dominant themes which 
explained the reasoning for Provisional dominance in the aftermath of the divide was the 
gradual nature in which changes were made or proposed.  This strategy allowed members 
and supporters to become accustomed to the implications of each individual change prior 
to the introduction of the next.  While this inevitably prolonged the armed campaign it 
similarly weakened the position of potential dissident groupings.  As was demonstrated 
with the 1969/70 split when there are a number of potentially divisive changes made or 
proposed within a short space of time the position of the dissident grouping is 
strengthened.   When there is only one change made at a time this isolates the potential 
dissidents who will view this as threatening to the organisational identity of the 
movement.  Due to the positioning of the 1997 split at the end of the macro-process of 
republican involvement in the Troubles one must not only consider the changes being 
made within the movement at the time of and in the immediate lead-up to the split.  The 
1997 split must be seen as a continuation of the macro process of Provisional 
republicanism and is therefore a continuation of the process began with the 1969/70 split.  
Therefore the politicisation of the movement in the lead-up to 1997 was a continuation of 
the politicisation process which was identified in the last sub-chapter as having started in 
1975.  Therefore the gradualism of the 1997 process is a continuation of the gradualism 
which was introduced in the process of the 1986 split. 
 
As with 1986 the changes implemented by the Provisional leadership in the lead-up to 
1997 were potentially divisive within the movement and therefore in order to maintain 
organisational survival, unity and the survival of their politicisation process they needed 
to ensure that the implementation of the internal disruption caused by the changes was 
minimal.  Therefore there was the continuation of the application of gradualism which 
had been largely successful in maintaining organisational unity in the lead-up to 1986.  
This is a viewpoint accepted by both the Provisionals and the 32CSC/RIRA as is 
displayed in Table 8c.5. 
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Group Leadership Ordinary 
Membership 
Supporter Total 
Provisional Republican 
Movement 
3 1 0 4 
32 County Sovereignty 
Committee/ Real IRA 
2 1 0 3 
Freelance Republicans 1 3 0 4 
External 1 (1 RSF) 0 0 1 
Total 7 (1 
External) 
5 0 12 
Table 8c.5: Gradualism: One Step at a Time 
 
For the dissidents they looked upon this strategy of gradual change as reflective of the 
‘dishonesty’ of the Adams/McGuinness leadership.  By changing policies and strategy in 
this gradual manner they were, in the eyes of the dissidents, betraying the trust of their 
membership and support network.  The view portrayed by the dissenting voices was that 
the leadership were never fully honest with their members about the direction in which 
they were taking Provisional republicanism.  However, even though they were critical of 
the use of this strategy of gradualism in implementing desired changes they were 
similarly complimentary of the effectiveness of the strategy, even if they did not agree 
with the overall strategy of change implemented.  
 
“It was broken down to single issue and that was the only issue being dealt with, as 
if all of the issues weren’t co-related.  That allowed the leadership the breathing 
space throughout the whole period to go that one step closer.”588 
  
As the above quote from Mackey suggests the application of gradualism was necessary 
for the maintenance of organisational survival and cohesion as well as the successful 
continuation of the politicisation process.  This is a view supported by the Provisional 
leadership who acknowledge that this gradual nature change was a necessity in order to 
achieve the successful politicisation of the majority of the movement.  
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“It’s a protracted thing.  If you look at the situation where in 91 or 92 or whatever 
it became public that the SDLP and Sinn Fein were in discussions and had been in 
discussions with the Dublin government, channels had been opened up with the 
British and all this stuff led in turn to the first cessation and then to the breakdown 
of that cessation nearly eighteen months later and then to a new cessation in 97 
and then to the Good Friday Agreement in 98 and all that has flowed after the 
Good Friday Agreement.  It’s all, none of it has been done (clicks fingers twice to 
indicate quick succession of changes) it’s always we’re looking for clarification.  
Obviously we did want that, but there would be other times we did want 
clarification obviously so that we could have fuller discussion in republicanism to 
inform people and to try and bring people with you.  There is not much point 
having an organisation if it fractures and if you’re not able to try and hold it as a 
coherent working group.”589 
 
The final sentence within the above quote emphasises the core point at the heart of the 
gradualism.  When an organisational leadership sees the necessity to implement a battery 
of significant changes to the direction taken by the group they will only be successful if 
and when they are able to convince the majority of their membership and support of the 
benefits and necessity of these changes.  While it is possible that they may have wished to 
implement all of the changes which took place over the twenty-three year period from the 
beginning of the politicisation in 1975 to the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 
1998 it was feasible to convince the majority of the membership of the necessity of all of 
the changes.  Similarly the context of the situation did not always permit or suggest the 
realistic potential of these changes.  Therefore the changes had to be implemented in a 
gradual manner, one step at a time, in order for the organisation could successfully reach 
a point where the majority of the republican membership were able to reach a point of 
acceptance of a series of significant changes which enabled Sinn Fein to successfully 
engage in the peaceful of modern day Northern Ireland where they share the office of 
First Minister and Deputy First Minister with the Democratic Unionist Party.  Each of the 
changes successfully implemented by the movement from the mid 1970s right up to today 
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have been part of a process of the politicisation of modern day Republicanism.  This 
dissertation posits that the historical changes within Sinn Fein policy could not have been 
possible without a number of the changes which preceded them both in policy and 
organisational structure.  The mistakes of the Goulding leadership in trying too much too 
soon were the lessons learned by the Adams/McGuinness leadership in implementing a 
strategy of gradual change. 
 
“There could have been much more disaffection, not necessarily splits, but I think 
people at each stage became accustomed to what had just happened and then were 
much more prepared and ready to adopt the next stage.  You know if you had said 
walking around the place in the yard August 1994 “we’re going to be supporting 
the amendment of Articles 2 and 3,590 ending the Northern abstentionism, 
supporting a new police service, the IRA is going to first of all open its dumps, its 
precious dumps, you know these weapons that had been painstakingly smuggled 
into the country, open its dumps, then seal its dumps forever, and that Martin 
McGuinness was going to end up in government with Ian Paisley”.  I mean that 
was so fantastic, and fabulous, if you had said that to me in July 1994 I would have 
been sending for the men in white coats.  But as things progressed you could see 
that each decision you took had a repercussion or a ramification and I don’t think 
that anybody from either side, I don’t think Paisley for example back in July 1994 
thought that “in ten years time I’ll be in government with the former Chief of Staff 
of the IRA”, because that would have been again too much for him.  I think that 
once people had it in their hearts that they were going to make peace and they 
were going to stabilise it and it was the best deal that we could get, even though 
you cannot do justice to the dead or the sacrifices of the dead, but this is the best 
shape you can make of it, and you have to go and do it, you have to go in in good 
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faith, even if it means doing unpalatable things, if it means sitting down with 
former enemies, you know.”591 
 
This theme of gradualism is further support for  
 
HO4. The sub-group most willing to make compromises is the one most likely to be 
successful in the aftermath of a split. 
 
HO4.  Hirschman592 states that the sub-group within a political organisation most flexible 
in their policy and strategic positioning are more likely to gain more supporters than 
those who are fundamentally fixed to their position and unwilling to compromise in any 
way.  As was displayed in the process of the 1986 split this proved to be detrimental to 
Republican Sinn Fein and the Continuity IRA with respect to the politicisation of the 
movement.  Due to their insistence on the provision of both the armed campaign and the 
abstentionist policies they were unable to successfully compete for membership and 
support with the politicising leadership who were maintaining the armed campaign while 
only changing the abstentionist policy to Dail Eireann.  This maintenance of the armed 
campaign while also preserving the abstentionist policies to Stormont and Westminster 
drew their policies closer to the developing sub-group of Republican Sinn Fein and the 
Continuity IRA.  They therefore were able to recruit the majority of the membership to 
their position and thus attract a number of potential dissidents to ‘mainstream’ 
Republicanism.  This was a strategy which continued throughout the peace process.  It 
was only when the leadership had established a base of membership and support that they 
moved on to implement the next significant change.  Therefore their position was 
gradually moving along the scale from armed to political and in the process they were 
maintaining the majority of internal support and thus isolating the dissidents who could 
not gain any significant strength as they were in the minority at each stage of the process 
of change. 
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8c.6 Preparation for Change: Support 
While the success of the politicisation of the movement is largely down to the gradual 
nature of the changes implemented this does not fully explain the situation.  Many of the 
changes implemented throughout the process of the 1997 split were potentially divisive in 
nature.  Therefore as with the changes implemented in the 1986 process there needed to 
be significant preparation made by the leadership prior to implementing the amendments.  
This required the assurance of sufficient support for the changes and as a continuation of 
the 1986 process this was carried out through the application of internal dialogue with the 
membership.  The importance of support had to be viewed as both an immediate aim as 
well as a longitudinal target.  In essence the leadership needed to be sure that they could 
have specific votes passed without significant levels of divisiveness manifesting in the 
long-term as a result.  The importance of this preparation for change and internal support 
was seen by the participants among the most decisive factors in the successful 
implementation of change in the movement, and significant within this was the respect 
for timing of change.  In order to successfully implement potentially divisive changes the 
context and timing needed to compliment the need for change.  It was most receptive to 
change when the leadership proposing it was in an internally strengthened position and 
therefore had the support for their own personal leadership and not just for the changes 
they were proposing.  A strengthened position for them enhanced the trust the 
membership had in them.  Therefore as with the 1986 process they implemented the 
strategy of, where possible, distancing themselves from introducing divisive issues until 
the point where they were confidant of internal support for both them and the change.  
The importance of these themes within the 1997 micro-process is illustrated in the tables 
below. 
Group Leadership Ordinary 
Membership 
Supporter Total 
Provisional Republican 
Movement 
4 1 0 5 
32 County Sovereignty 
Committee/ Real IRA 
2 0 0 2 
Freelance Republicans 1 3 0 4 
External 0 0 0 0 
Total 7 4 0 11 
Table 8c.6: Preparation for Change 
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Group Leadership Ordinary 
Membership 
Supporter Total 
Provisional Republican 
Movement 
5 0 0 5 
32 County Sovereignty 
Committee/ Real IRA 
2 1 0 3 
Freelance Republicans 0 3 0 3 
External 2 (2 
RSF/CIRA) 
3 (1 RSF/CIRA, 1 
IRSM) 
0 5 
Total 9 (2 external) 7 (3 external) 0 16 
Table 8c.7: The Importance of Internal Support 
 
Group Leadership Ordinary 
Membership 
Supporter Total 
Provisional Republican 
Movement 
4 0 0 4 
32 County Sovereignty 
Committee/ Real IRA 
1 0 0 1 
Freelance Republicans 0 1 0 1 
External 0 0 0 0 
Total 5 1 0 6 
Table 8c.8: The Importance of Timing 
 
Group Leadership Ordinary 
Membership 
Supporter Total 
Provisional Republican 
Movement 
0 0 0 0 
32 County Sovereignty 
Committee/ Real IRA 
2 1 0 3 
Freelance Republicans 0 2 0 2 
External 0 0 0 0 
Total 2 3 0 5 
Table 8c.9: The Application of Leadership Distancing. 
 
The leadership’s preparation for change does not just refer to the immediate lead-up to 
the ultimately divisive Army Convention of 1997 this preparation includes all the major 
changes implemented from 1986 onwards.  One specific example six of the participants, 
including all three of the 32CSC/RIRA members, was the preparation which preceded the 
August 1994 ceasefire.  In order to ensure organisational support for the cessation the 
leadership had been preparing all levels of membership and support for this possibility for 
a significant period prior to the actual declaration.  This was highlighted both in the 
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external Republican community and within the Republican prison communities.  The 
leadership met with their communities to discuss the potential for a cessation and to 
gauge the levels of support of resistance within these communities to the proposals, and 
the entire politicisation process.  They were also preparing members for what they could 
realistically expect from the process and how this would benefit the entire process 
seeking to achieve their ultimate and immediate goals. 
 
“That’s what was good about coming up to the ceasefire I think Adams and the 
people went out into all the Sinn Fein Cumanns.  And in the prison [Martin] 
McGuinness and Gerry Kelly was almost in there every other week, the British 
allowed them to come in.  Everybody went into the canteen, McGuinness was there 
asking questions and taking questions preparing everybody for ‘you know the 
reality is we’re going to enter negotiations, we might not get a united Ireland.  Be 
realistic look at the bigger picture.’”593 
 
It was this persistent preparation and engagement with all levels of membership which 
allowed the leadership to gauge the sentiment within the movement and as a result they 
were aware when the timing for change, in this case a cessation of IRA violence, was 
right.  This preparation prior to each change, not just the 1994 ceasefire, allowed for them 
to gauge the levels of support and the potential for splits within the movement.  Therefore 
they were able to pursue their desired course at the most opportune time when their 
leadership was not being challenged and also when the opposition to the proposed change 
was at its weakest point.  Therefore the more control the leadership had over the context 
in which the changes were implemented the more potential they had for success.  
However, as the violence in the summer of 1969 showed, the leadership does not always 
have control of the external context in which the change is being made.  Therefore the 
most opportune time for change, in order to maintain organisational survival, is when 
external events have as minimal impact on the internal changes as possible. 
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As was detailed in Chapter 7, which introduced the analysis chapters, the modern day 
Provisional leadership do not regard 1997 as a split in the Movement.  They see it more 
as a split which was fended off by their internal dialogue in the lead-up to the potentially 
divisive moments. 
 
“So I think that it took considerable skill, dialogue and debate and management to 
insure that what happened then didn’t turn out to be a re-split, which is what the 
Real IRA people and the 32 County Sovereignty Movement were trying to bring 
about.  So it was fended off then.”594     
 
This is not a completely accurate depiction of the situation as a split was not fended off.  
But the dialogue and debate and preparation for change did result in a weakened dissident 
grouping.  With respect to the two divisive Army Conventions, 1996 and 1997, the pre-
change preparations were carried out through both ‘above board’ recruitment of 
influential individuals to support their position and what the Provisionals in the aftermath 
of 1969/70 referred to as ‘internal methods.’  This support was gained through the 
dialogue as detailed above. 
  
Similar to 1986 it was essential for the leadership to have the support of influential 
individuals both locally and nationally to successfully to maintain the backing of the 
majority of the movement.  These individuals and groupings within the movement 
provided legitimacy to the position being taken by the leadership.  These influential 
individuals from within the Republican Movement and across Republican history were 
convinced to lend their support to the proposed actions of the leadership at times of 
potential conflict.  As was stated in the historical examination of the split Brian 
Keenan,595 a well respected senior IRA activist and strategist, moved from being a 
disapproving voice within towards the peace process to one of the most effective 
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have to be Pragmatic-Wish Lists are for Christmas.  In An Phoblacht, pp.10-11 
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proponents of change during the 1990s.  His move from dissenter to supporter provided 
invaluable legitimacy to the leadership’s position and proposals.   
 
“At key stages in all of this key people in local areas and at a regional area were 
wheeled out to say that this was 100% sound.  If a key person known in the locality 
to be in the IRA, if that person says that something was right well then it was taken 
as right and that they must have had some reassurances.”596   
 
The above quote provides further support to the leadership’s use of distancing in their 
advocating of change.  The ability of the Sinn Fein leadership to publicly distance 
themselves from the decision making of the IRA leadership gave them extra time in the 
external negotiation process as was detailed by Sean McManus in his previous quote 
where he mentioned the leadership calling for ‘clarifications.’  However, internally within 
the organisation the support and use of key figures such as Keenan allowed them to 
distance themselves from the initial suggestion of troublesome proposals such as 
decommissioning or the dropping of abstentionism to Stormont.  It was similarly 
important for them to acquire the support not only of influential individuals but also 
influential regional divisions of the movement.  Throughout the Troubles the central area 
of the Provisional IRA was always Belfast.  This is where some of the most active units 
were based and where a significant number of prominent leaders were stationed.  In 
September 1969 the significance of the Belfast IRA denouncing of the Goulding 
leadership is seen by many as one of the most significant moments in the beginning of the 
Provisional IRA. 
 
“That was the beginning of the split; that is where it happened first.  In Belfast the 
IRA split and they set up the Provisional IRA.”597 
 
                                                 
596
  Francie Mackey 
597
  Thomas MacGiolla. 
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Similarly when the politicising sub-group of the Provisional leadership acquired the 
support of the Belfast IRA it was clear to the dissidents that a dissident majority was 
impossible and that they would have to leave the movement rather than take it over. 
 
“Once the Adams faction had the Belfast members on their side we knew that they 
couldn’t take a majority.”598 
 
As was suggested earlier in the section this support was not always gained through 
‘legitimate’ means.  For the necessary success of Army Convention votes in particular 
there was the usage of what the Provisionals of the 1969/70 split entitled ‘internal 
methods.’  This was particularly enforced in the Army Convention of 1996.  This is a 
point referred to by six participants, although none of them were affiliated to the 
Provisionals in the aftermath of the split, as is illustrated in Table 8c.9.599 
 
Group Leadership Ordinary 
Membership 
Supporter Total 
Provisional Republican 
Movement 
0 0 0 0 
32 County Sovereignty 
Committee/ Real IRA 
2 1 0 3 
Freelance Republicans 0 3 0 3 
External 0 0 0 0 
Total 2 4 0 6 
Table 8c.10: Usage of ‘internal methods’ in 1996 Army Convention. 
 
As was outlined in the historical analysis in the introduction to this chapter the 1996 
convention was potentially extremely damaging for the Adams leadership.  In light of this 
they are reported to have organised for influential dissidents such as Frank McGuinness 
and others not to be picked up for the Convention so as to ensure that the vote to support 
and re-elect them was passed.  This was to ensure the immediate survival of the 
movement and their leadership.  But it was coupled with the maintenance, and regaining, 
of support throughout the movement so as to ensure the longitudinal survival of the 
leadership. 
                                                 
598
  ‘Conor’ 
599
 It would not be expected that the Provisionals would admit to this. 
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“That is actually the Army Convention where people were not brought.  They were 
left on the sides of roads and stuff, so that Adams could get the vote.  He had that 
all planned well in advance.”600  
 
This is an accusation made by each of the dissident groupings at each of the times of 
splits, it is also an accusation which precedes the 1969 birth of the Troubles.  However, 
the ability of a leadership to survive one vote through such means does not guarantee the 
survival of their process.  They additionally require the longitudinal support of the 
majority of their membership and base.  This is what the Provisional leadership have 
achieved and this is one of the major reasons for their ability to maintain the politicisation 
of the movement, a macro-process which dates back to the end of the Border Campaign 
and continues to the modern day.  
 
“Clearly you didn’t bring all people with you.  But one of the accomplishments of 
the leadership of both Oglaigh na hEireann and Sinn Fein is that they brought by 
far the majority of their members with them into the process, through the process 
and out the other side of the process.  I don’t think it was humanly possible to 
avoid some of the disaffections.”601  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
600
  Dolours Price 
601
  Mitchell McLaughlin 
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Chapter 9. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
9.1 Introduction 
The initial purpose of this dissertation was to contribute to, and advance, the 
understanding of splits across the fields of social science by focusing on four splits in the 
Irish Republican Movement from 1969 to 1997.  The work was predominantly based 
within the discipline of International Relations, terrorism research specifically.  In spite 
of this the theoretical and methodological foundations span wide across the social 
sciences and is therefore notable for its inter-disciplinarity.  In order to make the 
necessary advances in all aspects of and terrorism research the various disciplines need to 
engage with one another so as to develop the most comprehensive understanding 
possible, as no individual field has all the answers.602  The theoretical understanding of 
splits in the Irish Republican Movement has been advanced here by engaging with the 
existing literature while also assessing the potential contributions to be made by, among 
others, economic theory,603 the analysis of organised religion,604 and the methodologies 
of health psychology.605   
 
There are necessary advances to be made in the study of splits in both organisational and 
terrorism research.  In the general organisational literature the discourse needs to move 
beyond why and how splits take place and focus more on the functionality of the splits 
across different types of organisations.  The present research has strived to advance this 
by utilising the splits as the basis for a stage-based process model to analyse the 
politicisation of Irish Republicanism.  Specifically the research aspired to assess the 
mechanisms by which the Provisional Republican Movement moved from an extended 
terrorist campaign to the acceptance of the value of democratic politics.  The inter-
connectivity of these splits allowed the researcher to assess the split both in a 
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comparative manner, while also assessing the extended process of politicisation across 
the given time-line. 
 
The analysis of splits in terrorist groups is still in its naissance and is stunted by its 
constant inclusion in the ‘end of terrorism’ literature.  It is too blinkered to assess the 
splits purely in this manner.  As the present research has shown the occurrence of an 
organisational split is not analogous to the end of terrorism or the end of the terrorist 
group.  Approaching the topic from this standpoint fails to acknowledge the variety of 
forms of split which have no relationship with the end of terrorism literature and by 
considering it with this notion of finality will invariably fail to appreciate the long-term 
effects which the split may have.  To illustrate this point the 1969/70 split, which was 
central to the present analysis and a split which continues to shape modern day Ireland 
and Northern Ireland, may be either described as a significant stage in the Official IRA’s 
move away from terrorism or most notably the birth of the Provisional IRA.  Similarly 
each of the other three splits analysed saw the establishment of new terrorist groupings. 
Therefore it proves more accurate to describe an organisational split as a mode of terrorist 
group formation, or the end of an organisation as a unified political movement rather than 
as an end of terrorism.606 
 
Within the analysis sub-chapters and appendices the presentation of the results has been 
presented parallel with a discussion of their meaning and relevance.  Therefore while 
there is a further, more focused, discussion of some of the main findings the 
concentration of this concluding chapter is on the assessment of the contribution which 
the research has made and to point the way forward for future studies.  Within this there 
is also a critical analysis of the methodology applied         
 
9.2 Present Study Findings 
Through the previous sub-chapters there was a detailed discussion of the relevance and 
importance of the results with specific reference to the split being analysed.  While there 
was also a continuous comparison and contrast with previous processes throughout the 
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 Oots (1989), p.142.  
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present section brings these findings together and outlines the main findings of the 
research.  This is discussed with reference to the research questions, hypotheses and 
firstly the testing of the proposed models of organisational split and split avoidance. 
 
9.2.1 Testing of Stage-Based Process Models 
At the end of the theoretical chapters there were two stage-based process models 
proposed.  There was one proposed for organisational split 
 
Stage 1: The Origins of Split 
Stage 2: Factional Development 
Stage 3: Inevitability of and Preparation for Split 
Stage 4: Organisational Exit and Breakaway Group Formation 
Stage 5: Aftermath of Split: Competition and Re-Organisation. 
 
The second model proposed hypothesised split-avoidance 
 
Stage 1: The Origins of Conflict 
Stage 2: Factional Development 
Stage 3: Successful Application of Voice 
Stage 4: Organisational Change or Maintenance of Status Quo 
Stage 5: Aftermath of Conflict: Re-Organisation 
 
It was proposed that the third stage of the models was what invariably decided the result 
of the conflict and factionalism. The two models were identical for the first two stages.  
However, with either the preparation for split or the successful application of voice the 
conflict was either resolved or accentuated resulting in split.  These models were 
developed by first considering a number of separate models, stage-based process models 
and otherwise.  These were from across the organisational and terrorism literature.   
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The model of split was tested using the data gathered through the extensive interview 
process on the first three splits.607  Due to the insufficiencies with the data gathered for 
the fourth and final split the researcher was not capable of testing it on this case.  
Similarly due to the insufficiencies of the data the model of split avoidance was unable to 
be tested on and conflict which avoided split.  The three Provisional splits tested were 
considered micro-processes within the macro-process of Provisional involvement in the 
‘Troubles’ and similarly the two Official splits considered two micro-process within their 
involvement in the ‘Troubles.’  
 
9.2.1.1  1969/70 
The case of the 1969/70 split was supportive of the hypothesised model of split as the 
analysis of the interview data, and separate validating sources, indicated that this split 
went through each of the five proposed stages.  Within this specific process the vital third 
stage was marked by the pre-split preparation of the Provisionals and the continued 
disconnect between the Goulding leadership and the expectations of the Republican 
membership and public.  This process resulted in the split of the movement in 1969/70, a 
split which was accentuated by the Northern violence of August 1969 and the perceived 
failure of the IRA to defend the nationalist communities.  The evenness of this divide 
invariably resulted in a change of focus in both groups from the purposive goal of gaining 
a unified Ireland to damaging their former allies in the violent feuds between the Officials 
and Provisionals.  The dominant theme throughout this split was that of ‘too much too 
soon’ in reference to the excessive changes the Goulding leadership tried to bring about.  
These ranged from left-wing political strategy to the dropping of the abstentionist 
policies.  Within this split the Goulding leadership tolerated voice for too long in the third 
stage rather than resisting it and thus strengthened the position of the dissidents.608  
However, they learned their lesson for the 1974 split. 
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608
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9.2.1.2  1974 
The split of 1974 did not fit the proposed model.  The proposed third stage was bypassed 
by the expulsion of Seamus Costello and colleagues by the Official leadership.  This 
resulted in the process not being a five-stage model but a four-stage model due to the 
forced exit of those who formed the IRSM.  While the 1969/70 split could be marked as a 
standard organisational split the case of 1974 is an example of forced split.  While it was 
a forced split there was preceding factionalism notable for Seamus Costello’s pursuit of 
power and the Official leadership’s imposition of the strategy of defence and retaliation.  
Due to the bypassing of the third stage of the process the IRSM were never able to 
properly prepare for either split or organisational change.  Resultantly they had neither a 
sufficient organisational structure nor leadership succession plan in place to adequately 
survive the resultant violent feuds or make a significant extended political impact.   
 
9.2.1.3  1986 
The 1986 split in the Provisionals resulted in the formation of the Continuity IRA and 
Republican Sinn Fein.  However, it did not fit in the process model for organisational 
split.  It was closer in fit to the model for split avoidance.  The third stage of this split is 
marked by the success of the new-guard in taking over the leadership from the old-guard 
of O’Bradaigh and O’Conail, and simultaneously gradually implementing some of their 
proposed changes. However, in the fourth stage where the avoidance model suggests that 
the conflict should have been resolved a minor split took place with the successful 
dropping of abstentionism to the Dail.  The dissidents were the residual old-guard who 
had not accepted the gradual politicisation of the movement, and therefore moved away 
to form their autonomous organisation.  Even though a split did take place it did not 
support the proposed process model.  This suggests that the proposed model is suitable to 
model relatively even divides.  However, when the divide results in one significantly 
dominant organisation, with the other weak, the split avoidance model is a better fit.  The 
success of the Provisionals during this process is notable in contrast with the Goulding 
leadership of 1969/70 for the implementation of change one step at a time, and therefore 
its isolation of dissidents and consequently the ability of the Provisionals to move on 
from the split and develop their politicisation process.     
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9.2.1.4  1997 
The 1997 split is the final micro-process in the macro-process of Provisional involvement 
in the ‘Troubles.’  It also sees the continuation of the politicisation of Republicanism by 
the Adams/McGuinness leadership.  Due to the insufficient interview data gathered with 
respect to this split the researcher was unable to adequately test the proposed model of 
split.  However, it is posited that similar to the 1986 split this would fit the model of split 
avoidance better as it is sees the success of the leadership in implementing its changes 
through the successful application of voice.  This saw the majority of the Provisional 
Movement moving from an armed and political strategy to a political strategy with the 
acceptance of both the Good Friday Agreement and the Mitchell Principles.  Similar to 
1986 there was a residual group of dissidents who broke off to form their own 
organisation, the Real IRA and 32 County Sovereignty Committee.  The success of the 
leadership in the continuation of the politicisation was determined by the continuation of 
gradualism and preparation for change through their constant consultation with their base.  
This process continues today and allows the Provisional Movement to successfully 
engage in the democratic process of the devolved government of Northern Ireland. 
 
9.2.2 Organisational Perspective 
At the centre of all organisational theory is the immediate goal of organisational survival.  
If a political organisation is to have any chance of achieving the purposive goal of 
achieving a specified public good it is essential that they first maintain organisational 
survival.  This is as true for violent political organisations as it is for peaceful democratic 
political organisations. 609  However, much of the organisational literature has looked at 
organisational survival at the basic level solely of maintenance of a unified membership.  
In reality this is not always beneficial for the progress of the organisation to their desired 
goal.  Therefore it was deemed more accurate to hypothesise. 
 
HO1. The immediate goal for each sub-group at the time of split is organisational 
survival in a form which they respect and recognise. 
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It is the addendum of ‘in a form which they respect and recognise’ to the traditional 
survival hypothesis which more accurately describes the immediate goal of an 
organisation, especially at a time of split.  Each of the splits showed that both sub-groups 
were not aiming for the survival of the organisation just for the sake of survival.  They 
wished that if the organisation was to survive that the basis of the surviving organisation 
would be in a form which they respected and recognised.  It was deemed that there was 
no point in remaining within the organisation if it was not at least deemed to be moving 
in the direction of the group they aspired to.  Therefore if the survival of the organisation 
at a basic level of maintenance of a unified membership is stunting the desired progress 
of the leadership, or a rival sub-group, a split may prove beneficial in this regard as it rids 
the parent or breakaway organisation of the internal detractors deemed to be holding the 
organisation back.610  
 
At the most fundamental level the research was aiming to analyse why and how each of 
the splits took place.  In this regard the analysis of the interview data for each of the 
splits, coupled with the examination of relevant sources, has supported the second 
hypothesis.         
 
HO2. The conflict at the centre of a split is, for at least one of the sub-groups, threatening 
to the organisational identity.  
 
This was found to be the essential element across the four splits.  Throughout their 
existence human organisations, both violent and non-violent, invariably become involved 
in some form of intra-organisational conflict.  However, not every conflict results in split.  
In light of this the present research has found that those conflicts which do result in split 
are deemed to be threatening to the organisational identity by at least one of the 
conflicting sub-groups.611  Across the four splits the threat to the organisational identity 
was focused on the strategy and functions of both the political and armed wings of the 
movement.  In each of the four splits an element of the movement was proposing a 
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strengthening of the political nature of the organisation.  This was a common theme 
throughout.  However, the degrees of proposed politicisation varied, and therefore the 
results of the splits were accordingly different. 
 
It was found that when the leadership tried to implement multiple strategic and 
organisational changes, which could be perceived by others as threatening to 
organisational identity, within a short space of time that they are less likely to be 
successful in retaining the majority of the membership and support than a leadership 
which proposes and implements their desired changes with a greater degree of 
gradualism.  This is most apparent when one compares the split of 1969/70 with those of 
1986 and 1997.  The proposal of the Goulding leadership in the mid to late 1960s to 
politicise the movement by moving the IRA away from any form of armed campaign, 
coupled with the proposed abandonment of the abstentionist policies and the promotion 
of left-wing political ideals succeeded in isolating a large number of members and 
supporters. The internal division was further accentuated by the perceived failure of the 
leadership to adequately defend the Republican communities in the summer of 1969.  The 
scale of these proposed changes and the perception of organisational inaction contrived a 
situation where the position of the dissidents was strengthened.  This is in contrast with 
the split of 1986 where the leadership gradually brought through their politicisation while 
retaining the armed strategy throughout.  This succeeded in appeasing a number of 
potential detractors and resultantly weakened the position of the dissidents.  This 
gradualism allowed the leadership to ease their membership into the organisational 
transition from a terrorist movement into the democratically political organisation they 
are today.  This retention of the core of the membership throughout was vital to the 
success of the politicisation process, and therefore the constant engagement with and 
appreciation of the expectations of the base was essential to the successful 
implementation of change.  This gradualism eventually allowed the leadership to bring 
the majority of their membership away from terrorism and towards peaceful politics.  The 
importance of gradualism in the success of a sub-group suggests that the more focused 
the reasoning for split the less dramatic the divide will be.  This analysis further supports 
the fourth organisational hypothesis. 
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HO4. The sub-group most willing to make compromises is the one most likely to be 
successful in the aftermath of a split. 
 
The compromises made through the gradualism of the 1986 and 1997 processes allowed 
the Adams/McGuinness leadership to retain the core supporters of the politicisation 
process while simultaneously attracting the support of those members whose viewpoint 
was between the two extremes of politicisation and continued non-politicisation.  The 
leadership managed to succeed in this starting their politicisation relatively close to 
position of their dissenters and thus gaining and retaining the support of the majority of 
the membership.612  Therefore the sub-group most willing to compromise weakened the 
‘push’ factors away from them while simultaneously weakening the ‘pull’ factors of their 
rivals.613  Invariably in each of the splits it was the sub-group most ‘tied down’ to their 
strategic and ideological positioning which was the weaker grouping in the aftermath of 
split.  While it is not illustrated in the present research it is proposed that if both sub-
groups are willing to compromise on their position that a split will be avoided 
completely. 
 
This research has shown that it is vital not to look upon organisational splits as single 
events but to view them as processes, often times based on long-standing cleavages.614 
 
HO3. The roots of the splits will be in previously long standing cleavages. 
 
While the actors changed across the process the cleavages within Irish Republicanism 
remained constant.  There has always been a divide between the politicisers and the 
proponents of a strategy based primarily on armed action.  What changed was the degree 
of politicisation and armed involvement, and hence the strength of both groups.  Due to 
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the long-standing nature of these cleavages the application of a stage-based process 
model was crucial in understanding each of the splits as well as the entire macro-process 
of Irish Republican involvement in the ‘Troubles.’  The analysis sub-chapters have shown 
that the inter-connected nature of the four splits deemed it essential to first of all 
understand the earlier splits, and their processes, prior to accepting the full relevance of 
the later divisions.    
 
The process models developed for the first three splits have suggested that the critical 
stage in respect to the outcome of the split comes in the immediate aftermath of Stage 2 
‘factional development.’  It is proposed that the actions taken within this third stage had 
the most significant influence on the outcome of the split, and therefore the make-up of 
the groups in the aftermath of split.  In 1969/70 this third stage was notable for the pre-
split preparation of the Provisionals but most significantly the failure of the Goulding 
leadership to supply weapons or defend the Republican communities.  The combination 
of these two factors building on the factional development from the previous stage 
ultimately weighted the split in favour of the Provisionals.  Within this stage the 
leadership showed a disconnect between their organisational aspirations and their 
membership and support base resultantly weakening their position and strengthening that 
of the Provisionals.  This is in contrast to the third stage of the 1986 process which is 
notable for the relatively smooth transition of power from the old-guard traditionalist 
leadership of Ruairi O’Bradaigh, Daithi O’Conail and others to the new-guard 
politicising membership of Adams and McGuinness.  While the Goulding leadership lost 
their base support in the equivalent stage in 1969/70 Adams, McGuinness and colleagues 
retained and strengthened their internal support within the lead-up to 1986, and 
resultantly isolated and weakened the dissenting voices which in 1986 broke away to 
form Republican Sinn Fein and the Continuity IRA.  For the process of 1974 this third 
stage was bypassed by the Official leadership to force the exit of Seamus Costello and his 
supporters.  This pre-emptive expulsion proved debilitating to the IRSM as they did not 
have the utilisation of a post factional development period to adequately complete their 
preparation for the formation of a new armed and political organisation.  It is proposed 
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that as a result of this that the INLA has almost constantly been involved in feuds ever 
since.             
 
The fifth and final organisational hypothesis stated that 
 
HO5. In the presence of significant inter-organisational conflict the purposive goals of 
the organisation will be substituted with the aspiration of harming the rival organisation. 
 
It was found that significant inter-organisational conflict, and therefore the hypothesised 
substitution of goals, only came in situations of a relatively even organisational divide.  
In the situations where one of the resulting organisations was significantly more 
dominant than their former allies that the stronger organisation were able to prioritise the 
pursuit of their purposive goals while their weaker opponents had to focus on basic level 
organisational survival and did not have the means to significantly challenge or harm 
their rivals.  This is most notable in the aftermath of 1986.  However, when there was a 
more even split the focus of both groups did as hypothesised shift from focusing on their 
purposive goals to that of harming their Republican rivals.  This is best illustrated in the 
aftermath of both 1969/70 and 1974 where the organisations became embroiled in violent 
feuds which for many defined their organisational existence.  This is especially displayed 
in the months and years after 1974 where the INLA was actively recruiting members 
purely for their participation in the feuds against the Officials rather than for the pursuit 
of a thirty-two county socialist Ireland.        
 
9.2.3 Individual Perspective 
In order to gain a more extensive understanding of the micro-process of splits, as well as 
the macro-process of Irish Republican involvement in the ‘Troubles’, it was deemed 
necessary not only to not only understand the organisational reasoning for the splits but to 
additionally analyse the rationale for individual allegiance choice.  While the analysis of 
the organisational processes of splits is the main body of the dissertation the assessment 
of individual allegiance is equally significant.  This aided in determining the reasons for 
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success of one side over the other, and assessed the influence of both organisational and 
non-organisational rationales for allegiance.  It was proposed that 
 
HI1: The explanation of allegiance for a member of experienced membership and 
leadership will be intrinsically tied to the reasoning for the organisational split. 
 
The analysis of the individual interview data failed to support this hypothesis.  The data 
suggested that the outline of those whose allegiance was tied to the reasoning for the split 
was much narrower than first hypothesised.  It showed that only those central to the 
leadership of the conflicting sub-groups rationalised their allegiance pre-dominantly on 
the reasoning for the split.  While others were influenced by the reasoning for split their 
allegiance choice was shared between this and personal and local factors as referred to in 
the second hypothesis   
 
HI2. The explanation of allegiance for a member with a low level of experience will be 
predominantly tied to local influences and situations. 
 
Among the personal and local issues which proved dominant were the themes of 
influential individuals, regionalism, timing, context and age.615 
 
The final individual hypothesis tested in the research was derived from the work of 
Hirschman.616  It hypothesised that. 
 
HI3. A quality conscious member will exit the organisation to join or set up a new 
organisation when there is a perceived drop in the quality of the product produced by the 
parent organisation. 
 
This was supported in each of the splits with those exiting to form the breakaway 
organisation adjudging that there had been a significant drop in the product being 
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produced by the parent organisation.  If one is to take the 1986 split which formed the 
Continuity IRA and Republican IRA as an example it is clear that the small group of 
exiting dissidents were encouraged to do so as they saw the abolition of both Eire Nua 
and the abstentionist policy to Dail Eireann as a significant drop in quality of the 
Provisional product.  The converse of this can be seen in the rise of freelance dissidents in 
across dissident republicanism recently.  These individuals no longer ascribe any 
organisational allegiance and therefore are not concerned with the overall quality of the 
output of the dissident organisations. 
 
9.3 Contribution 
Every body of research aims to make a significant contribution to their respective field, 
and this dissertation has been no different.  It is believed that the contribution has been 
made both to the general realms of organisational and terrorism research as well as to the 
specific.  The basis of the research has been understanding and not condemnation.  By 
moving beyond condemnation one can gain a greater understanding and it is believed that 
only through understanding can the threat of terrorism be countered or eased.  The 
understanding sought here has been two-fold.  At the base level the dissertation aimed to 
understand both why and how the four splits analysed took place, and whether this was 
consistent with previous organisational research on splits.  However, parallel to this the 
research was assessing how the Provisional leadership of the late 1990s was able to 
successfully bring the majority of their membership away from an extended terrorist 
campaign and towards the acceptance of the political process of which they are now 
central. 
 
Both of these levels of understanding have been have developed through an active 
engagement with the interview data gathered and the relevant academic literature.  The 
research has developed two falsifiable stage-based process models, one for organisational 
splits and the other modelling the avoidance of split.  As section 9.2.1 shows the model of 
split avoidance is suitable for the modelling of minor splits.  However, as it was untested 
for its intended purpose it is unclear whether it is suitable for modelling split avoidance.  
The analysis of these four splits, and in particular the three Provisional splits, has put 
 269 
forward a model of how a terrorist organisation can move from the application of 
terrorism as a tactic to the acceptance of peaceful democratic politics.  As this research 
has only tested Irish Republicanism it does not suggest that these models are 
generalisable, and therefore it is recommended that they be tested externally from Irish 
Republicanism. 
 
While the process models mentioned above detailed above outline the organisational 
incidence of split and split avoidance the research has also provided an insight into 
individual allegiance choice and individual involvement in the split.  There has been an 
adaptation of the Hirschman model617 to aid in the explanation of splits from an 
individual perspective.  It was proposed that individual involvement in splits, when the 
individual sides with the dissidents, will follow the process of  
 
1. Voice 
2. Exit 
3. Entry 
 
This model displays the interdependence of exit and entry at a time of split.  This 
variation of an economic model displays the interdisciplinary nature of the work, a 
feature which should, but does not always, dominate the research of terrorism.   
 
While contributing to the academic literature the understanding gained from this research 
may also have a role to play in the development of future policy.  Within the realms of 
counter-terrorism it is necessary to understand the problem before one can solve it.  This 
research contributes significantly to this understanding.  It is proposed that the policy 
related lessons from this not be seen as the normal negative opportunity of merely split 
off ‘pragmatists from radical rejectionists’618 but as a more positive understanding of how 
to get a larger proportion of the supporters and membership to advocate a more political 
solution to their perceived problem. With sufficient consideration and understanding it is 
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believed that successful positive counterterrorist strategies can be developed not with the 
target of split the group but by developing so that the politicisers can gain more support 
and therefore move the organisation away from terrorism and toward the acceptance of 
the political process.  It is posited that this will benefit the wider society in the long-run 
as the politicisation rather than decimation of the movement seen to strengthen the 
political process and weaken the call for violence, and thus lessen the extent of 
organisational recidivism. 
 
9.4 Future Research 
The scope that this dissertation allows for the development of future research is 
extensive.  As has been proposed already it is preferable that in order to test the 
legitimacy of the stage-based process models which have been developed that these be 
tested on other organisational splits, not just within terrorism.  It would be informative for 
the progress of the understanding of organisational splits if the models were tested on a 
variety of organisations.  It is therefore proposed that this research should be continued to 
analyse splits in other terrorist organisations, political parties, economic institutions as 
well as criminal organisations and religious groupings.  The more testing of the proposed 
models the stronger they will become.  This proposed research should be carried out to 
analyse not just why and how the splits took place but also assess the functionality of 
these cleavages.  One of the weaknesses of the present research has been its failure to 
extensively assess the external factors which may have played a role in the splits.619  
Therefore it is proposed that future researchers take this more into consideration than was 
done in this dissertation.   
 
The significant gap in the results of the research on Provisional involvement in the 
‘Troubles’ remains in the split of 1997 which formed the Real IRA.  There is still much 
research needed on this division and the function it played in the peace process.  As was 
detailed within the methodology chapter it is exceedingly difficult to gain access to 
members of this group.  Within this analysis greater attention should also be paid to the 
role of the British and Irish governments, as well as the unionist, nationalist and loyalist 
                                                 
619
 Balser (1997) 
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communities, in successfully bringing through a successful peace process.  This 
continuation of the analysis of the Northern Irish ‘Troubles’ and peace process may also 
take into account those splits which took place since 1997, namely the formation of both 
Eirigi and Oglaigh na hEireann. 
 
While this continued analysis of splits in Irish republicanism may seem like the logical 
next step for the research it is proposed that Unionist involvement in the ‘Troubles’ and 
beyond should similarly be considered.  This similarly can assess splits within Unionism, 
most recently with the development of the Traditional Unionist Voice in 2007 when Jim 
Allister left in protest at the DUP taking their seats alongside Sinn Fein in a devolved 
assembly.620  For many the DUP members and supporters the opposition to involvement 
in former members of the IRA in electoral politics was a formative part of their 
organisational identity.  However, the Paisley Snr. leadership managed to bring the 
majority of their party and membership towards the acceptance of sharing power in 
Northern Ireland with Martin McGuinness, the former PIRA Army Council member, as 
Deputy Prime Minister.  It would be interesting to assess whether similar processes 
brought the DUP and their membership to this position as it did the Provisional 
Republican Movement. 
 
It is suggested that where appropriate that future terrorism and political research utilises 
the analytical methodology of IPA.  However, this should only be utilised when the 
research requires the phenomenological interpretation of data.  It should always be the 
case that appropriate analytical techniques and methodologies are utilised and/or adapted 
to fit the research question rather than adapting the question to fit a specific methodology.  
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 Rankin, A & Ganiel, G. (2008).  DUP Discourses on Violence and their Impact on the Northern Ireland 
Peace Process.  In Hayward, K. and O’Donnell, C. (Eds.)  Peace and Conflict Studies: Special Issue on 
‘Political Discourse as an Instrument of Conflict and Peace: Lessons from Northern Ireland.  Pp.115-135. 
(p.129)   
 272 
9.5 Conclusions 
In conclusion it is believed that the present dissertation has made a significant 
contribution not just to terrorism research but to organisational research in general.  
Through the application of a semi-structured interview methodology and the employment 
of IPA as an analytical technique two separate models for split have been develop; one 
modelling organisational split and the other modelling split avoidance and minor 
organisational splits.  Parallel to this it has detailed how the Provisional Republican 
Movement, in contrast to the IRA they split from in 1969/70, were able to bring the 
majority of their movement away from terrorism and towards the acceptance of the utility 
of peaceful politics.  Central to this was the application of gradualism in changing the 
trajectory of the movement.  Throughout this process the continuous engagement with, 
and connection to the base made the preparation for change less dramatic and resultantly 
lessened the effect of the split.  For thirty-years Northern Ireland entwined in an extensive 
violent conflict, one which claimed thousands of innocent lives.  Central to this conflict 
was the Provisional IRA and their political cohorts in Sinn Fein.  It would be easy to 
condemn the actions of both groups.  However, that has not been the purpose of the 
dissertation.  The dissertation has aimed to understand how the majority of this 
movement were eventually convinced to leave beyond their violent past and accept the 
necessity for peace.  This is what the research set out to achieve, and it is believed that an 
significant understanding has been realised. 
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Appendix A 
Table of Interviews 
 
Participant Date Splits Discussed Allegiance after 
split621 
Geraldine Taylor October 15th 2007 
and January 23rd 
2009 
1969/70; 1974622; 
1986; 1997 
1969/70: 
Provisionals 
1986: RSF/CIRA 
Roy Johnston November 29th 
2007, December 
19th 2007, January 
17th 2008, February 
3rd 2008 and 
February 21st 2009 
1969/70; 1986 1969/70: Officials 
Danny Morrison January 21st 2008 1969/70; 1986; 
1997 
1969/70: 
Provisionals 
1986: 
Provisionals 
Mitchell 
McLaughlin 
January 24th 2008 1969/70; 1974; 
1986; 1997 
1969/70: Officials 
then Provisionals 
1986: 
Provisionals 
1997: 
Provisionals 
Gerry Adams January 30th 2008 1969/70; 1986; 
1997 
1969/70: Officials 
then Provisionals 
1986: 
Provisionals 
1997: 
Provisionals 
Joe Doherty February 1st 2008 1969/70; 1974; 
1986; 1997 
1969/70: 
Provisionals  
1986: 
Provisionals 
1997: 
Provisionals 
Fra Halligan February 6th 2008 1969/70; 1974; 
1986 
1986: IRSM 
Ruairi O’Bradaigh February 20th 2008 1969/70; 1974; 
1986; 1997 
1969/70: 
Provisionals 
1986: RSF/CIRA 
                                                 
621
 As it was unclear whether some participants were on the armed or political side of the split, or both, 
each grouping has been given a non-committal all encompassing title.  This does not mean that the 
individuals was involved in both the armed and the political groups 
622
 Each split in italics specifies that the observer discussed this split as an external Republican observer 
 288 
‘Denis’ February 29th 2008 1969/70; 1974; 
1986 
1969/70: Officials 
1974: IRSM 
Harry Donaghy March 6th 2008 1969/70; 1974; 
1991 
1974: Officials 
1991: ORM 
Sean O’Hare March 6th 2008 1969/70; 1974; 
1991 
1969/70: Officials 
1974: Officials 
1991: ORM 
Anthony McIntyre  March 8th 2008 1969/70; 1974; 
1986; 1997 
1969/70: 
Provisionals 
1986: 
Provisionals 
Richard O’Rawe April 9th 2008 1969/70; 1974; 
1986; 1997 
1969/70: 
Provisionals 
1986: 
Provisionals 
Dolours Price April 21st 2008 1969/70; 1974; 
1986; 1997 
1969/70: 
Provisionals 
1986: 
Provisionals 
Cathleen Knowles 
McGurk 
May 13th 2008 1969/70; 1986; 
1997 
1969/70: 
Provisionals 
1986: RSF/CIRA 
‘Una’ May 14th 2008 1969/70: 1974; 
1986; 1997 
1969/70: 
Provisionals 
1986: 
Provisionals 
1997: 
32CSM/RIRA 
Pat Doherty May 19th 2008 1969/70; 1986; 
1997 
1969/70: 
Provisionals 
1986: 
Provisionals 
1997: 
Provisionals 
Sean McManus May 29th 2008 1969/70; 1986; 
1997 
1969/70: 
Provisionals 
1986: 
Provisionals 
1997: 
Provisionals 
Des Long June 7th 2008 1969/70; 1974; 
1986 
1969/70: 
Provisionals 
1986: RSF/CIRA 
Joe O’Neill June 10th 2008 and 
August 13th 2008 
1969/70; 1986 1969/70: 
Provisionals 
1986: RSF/CIRA 
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Martin McGuinness June 23rd 2008 1969/70; 1986; 
1997 
1969/70: Officials 
then Provisionals 
1986: 
Provisionals 
1997: 
Provisionals 
Francie Mackey  June 25th 2008 1969/70; 1986; 
1997 
1986: 
Provisionals 
1997: 
32CSM/RIRA 
‘Paul’  August 10th 2008 1969/70; 1974; 
1986; 1997 
1969/70: 
Provisionals then 
Officials 
1974: IRSM 
Paddy Woodworth August 15th 2008 1969/70; 1974 1969/70: Officials 
1974: Officials 
Sean O’Bradaigh  August 17th 2008  1969/70; 1986 1969/70: 
Provisionals 
1986: RSF/CIRA 
Richard McAuley September 12th 
2008 
1969/70; 1986; 
1997 
1969/70: 
Provisionals 
1986: 
Provisionals 
1997: 
Provisionals 
Thomas MacGiolla September 15th 
2008 
1969/70; 1974; 
1992 
1969/70: Officials 
1974: Officials 
1992: Workers 
Party 
Martin McGonagle  December 18th 
2008 
1974; 1986 1974: IRSM 
Tom Hartley  January 6th 2009 1969/70; 1974; 
1986; 1997 
1969/70: 
Provisionals 
1986: 
Provisionals 
1997: 
Provisionals 
‘Conor’  January 12th 2009 1986; 1997 1986: 
Provisionals 
1997: 
32CSM/RIRA 
Mick Ryan January 22nd 2009, 
February 2nd 2009,  
February 16th 2009, 
1969/70; 1974;  1969/70: Officials 
1974: Officials 
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March 18th 2009, 
March 24th 2009 
 
‘Alex’ January 23rd 2009 1969/70; 1974; 
1986; 1997 
1969/70: 
Provisionals 
1986: RSF/CIRA 
James Scullion January 23rd 2009 1986; 1997 1986: RSF/CIRA 
Anthony Coughlan  January 31st 2009 1969/70; 1974; 
1986 
1969/70: Officials 
(advisor) 
Gerry Kelly  February 4th 2009 1969/70; 1974; 
1986; 1997 
1969/70: 
Provisionals 
1986: 
Provisionals 
1997: 
Provisionals 
Patrick Kennelly  March 10th 2009 1969/70; 1974; 
1986 
1969/70: Officials 
1974: IRSM 
1986: RSF/CIRA 
(joined in 1998) 
‘Frank’ March 11th 2009 1969/70; 1974; 
1986; 1997 
1969/70: Officials 
1974: IRSM 
1986: RSF/CIRA 
(joined in 1998) 
Mick Murtagh March 11th 2009 1969/70; 1974; 
1986 
1969/70: Officials 
1974: Officials  
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Appendix B 
Complete Interview Schedule 
Engagement 
1) Why and how did you first become involved as an active Republican? 
1a) When did you first become involved with the Republican Movement? 
1969/70 Split 
2) What do you believe were the major factors in the 1969/70 split? 
2a) Where do you believe the origins of the 1969/70 split lie? 
2b) What effect if any did public support have on the split? 
2c) Why did the split take place at the time it did? 
2d) What effect if any did the national leadership being based in Dublin have on the split? 
2e) When did it seem that a split was inevitable? 
2f) Why do you believe that the Provisionals were more successful in attracting members 
than the Officials? 
2g) In the lead up to the split was there active campaigning on the part of either group for 
the purpose of gaining support? 
2h) What effect if any did the pogroms of 1969 have on the eventual split? 
2i) Were there obvious factions within the movement in the lead up to the split? If so 
what were these factions based on? 
2j) What effect if any did the Socialist agenda have on the split? 
2k) What effect if any did the issue of abstentionism have on the split? 
2l) What effect if any did the proposal of the National Liberation Front have on the split? 
 2m) How did the group reorganise/organise in the aftermath of the split? 
2n) What effect if any did external/international support have on the split? 
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2o) What effect if any did Fianna Fail have on the split? 
2p) What effect if any did the Wolfe Tone Society have on the split? 
2q) What effect if any did the fact that the proposal was to drop abstentionism from all 
three parliaments as opposed to from just one have on the split? 
2r) What effect if any did the return of many of the old guard have on the split? 
2s) What effect if any did the declaration of support from Tom Maguire have on the split? 
3) Why did you choose to stay with the Officials/ join the Provisionals? 
3a) Was there anyone who had a significant influence on your choice? 
3b) Was there any specific event which had an influence on your choice? 
3c) Did the Republican newspapers have any affect on your decision? 
3d) How was the split reflected in your local area? 
3e) What effect if any did the issue of abstentionism have on your decision? 
3f) What effect if any did the issue of Socialism have on your decision? 
3g) What effect if any did the proposal of the National Liberation Front have on your 
decision? 
3h) What effect if any did the pogroms of 1969/70 have on your decision? 
3i) What effect if any did the national leadership being based in Dublin have on your 
decision? 
3j) What effect if any did the old guard have on your decision? 
3k) What effect if any did Tom Maguire’s declaration have on your decision? 
3l) What effect if any did the Wolfe Tone Society have on your decision? 
3m) What effect if any did the actions of Fianna Fail have on your decision? 
3n) What effect if any did public sentiment have on your decision? 
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1974 Split 
4. What do you believe were the major factors in the 1974 split? 
4a) Where do you believe the origins of the 1974 split lie? 
4b) What effect if any did public support have on the split? 
4c) Why did the split take place at the time it did? 
4d) What effect if any did the national leadership being based in Dublin have on the split? 
4e) When did it seem that a split was inevitable? 
4f) What effect if any did the 1972 ceasefire have on the split? 
4g) What effect if any did the tactic of defence and retaliation have on the split? 
4h) What influence if any did Seamus Costello have on the split? 
4i) Were there obvious factions within the movement in the lead up to the split? If so 
what were these factions based on? 
4j) What effect if any did the Socialist agenda of the Movement have on the split? 
4k) What effect if any did external/international support have on the split? 
4l) How did the group re-organise/organise after the split? 
5) Why did you choose to stay with the Officials/ join the Irish Republican Socialist 
Movement? 
5a) Was there anyone who had a significant influence on your choice? 
5b) Was there any specific event which had an influence on your choice? 
5c) Did the Republican newspapers have any affect on your decision? 
5d) How was the split reflected in your local area? 
5e) What effect if any did the national leadership being based in Dublin have on your 
decision? 
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5f) What effect if any did the tactic of defence and retaliation have on your decision? 
5g) What effect if any did the 1972 ceasefire have on your decision? 
5h) What effect if any did the Socialist agenda of the Movement have on your decision 
5i) What effect if any did Seamus Costello have on your decision? 
5j) What effect if any did public sentiment have on your decision? 
1986 Split 
6) What do you believe were the major factors in the 1986 split? 
6a) Where do you believe the origins of the 1986 split lie? 
6b) What effect if any did public support have on the split? 
6c) Why did the split take place at the time it did? 
6d) When did it seem like the split was inevitable? 
6e) What effect if any did the 1975 ceasefire have on the split? 
6f) What effect if any did the issue of abstentionism have on the split? 
6g) What effect if any did the 1981 hunger strikes have on the split? 
6h) What effect if any did the elections of Bobby Sands and others following the 1981 
hunger strikes have on the split? 
6i) What effect if any did the dropping of the Eire Nua policy have on the split? 
6j) Why do you believe that the Provisionals were more successful in gaining 
membership than Republican Sinn Fein and the Continuity IRA? 
6k) Were there obvious factions within the movement in the lead up to the split? If so 
what were these factions based on? 
6l) What effect if any did the merger of the papers have on the split? 
6m) What effect if any did the change of leadership have on the split? 
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6n) What effect if any did the fact that only abstentionism to Leinster House was 
proposed to be dropped as opposed to all three parliaments have on the splits? 
6o) What effect if any did the support of prominent members of the IRA and  Sinn Fein 
from both the new and old guard of the Movement have on the split? 
6p) What effect if any did the Brownie letters have on the split? 
6q) How did the group go about organising/reorganising after the split? 
6r) What effect if any did the declaration of support from Tom Maguire have on the split? 
7) Why did you choose to stay with the Provisionals/ join Republican Sinn Fein and/or 
the Continuity IRA? 
7a) Was there anyone who had a significant influence on your choice? 
7b) Was there any specific event which had an influence on your choice? 
7c) Did the Republican newspapers have any affect on your decision? 
7d) How was the split reflected in your local area? 
7e) What effect if any did the 1975 ceasefire have on your decision? 
7f) What effect if any did the issue of abstentionism have on your decision? 
7g) What effect if any did the 1981 hunger strikes have on your decision? 
7h) What effect if any did the elections of Bobby Sands and others following the 1981 
hunger strikes have on your decision? 
7i) What effect if any did the dropping of the Eire Nua policy have on your decision? 
7j) What effect if any did the merger of the papers have on your decision? 
7k) What effect if any did the change of leadership have your decision? 
7l) What effect if any did the fact that only abstentionism to Leinster House was proposed 
to be dropped as opposed to all three parliaments have on your decision? 
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7m) What effect if any did the support of prominent members of the IRA and  Sinn Fein 
from both the new and old guard of the Movement have on your decision? 
7n) What effect if any did the Tom Maguire’s declaration have on your decision? 
7o) What effect if any did public sentiment have on your decision? 
1997 Split 
8a) Where do you believe the origins of the 1997 split lie? 
8b) What effect if any did public support have on the split? 
8c) Why did the split take place at the time it did? 
8d) When did it seem like the split was inevitable? 
8e) What effect if any did the 1994 ceasefire have on the split? 
8f) What effect if any did the Mitchell Principles have on the split? 
8g) Were both sides actively campaigning prior to the split? 
8h) Were there obvious factions within the movement in the lead up to the split? If so 
what were these factions based on? 
8k) What effect if any did the Downing St. Declaration have on the split? 
8l) What effect if any did the Peace Process as a whole have on the split? 
8m) What effect if any did the growing political involvement of Sinn Fein have on the 
split? 
8n) How did the group go about organising/reorganising after the split? 
9) Why did you choose to stay with the Provisionals/ join the Real IRA and/or the 32 
County Sovereignty Committee?  
9a) Was there anyone who had a significant influence on your choice? 
9b) Was there any specific event which had an influence on your choice? 
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9c) Did the Republican newspapers have any affect on your decision? 
9d) How was the split reflected in your local area? 
9e) What effect if any did the 1994 ceasefire have on your decision? 
9f) What effect if any did the Mitchell Principles have on your decision? 
9g) Were both sides actively campaigning prior to the split? 
9h) What effect if any did the Downing St. Declaration have on your decision? 
9k) What effect if any did the Peace Process as a whole have on your decision? 
9l) What effect if any did the growing political involvement of Sinn Fein have your 
decision? 
9m) What effect if any did public sentiment have on your decision? 
Splits in General 
10) In your opinion in general what causes a split? 
11) In your opinion in general what makes one side more successful than another in 
gaining support during a split  
No Splits 
12) Was there ever a time when you believed a split to be inevitable but it was somehow 
fended off? If so how? 
13) In general what can prevent a seemingly inevitable split? 
13a) Why was there no split at the time of the 1994 ceasefire? 
13b) Why was there no split at the time of the 1972 ceasefire? (This is in reference to the 
1972 splits of both the Officials and the Provisionals)  
13c) Why was there no split with the recognition of the PSNI? 
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Appendix C 
Ethical Issues in the Research 
 
As should be the case in all social science research the present project placed an emphasis 
on the necessity of a strong ethical approach.  This ethical approach started at the 
development of the research plan and continued into the interviewing and analysis of the 
data.  It was vital throughout that the safety and requests of the participants were at all 
times taken into consideration.  When dealing with any participants, especially those 
discussing sensitive information, it is necessary to constantly consider the possible future 
implications of the research findings and how they are presented.  As well as the safety of 
the participants it is equally critical that the researcher’s safety is always respected.  For 
these reasons researchers should avoid placing themselves in compromising positions.  
This avoidance can only be guaranteed with prior preparation and thought about the 
research questions and methods.623  This ethical awareness must be carried throughout the 
entire project including the competent and thorough analysis of the collected data.624 
 
One of the key elements in the ethical application of interview techniques is the 
appreciation of the importance of informed consent.  The researcher has an ethical 
obligation to make sure that each participant understands what their research entails, the 
possible risk if any, and how and where the research findings will and may be used.625  
Before an interview starts the interviewer must make every effort to obtain informed 
consent while also making clear to each participant that they are free to withdraw or 
refuse to answer specific questions if they do not wish to.  In the present research one of 
the tools which was utilised by the researcher in this regard was that of a consent form.626  
This was given to participants to read prior to each interview starting.  This took place 
after the participant had been told about the purpose and aims of the research.  Due to the 
fact that there was the intention to use participants’ actual names  one of the most 
sections of this form contained an option for each participant asking whether they wished 
                                                 
623
 Horgan (2004) 
624
 The author’s use of a comprehensive multi-stage analytical structure has ensured that the data has been 
analysed and interpreted in a sound ethical manner while still not losing the original meaning.  
625
 See Shaughnessy, J.J., Zechmeister, E.B. and Zeichmeister, J.S. (2003).  Research Methods in 
Psychology: Sixth Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
626
 See Appendix C. 
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to have their name used or not.  Interviewees were given the option to wait until the 
completion of the interview to make this decision.  In reality it was found that the 
majority of participants were more than willing to have their names used beside their 
quotes and decided this even before the interview took place.  There were four 
participants who requested to stay anonymous and therefore agreed to the use of an alias.  
There were also two individual who wished to have part of their interviews used 
alongside an alias while using their real name for the rest of the interview.  On reflection 
by the researcher, and in consultation with the participants, it was decided that in order to 
provide anonymity to the requested sections that it would be necessary to do so for the 
whole transcript and therefore all of the sections used would be presented alongside an 
alias and at no stage would the participants’ real names appear.  Of the four who 
requested full anonymity there was one participant who refused to sign the consent form. 
However, they did give verbal consent for their quotes to be used alongside an alias. 
Throughout the interview process after there were requests made by some participants for 
specific sections of their interviews not to be used, a request which was always respected 
by the researcher.  An additional requirement of certain participants was to view the 
transcript of their interview, or the sections which were to be used, prior to final approval, 
once more this request was accommodated by the author.   
 
While the above are some of the critical ethical measures taken during the interview 
process the centrality of the ethical approach continues into the analysis and presentation 
of results.  Through these processes the author ensured not to exaggerate or change 
anything which had been said by participants and took every precaution possible not to 
misinterpret or assign false meaning to their articulations.  As has been observed above 
the safety of the participant is the basis of all ethical research.  The selection of extracts 
from interviews was made with this in mind.  When it was believed the use of certain 
sections may possibly compromise the safety of the participant and/or the researcher 
these sections were omitted from the final write-up.  This did not in any way undermine 
the value of the research. 
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At each stage of the research process the necessary precautions and preparations were 
taken and made in order to deal with all envisioned ethical dilemmas.  However, ethical 
research is a dynamic process which needs to be closely monitored throughout.627  Ethical 
dilemmas often arise unexpectedly and it is the duty of the researcher to deal with these 
dilemmas accordingly.  During the course of the research one of the participants who had 
requested to view the completed verbatim transcript of their interview indicated by phone 
that there was a small unspecified section of the transcript which was not to be drawn on 
for the research.  There were attempts made between participant and researcher to 
organise a subsequent meeting to distinguish which elements of the transcript were 
suitable for use.  Regrettably due to health reasons the participant was no longer able to 
meet.  This provided a significant ethical dilemma for the research.  The participant had 
indicated on more than one occasion that they were adamant to have their views 
expressed in the research.  However, having stated that there was an unspecified section 
which was to be omitted the author could ethically not include any of the participant’s 
stated views without their permission.628  This issue was discussed between the author 
and his supervisor as well as with the departmental ethics advisor.  Under the 
recommendations of both actors the university’s ethics board sat to discuss the matter.629  
Simultaneous to the board discussing the matter the author was contacted by the trusted 
intermediary who had organised the initial interview.630  They indicated that the 
participant had transferred their consent to a leading member of their group who would 
meet with the author and review the transcript.  Prior to the meeting between the author 
and this affiliate there was a meeting between the original participant and affiliate to 
discuss what had been said during the original interview and what they believed should 
possibly be omitted.  Subsequently the affiliate met with the researcher to further discuss 
the transcript and the possibility of omitting some of what had been said.  During this 
                                                 
627
 Smith et al (2009) 
628
 Even though the participant had signed the consent form after the interview this new disclosure made 
this consent form null and void. 
629
 While this issue was discussed with these external actors at no point was the identity of the participant or 
their group revealed to anyone and no one was ever told of the contents of the interview.  Even after the 
situation was resolved the identity of participant or group was at no time specified.  
630
 They were already aware of the situation as it was through them that the participant had indicated that 
they would no longer be able to meet with the author due the health reasons.   
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meeting there was a further examination of the original transcript by both parties.  At the 
end of the examination and discussion, and with the prior meeting with the original 
participant, it was declared that all of the original interview could be utilised.  It had been 
decided by the affiliate and participant upon reflection that the entire contents of the 
interview was appropriate for use.  It was never indicated to the researcher at any stage 
what specific section or sections had been considered for omission.   During this specific 
situation and throughout the course of the research the wishes of the participants were 
always put first with regards as to what could and could not be included in the research.   
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Appendix D 
Consent Form 
 
John Morrison, 
School of International Relations, 
University of St. Andrews, 
Library Park, 
Fife, 
KY16 9AX 
Scotland. 
 
 
 
I _____________________agree to allow John Morrison to record our conversation and 
use quotes from it for his doctoral thesis for the School of International Relations in the 
University of St Andrews, Scotland, and any subsequent publications deriving from this 
research. As a researcher Mr Morrison agrees to respect the right of the interviewee to 
anonymity and confidentiality.  I am aware that I can request this interview to be 
terminated at any point in time. 
 
  I agree to allow my name to be used by Mr Morrison, alongside quotes from our 
conversation, in his doctoral thesis and/or publications deriving from this research. 
 
  I request Mr Morrison not to use my name, alongside quotes from our conversation, in 
his doctoral thesis and/or publications deriving from this research. 
 
 
________________________                                  _____________________________ 
Interviewee                                                                John Morrison (Researcher) 
 
____________________ 
Date 
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Appendix E 
The Stage-Based Analysis Process 
Stage 1 
After each individual interview was completed the recordings were transcribed verbatim.  
The dialogue between the researcher and participants was not edited in any way.  For the 
majority of interviews the transcription was completed within forty-eight hours of the 
interview.  Appendix A shows that there were certain times when there was a cluster of 
interviews taking place within a short space of time.  In these situations there was a 
backlog of interviews which had to be transcribed.  These were individually dealt with in 
chronological order.  With respect to the two interviews which the author was not 
permitted to record, notes were taken during the interviews which were written up in the 
immediate aftermath of each meeting.631   
 
After the transcription of each interview the preliminary analysis took place.  During this 
process the transcript was read and re-read so as to familiarise the researcher with the 
text.  During each reading the left-hand margin was used to annotate any themes and/or 
events which were being discussed in specific sections of the text.  These notes were 
either descriptive or thematic in nature, and were very general.  During the initial 
readings not every section of each text was annotated as the more detailed analysis was to 
take place in future stages.  The purpose of this stage was to familiarise the author with 
the texts.  It is at this stage of the analysis that a process of deductive reasoning started.  
This process continued in the subsequent stages whereby the analytical results were 
deduced up in the columns.  
 
Stage 2 
After the interviews had been transcribed the second stage of analysis started.  During 
this stage of analysis each transcript was more thoroughly analysed.  Every transcript was 
analysed concurrently under three headings; Group, Individual and Engage/Disengage.  
When analysing under the heading of Group the author was interpreting sections of the 
                                                 
631
 These interviews were with Mick Ryan and ‘Conor’. 
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texts where the participants were discussing why and how they believed each individual 
split had taken place.  This included the detailing of significant events lead up to the split.  
Similarly when the author was analysing the data under the heading of Individual the 
interpretation was of the sections where the participants’ individual reasons for choosing 
one side over the other were detailed.  The final analysis during this stage took place 
under the heading of Engage/Disengage.  Here the sections where participants detailed 
the rationale and mechanisms of their initial engagement with the Republican Movement 
were analysed as well as their disengagement from the group or any role within the 
group.  The analysis of disengagement and engagement also entailed interpreting the 
rationale and mechanisms behind participants leaving one group to join another during 
the splits under analysis.  Throughout each of these analyses there was constant reference 
to the original transcripts and the annotations from stage 1 of analysis.   
 
For each separate participant an individual table of analysis was constructed to organise 
and display the interpretations of this stage of analysis.  For the analysis of the interviews 
at a group and individual level the tables were divided into four separate columns and 
multiple rows.  Each row dealt with one individual section of the transcript, while the 
four columns provided the four separate headings under which the analysis of each 
section was constructed.  From left to right the columns were: 
• Split: In this column it was specified which of the four splits was being 
discussed in the analysed section; the split was exhibited with the years in which 
the split took place.  In the sections where the participant was discussing 
situations where a split had been avoided this was annotated as ‘No Split’ and 
when splits in general were being discussed this was simply displayed as ‘Splits 
in General’.  There were also occasions where the participants dealt with issues 
relevant to modern day Republicanism, on these occasions the annotation 
‘Modern Day’ was place in this left-hand column. 
•  Theme: In this next column the initial themes arising from the analysis of the 
separate sections were displayed.  These themes were very general and not 
influenced by any existing theories; this initial interpretation of themes was 
reliant on what was contained within the transcript. The annotations produced in 
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the first stage of analysis were used for reference.  In some cases more than one 
theme was required to illustrate the author’s initial interpretation of the section 
being analysed.  The open method of interpretation employed during this stage 
of analysis allowed for new themes to be identified as the interpretation was not 
constrained by prior research or findings.   
• Description:  For each section which was being analysed there was a brief 
synopsis of what had been said by the participant during the interview.  This 
was to accompany the emerging themes so as to illustrate the origins of the 
interpretations.   
• (Page, Line):  The final column of the analysis table indicated the location of 
the analysed section.  Prior to any analysis of the transcript each page and line 
was individually numbered.  In this column the page and line location indicated 
the starting point for each analysed section.  Each line was not separately 
analysed instead the transcripts were divided into manageable sections which 
were analysed and displayed in the separate rows of the interpretation table. 
 
With respect to the Engagement/Disengagement section of the analysis the interpretation 
table was very similar to both the Individual and Group tables.  The only difference was 
that the column ‘Split’ was replaced with ‘Engage/Disengage’.  In this new column it was 
indicated whether the interpreted section was detailing the engagement with or the 
disengagement from a group.  With regards the movement from one group to another 
during or after a split the section was often annotated as both ‘Engage’ and ‘Disengage’; 
this is due to the fact that often times there was an overlap in these sections dealing with 
the reason a person left a group as well as why they joined a specific new group  
  
Stage 3 
Stage 3 of the analysis provided a more organised set of themes and sub-themes.  The aim 
of this stage was to organise the emerging themes into manageable groups under the 
headings of the emerging super-ordinate themes.632  Two separate methods was applied in 
                                                 
632
 A ‘super-ordinate’ theme can be regarded as an over-arching theme which encompasses the overall 
character of an organised cluster of sub-themes. 
 306 
the organisation and development of the super-ordinate themes and sub-themes.  These 
were the methods of abstraction and subsumption.633   
 
The purpose of abstraction was to identify patterns between emergent themes in order to 
develop a super-ordinate theme.  During this process similar themes are placed together 
and a new name for the cluster was developed.  A clear example of abstraction can be 
seen in the development of the super-ordinate theme of ‘Process of Change.’  During 
stage two of the analysis twelve separate themes emerged from the interpretation of 
interview data which during the abstraction process of stage three were able to be brought 
together under the super-ordinate theme heading of ‘Process of Change.’  During this 
process the super-ordinate themes can be considered as the higher level theme and the 
themes within the cluster are sub-themes of this higher level theme. 
 
The process of subsumption is very similar to abstraction.  The only difference is that a 
theme which had already been identified during analysis acquires the super-ordinate 
status as it proved a beneficial higher-level theme which could bring together a series of 
related themes.  A clear example of this can be seen with the promotion of the theme of 
‘Leadership’ to super-ordinate status during this analysis. Under this super-ordinate 
theme of ‘Leadership’ there were twenty-one dominant sub-themes.  A number of the 
sub-themes were not exclusively tied to one specific super-ordinate theme.  This is 
especially true for the descriptive sub-themes.  If the example of the super-ordinate theme 
of ‘leadership’ is continued the sub-themes of ‘weakening’ and ‘strengthening’ are two 
examples of sub-themes which are present under the heading of a number of other super-
ordinate themes as well.  In the case of leadership they are referring to the strengthening 
or weakening of the leadership of the Republican Movement.  However, they similarly 
act as sub themes for other super-ordinate themes such as ‘Group’ and ‘Support’. 
   
Similar to the previous stage of analysis the results of this stage of the process were 
represented using analysis tables.  Instead of the three sets of analysis tables of stage 2 the 
results of stage 3 of the analysis were represented in two sets of tables.  This is due to the 
                                                 
633
 Smith etc al (2009) 
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fact that the ‘Individual’ and ‘Engagement/Disengagement’ tables were merged together 
to form one dominant ‘Individual’ table.  This decision was made as there was a 
significant overlap between both sets of tables and they were both dealing with the 
decision making process of the individual participants.  The development of the tables 
during stage 3 of the analysis was similar to the methodology utilised in the previous 
analysis stage.  During the processes of subsumption and abstraction the stage 2 tables 
were referred to as well as the original interview transcripts to assure that the resulting 
super-ordinate and sub-themes were reflective of the original meaning of the participant.  
‘Individual’ and ‘Group’ results tables were developed for each participant, and the 
analysis was carried out one participant at a time.   
 
The layout of the tables was similar to those of the stage 2 analysis however in place of 
the ‘Description’ column was a ‘Sub-Theme’ column and the ‘Theme’ column was 
replaced by the ‘Super-Ordinate Theme’ column.  The ‘Split’ and ‘(Page, Line)’ columns 
remained the same.  With respect to the sub-themes it was regular that there was more 
than one sub-theme in reference to an individual super-ordinate theme.  These sub-themes 
were ordered with the higher order sub-theme presented first and the lower-order sub-
theme last in the list.  Essentially the lower order sub-themes were sub-themes to the 
higher order sub-themes.  This is illustrated in Figure 4.2 below which is a row extracted 
from the Stage 3 ‘Group’ analysis results table of ‘Denis’.  This extract is in reference to 
a section starting on page 2 line 3 of the participant’s interview transcript where he is 
discussing the 1969/70 split.  In this section the super-ordinate theme identified was 
‘Membership’ and the higher order sub-theme was ‘Expectations’, with the lower order 
sub-themes being ‘Armed’ and ‘Weapons’.  Therefore this row of analysis shows he was 
discussing the importance of membership expectations to the 1969/70 split.  In this 
particular section he was specifically detailing the expectations of the armed membership 
for weapons.  
 
Split Super-Ordinate Theme Sub-Theme (Page, Line) 
1969/70 Membership Expectations: Armed: Weapons (2,3) 
Figure C.2: Row from the Stage 3 ‘Group’ analysis results table of ‘Denis’ 
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Concurrent to the processes of both subsumption and abstraction there was a re-analysis 
of the themes which arose from stage 2 of the analysis.  During this re-analysis it was 
found that certain themes identified were weakly connected to the original data and 
therefore were disposed of or modified so as to be more reflective of the original text.  
Through this process the themes became more reflective of the data.  The criteria for the 
process of pruning were specific to each separate case. 
 
Stage 4 
In the fourth stage of the analytical processes the results of the previous stages were re-
organised under the headings of the super-ordinate themes.  While stage 3 identified the 
presence of the super-ordinate themes these were still represented in individual 
participant tables.  The purpose of this final stage of analysis was to combine the results 
of the previous stages and represent them in sets of tables organised under the headings of 
the individual super-ordinate themes.  This analysis was carried out theme by theme 
rather than participant by participant.  As with all other stages there was constant 
reference to the results from the previous stages as well as to the original transcripts.  
This was to insure that the super-ordinate and sub themes were reflective of the original 
sentiments portrayed by the participants.  The researcher was ultimately assessing the 
developed themes for their relevance to their parent data.  This analysis minimised the 
chances of human error and/or researcher bias.   
 
During this analytical stage a new set of tables was developed to outline the presence of 
specific super-ordinate and sub themes across individual participants and splits.  These 
tables were developed at both an Individual and a Group level.   
 
For each super-ordinate theme there was a table constructed representing which 
participant transcripts insinuated the importance of this theme.  The table consisted of a 
column for each of the splits and a row for each participant who suggested the importance 
of this theme.  An X was placed in the corresponding column for the split which the 
theme had been associated with by the participant.  Figure 4.3 below illustrates the layout 
of the table.  These rows have been extracted from the ‘Group’ table for the super-
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ordinate theme of ‘Voice’.  The Xs marked in the table represent the splits for which the 
participants discussed the theme of ‘Voice’.  In the case of Martin McGonagle the table 
illustrates that in his interview he discussed the theme with regard to the 1974 and 1986 
splits as well as when he was discussing splits in general and modern day events.  When 
one moves down through the tables of higher and lower order sub-themes it becomes 
clearer as to what was been dealt with in each interview.  
  
Participant 1969/70 1974 1986 1997 No Split Splits In 
General 
Modern 
Day 
Francie Mackey    X X  X 
Fra Halligan X       
Martin McGonagle  X X   X X 
Figure C.3: Extract from the super-ordinate table for the theme of Voice. 
 
The development of these tables provided a clearer picture of what themes were dominant 
for each of the splits.  Unlike previous tables the stage 4 tables did not indicate each 
specific time that a theme was dealt with by a specific participant, neither did they 
indicate the specific location of the theme in the transcript.  For these reasons it was 
important during the write up of the interpretative results to once again use the resultant 
tables from each of the separate stages of analysis along with the original interview 
transcripts.  The development of these tables during stage 4 of the analysis provided the 
opportunity to compare which themes were dominant across splits as well as across 
groups and across membership levels within the groups.   
 
The purpose of this stage of analysis was not to create a quantitative data to take away 
from the importance of the original words of the participants.  The aim of stage 4 of the 
analysis was to make the themes which had arisen during all stages of analysis more 
accessible and retrievable for the researcher during the final stage of analysis.  The 
creation of these tables provided an extra tool so as to assure that the most precise 
analysis of the data was possible.   
 
While this is detailed as the final stage of analysis in this chapter the accurate conclusion 
of the analysis process comes during the write up stage of the analysis.  This stage 
 310 
utilised all of the tools created in the four stages detailed above and is comprehensively 
outlined the subsequent chapters of the research.  As will be displayed in the results 
chapters the four splits have been presented as four micro-processes with the macro-
process of Republican involvement in the Troubles.  Each stage of the process was 
developed through the interpretative evaluation of the results from the previous four 
stages to analyse the dominant themes which took place at different times in the process 
leading up to the organisational split.  In order successfully outline the stages of the 
processes the results had to be first validated. 
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Appendix F 
1974: The Officials Divide Again 
Introduction 
As the process for the 1969/70 split came to a close two new processes of splits began.  
This appendix covers the relatively short process which resulted in the division in the 
Official Republican Movement resulting in the formation of the Irish Republican 
Socialist Movement (IRSM) which consists of an armed wing, the Irish National 
Liberation Army (INLA) and a political wing, the Irish Republican Socialist Party 
(IRSP).   
 
In 1974 the Official Republican Movement court martialed and expelled Seamus 
Costello, in the aftermath of which he developed the IRSM in conjunction with a number 
of other erstwhile Officials.  Therefore there is an obvious difference between this and the 
other splits.  The 1974 split was a result of the expulsion of a leadership figure.  The other 
splits resulted from the voluntary departure of key leadership figures.  However, similar 
to the others the 1974 divide was the result of an organisational stage based process.  By 
the time of the divide the Officials were a significantly smaller grouping than their 
Provisional rivals.  Even with the relatively small size of the group though the 1974 split 
should still be regarded as significant in the macro-process of Irish Republican 
involvement in the Troubles. 
 
Of the participants interviewed only twelve individuals were involved in this split.  There 
were six who stayed with the Officials and another six who joined the IRSM.  Of these 
two of the Officials and one IRSM were members of their organisation’s national 
leadership.  One additional IRSM member was to become a member of the national 
leadership but at a time significantly detached from the split.  It is acknowledged that 
various subsequent splits happened within the IRSM in the years after their initial split 
from the Officials.  However, due to the sensitive and volatile nature of the issues none of 
the members involved were willing to talk about these splits in any detail.  Therefore 
there can only be a cursory acknowledgement of their existence. 
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In total twenty-three participants discussed the 1974 split.  Of these twenty-three twelve 
were involved in the split and eleven were external observers.  The make-up of the 
participants is illustrated in Table F.1. 
Group Leadership Ordinary Member Total 
Official Republican 
Movement 
2 4 6 
Irish Republican 
Socialist Movement 
1 4 5 
Undisclosed 0 1 1 
External 4 (2 RSF/CIRA and 2 
Provisional and 1 Official 
advisor) 
7 (1 RSF/CIRA and 6 
Provisional) 
11 
Total 7 16 23 
  Table F.1: Participants who discussed the 1974 split 
 
As with the sub-chapter which detailed the 1969/70 split the present analysis has detailed 
the 1974 split as a stage based micro-process.  Distinct from the 1969/70 split the analysis 
of the 1974 split has identified four stages as opposed to the five stages of the previous 
split.  This is due to the forced nature of the organisational exit and breakaway group 
formation brought on by the pre-emptive actions of the Official leadership against 
Seamus Costello and his followers.  As with the sub-chapters outlining the other three 
splits the dominant themes which have been identified in the analysis of the present split 
are detailed in the sub-sections of each stage.  These should not be regarded as separate 
themes but as themes dominant during that specific stage of the process.   The title of 
each stage illustrates the stage’s dominant characteristic and function.  The title of each 
sub-section illustrates the dominant themes described. 
 
The stages of the 1974 split are 
 
Stage 1: Aftermath of Split: Competition and Re-Organisation634 
Stage 2: Factional Development 
Stage 3: Forced Exit and Breakaway Group Formation 
Stage 4: Aftermath of Split: Multiple Feuds. 
                                                 
634
 This stage has been detailed within Chapter 8a 
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This does not fit either the models of split or split avoidance.  It may more accurately be 
described as a model of forced split.  Within this framework the Official leadership 
effectively bypassed the third stage of the hypothesised model from Chapter 4 and forced 
a split by expelling members.  This expulsion declined the dissidents the opportunity to 
adequately prepare for either split or change. 
 
Stage 2: Factional Development 
The previous split analysed is notable for the variety of intra-organisational conflicts in 
the lead up to the divide.  In contrast the 1974 split had one central intra-organisational 
conflict.  The factionalism within the movement in the lead up to this split was focused 
on armed strategy.  In the aftermath of Bloody Sunday635 the Army Council of the 
Official IRA ordered that any British soldier, on or off duty, was to be shot.636   
Following these orders on May 25th the Derry Officials ‘arrested’ and executed Ranger 
William Best as he walking through the Creggan.  This proved to be one of the most 
unpopular attacks ever sanctioned by the Officials and resulted in numerous protests 
against the movement.  This came in the aftermath of three other publicly disparaged 
Official attacks in which innocent civilians proved the main casualties.637  By May 29th 
the Official GHQ in Dublin declared a ceasefire638 and issued an order to all members 
that they were to only attack in situations of defence or retaliation, and this had to take 
place within forty-eight hours of the initial event and the resultant attack had to be 
approved of and justified by Dublin HQ.  This policy proved to further factionalise the 
movement as members found the process frustrating and restricting.   
 
                                                 
635
 January 30th 1972, British paratroopers shoot dead thirteen people participating in a civil rights march in 
Derry.   
636
 Crenshaw (2001) (p.22) and (1985) (p.483) outlines that the Officials’ heightened use of violence 
against both the Provisionals and British at this stage of the conflict, and in the direct aftermath of the split, 
can be understood as former moderates consenting to collective radicalisation in order to prevent the 
departure of a sub-group.   
637
 These attacks were the Aldershot barracks bombing where the casualties were all civilian and included 
the death of a Catholic priest, the murder of Minister for Home Affairs John Taylor and Sidney Agnew a 
Protestant resident of Mountpottinger East Belfast who was due to give evidence against three Officials 
charged with hijacking a bus.  
638
 Bowyer Bell, (1990), p.21. 
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This second stage of the process starts with this change in armed strategy in 1972 and 
focuses on the developing factionalism between members wishing to expand the armed 
strategy and their internal rivals aspiring for the movement to restrain all forms of armed 
conflict.  This is regarded as an extension of disillusionment and disconnect which 
originated in the first stage in the aftermath of the 1969/70 split.  Nine participants talked 
outlined the importance of this change in armed strategy to the outcome of the 1974 split.  
Most notable in this, as displayed in Table F.2 is that each of the IRSM members 
interviewed outlined the central role of the change in the armed strategy. 
  
Group Leadership Ordinary Member Total 
Official Republican Movement 2 1 3 
Irish Republican Socialist Movement 1 4 5 
Undisclosed 0 1 1 
External 0  0 0 
Total 3 6 9 
Table F.2: Change of Armed Strategy 
 
 Membership Disillusionment and Leadership Disconnect 
The composition of the Official Republican Movement in the early 1970s was diverse.  
The national leadership was still predominantly based in Dublin.  They were extolling a 
purely political strategy with the complete removal of the armed component.  In line with 
their left-leaning non-sectarian political philosophy they wished to reach out to the 
unionist and loyalist communities in order to work together in the fight for the working 
classes.  While this may have been viewed from Dublin as the right course of action it 
was met with disdain by many members and supporters across Northern Ireland.  It was 
difficult for them to accept such an overture to the loyalist communities when Republican 
areas were facing numerous sectarian attacks perpetrated by members of these 
communities.  The northern Officials attempted to voice this discontent and concern 
about the strategy to the national leadership.  These concerns were even being voiced by 
some of those who would stay with the Officials in the aftermath of the split, people such 
as Liam [Billy] McMillen.   
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“The other paramilitaries were involved in very, very grizzly sectarian murders.  I 
remember Liam McMillen at the September 1972 Ard Fheis reading a quotation 
from one of the pamphlets, a Loyalist pamphlet, to try and emphasise to the 
southern membership of Official Sinn Fein the depth of the sectarian bigotry 
among Unionists, essentially the Unionist population in the North, how deep it 
was.  We thought that overtures to Loyalist paramilitaries at this point in time were 
being interpreted by Loyalist paramilitaries as a sign of weakness and it was 
actually giving them a greater confidence to commit more sectarian murders; that 
was our belief.  This created a greater increase in tension within the Official 
Republican Movement.”639   
 
This factionalism was not solely based in Northern Ireland.  There were militant Officials 
across Ireland who were sceptical of the policy, as displayed in the quote below from 
Patrick Kennelly a Limerick Republican who was a member of the INLA leadership at 
the time of the split. 
 
“I would have been happy to go along with that if they kept fighting the Brits but 
they came along with a policy that said ‘we are trying to get contact with the 
Loyalists, get the Loyalist involvement’, which was a load of rubbish.  They weren’t 
going to make any move, Loyalism weren’t going to make any move towards any 
Republican organisation, irrespective of socialism, I don’t know if the Loyalists 
had any socialism in them, I don’t think they would have had any socialism.”640   
 
With respect to the immediate target of organisational survival this again fits with one of 
the dominant themes of the 1969/70 process, ‘too much too soon.’  The violence in 
Northern Ireland was at an all time high and the Official membership was being targeted 
by the British, Provisionals and the loyalist paramilitaries.  For the northern membership 
which was taking the force of these attacks they wanted their leadership to take decisive 
action to aid in this struggle and provide them with the ability to fight back.     
                                                 
639
  ‘Paul’ 
640
  Patrick Kennelly 
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The predominance of violence in Northern Ireland at this time had provided a context 
where a significant proportion of the Official membership advocated a stronger armed 
campaign on behalf of the organisation.  The ‘defence and retaliation’ strategy was seen 
as providing too many constraints and was viewed by many to be debilitating in the fight 
against the Provisionals and loyalist paramilitaries as well as the British occupation.    
 
“At the time we had to be active in defence and retaliation.  There was little done 
in retaliation as there were so many factors to take in to consideration; the time 
element, we had to be sure who carried out the attack which we were retaliating 
against so we couldn’t be seen to be starting the aggression.  There was a good 
deal of disgruntlement and frustration with the in built conditions, the conditions of 
defence and retaliation.  We had to contact GHQ before any operation and know 
the organisation responsible.  The retaliation had to be carried out within 48 hours 
of the attack so it wasn’t looked as us starting a fresh campaign.  Therefore it was 
very difficult to implement.”641   
 
While they were being personally constrained by their leadership in taking part in any 
significant offensives the Official membership were seeing the Provisionals acquiring an 
abundance of weapons.  For many this was to prove disheartening.  
 
“But as things got worse in the north the Provos were at the forefront of defending 
the Catholics at the time when there was a lot of pressure with pogroms and setting 
fire to homes.  As that progressed and got worse people within the Official Sinn 
Fein Movement were, the Official IRA, were beginning to get disillusioned because 
they saw that the Official IRA were standing back and weren’t sort of taking the 
lead, the Provos were taking the lead.  A lot of fellas that were in the Official Sinn 
Fein Movement, the Official IRA, they wanted to bring physical force back to the 
forefront of policies.”642   
                                                 
641
  Mick Ryan 
642
  Mick Murtagh 
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As Director of Operations at this time Seamus Costello found the strategy of defence and 
retaliation debilitating and from an early stage voiced his discontent.  While supportive of 
the need for the party to have a strong political basis he believed that in light of the 
Northern Irish context that the priority at that time should have been having a strong 
IRA.643   He believed that the strategy promoted by the national leadership was naïve and 
had misguided priorities. 
 
“Costello would have been for greater engagement by the Official IRA.  As 
Director of Operations a key element for him was the failure to implement ‘defence 
and retaliation’ due to the restrictions placed.  Costello was very upfront with his 
complaints… From then on Costello realised the frustration of local Directors of 
Operations in the North about not being able to take action.  The leadership didn’t 
want to take action against the UDR as this would turn into a sectarian war.  
Costello’s reaction was ‘so what if it turns into a sectarian war?’   This proved to 
Costello that the Republican Movement in the north was driven to a situation of 
appeasement of the Protestant working class… There should have been stronger 
emphasis on IRA military action against the British.  Costello saw the role for the 
political but thought that the IRA should have been carried out as a primary role, 
not a secondary role.”644   
 
The dominant theme at this stage of the split was that of disillusionment among the rank 
and file membership at the failure of the national leadership to implement a ‘strong’ 
armed strategy.  This was coupled with a significant leadership disconnect to their 
northern membership.  This disconnect between membership expectations and leadership 
actions resulted in heightened division within the group between those calling for a 
purely political campaign and those wishing for stronger armed action. 
This stage of the process lends support to three of the organisational hypotheses. 
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HO1. The immediate goal for each sub-group at the time of split is organisational 
survival in a form which they respect and recognise. 
 
HO1.  In light of the constant violence within the republican and nationalist areas of 
Northern Ireland at this stage of the process, and the specific violence directed against the 
Official IRA members and supporter by the Provisionals, a significant number of the 
Northern Irish membership in particular felt that the survival of the organisation was 
under threat.  The threat to survival of the organisation at this stage was twofold.  The 
physical threat to the survival of the organisation was in the death of members due to the 
ongoing feuds and violence and there was similarly a numerical threat to organisational 
survival due to ongoing competition for membership with the Provisional IRA.645   
 
HO2. The conflict at the centre of a split is, for at least one of the sub-groups, threatening 
to the organisational identity.  
 
HO2.  In the aftermath of the 1969/70 split and in light of the ongoing violence described  
A number of longstanding Officials as well as those new members revised their perceived 
organisational identity.  This was particularly true in the areas most affected by violence.  
A significant number of the members in the worst effected regions believed that the 
OIRA should have a stronger armed presence both in a defensive and agitational manner.  
However, the majority of the national leadership still professed the necessity of a 
restrained use of the armed strategy, with many denouncing any use of violence at all.  
Therefore they believed that due to the strict promotion of the defence and retaliation 
strategy and the deficiency of weapons to partake in offensives that the purpose and 
identity of the organisation was being diminished.  At this stage the attempted to rectify 
this perceived threat through the application of voice.  This was particularly carried out 
by the local leadership as well as disapproving national leadership figures such as Seamus 
Costello.       
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HO4. The sub-group most willing to make compromises is the one most likely to be 
successful in the aftermath of a split. 
 
HO4.  It was unmistakable at this stage of the process that the national leadership were 
unwilling to compromise on what they believed to be the necessary role and strategy 
employed by the organisation.  The continued application of what the defence and 
retaliation strategy, which the advocates of a strengthened armed campaign believed to be 
purposively restrictive, and the active engagement with the loyalist and unionist 
communities illustrated even in the aftermath of the application of critical voice on behalf 
of the disillusioned that the national leadership were unwilling to compromise.  This 
continued strict adherence to their stated principles and strategies outlined to the 
emerging dissidents that the growing conflict was possibly irreconcilable.    
 
As a consequence of the active and continuing politicising campaign by the Official 
leadership the organisation at this stage was a significantly heterogeneous grouping.  A 
significant proportion of the organisational leadership was very much in favour of the 
politicisation of the movement.  However, in the context of the violence this was 
significantly disconnected from the expectations of a significant proportion of the 
membership.  This heterogeneity of viewpoints about both the short term and long term 
strategic prioritising of the group provided a fertile setting for a possible split. 
 
Preparation for split 
This split more than any of the others was driven by one dominant individual.  As is 
displayed throughout the process it was Costello who was the predominant voice in the 
call for a more militaristic Official IRA.  Each of the participants who participated in the 
1974 split, as well as three external observers, indicated the centrality of the leadership of 
Seamus Costello to the split as is illustrated in Table F.3. 
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Group Leadership Ordinary Member Total 
Official Republican Movement 2 4 6 
Irish Republican Socialist Movement 1 4 5 
Undisclosed 0 1 1 
External 0 3 (Provisional IRA) 3 
Total 3 12 15 
  Table F.3: Centrality of Seamus Costello to the 1974 Split  
 
At the Army Convention of 1972 he put forward the motion for the continuation of the 
armed campaign, and the motion was passed.  In the year subsequent it was clear that 
Costello was making moves to form a new more militant armed group, a move which was 
countered by the rest of the national leadership.  The discontent already illustrated 
transformed into decisive action.  A section of the membership, led by Costello, started to 
form a more organised dissident grouping with the possibility of moving away from the 
OIRA.  Costello was actively putting forward arguments for the reinforcement of the 
armed strategy.  Even though he could not rely on the support of the majority of the 
movement he did have the backing of a significant minority.  It was with this minority 
that he began to prepare a dissident organisation.  Costello’s voicing of discontent was 
not restricted to the national leadership.  His misgivings about the organisation’s armed 
strategy were also promoted to the discontented rank and file.  In specific areas where 
there was significant discontent especially among the local leadership Costello’s strategy 
was welcomed as an alternative to the restrictive ‘defence and retaliation.’       
 
“Costello acted as subversive in the Army and Sinn Fein, and was not just 
restricted to the Army Council and Sinn Fein.  He was going along the route of 
pandering to dissatisfaction at local level.”646 
 
The strategy latched on to the sentiment of those who had joined the organisation to take 
part in an armed struggle.  The argument put forward to them by Costello and his 
supporters at a local leadership level was that while there was the necessity for a strong 
political strategy that in order to have any chance of achieving the organisation’s ultimate 
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objective that there must similarly be a strong armed campaign.  This was a strategy 
which appealed to many at the forefront of the conflict.  
 
“Our attitude was we didn’t want to be like that [purely political].  If we’re going 
to have weapons we wanted to use them, and that’s what we joined the movement 
for… So what we were saying was ‘yes there needed to be a certain political 
direction, but the gun is an extension of politics’.  Throughout history the gun is an 
extension of politics, it just depends what way you use it.  But they didn’t want the 
gun in the politics, the Officials didn’t want…the gun in the politics at all.  So 
people were all getting disillusioned.  Most people, the old ones who were still 
there were starting to go ‘what’s the point?’… Then came the mention of going 
back [to an armed campaign] and eyes lit up.”647 
 
With these growing levels of support for his alternative strategy Costello’s stance 
transformed from changing the movement’s armed strategy to preparing for a takeover of 
the leadership, or alternatively splitting to form a new Republican organisation.  Acting 
on this sentiment necessitated significant preparation.  The possibility of a split was clear 
from 1972.  However, Costello wished to gain greater levels of support or if at all 
possible the support of the majority of the movement. 
 
“The reason it didn’t happen was because Costello wanted to take the whole 
Movement.  He could have gone in Autumn of 72, that is when a split could have 
taken place.”648 
 
In his preparations for a split, or alternatively a coup, Costello through his role as 
Director of Operations had gained the loyalty of units across the island.  A number of 
these would carry out his orders ahead of those of Cathal Goulding. 
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“The Derry people wouldn’t take any orders from Cathal, they would only take 
orders from Seamus Costello.  He went up to find out and Costello had all the 
Derry unit in his hands and had policies to do this and do that and the other, and 
was all military action in other words.  The Provos were at it at this time and we 
weren’t, we were doing nothing, and Costello said that we should be doing 
something.”649 
 
As he gained the backing of a significant minority his preparation moved on to include 
the securing of sufficient levels of weapons for the potential new grouping.  For the 
participants interviewed this was a key issue.  Eight interviewees, three Officials and five 
IRSM, outlined the importance of this pre-split preparation through the attempted 
acquisition of armaments.  However, the Official leadership, and those loyal to Goulding, 
were privy to these preparations and countered this by disarming and discontinuing the 
rearming of units suspected of dissidence.  This move was made so as to weaken any 
possible coup or future external opposition.  The disarming of units was taking place 
when it became apparent to the leadership of the possibility of another split.              
 
“At that stage the unit that we were in, the Fianna and the Army in Divis Flats 
[Belfast} were known as a head cases because they were always wanting guns, they 
were always firing out operations, ‘can we get this? Can we do that? Can we have 
more weapons? I want more weapons. Give us more.  Let us do.  Come on we 
do…So we were finding then that weapons weren’t coming into the areas, just 
whatever weapons you had, you had.  And then you would be asked for maybe 
someone would want a Shorty and it was going out of the area, but it wasn’t 
coming back.”650   
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“They were strapped for arms.  The Official IRA ensured that they would disarm 
most of us at the time.  A lot of fellas in Limerick and Clare and Cork and 
Waterford guns were taken off them months before the split.”651 
 
The Officials had learned their lesson from the experience with the pre-split Provisionals 
and were now taking decisive action to prevent or at least minimise the effects of the 
split.  As will be displayed in the subsequent sections this pre-split intervention by the 
Official leadership proved significant in affecting the subsequent strength of the 
dissidents.  By not allowing them to adequately prepare for the formation of a new group, 
as the Provisionals had been allowed in the lead-up to 1969, the dissidents were therefore 
a much weaker organisation in the aftermath of split.  This is not solely in reference to 
numerical strength and the possession of weapons.  The dissidents had also failed to 
prepare a significant organisational structure for the new impending new movement.  In 
the aftermath of the split in the resultant violent feuds Seamus Costello was killed and 
without a clear succession plan the organisation once again entered into further conflict 
and feuds, this time purely due to a leadership struggle.   
 
This stage of the process suggests the significance of the desire for power as a dominant 
factor in the lead up to the 1974 split.652  This is an issue which was not hypothesised 
within the Chapter 5.  However, it may prove significant in the analysis of splits and 
coups led by influential or charismatic individuals rather than groups.  The influence of 
Seamus Costello as the predominant leader of the dissidents was one of the overarching 
themes within this stage.  It is proposed here that his growing dissidence was not solely 
motivated by the wish for a more combative armed campaign.  Although it is clear that he 
believed in the necessity for an armed campaign it is not clear whether his motivation for 
dissidence was linked to a belief that the leadership strategy was threatening to the 
organisational identity.  It is posited that his dissidence in particular was also linked to his 
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wish for control of the organisation.653  At this stage of the split Costello was putting 
forward claims for control.  However, in order to gain sufficient control of the 
organisation he needed significant levels of support both numerically in members and 
physically with respect to weapons and artillery.  Therefore it was necessary to frame his 
push for leadership with the discontent within certain sections of the organisation.  This 
desire for power is particularly illustrated in the quote from Tomas MacGiolla detailing 
Costello’s Derry specific usurping of leadership control. 
 
Stage 3: Forced Exit and Breakaway Group Formation 
This awareness of Costello’s organisation of dissident factions led the rest of the national 
leadership to take steps to remove him from a position of power and ultimately expel 
him.  The first major move against Costello by the leadership came in the wake of the 
1973 Official Sinn Fein Ard Fheis where he was accused, alongside a number of his 
supporters, of vote rigging by the national leadership.  Although his dissidence was 
focused upon the armed campaign and the military leadership he had also attempted to 
utilise his influence within the political wing to gain ground. 
 
“His conspiracy would develop into ‘Goulding, Garland and Ryan are going soft.’  
He was conspiratorial and undermining our credibility.  It became more than 
opposition and change at Army Council.  He also wanted to change things secretly 
at local councils and had lists of voters at Ard Fheiseanna.” 654  
 
Official IRA units around the country were briefed on multiple accusations against ‘Vol. 
Clancy’655 by leading members of the movement.  Ultimately on February 21st 1974 an 
Official IRA Court of Inquiry dismissed Costello from the movement.  Upon being 
dismissed Costello requested a court martial.  When this was convened he was accused of 
undermining the IRA through his conduct, misappropriating army funds and faction 
building.  The ‘judges’ of this court martial found him guilty on all charges and he was 
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dismissed ‘with ignominy.’656  When it came to his membership in Sinn Fein he was 
originally suspended for a six month period but was subsequently dismissed from the 
political party, along with a number of his supporters, as he did not adhere to the 
guidelines of his suspension.657  He was officially dismissed from the party after a vote to 
reinstate him was defeated at the 1974 Ard Fheis. 
 
In the aftermath of the court martial the Official leadership de-briefed the national 
membership on the reasoning for the judgement.  Within the ranks of the northern 
membership in particular this was at times met with anger due to what Costello loyalists 
believed to be an unfair ruling.  Many believed that his positioning with respect to a 
strengthened armed campaign was justified in light of the situation across Northern 
Ireland.  However, not all of these people angered and vocal in their concerns exited in 
the formation of a Republican new grouping.  A number of these critiques stayed out of 
loyalty to the movement, and at the dismay of having to develop yet another movement 
from scratch so soon after the split with the Provisionals. 
 
“Costello had been court martialed in June/July 74.  I remember we were all 
called to a meeting in Cyprus St, it was the Officials then headquarters in Belfast, 
and Goulding was brought up.  The entire membership were summoned to the 
meeting and they read out the whole details of Costello’s court martial and why he 
had been dismissed…It was a witch hunt.  They wanted to get rid of Costello.  
Costello was also basing his position on moves which had been made by a lot of 
people in Belfast and in Derry saying to him to take a firmer line.  Some of those 
people when it came to the crunch then backtracked and stayed with the 
Officials.”658 
 
The position of those calling for an armed campaign in the place of the politically led 
movement of the time was understood and empathised with by many of those who stayed 
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on in the movement.  For those northern Republicans especially who remained with the 
Officials in 1974 the calls for a re-focusing of the armed campaign was not wholly 
uncalled for. 
 
“People at the coalface here, you will notice that any splits that happened here 
were to do with weapons or military tactics or things.  They didn’t have the luxury 
of sitting back and falling out over philosophical issues.”659  
 
With the imposed exit of Costello and a number of his internal supporters the decision for 
them then was to either remain external to organised Republicanism as independent 
dissidents or to develop a new organisation.  As they collectively believed in the need for 
a strong republican socialist armed campaign they selected to set up the Irish Republican 
Socialist Movement.  They were joined in the new movement by a number of 
disillusioned members who had not been dismissed from the organisation.  There was 
also a portion of the disillusioned that chose to join the Provisionals.   
 
With Seamus Costello regarded as the figurehead for a stronger armed campaign his 
dismissal from the movement was regarded by many of those exiting to join the IRSM as 
a seen that the intra-organisational conflict about the strengthening of the armed struggle 
had reached an irreconcilable stage.  With the development of the IRSM they now had a 
new alternative more in line with their beliefs and expectations for an Irish Republican 
organisation. 
 
Breakaway Group Formation 
Even though the split was predominantly a division from within the OIRA the 
organisation which was initially publicly developed was a political party, the Irish 
Republican Socialist Party (IRSP).  The new party included former members of the 
Official Republican Movement alongside a number of prominent civil rights figures such 
as Bernadette McAliskey (nee Devlin).  One of the main features which differentiated the 
IRSP from Official Sinn Fein was the new party’s dismissal of the potential for beneficial 
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engagement with the loyalist paramilitary groups on socialist issues.660   However, for a 
large proportion of the membership the most notable differentiating factor was the 
presence of an armed campaign.  Unbeknownst to purely political members of the IRSP 
Costello, along with a number of former Official IRA members, set up a new left-wing 
paramilitary organisation the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).  This organisation was 
the precursor to the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), a name it changed to in 
1975. 
 
The rationale for the initial clandestine nature of the armed wing was twofold.  Firstly the 
armed leadership were aware that the existence of an armed wing would compel the 
political recruits to leave the organisation, an exit which took place during the walk out 
from the 1975 Ard Fheis.  These political figures gave the new movement an air of 
legitimacy which was needed in order to have Costello’s desired political impact. This 
provides further support for the power based proposal contained within a previous stage 
of this process.  Costello’s wish for power was not confined to power within the Irish 
Republicanism.  This desire spread externally to his desire for personal political success 
at times ahead of the purposive goals of a united Ireland.  This is an observation which 
was made by four members of the Official movement, two in a leadership position.  With 
his new movement he wished to gain significant political success and therefore recruited 
these politically legitimising figures.  However, he was aware that in order to achieve this 
political success that he would need to retain both their legitimising presence as well as 
the core Republican grouping who expected the organisation to provide a strengthened 
armed campaign.  This may be a further explanation for hiding the presence of the armed 
wing from the purely political membership.    
 
Due to the pre-emptive moves by the Official leadership to expel Costello and 
commandeer weapons the armed grouping was not fully ready for a sustained armed 
campaign.  The pre-emption of his move away by the Official leadership had impaired 
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the preparations for a new movement.  They had yet to acquire adequate arms or 
personnel, even though they had been recruiting and organising months prior to the split. 
 
“So what happened was when we were still there we hadn’t officially put a 
resignation in because what we needed to do was to stay underground until we got 
ourselves strong, until we got ourselves organised in units and OCs and adjutants 
and brigades, because it wasn’t just a case of walking away.  The Officials 
wouldn’t let you just walk away one on one.  You needed to do it on block when it 
wouldn’t have been just as simple, that’s the theory.”661   
 
Due to the need for organisational stability and maintenance the armed movement did not 
wish to declare their existence until they had developed a sufficiently ready and equipped 
paramilitary organisation.  They were wary that due to the animosity on the ground that 
they would be faced with the prospect of entering into a violent feud with their former 
comrades. 
 
“Seamus didn’t want it to become public knowledge until they had acquired 
finances, weaponry, had drilled and trained and were in a position to launch 
attacks on a proper scale.”662   
    
However, it was this very mistake which they needed to avoid that defines the path of the 
organisation for the rest of the twentieth century. 
 
“What happened with the INLA/IRSP was Costello had made a blunder of making 
it public to effect that he had a new power a new political power in the Irish 
Republican Socialist Party.  People in Belfast had forewarned him that that was 
dangerous, unless they were in the position to militarily defend themselves.  The 
Belfast people knew their city better than Costello and they knew that the Official 
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IRA and Liam McMillen would not tolerate another organisation, and would come 
down heavily.”663 
 
Stage 4: Aftermath of Split: Multiple Feuds 
As with all splits the aftermath of 1974 was notable for the competition for membership 
and support.  The leadership of both sides were aware of the necessity of a strong 
membership and support in order to have any chance of achieve the organisation’s 
immediate aim of survival, let alone their purposive goal. 
 
“They [organisational policies] may be the best in the world but that is irrelevant 
if you haven’t got people putting their support behind you you are going no 
where.”664   
 
The result of this pursuit of membership and support was the explicit regional division of 
previously Official dominated areas.  For example in the aftermath of the 1969/70 split 
the Lower Falls Road and Divis Street area stayed loyal to the Goulding leadership.  As a 
result of 1974 this was further sub-divided with Divis Street moving to the INLA and 
Leeson Street and other nearby Official areas staying loyal.  This regional divide coupled 
with the post-split hostility resulted in some of the most violent feuds in the history of 
Irish Republicanism. 
 
“Everybody came out, Divis Flats was a no-go area for the Sticks, it actually 
became known as Planet of the Irps.665”666 
 
Alongside the influence of Seamus Costello these feuds were the most dominant theme 
throughout the analysis of the 1974 split as is displayed in Table F.4.  Each participant 
involved in the split, as well as four external observers, commented in detail about the 
feuds. 
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Group Leadership Ordinary Member Total 
Official Republican Movement 2 4 6 
Irish Republican Socialist 
Movement 
1 4 5 
Undisclosed 0 1 1 
External 1 (1 
RSF/CIRA) 
3 (1 RSF/CIRA and 2 
Provisional) 
4 
Total 4 12 16 
  Table F.4: Post Split Violent Feuds 
 
As with all splits both groups wished to put forward the impression that they were the 
true republican socialist group, and also that they were the stronger of the two groups. 
 
“In paramilitarism there is a lot of macho attitude, ‘we are the real ones and we 
should do this and we should do that.’  Then I think you had a situation were each 
side thought the other side was going to do something and you better not show any 
weakness.  That kind of thing builds up and then tensions build up and tensions 
build up and then something happens.”667   
 
With the new organisation trying to put forward an air of political legitimacy these 
violent feuds were to prove a significantly regressive step.  Not only did both 
organisations lose a number of significant figures through interment and death, but the 
IRSP in particular was degraded by the exit en masse of a considerable proportion of their 
newly recruited political membership.  This inevitably stunted any political growth. 
 
“In hindsight it [feuds] didn’t allow the politics to flourish the way it should have 
been…I think that that done more damage than Costello’s stance. With political 
people once the guns came out and the Officials attacked them, which was a very 
deliberate thing, people said ‘right I don’t want part of that.  It is bad enough 
having the British out after us but you know…’ that scared a lot of political people 
as well.”668 
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Both groups lost significant leadership figures through the violence, the most significant 
for the Officials was the murder of Billy McMillen in 1975.  However, the defining death 
of the entire feud was that of Seamus Costello in 1977.  As a result of Costello’s death the 
INLA became embroiled in additional feuds as there was no obvious successor to 
Costello within the movement.   
 
“Another year or two of him living would have just maybe, he would have had 
more people politically aware, or organisationally aware, and would have left the 
Movement on a stronger base.  That’s not his fault unfortunately, but him leaving 
at that particular time in a transitional period where we were just out of the feud, 
people were banged up in jail.  We were just starting to get back on our feet, and 
then bang.  The man who had started it everybody looked up to, he was the one we 
were going to follow, bang away.  It was like cutting the head off, so you needed 
somebody else to take his place who was as charismatic, who was as strong, who 
had his leadership qualities and who was as politically aware as him.  
Unfortunately there wasn’t that one there at that particular time, there was just 
that many issues.”669 
 
It was this issue of internal feuding which would define the IRSM right up to the 1990s.  
During the feud with the Officials a number of new members were recruited purely for 
the purpose of partaking in the feuds.  These new members had little to no aspirations for 
a socialist Irish Republic.  Their sole purpose in the movement was to take part in combat 
against the Officials.  When a number of these new recruits became involved in a 
leadership battle in the aftermath of Costello’s death it led to the development of a 
number of new smaller Republican organisations, which to a large extent were violent 
criminal gangs with little to no political aspirations.  The net result of all of these feuds 
was the loss of public support, a necessity for organisational survival, for all groups 
involved. 
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“Unfortunately what happens with any feud is the public don’t support feuds at all.  
In the time that you are involved in the feud you’re ignoring the public entirely and 
this applies to all groups because the public come out and protest about feuds.  But 
the attitude of a feud is if you step down you get destroyed and walked on and you 
have to do to them what they have done to you, and a bit more maybe.”670 
 
The INLA feuds in the aftermath of the death of Costello succeeded in decimating the 
organisation, and none of the resultant groups ever made as significant an impact on the 
Troubles as the Provisionals. 
 
“The first split with the IPLO and Gerard Steenson in Belfast, he wiped out quite a 
good few of the INLA figures at the time, but eventually they shot him.  They 
cornered him in some part of Belfast and shot him.  That seemed to put an end to 
that feud.  There have been several feuds after that.”671 
 
This stage provides further support for  
 
HO5. In the presence of significant inter-organisational conflict the purposive goals of 
the organisation will be substituted with the aspiration of harming the rival organisation. 
 
HO5.  This is particularly illustrated in the recruitment by the INLA of a violent criminal 
membership with no link to Irish Republicanism for the sole reason of taking part in the 
feuds.  No longer was the organisational priority the achievement of a unified socialist 
Irish Republic.  The perceived necessity now was to harm their rival organisation, the 
Official IRA and secure organisational power and survival in this competitive 
environment.  Even though the purposive goal of the two groups was the same the 
concentration was now on destroying the rival Republican organisation.  Therefore it 
similarly lends support to a further hypothesis. 
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HO1. The immediate goal for each sub-group at the time of split is organisational 
survival in a form which they respect and recognise. 
 
HO1.  At this point of group inception and immediate aftermath of a close split, similar to 
the aftermath of 1969/79, this immediate goal of organisational survival is accentuated.  
Due to the closeness in strength of the two rival organisations they are both competing for 
organisational survival.   
 
The resultant feuds in the aftermath of the death of Seamus Costello further suggests the 
presence of a power driven motivation for organisational split.  However, due to the 
insignificant level of data gathered on this it requires further investigation. 
 
Regarding the Official Republican Movement they rebranded themselves as ‘Sinn Fein 
The Workers Party’ with a purely political focus, later dropping all titular signs of their 
Republican past by becoming ‘The Worker’s Party.’  This party had a small amount of 
electoral success particularly in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland before 
splitting again with the foundation of Democratic Left in 1992.672  The reason for this 
split was twofold, those exiting wished for the party to recognise free market economics 
and they were against the continued existence of the Official IRA, even though it was 
existent in name alone.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
672
 There was one other minor split in 1991 when a small number of members left to form the autonomous 
‘Official Republican Movement’ as they believed that the party had moved away from its Republican 
heritage too much.  
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Split Summary673 
It has been illustrated here how the 1974 split in the Official Republican Movement was 
distinctly different from the other three splits analysed in the present research.  The 
dissident faction within the movement was predominantly led by one figurehead 
leadership figure rather than a group of likeminded dissidents.  While this figurehead, 
Seamus Costello, had significant levels of support from sections of the membership due 
to his stance on the armed strategy the split can be seen not only as a result of armed 
strategy based dissidence but also due to Costello’s aspirations of power.  The split is also 
distinct as the impending split or coup was pre-empted by the Official leadership and they 
took decisive action through the safeguarding of weapons from known dissidents and the 
expulsion of Seamus Costello from the movement.  The even nature of the divide in the 
aftermath of the split as with 1969/70 resulted in a significant level of violent feuds and 
therefore a shift in the immediate goals of the new movements.  The focus was now on 
weakening their Republican opponents as opposed to fighting against the British presence 
in Northern Ireland or loyalist attacks on nationalist and Republican communities.  
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 For an Official analysis of Irish Republicanism from the early 1960s to 1975 see MacGiolla, T. (1975).  
The Making of the Irish Revolution: A Short Analysis.  Repsol Pamphlet No.17.  In this MacGiolla outlines 
that the intentions of the Republican Movement was not to settle for a 32 County Free State but that the was 
an intention to change the way the political system in the whole of Ireland was to work.  They wished to 
‘organise the people to build a revolution and not just build an army to start a campaign.’  In this document, 
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as well as detailing how Republicanism should move forward.  The points he raised in this document are 
resonant of what took place in over two decades after with the success of the peace process.  In this he 
outlined the necessity to achieve peace for the people’s benefit and in order to achieve this among other 
points he outlined the necessity for amnesty for political prisoners, the reform of the police and the 
abolishen of ‘repressive legislation.’  He also detailed that ‘only when people can move about and talk 
without fear can progressive idea once more flourish.’ (p.5).  It is the ability for this peaceful dialogue 
which proved to be the cornerstone of the peace process of the 1990s and early 2000s.   
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Appendix G 
Why Do People Become Dissidents? 
Introduction 
Throughout the analysis of the splits in the main body of the dissertation there was focus 
on the micro-processes of the splits and the macro-process of Republican involvement in 
the ‘Troubles.’  Within this analysis there was a focus on the reasoning of why and how 
the splits took place from an organisational perspective.  Within this analysis there was a 
focus on why and how the splits took place, and therefore when individual reasoning for 
allegiance was referred to it was in reference to the reasoning of the split.  However, 
while individuals may acknowledge a specific organisational reason or reasons for the 
split taking place this is not analogous to their own individual reason for allegiance 
choice before, during or after the formal divide.  While there are individuals who do 
make allegiance decisions based on the rationale for the divide there are similarly non-
organisational factors which influence. The organisational approach stipulates that 
recruits join organisations for a variety of reasons, not all of which are tied to ideological 
commitment.674  Therefore the purpose of this appendix is to look beyond the divisive 
strategies and focus on individual specific reasons for allegiance choice.   
 
The results are represented in a thematic framework.  The analysis of the individual 
allegiance data demonstrated the importance of a variety of themes in decisions of 
allegiance.  The focus is on three of the most prominent of these themes, as well 
assessing the issue of freelance dissidents and the switching of organisational allegiance.  
They are demonstrated across splits displaying the importance of each of the themes 
during the different micro-processes. The chapter is shaped specifically to deal with the 
question ‘why do people become dissident Republicans?’  The results of the analysis 
demonstrate that the choice of allegiance is not always specifically connected to the 
defining feature of the organisation’s policies, strategies, tactics and goals.  
Predominantly it was found that the most important factors were those which were more 
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 336 
personal to the individual rather than specific to the organisation of their chosen 
allegiance. 
 
Before the results of the analysis are displayed it is important to acknowledge the 
heterogeneity of terrorist actors.     
 
Heterogeneity 
In order to gain a comprehensive understanding of terrorist actors and their actions there 
must first of all be a clear respect for the heterogeneity of individuals who engage in 
terrorism across groups, and even within individual movements and organisations.  This 
heterogeneity may be analysed and assessed in a variety of ways.  However, for the 
purpose of analysing why individuals become dissident Republicans it is posited that two 
of the most informative heterogeneities are those of timing of dissident affiliation and 
prior Republican experience.  An understanding of these as well as other factors will 
contribute to enhancing our understanding of what contributes to these critical choices.   
 
With respect to the timing of dissident affiliation one must consider whether or not an 
individual chooses their affiliation at the time of, or alternatively a significant time after, 
the relevant organisational split.  Did the individual become a dissident at the group’s 
inception or during a period of time afterwards?  It is to be expected that the reasons for 
dissident affiliation at the time of a split will more likely be intrinsically linked to the 
cause of the intra-organisational conflict and split than for those who join the dissident 
organisation during a period significantly detached from the separation of groups.  This 
appreciation for timing, however, must only be considered as the foundation level to a 
multi-faceted understanding of dissident affiliation.  The analysis must similarly assess 
the level of experience and organisational rank of the dissident prior to their decision to 
dissent.  This analysis must distinguish between those with an extended history of 
experience and those newly affiliated with organised Republicanism.675  Within these 
considerations one must be aware of the role, if any, played by the actor within the local 
                                                 
675
 Within this assessment it must be acknowledged that the length of time one has been a member is not 
always analogous to level of experience.  This must include an assessment of the level of commitment and 
activity during the period of membership.  
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and/or national leadership and therefore the influence they may have had in, and the 
knowledge they may have had of, the decision making processes.  Parallel to this must be 
an appreciation that at times in historically enduring movements, such as the Irish 
Republican Movement, there are those outside the leadership who hold a significant 
influence in the movement and over members and leadership alike.  This influence may 
come from the historical significance of their previous actions or a previously held 
leadership position.  Therefore, with the assessment of the level of influence of individual 
members it is insufficient merely to divide the membership into the categories of 
‘leadership’ and ‘rank and file members.’  These categories must be further scrutinised to 
acknowledge the different levels of experience and influence which may exist among the 
two categories.  The heterogeneity does not, and the analysis must not, stop with timing, 
experience and rank.  There must be a similar appreciation of the roles which age, 
regionalism and other factors can play in the decision making process.  Within the 
following pages there will be a careful assessment of the roles which these factors can 
and have played, while still acknowledging that the factors assessed are far from an 
exhaustive list of influential variables. 
 
Why do People Become Irish Dissidents? 
The current focus of the media, security and policy makers tends to be on those members 
of groups such as the Continuity and Real IRA but in the analysis of dissident 
Republicanism one must not overlook the fact that the original Republican dissidents of 
the Troubles are those who shifted their allegiance away from the Goulding leadership of 
the old IRA to the development of the Provisional IRA.  This extended history of 
organisational dissidence and split, not just in the same conflict but within the same 
movement, presents the opportunity to analyse in a more reliable manner the relevant 
issues and themes which arise in an individual’s decision to dissent and switch allegiance 
from ‘mainstream’ Irish Republicanism.  This opportunity is reflected throughout the 
appendix as there is continuous reference, not just to the rationale of the post 1986 
dissidents, but also to some of those original dissenters from the late 1960s and early 
1970s.  While they originated as dissident the process that is modern day Irish Republican 
activism has gradually re-defined that group as ‘mainstream’ Republicans.  During the 
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interview process the themes involved in the development of the dissension of the 
original ‘Provos’, while not identical, display the same underlying factors as those of the 
modern day dissidents. 
 
Throughout this appendix there is continuous reference to individual reasoning for 
organisational exit which precedes joining or establishing an alternative Republican 
group, and becoming a dissident.  The form of exit outlined does not constitute an overall 
disagreement with the organisational aims but suggests a disparity with a specific 
attribute, or attributes, of the parent organisation, whether this be a strategy, tactic, 
personality, goal or structure.  Reflecting on the issues which can drive individuals and 
groups to organisational exit and the development of, or enrolment in, alternative groups 
not all individuals who have the same disagreements will react in the same manner.  In 
order to take the significant action of leaving to develop a new autonomous group 
individuals must view the conflict at the centre of their exit as significantly threatening to 
what they believe to be the organisational identity. This is supported by Francie Mackey a 
leading member of the 32 County Sovereignty Movement (32CSM).  In 1986 Mackey 
disagreed with the decision to drop the abstentionist policy to the Dail.  However, he did 
not regard it as an issue which warranted the formation of an independent group or his or 
other’s exit from the organisation.676 
 
“At a personal level I disagreed with going into Leinster House, but it wasn’t a 
significant enough issue to create a major split in the Republican Movement.”677  
 
Converse to this are the views and actions of Ruairi O’Bradaigh, Daithi O’Conail and 
others who left the Provisionals to develop the new political and armed groups of 
Republican Sinn Fein and the Continuity IRA. They regarded the dropping of this section 
of the abstentionist policy, coupled with the removal of Eire Nua, as a denouncement of 
what it was to be regarded as ‘true’ Irish Republicans.   
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 Mackey chose to ‘actively stay’ with the organisation as he believed there was no justification to exit 
and therefore felt he could have more of an impact if he stayed.  See Sani and Reicher (1999) 
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“…our attitude was that the people who did that [accept that elected Sinn Fein 
members could take their seats in the Dail] had broken the constitution.”678 
 
This is supportive of the belief that organisational exit is preceded by a change or action 
perceived to be threatening to what the dissidents regard to be their organisational 
identity.679 
 
HO2. The conflict at the centre of a split is, for at least one of the sub-groups, threatening 
to the organisational identity.  
 
It is similarly supported by the organisational theory posited by Hirschman who states 
that quality conscious members will exit when they believe there to be a significant drop 
in the quality of the ‘product’ produced or promoted by a group.680 
 
HI3. A quality conscious member will exit the organisation to join or set up a new 
organisation when there is a perceived drop in the quality of the product produced by the 
parent organisation. 
 
HI3.  The exiting members of Republican Sinn Fein and the Continuity IRA can be 
regarded as defining their membership very much in terms of what they believed to be the 
core values of Irish Republicanism, and central to this was the rejection of what they 
believed to be partitionist parliaments.  In the language of Hirschman their continued 
membership was defined by an adherence to the ‘quality of the product’ produced by 
Sinn Fein and the IRA.  Central to this adherence was an unremitting rejection of the 
three parliaments while continuing the armed struggle to achieve a united Ireland.  
However, when there was a significant drop in the quality of this policy, namely an 
electoral acceptance of Dail Eireann, they could no longer recognise themselves as ‘true 
Republicans’ if they continued with the Provisionals, and therefore left to form their own 
group.  Each of the participants from the Continuity IRA and/or Republican Sinn Fein 
                                                 
678
  Ruairi O’Bradaigh 
679
 Sani and Reicher (1998); Sani and Reicher (1999). 
680
 Hirschman (1970).  (p.47) 
 340 
considered this to be a significant drop in the quality of the product produced.  
Countering this, it can be proposed that those who remained with the Provisional 
Movement did not deem this to be a significant drop in the quality of the product or 
policies being adhered to and promoted by the Movement.  On the contrary many 
believed this to be an improvement in quality and a change necessary to bring about the 
group’s purposive goals.  This is in stark contrast to those freelance dissidents described 
at a later point. 
 
This rationale for the splitting of the groups does not always equate to each individual’s 
motivation for their own personal dissent, even if they do leave to join this same 
dissenting organisation.  It would be unwise to just focus on the reasoning of the 
leadership and those others intrinsically tied to and aware of the divisive issue.  It is never 
the case that every individual member is aware of the full context of the disagreement.  
They can only come to their decision in light of the information which they have at any 
one time.  Therefore, in order to gain a fair and accurate reflection of the overall spectrum 
of membership dissent, the reasoning of all levels of the rank and file membership is just 
as, if not more, important to understand.  As with initial engagement into a terrorist group 
a person’s exit or dissidence can be regarded as the result of a gradual process.  This can 
be true at both leadership and rank and file level.  As was displayed in the previous main 
body of the dissertation, in order fully to understand the origins of Republican Sinn Fein 
and the Continuity IRA, one must start by analysing the aftermath of the 1969/70 split, 
and the origins of the Real IRA have to be traced back to the aftermath of 1986.  
Similarly, in order to understand an individual’s defection often one must understand the 
process leading up to this dissent in the previous years.  This was reflected in an 
interview with a leading 32CSM member, who was once imprisoned for their role in a 
Provisional IRA attack.  While they did not leave the Provisional Movement until 1998 
their discontent can be traced to the early 1990s. 
 
“My real concern with the Provisional Movement started to come about in the 
[early] 1990s when I began to feel that the people at the top were more concerned 
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with furthering their own agenda than they were with following the Republican 
agenda and that began to cause me problems…”681 
 
This supports the claim that a clear understanding is not achieved by focusing purely on 
the action of dissent or exit, but by first assessing the origins and process of this dissent.  
The process of exit and dissidence can be influenced by numerous factors, with some 
more pertinent than for others.  These factors need not always be related to the stated 
factors of organisational split, or even any ideological, strategic or tactical differences 
with the parent organisation.  The diversity of factors is reflected in the subsequent 
sections which focus on the importance of timing, influential individuals, regionalism and 
age.  The following appendix should be viewed as support for  
 
HI2. The explanation of allegiance for a member with a low level of experience will be 
predominantly tied to local influences and situations. 
 
However, it also shows that this hypothesis should be expanded to include members with 
high-levels of experience as the local and personal influences equally effect their 
allegiance.  
    
Timing and Context  
As has been stated here already the reasons behind individuals joining or developing 
dissident organisations should not be regarded as being uniform in nature.  Some of the 
key factors at play are those of context and timing.  The individual reasons for dissidence 
can vary from time to time and across contexts.  One of the most obvious issues of timing 
is whether dissidence takes place at a time of dissident organisation inception, i.e. does it 
occur at the time of the split?  If it does take place at this time it is assumed that the 
rationale for the dissidence of leadership members at least is likely to be intrinsically tied 
to the reasoning for organisational split. 
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HI1: The explanation of allegiance for a member of experienced membership and 
leadership will be intrinsically tied to the reasoning for the organisational split. 
 
However, it must similarly be assumed for those rank and file members, who are not fully 
aware of the reasons for the split,682 that their reasoning will not be as intrinsically tied to 
the rationale of schism.  The assumption that dissidence at a leadership level is tied to the 
reasoning for the split does not mean that this reasoning is tied to the official reason for 
the divide.  In an interview with a leading member from the Provisional IRA Executive 
and Engineering Department of the mid to late 1990s, a man who was a founding 
leadership member of the Real IRA, the reasoning behind the 1997 split is detailed. 
 
“The Army split on practical issues…prior to the split certain weapons were not 
being used, not allowed to be used.  If weapons were there prior to the split, why 
couldn’t we use them?  We had new weapons coming from Libya that were never 
used, or even announced.”683 
 
This not only reveals some of the issues at the heart of the organisational split, but also 
the individual’s own personal reason for dissidence.  Within his role on the IRA 
Executive and within the Engineering Department, and through strong links with the 
Quartermaster General of the time, he was very well informed of the issues at the heart of 
the intra-organisational conflict as well as the operational capabilities of the IRA.  This 
reasoning similarly displays a discrepancy between his cited ‘practical issues’ for the split 
and the official reasoning of acceptance of the Mitchell Principles.684  While the two 
issues are not completely unrelated the dissident leadership was aware that in order to 
secure as much support as possible they would have to frame the origins of the new group 
in a more acceptable manner.  With national and international support for the peace 
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process, and a growing appreciation of the value of political solutions among a large 
section of the Republican Movement, if they had simply announced that they were 
splitting on the issue of use of new arms it would have proved near impossible to gain 
any level of credibility or support.685  This is a view which was appreciated by the 
dissident leadership at the time. 
 
“Representatives from the Army who wanted to split met with the political people 
(32County Sovereignty Committee686) to decide how best to frame the split. We had 
to be seen to be splitting on an issue.”687 
 
While the reasoning for exit and dissidence at a leadership level may have originated to a 
large extent over the issue of use of arms, those less informed rank and file members who 
chose their affiliation on what they believed were the issues of split were not doing so on 
an entirely informed basis but with the information which had been issued to them by the 
their national or local leadership.  Therefore, the reasoning for organisational affiliation, 
be it dissident or mainstream, is disparate due to levels of information available to the 
relevant actor.  In some instances at times of split potential members, especially those 
with no previous Republican affiliation, may have little or no idea of the rationale of 
schism or the differentiation between the groups.  This was quite common in the late 
1960s early 1970s when there was a large number of new recruits wishing to join the 
IRA.  These potential recruits at times were not aware of the differences between the 
Officials and Provisionals, and, in some instances in the immediate aftermath of split, 
were not aware of the existence of any division at all.  In such circumstances decisions 
are not made on the basis of differing organisational strategies, tactics or goals but of 
other issues less tied to the ethos and strategies of the group but more to do with the 
individual’s opportunities for membership and the influence of others around them where 
they lived. 
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 “At that particular time the Official IRA was at war as well with the British, so I 
mean they would be operating at one end of the street shooting machine guns at the 
army, and the Provisionals would be at the other end.  I didn’t really know, I was 
just too young…I didn’t really understand it [the difference between the Officials 
and Provisionals] until I went into prison.”688 
 
This description by Joe Doherty of his early days as a young Provisional IRA member in 
West Belfast is similar to the experience of many other young recruits at the time.  Their 
affiliation was not decided by their views on abstentionism, the National Liberation Front 
or socialism.  The extended beliefs and ideology of the individual groups did not matter 
to them.  They wanted to join the IRA to protect their communities in the short run.  For a 
number of new recruits at that time their initial involvement with the IRA was not even 
strongly linked to the aspiration for a united Ireland.  The relevance of the context of their 
mobilisation and choice of group was not linked to the inner workings and debates within 
the Irish Republican Movement, it was influenced by what they saw on the Falls Road, 
the Short Strand and in the Bogside.  They were influenced by their peers and the 
influential individuals local to them.  This is a description which is as true today across 
both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland as it was in 1970.  What follows is a 
description of some of these factors beyond the internal debates and ideologies which 
play a significant role in an individual’s movement into dissident Republicanism. 
 
Influential Individuals 
Throughout organisational involvement in the Republican Movement, and within other 
political and terrorist groups, decisions made by members are often significantly 
influenced by the viewpoint of another individual.  This individual may be a peer, 
comrade, leadership member or relative.  These influential individuals can have either a 
negative or a positive influence.  They need not even be members of the Republican 
Movement for their actions and viewpoints to play a role in the decision-making process.  
Throughout the research every interviewee, without fail, detailed the significant role 
played by at least one influential individual in their decision-making processes.  Nowhere 
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was this more relevant than at the time of choice of group affiliation.   It was found that 
the beliefs and actions of influential individuals can at times have more of an influence 
than policy or strategy.   
 
As was detailed in the previous section, as well as the main text, at the end of 1969 and 
throughout 1970 there were numerous new Republican recruits assessing whether to join 
the Officials or the Provisionals.  To many of these the intricate ideological and strategic 
issues involved at the heart of what had first been an intra-organisational dispute but had 
now become an inter-organisational dispute held little or no significance.  However, one 
of the factors which time and again proved vital in their decision-making process was that 
of the position and views of influential individuals.  The group they eventually joined was 
often the one containing members to whom they could most relate on a personal level, or 
for whom they held the most respect.  For some, the influential individual was a national 
or local leadership figure.  However, the choice for others was similarly influenced by the 
rank and file members of each group.  The period of time in the aftermath of the 1969/70 
split was on occasion confusing for potential new recruits to the Republican Movement.  
They had to decide between membership of the Officials or Provisionals.  This 
competition between groups, and confusion for recruits, caused a number of young 
members to switch allegiance after their initial recruitment.  Often this was heavily 
influenced by their negative opinions of the individuals they encountered in their first 
group, or the positive influence of the members of the group they went on ultimately to 
join, and at times there was a combination of both.689  One individual who switched 
initial allegiance was Martin McGuinness who in late 1970 joined the Official IRA 
initially unaware of the difference between the two groups, or even the existence of two 
separate IRAs. 
 
“Both of us [McGuinness and a friend] decided that we would join what we 
believed to be the IRA at the time.  Now at that time the IRA was going through its 
own turbulence in terms of the split and so forth.  At that stage my knowledge of 
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who was the IRA would have been like everyone else’s, you would have thought 
there was only one IRA and this whole turbulence occurred because of different 
approaches and different ideas and suggestions about how things should go 
forward.  For us we joined what we believed to be the IRA in Derry.”690 
 
However, after a period of initial engagement McGuinness realised that the group he had 
joined was not what he thought he had initially signed up for.  His disillusionment 
stemmed from what he perceived to be the group’s inaction and his dissatisfaction with 
the local membership he had encountered.  Coupled with this push factor of his negative 
opinion of the Official IRA membership was the pull factor of his respect for and 
friendship and familiarity with a number of prominent local Provisional IRA members.   
 
“Well I suppose it was mostly being unimpressed by the people that we met [in the 
Official IRA] after we effectively joined [which pushed us away]…In terms of then 
joining the Provisional IRA, I was familiar with some of the people who were 
associated with the Provisional IRA.  In fact I realised that I was probably more 
familiar with some of the people who were in the Provisional IRA than I was with 
some of the characters I met in the Official Republican Movement.  The Keenan 
family were a leading family in Derry city at the time and I had been a long time 
friend of Sean Keenan Junior, who is now sadly deceased, and also familiar with 
his father, and his father’s role in the Citizen’s Defence Group in Derry, and I was 
also familiar with the fact that he had spent a very long period in prison as a result 
of internment, in total from maybe fourteen to sixteen years.”691 
 
This example of McGuinness, a former leading member of the Provisional IRA and now 
Deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland, displays both the negative and positive 
influences that certain individuals can have on affiliation choice.  While this illustrates 
the persuasive powers of influential individuals on young less informed new recruits, 
their impact continues right up to experienced and leadership levels.   
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In each of the four major splits, as was alluded to in the analysis of organisations, one of 
the most effective strategies employed to attract support and membership at the time of 
intra-organisational conflict and split was the use of well respected influential individuals 
to legitimise the position taken by a specific group or sub-group.  These influential voices 
were used in the preparation for the split, at a personal level as well as at significant 
membership meetings, General Army Conventions and Ard Fheiseanna.  The success of 
such a strategy is acknowledged by all sides as numerous members, fully aware of the 
dispute at the heart of the schism, were influenced by the position taken up by respected 
figures within the movement, people who they trusted.  The effectiveness of these 
influential individuals is clearly illustrated by Mick Ryan, a former leading member of 
the IRA in the lead up to the 1969/70 split and then a leading member of the Official 
IRA, in the decision making process of a number of Republican members in the aftermath 
of the split between the Officials and the Provisionals. 
 
“Many people made up their mind on the basis of who was on particular sides, 
people they trusted and liked more…It was not clear cut hard political people 
deciding.  It was human factors that were deciding why some people went with one 
side over another, and this is not in hindsight. The political orientation would have 
counted but to what degree with certain individuals is unclear.”692 
 
The employment of these influential voices was effectively utilised by the Provisionals at 
both a military and political level of involvement in the lead up to and in the process of 
the 1986 split.  Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the 1986 Ard Fheis where Sinn 
Fein delegates voted on whether or not to drop the abstentionist policy to the Dail.  The 
Adams leadership, which was proposing this change in electoral policy, was able to call 
upon the support of a variety of influential individuals from both the old and new guard at 
political and military levels.  Similarly the O’Bradaigh and O’Conail faction, who would 
later go on to form Republican Sinn Fein and the Continuity IRA, sought to legitimise 
their stance by gaining the support of the well respected Republican leader General 
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Commandant Tom Maguire.  However, with respect to the use of influential individuals it 
is clear that the Adams leadership had the upper hand, and this legitimising support from 
such a respected group of influential individuals proved vital in their maintenance of 
large levels of support.  The chairman of this 1986 Ard Fheis, Sean McManus, held an 
ideal position to view the effect which these individuals had. 
 
“To have people of the calibre of John Joe McGirl get up, other people like Fergie 
Albert McGovern who would have been from Cavan would have been significant as 
well.  People like Joe Cahill obviously as well, older republicans who had been 
through the mill, who had seen stuff and I’m sure there were hundreds if not 
thousands who had seen them as an inspiration, certainly hundreds of delegates 
who would have seen them as inspirational figures and they would have been to 
some degree swayed.”693 
 
The role played by influential individuals while significant at the time of split remains 
important throughout all stages of involvement.  These influential individuals are needed 
to retain support and membership, especially in the smaller dissident groupings.  They not 
only exert their own positive influence on members and supporters, but at times they help 
to neutralise the negative influence which the leadership of Sinn Fein and ‘mainstream’ 
Republicans can have on their membership.   
 
The negative impression of the current Sinn Fein leadership among certain individuals, 
groups and regions is manipulated so as to strengthen and gain membership and support.  
This is especially prevalent with reference to Sinn Fein’s opinion of dissident 
Republicans.  At times this is manipulated or exaggerated by dissidents in order to 
promote opposition to the mainstream Republicans among their members, supporters and 
potential recruits. 
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“They always have to find a term.  I don’t know what anyone else thinks but if he 
[Gerry Adams] calls me a dissident to me it’s a badge of honour.”694 
 
The above quote is taken from an individual who in his own right could be classed as an 
influential individual in Republican West Belfast.  He was prominent in the development 
of the Provisional IRA in the area in 1969.  However, in the aftermath of the 1986 split he 
left the Provisionals to support the Continuity IRA and Republican Sinn Fein.  This quote 
is relevant for two main reasons.  The most obvious is his use of the critical opinion of 
Gerry Adams within certain populations to revise the negative connotations normally 
associated with a label such as ‘dissident’ and transfer a more positive ‘badge of honour’ 
onto the term.  However, it is the legitimacy which he, as an influential individual, gives 
to the dissidents that is most interesting.  It is assumed here that he uses similar sentiment 
when speaking to both potential and existing supporters and members of the dissident 
community.  Without such legitimisation provided by influential individuals it proves 
more challenging for people to associate themselves with the smaller dissident 
Republican groups.    
 
Regionalism 
The geographical location in which a person lives can have a significant impact on them 
joining a specific group.  The influence of this regionalism can derive from the influential 
individuals living in the area, as well as the historical and modern day circumstances 
relating to the locale.  These geographical areas may be as small as an apartment block or 
housing estate, or as large as a country or even continent, and therefore with respect to 
geographical influence on Irish Republicanism one must look beyond whether a person is 
situated north or south of the border.  Terrorist organisations can invariably find it easier 
to recruit in specific areas as opposed to others.695  As was detailed in the opening chapter 
in certain areas the organisation’s ideals are often entwined with local aspirations.696   
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At a time of split regionalism proves one of the most dominant rationales in the choice of 
whether to remain a member of the parent organisation or join the newly established 
dissident group.  This can be especially true for the ordinary rank and file members 
whose membership is not as closely tied to ideological and purposive elements.  
Members often tie their membership to that of local influential individuals.  These may be 
family members, friends or the local leadership.  If a member whom they trust and look 
up to is adamant on joining the dissidents or, alternatively, staying with the parent 
organisation this may have a significant influence on the choice made.  Tied to this is the 
fact that if the vast majority of the membership within a designated geographical area are 
members of one specific organisation the cost of membership of their rivals rises 
dramatically.  The most unmistakeable example of the influence of regionalism is in West 
Belfast where there have been clear divisions with respect to regional affiliations during 
and after the Republican splits.  After the 1969/70 split most of the Falls Road would 
have been Provisional dominated while areas very close by such as Divis Street and 
Leeson Street would have been under the control of the Official IRA, with a significant 
proportion of the residents there siding with those groups.  This has earlier been 
illustrated by the Joe Doherty quote.  
 
“…they [the Official IRA] would be operating at one end of the street shooting 
machine guns at the army, and the Provisionals would be at the other end.”697   
 
With the split in the Official IRA in 1974, resulting in the formation of the INLA, 
regionalism further came into play.   
 
“Even at the time of the split in 74/75 all of the Divis Flats unit and 99% of na 
Fianna [the youth wing of the Irish Republican Movement] all went to join the 
INLA and it was the opposite in Leeson Street, 98/99% percent stayed and only one 
or two left.”698 
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This dramatic division does not reflect a division of political views or beliefs.  This 
reflects the power of regionalism and the influential individuals within these specific 
areas.  Leeson Street and the Divis Street Flats are in particularly close proximity to each 
other, yet the division at this time of schism displays the power and influence of the 
allegiances of the local leadership and other influential individuals in the area.  As is 
evidenced by the example of na Fianna this influence can be particularly visible among 
young recruits, a finding which is described in more detail in a later section. 
 
As with the previously detailed factors the theme of regionalism is just as dominant today 
as it was in the 1970s.  There are specific regions across the island of Ireland where 
certain groups, be they dissident or ‘mainstream’ Republicans, are dominant.  One can 
look to areas such as the city of Limerick as a stronghold for the Continuity IRA.  This is 
often worn as a ‘badge of honour.’  The local leadership of the area not only take pride in 
the strength of their recruits on the ground in the area, but also those from the area 
imprisoned for their role in dissident group activities. 
 
“What we say is this there is youth in our organisation in Limerick.  Limerick is 
very strong, Limerick is one of the strongest parts of Republican Sinn Fein in the 
south, even if you go to any part of the country.  They are capable of doing 
anything…A lot of them would be political, most of them would be political.  But 
within our youth are armed units, among the Continuity.  Even now we had one of 
our members arrested lately, he is in Portlaoise [prison].  We had a lot of people in 
Portlaoise from Limerick.  Going back years and years no matter what movement 
there was always a very militant element in it.”699 
 
This statement from a Republican Sinn Fein and Continuity IRA activist not only takes 
pride in the regional involvement in dissident Republican activity, both militant and 
political, but also in those prisoners from the area in jail in Portlaoise.  The power of 
regionalism is similarly seen across the island of Ireland.  Other small clusters similarly 
show the dominance of specific Republican groups in a region.  The combination of 
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regionalism and influential individuals often overpowers any political or ideological 
differentiation.   
 
Age 
Throughout this appendix there has been continued reference to the recruitment and 
affiliations of young Republicans.  The importance of focusing on young recruits, 
especially young males, is supported by the findings of the most recent Independent 
Monitoring Commission (IMC) reports.  In reference to dissident Republican groups it 
states that: 
 
“The majority of recruits are inexperienced young males”700  
 
This has been the result of a deliberate targeting of young males by the various dissident 
groups.  One needs only look to the Republican Sinn Fein press conference in the 
aftermath of the Continuity IRA murder of PSNI officer Stephen Carroll in March of 
2009.  This press conference showed the young RSF press officer Richard Walsh 
positioned beside three young males from the Craigavon area outlining how he believed 
they had been unfairly treated by the PSNI.  This can be seen as a deliberate attempt by 
the group to appeal in particular to young males, as that dissident group and their militant 
wing the Continuity IRA would be perceived among some people as being overly 
populated by old guard traditionalist Republicans, a reputation in need of alteration in 
order to maintain their survival.   
 
The young modern-day recruits would have no clear memory of the Troubles, and in 
some cases would not even have been born.  Therefore the dissident leadership have the 
opportunity to glorify active involvement in militant Republicanism.  Their positioning of 
influence within specific areas provides them with the ability to influence, shape and 
form the beliefs of this youthful population, in some instances with no relevant 
alternative narrative clearly available to the young recruits and potential recruits.  Active 
membership in a militant group can appeal to a young male’s sense of adventure and 
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rebellion.  This sense of adventure is not reliant on an in-depth knowledge of the defining 
ideological issues relevant to a specific group, but on the framing of what active 
involvement will entail, the status among the peer group and a simplified justification 
based on the aspirations for a united Ireland.  This is once again resonant of the situation, 
particularly across Northern Ireland, during the early 1970s. 
 
“At that stage there was three of us from the bottom of the Falls Road, Divis St 
area and this guy approached us and asked if we wished to join the Republican 
Movement.  Dream come true.  ‘Certainly, yes, incognito, cloak and dagger, a 
chance to do something.’  In yourself you were a big lad, you were swore in it was 
‘Ssssh don’t say this, don’t say that.’”701 
 
The above quote shows how easy it can be to appeal to a young male, in this case a 
thirteen year old boy, to join a violent Republican grouping.  It was the status and 
adventure of membership and involvement which appealed to the young boys, rather than 
any particular desire to achieve the national or even local goals of the movement.  While 
this case is an example of young male recruitment in 1970 this is also relevant today.  
The findings of the IMC report are backed up by a statement which has already been 
referred to earlier in the appendix in relation to the Continuity IRA. 
 
“What we say is this there is youth in our organisation in Limerick.  Limerick is 
very strong.”702 
 
Taking all of this into consideration a strong ideology or purposive goals will not be 
sufficient to attract a significant number of new young recruits to any organisation.  The 
leadership must be able to put in place sufficient personal and social incentives to attract 
and retain recruits without which these dissident organisations will not last for any 
significant amount of time.703   
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Change of Organisation  
Traditionally when looking at dissidents one would focus on those who move from one 
group to another after a split between the two organisations.  With respect to dissident 
Republicans such splits have seen the former members of the Provisionals joining or 
setting up the Continuity and Real IRA, and former Official IRA activists developing and 
joining the INLA.  However, this transfer of groups need not always be from the parent 
organisation to their own dissident groupings.  There are cases within the Irish 
Republican context where individuals, or groups of individuals, have moved from one 
dissident organisation to another.  One such example is that of a large portion of the 
INLA and IRSP membership of Limerick and Clare moving over to the Continuity IRA 
and Republican Sinn Fein in 1998.  If one is assessing these groups on purely ideological 
and political grounds this movement, and especially the acceptance of these new 
members into CIRA and RSF, would seem counterintuitive.  The leadership of the CIRA 
and especially RSF go to great lengths to frame themselves as the only ‘true’ Republican 
Movement, and dismiss and disparage the actions and beliefs of all others who had taken 
a different course at any time during the history of the Irish Republican Movement.  They 
are publicly wary of those who have historically taken an ‘extreme socialist’ political 
standpoint or criticised and disposed of the abstentionist policy which they hold as the 
cornerstone of Irish Republicanism.  This standpoint would suggest an inherent distrust of 
all members past and present of the Irish Republican Socialist Movement or the Official 
Republican Movement.  It was these individuals who they moved away from during the 
split of 1969/70 when they were part of the Provisional Movement denouncing the 
Goulding leadership of the Irish Republican Movement.  However, when the case of the 
movement of Clare and Limerick INLA and IRSP members is looked at it in more detail 
it is clear that ideological and political beliefs and concerns played little or no part in the 
choice of organisational affiliation, or acceptance and recruitment into the movement.  
This departure took place in the aftermath of the 1998 INLA ceasefire, when it became 
clear to the dismay of these members that their organisation, the INLA, was no longer 
going to continue with the armed Republican struggle.  However, they still believed in 
the viability of an armed struggle in the pursuit of a united Ireland.  At this stage they 
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viewed the pursuit of this purposive goal to be more important than any political or 
ideological standpoint. 
 
“There is an armed struggle and they [RSF and CIRA] hardly have deviated since 
1921, they have the same policies, there is a lot to be said for it.  The struggle is 
above everything else, there is nobody bigger than the struggle, not Leinster House 
Stormont or Westminster or any of those places.  The struggle for national 
reunification of the country, that would be a priority....The Continuity or RSF was 
the only group I could see holding on to the Irish Republican end of things.  The 
Provos had accepted, had a ceasefire and soon afterwards they decommissioned, 
we could see all this coming on board.  The Provos asked me to join them, but I 
wasn’t going to join the Provos.”704 
 
The above quote from Patrick Kennelly outlines his, and his former INLA comrades’, 
justification for joining Republican Sinn Fein.  For this grouping, a collection of 
individuals with extensive experience in and knowledge of the armed Republican 
movement, political and ideological beliefs were surpassed by the imperative of 
continuing the armed struggle.  This further supports the fundamental proposal of the 
present appendix.  In order to understand why a person becomes a dissident Irish 
Republican, or a specific kind of dissident Republican, it is important to acknowledge 
that the reasons for dissidence are often independent of the political and ideological 
stance taken by a particular organisation, and is more reliant on a rationale external to 
these beliefs.  
 
Freelance Dissidents 
While a number of dissidents will choose to change organisational affiliation there are 
similarly those who have decided to continue their Republican activism in an independent 
or freelance manner.  These individuals will at times offer their ‘services’ to a variety of 
armed dissident Republican groups for specific actions.  The growing threat of freelance 
Republicans has been acknowledged as being very serious in nature. 
                                                 
704
  Patrick Kennelly 
 356 
 
“There are…now indications that former republican terrorists have as individuals 
provided services in some instances to dissident republican groups, which even if 
occasional can significantly add to the threat.”705  
 
These individuals are often recruited for their specific skills for an individual action by 
the local or national leadership of the dissident group.  Similar to the case of those 
Republicans switching organisational allegiance from the INLA to the CIRA and RSF the 
continuation of an armed Republican struggle outweighs any individual ideological or 
political belief structure.  The freelance nature of their activism, and their 
organisationally independent Republican belief structure, leaves them open to assisting a 
variety of Republican groups in individual campaigns or actions. 
 
“I probably agree with most of what they [32CSM] say.  I also agree with a lot of 
what Republican Sinn Fein say.  I also agree with quite a lot of what the INLA 
would say, I would have a lot of common ground with a lot of different groups. But 
I wouldn’t be comfortable lending my total allegiance to one group…If it came to 
the bit, and it is not going to come to the bit, but if it came to the bit where I was 
needed to do something and I approved of it, I would certainly do it.  But as it 
stands it is all different little groups and I believe that there is so little separating 
them all that they are not necessary.”706 
 
Dolours Price, the former Provisional IRA activist, outlines above the rationale by which 
she and others justify their organisationally independent Republican activism, and at 
times their association with the actions of specific dissident groupings.  Her justification 
moves on to the hypothetical situation whereby she is requested to aid one of these 
groupings.  She has outlined what is probably true for a number of independent dissident 
Republicans.  They would be willing to take part in an action for a number of these 
groups if it were something of which they approved.  Therefore, unlike the 
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organisationally committed Republicans they can in a sense pick and choose the actions 
with which they wish to be associated, be they armed or political. 
 
If the violent dissident Republican threat is to be successfully countered one must not 
only focus on the dissident groups but also on those freelance dissidents operating 
independently of organisational ties and leadership orders.   
 
Summary 
The purpose of the present appendix has been to offer an understanding of the rationale 
behind an individual’s decision to become a dissident Irish Republican.  While these 
dissident Republican groupings often define themselves by their political and ideological 
belief system, this is not always reflected in the reasoning behind a person’s decision to 
become a dissident or in their choice of dissident affiliation.  An analysis of the interview 
data gathered has pointed to the importance of the factors of timing, context, influential 
individuals, regionalism and age.  While not an exhaustive list by any means, if one is to 
come close to an understanding of dissident group affiliation and selection, the 
importance of these issues must be acknowledged and appreciated.  It is this 
understanding which must first be in place before any policy is developed to counter the 
current threat posed by these small but dangerous groups.   
   
 
 
 
     
 
 
